Abstract
In Harris v. Quinn (2014), the United States Supreme Court used disability rights rhetoric of independence and control to argue that disabled people—not the State—are the real employers of in-home care workers. Consequently, the State cannot force care workers to pay labor union fees. Justice Alito’s majority decision interprets the employment contract as a capacity contract: a device that uses the recognition of equal cognitive capacity to obscure domination. Alito ignored the vulnerability of disabled people and in-home care workers to legitimize neoliberal cutbacks. In her dissent, Justice Kagan argued that disabled people, care workers, and the State forge multiple and iterative contracts. Using Kagan’s dissent, Charles Mills’s critique of ideal theory, and Susan Burgess and Christine Keating’s participatory social contract, I argue that an emancipatory contract must replace cognitive capacity as the condition of membership with the recognition of shared human vulnerability amid oppressive conditions.
