Although it is one of the least theorized concepts in his oeuvre, Jürgen Habermas's recourse to constitutional patriotism at critical junctures of his intellectual career points to the concept's significant role in his democratic theory. In analyzing Habermas's invocations of constitutional patriotism in his accounts of civil disobedience, the article argues that Habermas uses the concept not only as an alternative to nationalism but also as a way to deal with the indeterminacy of the radical core of deliberative democracy. In doing so, however, he inadvertently undermines his own powerful criticism of the philosophy of the subject. What suffers from this unintended resurgence of the philosophy of the subject, in both its liberal and its republican variants, is the radical core of constitutional democracy itself.

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