...Sol Schindler Sumantra Bose: Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention . London: Oxford University Press, 2002. 303 pages. ISBN 0-19-515848-2. $35.00. Mediterranean Affairs, Inc. 2003 Sol Schindler is a retired U.S. Foreign Service officer who writes...

... at the Institute for the Preservation of Cultural Heritage in Sarajevo and as a curator at the State Art Gallery of Bosnia-Herzegovina. She would like to thank Aleksander Kuzmanovich for helping her gather the information on the present situation of major icon collections from Bosnia-Herzegovina...

...: The West Brings “Democracy” to Bosnia Ted Galen Carpenter With the signing of the Dayton Accords in November 1995, the Western powers committed themselves not only to help bring peace to Bosnia but to help build a viable...

...: Bosnia and the Economics of War and Peace P. H. Liotta The leaders on all sides have learned the words to use: free enterprise, Western-style, market economy, dynamic, efficient. They say these things with great passion...

...David Binder Svetlana Rakic: Serbian Icons from Bosnia-Herzegovina: Sixteenth to Eighteenth Century . New York: A. Pankovich Publishers, 2000. 294 pages. ISBN 0-9672101-2-7. $125.00. David Binder is a retired Washington, D.C.-based correspondent for the New York Times . Mediterranean...

...Peter Brock Despite the dreadful wars — and the comparable horrors of uncertain “peace” — and against the background of an almost religious knack for recurring Balkan catastrophe, there are warnings that hostilities are reviving in the former Yugoslav republics of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia...

...Melissa McConnell Foreign policy capacity is defined as dynamic, information-based adaptation by nation-states in complex, ambiguous environments that involve their domestic systems as well as external variables. On questions of Bosnia and Kosovo, Serbia's policy capacity is weakened by lack...

... and popular accounts, as well as official US and European positions, have placed emphasis on Milosevic's machinations to build Great Serbia, yet in the Serbian narrative itself the rebirth of Islamic power in Bosnia and Kosovo proved fundamental. This essay examines both narratives and concludes with some...

...Ted Galen Carpenter Washington’s policy in the Balkans has been a failure for more than two decades. Beginning with the US-led military interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo during the 1990s, the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies have made difficult situations worse...

... In October 2004, Yossef Bodansky—then the director of the congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare—claimed that the bombers of the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad the prior year were trained in Bosnia. According to Bodansky, “There is a terrorist network in Bosnia...

... limiting the threat posed by Islamic extremists in the Balkans is the existence of an active, secularly oriented civil society among the native Muslim inhabitants in the region. Secular Muslim intellectuals and nongovernmental organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo enjoy a public prominence...

...- cate Dayton peace accords with regard to Bosnia, (3) the growing reluctance to expand the European Union, and (4) the decision to offer membership in NATO to certain successor states of the former Yugoslavia. Recognizing Kosovo The most prominent development that could...

... Tribunal for the former Yugo- 1. According to the statistics of the Ministry of Family, Veterans’ Affairs, and Intergenerational Solidarity of the Republic of Croatia, Croatia’s death toll was twelve thousand people, with one thousand persons still missing. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, about one...

...; it went to Haiti to restore democracy but produced tyranny; it intervened in Bosnia to reverse the effects of a civil war but now oversees an unsustainable peace; and it occu- pied Kosovo to build a multiethnic democracy but has instead witnessed...

.... In that melodrama, the Serbs in general, and Serbia’s leader Slobodan Milosevic in particular, were almost entirely responsible for the breakup of Yugoslavia and for the violence that followed, especially in the secessionist states of Croatia and Bosnia-­Herzegovina. The Serbs became the arch villains...

... theorist who received his Ph.D. from the University of Missouri, Columbia. Reviews Sumantra Bose: Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention. London: Oxford University Press, 2002. 303 pages. ISBN 0-19-515848-2. $35.00. Reviewed by Sol...

... University's Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy. Reviews Sumantra Bose: Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention. London: Oxford University Press, 2002. 303 pages. ISBN 0-19-515848-2. $35.00. Reviewed by Sol Schindler. Sumantra...

... war when they shot down a Yugoslav army helicopter. Following intense German pressure, the European powers agreed to the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, in January 1992. Soon thereafter, the United States declared that it, too, would recognize Slovenia and Croatia, provided Bosnia...

... 1.5 million in the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. America’s last ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann, no friend of the Serbs, has written that the Serbs “had a real grievance against Tito, in some measure justified, for creating a postwar...

... Organization’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia- Herzegovina. The declared objective of the effort is to prevent a continu- Symeon A. Giannakos is visiting assistant professor of political science, Ohio University. MQ 11.1-07 Gian 1/19/00 1:16 PM Page 92 92...