..., and durable features in this renewed process of Turkish national-identity formation and nation building. Kemalism collective memory Turkish identity Erdogan Copyright 2018 by Mediterranean Affairs, Inc. 2018 ...

..., Slavonic, and Turkish identities and is the common thread of Eurasianism’s shared civilization. The Orthodox faith is a major determinant of Russian identity, and thus of Eurasian civilization, but Eurasians draw attention to their vision of a totality of common values that will include, rather...

... the early years of the Republican era and the reconstitution of Turkey as a nation-­state that sought to uproot supranational religious self-­understanding and impose a secular and ethnonational Turkish identity.2 In fact, a stronger argument can be made in support of imperial continuities...

...Aeshna Badruzzaman; Matthew Cohen; Sidita Kushi The debate over the ban on women wearing headscarves in Turkey has served as a central symbol for Turkey's soul, torn between secular and religious identities. This essay explores the multifaceted narratives of Turkish secular and religious groups...

.../databank/REPORTS/r9/BU_9_Konstantinov.html; Mastny, 139 – 43, 243; Ivan Ilchev, “Emigration and the Politics of Identity: The Turkish Minority in Bulgaria,” in The Politics of National Minority Participation in Post-Communist Europe: State-building, Democracy, and Ethnic Mobilization, ed. Jonathan P...

... of a maturing democracy. For his intellectual honesty Pamuk was charged with “harming the state” (a charge later dropped), and Oran’s report was rejected by the very government that authorized his commission to take another look at “Turkish identity.” But we all know that historical facts cannot...

... why in Europe, which is known as behaviorally and attitudinally more secular than Turkey, is there such a strong anti-Turkish opposition that is increasingly expressed in a religious and cultural frame- work? In this essay I locate the answer to this question in the way European identity...

... facade, has a hidden Islamist agenda that would contaminate official Turkish identity. In the past it has expressed doubts and warnings even about center-­right governments whose actions were in no sense Islamist or antimodern. This indicates that military-­led institutions hold an incoherent...

... in Transcaucasia and Central Asia failed to materialize; second, the EU seems capable of satisfy- ing — beyond socioeconomic and political interests — Turkey’s special needs for identity and belonging. Indeed, Turkey’s identity problem is at the heart of sophisticated Turkish analyses. The problem arises...

... alignment,” did not emerge within a historical vacuum. The Jewish and Turkish people have a long and at times shared sense of history and identity. As a result, the historical roots of the relationship can be traced to far before the beginning of the Cold War. How- ever, the fact that both the states...

... religious bigotry, suppress- ing their people’s Turkish identity, and cravenly collaborating with European powers. Completely ignoring the Ottoman past, the story goes, Ataturk gave his people a glorious and invented history of Central Asian Turks to serve as a basis for their national pride...

... trust in the military while simply being religious does not, because the military, although it opposes political Islam, recognizes Islam as a significant element of Turkish identity.17 Therefore, we should distinguish simply observant-conservative citizens from those who actively support...

... University Press, 2003), 108 – 10. See also Busra Ersanli, “Can Eurasia Be an Identity Issue for Turkish Foreign Policy?” in Turkish Views on Eurasia, ed. Ismail Soysal and Sevsen Aslantepe (Istanbul: Founda- tion for Middle East and Balkan Studies, 2001), 111 – 24; Jacob M. Landau, Pan-­Turkism from...

... the cost to human rights, the integrity of a repub- lic based on a single, Turkish, religious-ethnic identity. It is this all-pervasive guard- ianship by the armed forces that has, on important occasions, collided with efforts to modify substantially if not change radically the Ataturk vision...

... his influence. A subtext also runs throughout this narrative: the constitutional empowerment of Turkey’s military to defend, whatever the cost to human rights, the integrity of a repub- lic based on a single, Turkish, religious-ethnic identity. It is this all-pervasive guard- ianship...

... an act of genocide against the Armenians, with the rare exception of Taner Akcam, in Turkish National Identity and the Armenian Question [Turkish] (Istanbul: Iletisim, 1992). For more information about minorities in Turkey, see Hugh Poulton, “The Struggle for Hegemony in Turkey: Turkish Nationalism...

... be restored, would be settled only with the agreement of the president and the vice pres- ident. Article 129 indicated that the republic would have an army of two thousand men, of whom 60 percent would be Greek Cypriot and 40 percent Turkish Cypriot. The issue for the Greek and Turkish Cypriots...

..., the primary area of focus in Turkish for- eign policy under Ozal centered on initiatives aimed at developing commer- cial relations with the Middle East and the Eastern bloc. However, this too created both a change in priority and an adjustment in Turkish foreign policy. Pluralist Identity...

... and the will of their respective peoples.” For the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish side is, in effect, proposing the dissolution of the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus and its replacement by a new two-state confederal entity with indeterminate or a rather weak international identity and representa- tion...

... to French youth who are not Muslim. From housing to entry into nightclubs (a grievance often voiced by individuals who participated in the riots), discrimination is common in France.47 Police profiling and identity checks of youth of Arab or Turkish descent are common everyday practice. The long...