... attention in the wake of two major diplomatic crises in 2010: a flotilla incident—when the ship the Mavi Marmara , owned by a Turkish nonprofit organization, was boarded by the Israeli military while on the way to Gaza with aid—and Turkey’s “no” vote at the UN Security Council on sanctions against Iran...

... after the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, the widening divergence in interests between Turkey and Israel have provided the geopolitical impetus for the development of a rapprochement between Greece and Israel. While political, military, and economic cooperation, in particular, between Israel and Greece have...

...Kilic B. Kanat; Jackson Hannon On 27 June 2016, Turkey and Israel announced a deal to resolve the diplomatic crisis stemming from the Mavi Marmara incident of 2010. The countries also upgraded diplomatic relations to ambassadorial level. It is unlikely that Israel and Turkey will return...

..., eliminating incentives for rebalancing. It was seismic diplomacy in 1999 that opened possibilities to imagine a different regional balance of power, and Israeli heavy hand- edness visvis the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara in 2010 prompted a reexamination of Israeli-Greek­ ties. The second question...

... and Western European countries. Nevertheless, Erdogan’s populist attitudes weakened Turkey’s ties with Western allies. Since the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010, Erdogan has constantly and severely criticized Israel. This attitude has mostly served to energize his constituency by creating an image...

... that will be easier and cheaper to develop. But Erdogan and Davutoglu seem glued to the idea that the normalization of Turkish-­Israeli ties should depend not just on the now-­granted Israeli apology over the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident or compensation for its victims but on an end to the Gaza blockade...

... into Gaza and culminated in late May 2010 after Israeli naval commandos killed eight Turkish “protestors” on the Mavi Marmara, which had sailed toward Gaza as part of a larger protest flotilla aimed at drawing world atten- tion to the plight of Palestinians. During the summer of 2011, Ankara down...

... realignment that is hard to imagine, given what has occurred in their relations since the Mavi Marmara rift of 2010, Israel cannot logically commit more than 50 percent of its entire export capacity. This capacity is limited to 16 bcm per year for twenty years, according to the country’s gas export...

... confrontation with Israeli president Shimon Peres and the Mavi Marmara incident in May of 2010, further wedges have been driven between these two former allies. Since the late 1960s and espe- cially after 1979, Israel, Turkey, and Egypt had been at the cornerstones of US policy in the region...

... and International Ramifications, ed. Efraim Inbar (New York: Routledge, 2013), 145 – 65. 40. Inbar, “The New Strategic Equation,” 13 – 4. 12 Mediterranean Quarterly: March 2018 the past several years, however, have been frozen following the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident. Although today the relations between...

... under the Lebanese seabed might be affected.23 Israel, about 250 miles southeast of Cyprus, has been actively pursu- ing a kaleidoscopic partnership with its newest regional partner ever since June 2010, when Cyprus denied territorial access to the flotilla led by the Mavi Marmara, owned...

... World, they are doing the same with Israel. In recent years, Cypriot officials have made numerous trips to the Jewish state, and Israeli officials have reciprocated. Turkey’s severe criticism of Israel’s war in the Gaza Strip against Hamas from December 2008 to January 2009 and its raid on Mavi...