Abstract
The Changsha rice riot of April 12–16, 1910 was one of the series of popular revolts that racked the Ch'ing dynasty in its closing years.1 Triggered by serious crop failures and peasant demand for relief, it involved over twenty thousand participants and the occupation of a heavily garrisoned provincial capital. Rioters put the torch to the governor's yamen, foreign property and government offices and looted over one hundred rice shops. In outlying districts secret societies made spasmodic attempts to incite a general uprising against the dynasty.
Notes
For the purposes of this paper, I have accepted Hsiao Kung-ch'uan's terminology. A riot is defined as an uprising of local inhabitants against local officials. It is distinguished from rebellion by the fact that the rioters wish only to remove specific grievances whereas a rebellion seeks to overthrow the existing government.
In addition to the insights it offers into Hunanese local politics, the riot is of interest to the historian because it was the first political event that is known to have attracted the attention of Mao Tse-tung. In an interview with Edgar Snow, Mao claimed: “This incident was discussed in my school for many days. It made a deep impression on me. Most of the other students sympathized with the ‘insurrectionists,’ but only from an observer's point of view. They did not understand that it had any relation to their own lives.,They were merely interested in it as an exciting incident. I never forgot it. I felt the rebels were ordinary people like my own family and I deeply resented the injustice of the treatment given to them.”
As Jonathan Spcncc has suggested, the Chinese gentry did not of themselves compose a class, but were a stratum within the Chinese upper class. Spcncc follows Richard Centers in insisting classes arc psychosocial groupings that are “essentially subjective in character, dependent on class consciousness,” while a stratum is defined by such characteristics as education, occupation, power, function, etc.
In 1904 Japanese observers identified eleven individuals as the established leaders of the gentry community in Changsha: T'an Chung-lin, Wang Hsien-ch'icn, T'ang Pin-chen, Chang Tsu-t'ung, Lung Chan-lin, Yeh Te-hui, Ch'en Ch'i-t'ai, Liu Fcng-pao, K'ung Hsicn-chiao, Wang Kai and Tu Pen-t'ang. Three of these men—Yeh Te-hui, Wang Hsicn-ch'icn and K'ung Hsien-ch'ien—were implicated in the riots. Relatives of three other men were among the most prominent members of the progressive group: Tan Yen-k'ai, son of T'an Chung-lin, Lung Chang, son of Lung Chan-lin and Chen Wcn-wei, brother 0f Ch'en Ch'i-t'ai.
Hu-nan sheng-chih pien-hui wei-yuan-hu: (Committee for the compilation of the Hunan provincial gazetcer), Hu-nan chin-pai-nien ta-shih chi-shu (Narrative of the major events in Hunan in the past Hundred years), (Tokyo: Daian reprint, 1966), pp. 189–303 for derails on the activities of the revolutionary movement in Hunan.
Nakamura Tadashi, “Shingai kakumei no shozentei—tokuni Konanshō o chūshin toshit” Rekishigaku kenkyū (Studies in History), No. 188 (Oct. 1955), pp. 1–12.
Charlton Lewis, “The Opening of Hunan: Reform and Revolution in a Chinese Province, 1895–1907,” pp. 110–170.
Hu-nan chin-pai-nien, pp. 245–47.
Hu-nan ehin-pai-nien, pp. 207–12:
Hu-nan chin-pai-nien, pp. 242–45, 276–78. The company was headed by Yü Shao-k'ang, Yuan Shu-hsun, Chang Tsu-t'ung and Hsi Hui-hsiang.
Ibid. This episode is one of the few indications of merchant dissatisfaction with the gentry. Merchants in Hunan generally deferred to the gentry who had close connections with officials. Moreover, the Merchant Guild itself included gentry directors—Ch'en Wen-wei, brother of Ch'en Ch'i-t'ai, and U Ta-chang, an ex-local magistrate—who had become industrial capitalists.
Ibid. For a study of central government policy see
Ibid. p. 243. The governor agreed to levy taxes on rents, income, houses, and government salaries. By 1910, Hunan had raised Tls. 5,000,000, approximately one-fourth of the necessary capital.
Tan Ycn-k'ai (1874–Sept. 22, 1930) was the son of Tan Chan-lin. He passed the chin-shih examination in 1904, entered the HanJin Academy and later returned to Hunan where he served as director of several modern schools in Changsha. Active in local politics and the reformist movement, he was selected head of the pronvincial assembly in October 1909 and served as Hunan's delegate to the National Assembly. Returning to Hunan, he led the constitutional reformers and masterminded the coup that ousted the T'ung-Meng-hui leaders from power in Hunan after the 1911 Revolution. In 1913 he was forced out of power by Yuan Shih-k'ai, but briefly served as governor of Hunan in 1917 and 1920, He later joined the Kuomingtang and eventually sided with Wang Ching-wei and the Wuhan wing. See Howard Boorman, Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, Vol. 3, pp. 220–22. For details on the provincial assembly FO 405/199 Enc 1 in No. 11, Report by Cambell, Oct. 1909; Enc 1 in No. 31. Also Hu-nan chin-pai-nien, pp. 252–54.
Hu-nan chin-pai-nien, pp. 221 for statistics. Modern nationalism allowed Chinese to accept Western knowledge while resisting foreign domination. Despite the thirst for Western knowledge, missionaries reported that the Hunanesc were highly selective in their utilization of foreign personnel. The government was reluctant to hire foreign teachers and refused to give foreigners control of the school. Yale-in-China archives (Yale Divinity School, New Haven), Report of Inspector of Yale Mission, May 1907; Gage to Reed, January 2, 1906; Beach to Reed, May 9, 1904.
Hu-nan chin-pai-nien, pp. 221–225.
Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao (Materials on the History of Hunan), Vol. 3 (1958), pp. 130–32. K'ung was an expectant taotai (fen-sheng pu-yung tao) and a former member of the Hanlin Academy. Although government sources portray K'ung as an individual of low repute with a reputation for fabricating rumours and turning right and wrong upside down, he was one of the leading Changsha gentry.
As Professor Ichiko and others have pointed out, the constitutional reforms and the establishment of local self-government afforded the gentry another chance to reconsolidate their control. Local gentry frequently assumed control of the schools, railways, elections etc. However, there can be little doubt that by 1909 the Ministry of Posts and Communications was in the process of reasserting its control over railways and that the long term implications of a national police and judicial system were not favorable to local gentry power. See Ichiko, “The Role of the Gentry,” pp. 299–300.
Yeh Te-hui (1964–April II, 1927) received his sheng-yuan degree and went into business before succeeding in the ehin-sfuh examination of 1892. A rabid conservative known for his opinionated views, he found official office distasteful and returned to Hunan after a brief stint as an assistant secretary in a board. In 1897. together with Wang Hsien-ch'ien, he led the conservative opposition to the Hundred Days Reform in Hunan. He was cashiered for his role in the rice riot and later opposed the Revolution of 1911. In 1927 he was executed by the Chinese communists. Boorman, Biographical Dictionary, Vol. 4, pp. 35–37.
Yang Kung had been cashiered from his post as magistrate of P'ei-chou in Szcchwan, He was in charge of public construction in Changsha, a position which enabled him to exert considerable influence over the masons.
Hu-nan chin-pai-nien, pp. 242–43.
Ibid. pp. 253–58 for a list of members of the assembly. It should be noted that the children of several of the established gentry leaders were members of the assembly or active in the constitutional movement, (i.e. T'an Yen-k'ai and Lung Chan).
Ts'en Ch un-ming was the fifth son of the famous Ts'cn Yü-ming( former governor-general of Yunnan-Kweichow and the man responsible for suppressing the southern Muslim rebellion under Ma Ju-lung in the 1860's. Three of his brothers served as Ch'ing officials including Ts'cn Ch'un-hsuan, a leading foe of Yuan Shih-k'ai who had risen to become governor-general of Kwangtung and Szechwan.
North China Herald, August 5, 1910, pp. 317–18 (hereafter cited as NCH). Also Ta-Ch'ing Hsüan-t'ung cheng-chi shih-lu (Veritable Records of political events in the Hsuan-t'ung reign of the Ch'ing dynasty), (Tokyo: Okura Shuppan, 1937–38), ch. 27/8a for the rumors (hereafter cited as SL).
FO 405/199, No. 163, Muller to Grey, March 21, 1910.
NCH, August 5, 1910, pp. 317–18; Jan. 7, 1910, p. 20.
NCH, July 1, 1910, pp. 23–24.
Great Britain, Original Manuscripts of Foreign Office Documents of Public Records Office, London. Hereafter cited as FO, with additional annotations referring to scries and volume. FO 405/199, Enc. 1 in No. 11, Report of Cam bell; Enc. 1 in No. 31. Ch'en Wcn-wei was director of the Chamber of Commerce, director of the Electric Lighting Company, a leading investor in the provincial railway and brother of Ch'en Chi-t'ar. According to Cam-bell, T'an was responsible for political decisions while Ch'en was in charge of all commercial issues coming before the provincial assembly. However, Cambcll is in error when he implies that Ch'en actually served in the assembly. For the membership of the assembly, see Hu-nan chin-pal-nien, pp. 252–54.
Ibid., The provincial assembly also demanded that “in all cases where the government proposes to contract an agreement with any foreign nation involving the interests of Hunan, or in case of the issue of rules and regulations of provincial or local interest, they shall first form the subject of debate on the part of the provincial assembly.” Quoted in FO 405/199 Enc. 1 in No. 31. Ts'en's contention that the assembly had encroached on the prerogatives of the central government by interfering with foreign policy was upheld by the central government.
Ibid. Also U. S. Department of State, Records of Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of China, 1910–1927, microfilm, Roll J, Vol. 1, No. 250. Baugh to Assist. Sec. of State, Jan. 25, 1910.
Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao, p. 126 for one of many examples of gentry access to the governor.
Chung-kuo shih-hsueh hui (Chinese Historical Association),
Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao, p. 131.
FO 405/199, Enc. 1 in No. 137, Hewlett to Muller, April 28, 1910.
Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao, p. 131.
The question of changing patterns of tenancy and their effect on the well-being of the peasantry is beyond the scope of this paper. Tenancy rose from 50–60 per cent in the eighteenth century to 70–80 per cent in the early twentieth century. As Evelyn Rawski has demonstrated, rising rents and higher rates of tenancy do not automatically produce a decline in the standard of living. Her study indicates that for the eighteenth century rising rice prices enabled tenants in Hunan to enjoy a higher standard of living. However, the trend was reversed in the nineteenth century. According to one set of fragmentary figures, in the nineteenth century the price of land tripled whereas the price of rice increased by only 80 per cent. Although Rawski feels these figures arc too incomplete to provide an accurate and representative picture, they are not out of line with the data collected by Marxist writers.
Memorial by Yang Wen-ring cited in Hu-nan sheng-cfiih pien-hui wen-yttan-hui (Committee for :he compilation of the Hunan provincial gazetteer), Hu-nan chin-pai-nien ta-shih chi-shu (Narrative of he major events in Hunan in the past hundred years) (Tokyo: Daian reprint, 1966), pp. 265–66.
Hu-nan chin-pai-nien, p. 266. The Shanghai Shih-pao, a newspaper of moderate reformist persuasion, claimed that Hunanese officials were raising taxes in an irresponsible fashion. All that the government had accomplished with its program for “new government” (hsin-cheng), it editorialized, was to line the pockets of officials. Cited in Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao. pp. 117–18.
Hu-nan chin-pai-nien, pp. 243–44. These surcharges and others on house and store rents and the salaries of government employees were levied by the provincial assembly in late 1909 and early 1910.
For an excellent analysis of traditional riots and the rioters' general acceptance of the Confucian framework sec, Hsiao, Rural China, pp. 433–53.
FO 405/199, No. 11, End. 11, Report of Cambell, October 1909, pp. 21–22. Cam bell's statement brings into question die current assumption that local gentry, including the more conservative elements, were able to extend their power and enlarge their wealth by managing self-government agencies. At least in Hunan there were locjal gentry who did not trust modernization or constitutional government, even if directed by a provincial assembly.
Ibid.
The customs agents at Changsha estimated that “given ordinary crops, there will remain a surplus of 3 to 5 million bags (of 150 catties) for export,” which at the normal rate of 100 catties per picul converts into 4.5 million piculs as the minimum export. If this is correct, it means that most of the export rice bypassed the customs houses at Yochow and Changsha. In 1908, Yochow and Changsha customs recorded a total of 1,700,000 piculs of rice being exported, the highest figure of the decade. Japanese authorities placed the domestic consumption of rice in Hunan at 43 million piculs. Thus, five to ten per cent of Hunan's rice crop was intended for export.
Ibid.
Ibid. For confirmation of diversion of relict funds to the railways see Yang Wen-ting's report on Hunanese finances in Hu-nan chin-pai-nien, pp. 265–66. In Hupei, where funds earmarked for relief had been diverted to railways, the Ministry of Posts and Communications blocked provincial efforts to use the money to help finance relief measures. See SL, Ch. 23/42–43a edict, Nov. 23, 1909; Ch. 24/80–98, edict, Dec. 4, 1909.
Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao, p. 126. Government and newspaper accounts do not specify whether all segments of the gentry engaged in rice hoarding. Moreover, the charges leveled against Wang and Ych are not linked to the activities of the assembly which demanded a ban on rice exports. This may indicate that conservatives and moderates were more directly involved in these “traditional” forms of “cntreprencurship” than the progressive constitutionalists. However, Nakamura Tadashi has argued that usury and pawnshops were the main source of economic power in Hunan. Profits from these activities—and probably from rice speculation—sustained gentry investment in land, commerce and foreign trade. Although Nakamura lacks the data to link specific individuals with investment in pawnshops, his thesis suggests that even the gentry progressives who can be termed “industrial capitalists” may have been involved in rice hoarding. I am inclined to believe that the government's failure to indict more gentry for hoarding—including some constitutionalists—was dictated by political expediency. Conservative gentry speculation was more common, but some gentry from all three groupings were involved in rice speculation and the assembly's call for a ban to rice exports was self-serving. However, public opinion demanded the imposition of a ban and individual members of the assembly not involved in speculation would have supported a move to keep rice in Hunan. Moreover, Nakamura is incorrect in assuming that the riots were led by the Ko-Iao-hui and directed against the gentry. He also underestimates the hostility between Ts'cn and the gentry. See Nakamura Tadashi, “Shingai kakumci no shozentei,” pp. 1-12.
SL, Ch. 20/20a, edict dates October 1, 1909. Also NCH, June 10, 1910, pp. 615–16.
NCH, June 10, 1910, pp. 615–16.
FO 405/199, Enc. in No. 144, “Memorandum by Phillip on the Prohibition of Rice” NCH, June 10, 1910, pp. 215–16.
Ibid.
gives the figures of one million piculs. The veracity ot this and all other statistics dealing with rice exports is subject to question. The quarterly returns for Changsha, published by The Maritime Customs, show abnormally high exports in the second quarterly of 1909 and then a rapid decline in rice exports:If one assumes thai most rice shipped by foreign firms passed through customs, certain conclusions may be drawn. First, the absence of a ban permitted sizable exports during the fourth quarter, equal to one half of total shipped during the bumper harvest of 1908, but less than was commonly believed by the public. Second, there is no indication that foreign firms were responsible for the massive outflow of the first quarter of 1910. The outflow cither was exaggerated or was the result of the activities of Chinese merchants and gentry. See China, The Maritime Customs, Quarterly Reports, 1908–1911.
FO 405/200, Enc. in No. 7, Fraser to Muller, April 13, 1910.
Ibid., For Ts'en's assurances see FO 405/199, No. 12, Müller to Grey, April 14, 1910.
TFTC, Vol. 7, No. 5 (May, 1910),
Ibid. During the later stages of the rioting, the masons and carpenters were acting under orders from Yang Kung and K'ung Hsien-chiao, two members of the conservative wing of the gentry class. It is possible that the masons may have gone to Ao-shan*tiao to cause trouble.
Ibid. According to most accounts, the magistrates were annoyed that Lung had arrested a man for such a trivial matter and ordered him to return to Changsha and release Liu. This order, as well as others issued by them, were never executed. When Lai arrived at Ao-shan-tiao, Yü and Kung vainly sought to calm him down, apparently aware of the crowd's mood and the unpopularity of policemen. After Lai was beaten, he found temporary refuge in a nunnery. He had two soldiers disguised as peasants take him on their backs, shouting to the crowd that they were taking him to Changsha to be punished by the governor. In the confusion of entering the city, Lai finally managed to escape from the crowd. Communist writers, perhaps embarrassed by the popularity of Yü and Kuo, accuse them of deliberately deceiving the people and making false promises they never intended to keep.
Ibid., pp. 23–24.
Ibid. Ts'en's reluctance to employ force to disperse the crowd is puzzling, especially when contrasted to his aggressive response to the Ao-shan-tiao incident. He had at his disposal six thousand soldiers of the new standing army stationed outside the city as well as local police and yamen guards. Perhaps he was motivated by a reluctance to fire on innocent people, but I am inclined to believe that he lost his nerve. Aware of gentry hostility towards him and lacking the loyalty and guidance of his subordinates, he was incapable of taking decisive action.
TFTC, Vol. 7, No. 5 (May, 1910), pp. 71–72, memorial by Jui-cheng: HHKM, Vol. 4, p. 509.
Ibid. Ting Yüan-ying disputes this version. In his account, Ts'en announced the reduction in the price of rice only after the yamen guards proved unable to break up the crowds by force. Ts'en's conciliatory gestures are seen as a desperate measure to buy time until the standing army could arrive on the scene. He also claims that the guards killed three and wounded ten others while clearing the courtyard and the army, when it arrived, shot and bayonetted “several tens.” Ting, “I-chiu-i-ling,” p. 203. Casualties were inflicted by the army and guards, but Chinese and Western contemporary accounts indicate that the soldiers were remarkably restrained considering the verbal and physical abuse directed against them. In fact, the general passivity of the troops led to rumors that large numbers of soldiers had defected to the side of the rioters. FO 405/199, Enc. in 171, Müller to Grey, June 1, 1910.
Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao, pp. 130–32.
HHKM, Vol. 3, pp. 509–10.
Tan's role in the affair is not clear. Li Shih-yueh alleges that T'an used the opportunity to press for Ts'en's outster and the appointment of Chuang Keng-liang as the new governor. If so, he remained behind the scenes and is not mentioned in any other account. Li Shih-yueh, Hsin-hai, p. 49.
Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao, pp. 130–32. Seven people signed the telegram including Lung Chang, a leader in the rights recovery movement and the provincial railway company. Wang never admitted that he had signed the telegram, claiming that his name had been forged. He spent the rest of his life trying to clear himself.
FO 387, Enc. 1, in No. 863. Hewlett to Muller, April 28, 1910. According to Hewlett, the troops sustained 120 casualties before they took action. Later, when two soldiers fired on their own initiative, they were executed on the spot. Estimates of the number killed by the soldiers range from two to ten.
HHKM, Vol. 3, p. 509.
Ibid., p. 510.
FO 405/199, No. Müller to Grey, May 21, 1910.
HHKM, Vol. 3, p. 510. One reason for the failure of the fire brigades to respond to call for assistance is that each organization had four masons and carpenters as members.
NCH, May 13, 1910, pp. 377.
Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao, pp. 132–33.
TFTC, Vol. 7, No, 4 (April, 1910), pp. 52–54.
Yale-in-China, Hail, “Changsha after the riot,” file of 1910–11. Many foreigners claimed that they escaped because of the warnings provided by the British Consul, Hewlett. The Chinese government, on the other hand, insisted that it offered adequate protection to foreign lives although the limited resources at the disposal of the government did not permit protection of private property. A careful reading of missionary letters published in the North China Herald indicates that the Chinese government offered some assistance, but that many had to make their own way to safety. The single most important factor in preventing foreign deaths appears to have been the mood of the mobs. A number of missionaries escaped out the back door as the rioters entered through the front door. Rarely, if ever, was there any attempt at pursuit.
Ibid. Also Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao, pp. 139–42.
Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao, pp. 135–36. NCH, April, 29, 1910 and May 6, 1910, pp. 312–13.
Ibid.
NCH, June, 1910, p. 679. At Hua-shih, twenty miles south of Siangtan, rebels wore yellow head-dress and carried yellow flags.
Ibid.
NCH, May 20, 1910, pp. 456–57.
NCH, May 27, 1910, p. 494; April 29, 1910, pp. 264–65.
SL, Ch. 33/4b–5a, edict dated April 16, 1910; Ch. I4a–b, edict dated April 17.
SL, Ch. 33/15b–16a, April 17.
Yale-in-China, Hail, “Changsha after.”
Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao, pp. 128–131. Ironically, the government took a much harsher interpretation of the gentry's refusal to allow the use of force against the rioters.
Ibid., pp. 132–33.
NCH, July i, 19x0, pp. 23–24.
Ibid.
Yale-in-China, Hail, “Changsha after.”
Ibid.
Hu-nan chin-pai-nien, pp. 265–67.
Ibid.Also HHKM, Vol. 4. PP. 523–53.
For two examples of this type of interpretation,
NCH, July 1, 1910, p. 24. According to the correspondent, Chuang Kcng-Iiang was “the most beloved of all officials.” Kuo Chung-kuang also received the accolades of the crowds as he left. It is ironic that Chuang, the agent of gentry power, remained a popular figure in the public imagination. In his account of the riots, Mao remembered, “the Commissioner of Internal Affairs, a man named Chang (sic.), came out on his horse and told the people that the Government would take measures to help them. Chang was evidently sincere in his promise, but the Emperor disliked him and accused him of having intimate connections with ‘the mob.’ He was removed.” See Snow, Red Star, p. 129.
Chuzo Ichiko, “The Role of the Gentry,” pp. 302–303. Whether the Changsha riot was typical of other riots of this period can not be answered in this paper. An impressionistic reading of the accounts of late Ch'ing riots printed in the North China Herald and the collection Hsin-hai ko-ming suggests that conservative gentry led riots against manifestations of centralizing power were not uncommon.
NCH, July 1, 1910, p. 24.
Hu-nan chin-pai-nien, pp. 271–74.
Hu-nan chin-pai-nien, pp. 262–63. During the frantic days of April 1910 Ch'en Tso-hsin considered having the new army join the rioters in order to incite a general uprising against the Ch'ing. He broached the idea to his superior who advised him that the time was not ripe.
Ibid., p. 288.
Ibid.