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zero-sum game

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Journal Article
History of Political Economy (2021) 53 (4): 595–631.
Published: 01 August 2021
... for two-person zero-sum games that he had conceived and proved in 1928. Aspects of the research leading to this paper were conducted at the Center for the History of Political Economy at Duke University and at the Centre Walras-Pareto at the University of Lausanne, where I acted as a visiting...
Journal Article
History of Political Economy (2014) 46 (2): 307–331.
Published: 01 June 2014
... and liberty, economic efficiency, commercial interests, corruptive effects on individual and public morality, and political necessity. Distribution of limited resources is discussed in terms of a zero-sum game. In one of the key moments of the treatise, Guicciardini denies that preferences toward the best...
Journal Article
History of Political Economy (2016) 48 (4): 733–740.
Published: 01 December 2016
... vindicate Mises's assessment and criticisms of Montaigne by way of three points. First, Mises was indeed correct in christening the belief that the economy can be presented as a zero-sum game as the “Montaigne dogma.” Second, we demonstrate that Montaigne refers not only to involuntary exchanges but also...
Journal Article
History of Political Economy (1992) 24 (Supplement): 165–175.
Published: 01 December 1992
... Solutions of a Two-Person Zero-Sum Game with a Finite Number of Strategies. Engineering Research Institute, University of Michigan. Report No. M720-1 R-28. September. Savage , L. J. 1951 . The Theory of Statistical Decisions. Journal of the American Statistical Association 46 . 253 ( March...
Journal Article
History of Political Economy (2016) 48 (4): 741–745.
Published: 01 December 2016
... 2016 Ludwig von Mises Michel de Montaigne zero-sum game entrepreneurial profit References Mises Ludwig von . (1949) 1996 . Human Action: A Treatise on Economics . San Francisco : Fox & Wilkes . Kuscevic Montero Martín Casto del Río Rivera Marco Antonio...
Journal Article
History of Political Economy (1992) 24 (Supplement): 283–303.
Published: 01 December 1992
..., as interpretation for solu- students, 117 tions of two-person non-zero- of mathematics as a reaction to sum games, 174 intuitionism, 42 Arnoff, E. Leonard. See Churchman, of physics C. West, Russell L. Ackoff, and by Hilbert, 41, 117, 119 E. Leonard Arnoff...
Journal Article
History of Political Economy (1992) 24 (Supplement): 151–163.
Published: 01 December 1992
...- guage and description of decision-making encompassing the extensive form and game tree with information sets, and then the reduction of the game tree to the strategic form of the game; (3) the theory of the two- person zero-sum game; * (4) the coalitional (or characteristic function) form...
Journal Article
History of Political Economy (2012) 44 (3): 546–550.
Published: 01 September 2012
... the origin of noncooperative and cooperative game theory respectively. The noncooperative part explains how von Neumann’s (1928) minimax theorem solves the problem of rational play in two-person, zero-sum games, where zero-sum means that whatever is good for one player is bad for the other...
Journal Article
History of Political Economy (2012) 44 (3): 541–543.
Published: 01 September 2012
... the origin of noncooperative and cooperative game theory respectively. The noncooperative part explains how von Neumann’s (1928) minimax theorem solves the problem of rational play in two-person, zero-sum games, where zero-sum means that whatever is good for one player is bad for the other...
Journal Article
History of Political Economy (2012) 44 (3): 543–545.
Published: 01 September 2012
... play in two-person, zero-sum games, where zero-sum means that whatever is good for one player is bad for the other. In the process, almost as an aside, the authors show how to solve a whole bundle of problems involving risk and information that had proved too much for previous generations...
Journal Article
History of Political Economy (2012) 44 (3): 550–551.
Published: 01 September 2012
... the origin of noncooperative and cooperative game theory respectively. The noncooperative part explains how von Neumann’s (1928) minimax theorem solves the problem of rational play in two-person, zero-sum games, where zero-sum means that whatever is good for one player is bad for the other...
Journal Article
History of Political Economy (2012) 44 (3): 552–553.
Published: 01 September 2012
... the origin of noncooperative and cooperative game theory respectively. The noncooperative part explains how von Neumann’s (1928) minimax theorem solves the problem of rational play in two-person, zero-sum games, where zero-sum means that whatever is good for one player is bad for the other...
Journal Article
History of Political Economy (2012) 44 (3): 553–555.
Published: 01 September 2012
... play in two-person, zero-sum games, where zero-sum means that whatever is good for one player is bad for the other. In the process, almost as an aside, the authors show how to solve a whole bundle of problems involving risk and information that had proved too much for previous generations...
Journal Article
History of Political Economy (2012) 44 (3): 555–557.
Published: 01 September 2012
... the origin of noncooperative and cooperative game theory respectively. The noncooperative part explains how von Neumann’s (1928) minimax theorem solves the problem of rational play in two-person, zero-sum games, where zero-sum means that whatever is good for one player is bad for the other...
Journal Article
History of Political Economy (2012) 44 (3): 557–559.
Published: 01 September 2012
... the origin of noncooperative and cooperative game theory respectively. The noncooperative part explains how von Neumann’s (1928) minimax theorem solves the problem of rational play in two-person, zero-sum games, where zero-sum means that whatever is good for one player is bad for the other...
Journal Article
History of Political Economy (2012) 44 (3): 559–562.
Published: 01 September 2012
... the origin of noncooperative and cooperative game theory respectively. The noncooperative part explains how von Neumann’s (1928) minimax theorem solves the problem of rational play in two-person, zero-sum games, where zero-sum means that whatever is good for one player is bad for the other...
Journal Article
History of Political Economy (2012) 44 (3): 562–565.
Published: 01 September 2012
... how von Neumann’s (1928) minimax theorem solves the problem of rational play in two-person, zero-sum games, where zero-sum means that whatever is good for one player is bad for the other. In the process, almost as an aside, the authors show how to solve a whole bundle of problems involving risk...
Journal Article
History of Political Economy (1992) 24 (Supplement): 113–147.
Published: 01 December 1992
... the existence of the minimax solution for all zero-sum games by means of the introduction of the innovation of the “characteristic function,” which reduced the n-person game to its two-person counter- part through assignment of a value to each and every coalition and its complement. There were...
Journal Article
History of Political Economy (1991) 23 (S1): 227–255.
Published: 01 December 1991
... experience in 1949 of finding that his own proposed solution- concepts for 2 x 2 bimatrix non-zero-sum games were not generally chosen in situations of simulated play; nor were they chosen by other game theorists when playing the game. When Games Grow Deadly Serious 233 practitioner must admit that we...
Journal Article
History of Political Economy (1992) 24 (Supplement): 15–27.
Published: 01 December 1992
... advance, but it built upon an existing literature on strategic games to which both its authors had contributed. This paper examines the pre-1944 literature on the minimax theorem which holds that two- person zero-sum games with a finite number of pure strategies (or a continuum of pure...