...” or “basic” science and applied science, noting how distinctions appear to underwrite particular economies of credit within the scientific community and beyond it. Second, by exploring the relevance of this historiography to the case of evolutionary biology’s theory of games, it demonstrates how one...

... methodological holism and social effects on pref- erences. The book ignores evolutionary game theory,which is,arguably,the principal locus of modern Darwinian thought in mainstream economics. As Paul Krugman (1996) has noted,current evolutionary theory bears an unexpected resemblance to neoclassical...

... for” and in providing a “credible specification of the replication mechanism.” The last part of the book discusses issues of altruism and cultural evolution. Again, a central issue is the unit of selection: the gene, the individual, or the group. Evolutionary game theory...

... 24.3 : 623 -56. Mailath, G. J. 1998 . Do People Play Nash Equilibrium?Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory. Journal of Economic Literature 36 : 1347 -74. Mas-Colell, A., M. D. Whinston, and J. R. Green. 1995 . Microeconomic Theory . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mason, E. S. 1939...

... History of the Dismal Science. http://www.econlib.org . Samuelson, Paul A. 1978 . The Canonical Classical Model of Political Economy. Journal of Economic Literature 16 : 1415 -34. Book Reviews 353 Evolutionary game theory’s analogy...

... equilibrium. They might even imagine that the economy required a set of shared symbols and norms in order for markets to op- erate, only subsequently to subsume these entities in a meta-utilitarian calculus of evolutionary game theory. Culture, initially posited as the residual category of everything...

... of evolutionary game theory may be viewed as a further refinement of perfect equilibrium, one of the most common notions used to refine the Nash equilibrium. Second, bounded rationality has been used to rule out unintuitive equi- libria in the prisoner’s dilemma game, the chain store paradox, and the 316...

...). First, bounded rational- ity functioned as a dynamic for selection among multiple equilibria by promising to “refine” equilibria. Moreover, the evolutionary stable strat- egy concept of evolutionary game theory may be viewed as a further re- finement of perfect equilibrium, one of the most common...

... of animal behavior” as in Kagel, Battalio, and Green 1995 or the “evolutionary” approaches to the Nash equilibrium in game theory), but I think these five cases sufficiently cover the waterfront in the 1990s to justify the following claim: What is deemed “exciting” by the elite avant garde...

... of altruism and cultural evolution. Again, a central issue is the unit of selection: the gene, the individual, or the group. Evolutionary game theory is discussed and the characteristics of evolutionarily sta- ble strategies and culturally stable strategies...

... it implies is that we have to go outside standard game theory to something like evolutionary game theory to explain how individuals actually select their optimal strategies. Game theory as such cannot be the end of the story.6 Intellectual cowardice prevents me from mentioning another diffi cult...

... – 22 . ———. 2005 . Professor Jack Hirshleifer (1925–2005): A Life Remembered . Journal of Bioeconomics 7.3 : 209 – 14 . Dimand Mary Ann Dimand Robert W. . 1996 . A History of Game Theory: From the Beginnings to 1945 . London : Routledge . Edgeworth Francis Y. [1881...

... the potential for conflict. My, own interpretation owes much to Hayek and to recent develop- ments within the game theoretic literature. From Hayek we have learned to think in evolutionary terms. Game theory has posed ques- tions solutions to which require that we learn to think in terms of ex...

...Clément Levallois Today, Alchian's “Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory” (1950) is hailed by evolutionary economists as a most important piece that resumed an evolutionary brand of theorizing in economics after the eclipse of the interwar period. On the other hand, Alchian's article...

.... Lazonick , W. 1991 . Business Organization and the Myth of the Market Economy . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lazonick , W. 1994 . The Integration of Theory and History: Methodology and Ideology in Schumpeter's Economics. In Evolutionary and Neo-Schumpeterian Approaches to Economics...

... framework. But leading “neoclassical” economists now work on growth mod- els that can produce multiple equilibria, especially where there are increasing re- turns; or on the theory of games, where multiple equilibria are general, asymmetric pricing, which is incompatible with Arrow-Debreu; and on many...

...: Economic Methodology and Contemporary Science Theory . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press . Hodgson Geoffrey M. 2006 . Economics in the Shadows of Darwin and Marx: Essays on Institutional and Evolutionary Themes . Cheltenham : Edward Elgar . ———. 2007 . “ Meanings of Methodological...

..., primatology, and game theory along with works by such social theorists as Marcel Mauss, Karl Polanyi, and Pierre Bourdieu, the connection between economics and religion is especially evident in the uniquely human capacity for gift-exchange— which, he observes, has figured as a fundamental principle...

... game theory, computable general equilibrium, dy- namic modeling or simulation, evolutionary approaches, experimental economics, and so on, as well as a burgeoning of more heterodox approaches. Perhaps, as the ti- tle hints, the aim of the collection is to delineate the foundations supporting...

... almost inevitable limitations. It does not extend to contributions written after the mid-1970s, and thus omits developments such as duality in optimization, asymmetric information, applied game theory, computable general equilibrium, dy- namic modeling or simulation, evolutionary approaches...