“Why hasn’t Mexico backed the United States. . . [in] Central America,” asked assistant United States secretary of state Elliot Abrams in 1986. With this quagmire used as an epigraph, Jürgen Buchenau lays out Mexican foreign policy’s historical projection in Central America. As the author sets out to examine Mexico’s reasons for engaging in the affairs of the Central American countries independently, in reaction to, or in defiance of United States policies in the region, Buchenau necessarily explores Mexico’s relations with the United States in the context of the former country’s changing internal political, social, and ideological configurations. Buchenau’s book goes back as far as the post-independence era because as early as then it appeared as if Mexico might be “encircled” by United States expansion (p. 6). The greater part of the book, however, is devoted to the Porfiriato, which lasted from the last quarter of the nineteenth century to 1910, when the shots of the revolution brought it down. Following a chapter on the Mexican Revolution and Mexico’s Central American policies at the time, Buchenau extends his incisive analysis to include the Obregon and Calles administrations during the 1920s. The book ends with an epilogue that seeks to illustrate the continuation of the work’s main thesis through to the present.

Indeed, the main thesis of the book is established in the chapters on the Porfiriato: namely, that Mexico is not a newcomer to the international arena as a middle-level power. Rather, Buchenau maintains that since Porfirio Díaz’s government, Mexico’s foreign policy has been driven by the country’s opposition to United States domination and by the fear of United States encirclement as it expanded in Central America. This drive motivated Mexico to act on its own in a region that has traditionally had weaker political, social, and economic structures than Mexico, and therefore has been an easy prey to, or an ally of, the United States. Hence, Mexico has felt threatened by the United States not only from the north, but also from the south, where instability has been notorious and United States intervention a common practice up to the 1980s. The latter chapters are time variations on the same theme. Thus, Buchenau’s reading of Mexico’s foreign policy is that continuity prevailed over change.

The author builds on an already robust literature dealing with United States-Central American and United States-Mexican relations. By centering his discussion on Mexico, Buchenau brings in an important player whose actions modify our understanding of the regional conundrum. Perhaps the most innovative element of Buchenau’s research is the idea that both the Central American republics and Mexico could form temporary alliances to offset the effects of domination by the United States. Furthermore, Mexico’s support strengthened a more liberal, anti-Yankee opposition in Nicaragua in the early part of the century and again during the 1920s, while Mexico’s antagonism to Guatemala’s pro-American oligarchies and dictators indirectly weakened their grip on society and undermined entrenched United States positions in that country. However, Buchenau is far from portraying Mexico as always being a successful international actor. On the contrary, the author’s reliance on multinational archival sources allows him to be wary of any categorical conclusion. Mexico sought to play an active role in Central America, but often could not afford to do so given the risk of antagonizing the United States above and beyond the Mexican government’s capacity to deal with its consequences at home. This was the case during the Mexican Revolution of 1910-20, and again during the 1920s.

Buchenau corroborates his thesis by imaginatively reading his sources and carefully crafting his arguments. It is safe to say that the book will be profitably read by scholars in several fields: in political history, in international relations, and, of course, in modern Mexican history. The book will also allow students to examine a scholar at work, painstakingly weighing evidence and building his argumentative edifice. Hopefully, someone might rise to the challenge and demonstrate that Mexico’s foreign policy during the turbulent 1980s followed in the footsteps of Don Porfirio.