John Major’s Prize Possession is the latest in a series of histories that use the Panama Canal to highlight U. S. paternalism in Panama. Similar in scope and methodology to the works of Gustavo Mellander, Walter LaFeber, and Jorge Conte-Porras, Major’s work goes beyond these earlier, more general accounts by tracing in great detail the many injustices Panamanians have confronted when seeking equity regarding the canal.
Major argues that the 1977 Torrijos-Carter Treaty will not free Panama from U.S. subjugation. While the canal has now “lost the status of a prize possession” in Washington’s eyes with the advent of a “new world order,” the author contends that the United States will continue to bully Panama as long as the Isthmus offers American policymakers “a vantage point at the heart of the hemisphere from which to keep close tabs on developments in the region” (p. 5).
After citing the 1989 invasion to underscore his argument, Major devotes the remainder of his book to defining the forces that underlie Washington’s ongoing self-indulgence concerning Panama. In successive chapters the author identifies a sequence of ideological, economic, military, political, and diplomatic factors that he believes epitomize the development and evolution of the canal enclave. Of particular significance is the chapter on the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty. Here the author convincingly challenges earlier scholarship by confirming that the United States actually wrote much of that despised 1903 accord. In doing so, Major accentuates the depth of U.S. paternalism in Panama from the outset of the canal project while identifying several reasons for that behavior.
At the same time, Major’s exclusive reliance on U.S. sources for primary documentation gives an incomplete understanding of the canal and its significance to Panamanian-U.S. relations. Of the 51 unpublished primary sources listed in his bibliography, not one is a Panamanian document. The author justifies his disproportionate reliance on U. S. sources by explaining that Panama’s archives are closed and have been for some time (p. ix). Since the late 1980s, however, this reviewer has repeatedly located and used numerous valuable documents in Panama’s Archivos de Relaciones Exteriores, its Contraloría General de la República, Archivos Nacionales, Riblioteca Nacional, and even its Archivos de la Presidencia—collections Major incorrectly dismisses as inaccessible. Equally disturbing is the author’s treatment of Panama and its people. At one point he writes, “Panama’s importance in modern history derives exclusively from its location at one of the great nodes of international maritime commerce” (p. 97). This opinion, which permeates much of the book, underscores the author’s failure to consult Panamanians and their archives. Yet by ignoring those sources, Major fails to address adequately issues of Panamanian labor and political unrest, including events such as the renters’ strikes of the 1920s and 1930s, the 1947 Filós-Hines Treaty debacle, and the 1968 revolt. These issues profoundly influenced the U.S. administration of the canal.
Major has produced an uneven book that wrongly diminishes the role of Panamanians in the history of their canal. The book’s strength lies in the author’s detailed attention to various facets of U.S. paternalism on the Isthmus, although these details portray only one side of a dynamic relationship between the two nations. This book will primarily interest students of U.S. foreign policy.
