John Crabtree’s work is the first overall evaluation of the political and economic problems of Peru’s recent past. It combines detailed information with a sensible treatment of ex-president Alan García’s rise to power and subsequent descent. Crabtree, a political scientist, conducts an earnest criticism from an initially sympathetic approach to García’s “heterodox” agenda. Crabtree’s central argument is that García subordinated his economic policy to his political objectives, and that these in turn were undermined by his personalist excesses.
Crabtree refutes the argument that García’s heterodox program was doomed from the beginning. He claims that García faced enormous economic constraints looming from the failure of orthodox stabilization programs erratically implemented by the previous president, Fernando Belaunde. Moreover, the preeminence of short-term solutions over long-term goals and planning resulted in irresponsible management of García’s program. A historic opportunity for solving Peru’s urgent problems was thereby wasted.
Like most efforts to analyze recent history, the book’s basic sources of information are key economic and political indicators from independent and official periodicals and reports, as well as recent research by Peruvian and international analysts. Historical literature and long-term analysis, however, are scant. There are no new revisions of the accepted views on the role of the Aprista party and Juan Velasco’s military regime in Peruvian history. The analysis of the shady social interests behind the García regime is fragmentary. Unfortunately, these last two topics, which might have attracted more attention from historians, are beyond the stated goals of an otherwise well-balanced interpretation.
The book is well written and easy to follow. It makes good and necessary reading for those interested in an up-to-date discussion of the seemingly intractable problems of contemporary Peru. The treatment of Sendero Luminoso, for example, is connected with the general political and economic context. Crabtree’s approach is not shared by most senderólogos, who tend instead to use arcane analytical tools. According to Crabtree, García initially faced the problem of Sendero from a novel, developmentalist approach that differed from the basically repressive military tactics favored by Belaunde. García’s initial approach, however, was capriciously betrayed by the political blunder of ordering the armed forces to massacre Senderistas in Lima’s prisons in June 1986. The bizarre nationalization of local banks in 1987, Crabtree affirms, completed the conditions for the swift downfall of a disastrous administration that seriously undermined public confidence in Peru’s democracy.
