Ronald Newton has produced a book that will be mandatory reading not only for students of modern Argentine history, but for those interested in the broader repercussions of World War II and in great-power competition in South America. Professor Newton set three goals for himself: to determine the impact of Nazism on the German community in Argentina; to define the nature of Berlin’s intentions toward that country; and to expose the “bizarre and irrational” character of wartime U.S. policy toward Argentina and the perceived German threat there.
Newton’s detailed study of Nazi agents, their methods of proselytizing, and their target groups in Argentina yields a convincing picture of intrigue, divisiveness, and limited political-ideological success. Especially valuable in this regard are two chapters on the resistance to Nazi activities offered by anti-Hitler exiles and refugees, particularly German Jews. In assessing official German objectives in Argentina, Newton emphasizes commercial considerations; reinforcing the prevailing view of the Third Reich’s aims in the general region, he finds no evidence of broader, long-range political or military considerations.
The story of the U.S.-British-Argentine diplomatic struggle after 1940 is well known, but Newton adds detail that fills out the picture. He makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the secret war that accompanied the diplomatic quarreling, painting colorful portraits of the personalities involved, striving to separate fact from fantasy, and offering reasoned judgments about the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of German, British, and U.S. clandestine efforts.
Newton gives high marks to British foreign policy managers for their equanimity vis-à-vis the German challenge in Argentina; but he levels harsh criticism at their U.S. counterparts, whom he judges to have been ignorant, unsophisticated, and gullible as they grossly exaggerated the menace. His scathing denunciation of recent U.S. policy toward Grenada, Panama, Nicaragua, and even Iraq, however, may cast doubt on a priori conclusions. “Lit by the flaring synapses of official Washington,” he writes, “the politicians, bureaucrats, diplomats, and warriors lurch off on their adventure, incapable of defining objectives, assimilating evidence before their eyes, … or reasoning in a straight line” (p. xix). Some readers undoubtedly will ask if he approached the documentary record already convinced that U.S. policy was misguided. I think not; but he does overstate the case, and he could have played up more the Argentine leaders’ unparalleled talent for provocation.
The author’s writing style is lively, even frequently journalistic—down to the mild sarcasm and occasional incomplete sentence—and the book makes enjoyable reading. The research effort that went into it was prodigious, as readers have come to expect of Professor Newton.
