Though of limited use to Latin Americanists, this book nonetheless has a clearly stated goal: the assessment of the U. S. Navy’s mission in the circum-Caribbean from the Spanish-American War to the end of World War II. The author develops his principal argument—that the Mahanian concept of the Caribbean as the American Mediterranean was broadened from its initially narrow strategic definition to incorporate the Navy’s assignment of policing and pacification—in narrowly defined but informative accounts of policymaking and operations. For those who want a capsule summary of U.S. naval operations in the Caribbean during these years, Admirals and Empires is a handy guide. Its strength is the author’s reminder that the Navy did not seek this mission; rather, circumstance (notably the building of the Panama Canal and the perceived external threat from Germany) required it.
The book’s weakness, however, is the author’s too-casual acceptance that the second mission of the U.S. Navy in the Caribbean—policing and pacification— was largely unavoidable. That the principal reason for the “Banana Wars” was strategic may be unarguable from the Navy’s perspective; but to maintain that U.S. motives and methods are understandable and explainable in this framework is quite another thing. Here, the author’s reliance on the official record (as contrasted with other works that delve into the rich personal accounts of these interventions) and his apparent unfamiliarity not only with Spanish-language works but, more important, basic works in English (e.g., Louis Pérez’ works on Cuba or Bruce Calder’s seminal work on the Dominican intervention) limits the value of the book. Finally, no devotee of Marine Corps or U. S. Army history can accept the author’s implication that the role of these services was marginal—in planning, perhaps, but certainly not in execution or (in Cuba and Veracruz) in governing.
