This volume on U. S.–Latin American relations during the first half of the nineteenth century was published in honor of Alfred Barnaby Thomas and in memory of Richard K. Murdoch. With but one exception (Paul B. Goodwin, Jr.), all its contributors were either students of Thomas or received their training at Tulane University.

The major objective of the seven studies gathered here was to delineate the contributions of the U. S. agents posted to the Central and South American republics in establishing the basis for understanding—or misunderstanding—between north and south. For documentation the authors relied heavily on published official reports and well-established secondary sources. In pointing out the agents’ contributions, the book also brings into sharp focus the problems the agents had to confront. (Edward H. Moseley’s essay on Mexico and T. Ray Shurbutt’s on Chile were particularly successful in that regard.)

These U. S. envoys apparently possessed a very limited knowledge of Latin America and very little diplomatic expertise. Nearly all of them received their assignments through their ties to well-placed politicians. Not mentioned, as I recall, but important is the fact that many of the agents accepted appointments to Latin America with the simple goal of receiving the rather generous allotments for “outfittings.” That alone tells a great deal about Washington’s view of the new nations.

Although this book could become a handy reference source for major aspects of early hemispheric relations, its studies contain considerable distortion. The era before 1830 receives far more attention than do the next three or four decades, during which Great Britain repeatedly violated the Monroe Doctrine. The struggle with Great Britain for influence in Latin America intensified, especially in Central America, while France constantly probed for weaknesses in republicanism that would give it an opportunity to sponsor monarchism in the New World. The authors pay little attention to the limited qualifications of Latin American officials and to the erratic changes in policy with which the U. S. agents had to cope. Cultural differences, ethnic attitudes, economic imbalances, and influences from across the pond are largely neglected. Finally, the volume would have benefited from even a short summary chapter establishing the generalizations, if any, that might be drawn from it.