Over the past decade, economic historians have begun to take a long hard look at much of the conventional wisdom about the nature of the pre-1930 Brazilian economy. As is usually the case when scholars look at the empirical data, the conventional wisdom has proved to be neither wise nor accurate. It is in this revisionist vein that Winston Fritsch gives us his study of economic policy making in Brazil.
Fritsch’s basic argument is that political historians have long overestimated the strength of the São Paulo oligarchy in setting the nation’s economic policies. While he does not dispute their hegemonic position within their state, he argues that the coffee elite of São Paulo could not always get their way when it came to federal support for price-control schemes and low exchange rates. Other forces or interest groups often held sway, producing policies inimical to the São Paulo interests. Indeed, Fritsch argues that even when the federal government did pursue policies helpful to the interests of São Paulo, it often did so because it was pursuing a general economic stabilization policy, not because it favored a particular sectoral interest at the expense of others.
Fritsch’s textual organization is a familiar one: a chronological narrative of institutional and political developments. Readers without a strong background in economic history or international economics, however, will find the book heavy going. The author takes it for granted that his audience understands the ins and outs of the gold standard, the mechanisms for coffee valorization, and the effects of an orthodox monetary policy in the face of a balance-of-payments crisis. The prose is heavily laden with both the jargon and tortured syntax of economists, and this will further discourage many. For those who work in this field, however, this is a book well worth reading.
