The author, a former Colombian foreign minister, notes the range of diplomatic problems between his country and Venezuela, but examines only those pertaining to common boundaries and to Los Monjes—a group of uninhabited rocks off the Guajira Peninsula.
After the breakup of Gran Colombia in 1830 both nations adhered to the doctrine of uti possidetis juris—that a treaty between parties vests in them the territory under their actual control, and that natural limits represent legal boundaries. In 1833, they agreed to the Pombo-Michelena Treaty, ostensibly based on uti possidetis juris, but which neglected to ascertain some common boundary points. Border clashes ensued and relations between the countries were broken in 1873 and 1875. In those years Venezuelan strongman Antonio Guzmán Blanco, a Darwinist who interpreted compromise as weakness, tried to block Colombian access to disputed waterways.
Mutual distrust grew. Arbitration failed to settle the border differences. The potentially oil-rich continental shelf under the Gulf of Venezuela became a prime source of conflict between the states. In 1941, in an attempt to build unity during World War II, they agreed on a treaty that supposedly resolved all boundary problems. Colombia then assumed control over Los Monjes. In 1952, Venezuela claimed sovereignty over the area, which reputedly contained petroleum and uranium. The nations continued to disagree on their maritime boundaries and on control of the water around Los Monjes. Colombia wanted to take the dispute to the International Court of Justice in 1973, but Venezuela refused on the grounds that submitting to arbitration would be interpreted as ceding sovereignty. Currently, Venezuela with its nationalized oil industry sees great potential profits in the disputed zone, and Colombia wants to reduce petroleum imports by extracting “black gold” from the area.
Vázquez Carrizosa bases his findings on primary sources and shows that many diplomatic conundrums emanated from the internal turmoil that led to the dissolution of Gran Colombia. He tells how power struggles in the two countries have exacerbated conflicts; he asserts that Colombia’s fundamental objective has been free navigation of waterways; and he accuses Venezuela of intransigence. To counter his bias, one might read Venezuelan Pablo Ojer's La década fundamental en la controversia de límites entre Venezuela y Colombia (1982) and El Golfo de Venezuela: Una síntesis histórica (1983).
The author exhibits a solid sense of history and mastery of his topic in an unorthodox way. Some chapters contain pages of interpretative analyses connected by verbose documents. Putting the sense of the documents into prose would have yielded a more cohesive and interesting book, one suitable for specialists in the field, not just for research libraries.
