This is a very important book for anyone interested in the history of Argentina during the last half century. Robert Potash, its editor, was already the major authority on the Argentine army in the middle decades of this century, writing several books on the subject. Here, however, he has discovered and brought together formerly “secret” information, which even he did not have fully available when he wrote his earlier volumes.
The bulk of the book consists of internal documents of the army secret group that brought about the coup of June 4, 1943, thus launching the Perón era. Potash has provided essential introductions to and notations on the seven categories into which he divided the material.
This reviewer has found several surprises in the documents. First, the name of the GOU: probably the most usual interpretation of the initials has been Grupo de Oficiales Unidos, but the GOU documents show that it was Grupo Obra de Unificación—and the twelve chiefs of it were the Grupo Organizador y Unificador. Second, I was surprised at the clear preeminence of Perón in the GOU. It was, of course, known that he had been one of the principal members of its leadership; but this material makes clear that he was its major inspirer and organizer. The importance of another person in the GOU was also surprising: Colonel Eduardo Avalos, who, in October 1945, was to bring about the temporary overthrow of Perón. Third, this material explains the apparent tragi-comedy of General Arturo Rawson on becoming the first president after the June 4 coup. The documents insist that this occurred because the GOU’s candidate, Minister of War General Pedro Ramírez, was not at first willing to assume the presidency. It took two days after the coup to convince him. Fourth, the apparent anti-Semitism of the GOU leaders, as indicated in these documents, was surprising. As president, Perón had a number of prominent Jewish associates in government. The question remains, therefore, whether Perón himself was anti-Semitic or whether in these documents he ceded to the prejudices of his associates.
Finally, the fact that the GOU had a full-fledged plot organized to overthrow President Ramírez for September 27, 1943, was news to this reviewer. It is of course known that the GOU finally forced Ramírez out in February 1944, but it was not, I think, general knowledge until now that the officers were ready to oust him less than four months after they had placed him in office.
This is a book that will become a standard reference work for twentieth-century Argentine history.
