Defense analysts in the late 1970s were increasingly impressed by a surprising phenomenon in the international arms sector: the emergence of Brazil as not only the leading manufacturer of war matériel in the Third World, but a significant exporter of hardware as well. “Clearly Brazil is rapidly joining the big league producers … ,” one observer aptly commented.1 The creation of a “military-industrial complex,” one of the striking offshoots of Brazil’s remarkable economic development in recent times, was not accidental. Financial considerations naturally were instrumental in the drive for general industrial self-sufficiency that has been a major component of Brazilian national strategy for fifty years, but that drive, along with its complementary campaign for arms autonomy, has deep roots in elite perceptions of national needs and in Brazil’s experiences with arms dependence during the turbulent first half of the century. The Old Republic (1889-1930) was an important period in the evolution of Brazil’s military-industrial sector primarily because of the formation then of a body of elite opinion that advocated reduced dependence in matters of national security. The real “take-off,” however, came during the Getúlio Vargas era (1930-54) when modernization of the armed forces became one of the government’s priority goals. Sharing fully the preoccupation of the generals and admirals with Brazil’s vulnerabilities in a lawless world, Vargas and his civilian counselors, as well as military leaders, were keenly aware of the critical importance of enhancing national capacity to meet the ominous demands of the era—and the official consensus was that effective military strength required an industrial base that was as independent as possible.
The need for an expanded and more efficient defense establishment became progressively clear to Brazilian strategists as the country moved into the twentieth century. Indeed, as cracks in the structure of European peace began to appear at the turn of the century, disquiet slowly spread in elite circles, especially in view of the disturbing colonial thrust of great power politics.2 The outbreak of war in 1914 justified the pessimism of Brazilian analysts. Reverberations of the conflict quickly reached Brazil and, after Washington’s declaration of war and attacks on Brazilian ships by German submarines, Rio de Janeiro also joined the Allied cause. Defeat of the Central Powers did not bring the peace to Europe that many predicted; on the contrary, the Versailles settlement generated new instability, and throughout the 1920s Brazilian observers attentively studied European tensions. “The threat of war continues to hang permanently overhead,” wrote one admiral from Paris in 1925.3
A constant source of preoccupation to Brazilian policy-makers was the unsettled state of South American politics. Early in the century, for example, Itamaraty worried justifiably about the possibility of war between Argentina and Chile; then in 1905 and again in 1910, civil strife in Paraguay induced Rio de Janeiro to send a flotilla to the area to protect its interests; and during the same period, rebels from Uruguay crossed the Brazilian border, inviting countermeasures and provoking fears in Itamaraty that civil war there might cause a “general conflagration” in the Southern Cone.4 Boundary disputes with adjacent countries often led to severe tensions.5 Enduring friction between Chile and its Andean neighbors, and, more important, the animosity that prevailed between Bolivia and Paraguay throughout the 1920s as a result of their competing claims to the Chaco kept Brazilian leaders on frequent alert.6
Underlying the whole problem of continental instability was Brazil’s historic rivalry with Argentina. Brazil’s victory in the arbitration of the Missions dispute in 1895 set the stage for a marked revival of tensions in the twentieth century. The two adversaries engaged in an intense naval race in the early 1900s and border alarms were common. Senator Ruy Barbosa in 1908 warned President Afonso Pena that Argentina might attack without warning, and the two countries in fact approached the brink of war that year.7 Hostility subsided temporarily as European peace disintegrated, but the two governments then followed divergent policies and, as Brazil entered the Allied camp, its leaders kept a troubled eye on Argentina’s rearmament, its perceived expansionist tendencies, and its alleged pro-German sympathies.8 The first postwar decade saw a recrudescence of antagonisms. All Brazilian defense plans centered on the possibility of Argentine aggression, and in the face of expanding porteño military budgets and politico-economic maneuvering in neighboring countries, Brazilian strategists became convinced that the country could suddenly find itself at war.9
Given the instability of the international environment, it was obvious to Brazilian planners that the country’s defensive capacity might at any moment be challenged. How efficient were national capabilities? Dramatic episodes in the mid-l89Os provided a disquieting answer. First, civil war in Rio Grande do Sul, accompanied by a month’s long naval revolt in Rio de Janeiro, during which foreign warships proceeded peremptorily vis-à-vis both government and rebels, was a source of keen embarrassment. Equally humiliating was the Canudos affair in 1897, when it took government troops four attempts over a one-year period and cost 5,000 lives to crush a band of rebellious backlands fanatics in Bahia. During the conflict, federal commanders faced staggering logistical problems, and President Prudente de Morais was forced to appeal to state authorities for aid.10 Capabilities improved little over the next decade. On agreeing to serve as minister of war in Pena’s administration, General Hermes da Fonseca candidly admonished him in 1906 that conditions in the army were “woeful,” while a sympathetic federal congressman went further, complaining that the armed forces were “sadly unequipped to defend the nation against any enemy, even a 3rd or fourth-class power. The Baron of Rio Branco, Brazil’s Bismarckian foreign minister (1902-12), was gloomily blunt: “As for the state of our defenses, it is the most regrettable possible,” he confided. Successive presidents in the prewar period cautioned Congress about the deficiencies of the armed forces, whose shortcomings were underscored by events during the World War I era. Naval commanders, who customarily concentrated attention on the threat from the south, now had to consider possible challenges in the north, where they found shocking conditions at base facilities. At home the army faced a Canudoslike test in 1914–15 in Santa Catarina—Paraná, where repeated expeditions failed to disperse another band of religious fanatics, who were subdued, finally, by a division of 6,000 troops.11
By the end of World War I the discontent within the officer corps over the material plight of the armed forces was nearly universal. “From North to South rain telegrams about the precarious situation of the units … Finance Minister João P. Calógeras told the president-elect in 1918. The complaint of General Augusto Tasso Fragoso, head of the army’s Diretoria de Material Bélico (DMB), regarding artillery was typical. “You can’t imagine how backward we are in this respect; it’s a disgrace!” he wrote a few months after the Armistice in Europe. Indeed, the task ahead, Calógeras said frankly to President Epitácio Pessoa on assuming the portfolio of war in 1919, was to “create the Army. ”12 During the ensuing decade, military planners made frequent comparative studies of Brazilian and Argentine strength and invariably found Brazil wanting, a realistic judgment that foreign experts shared.13 The army’s unspectacular campaign against another rebel column that wandered the backlands for two years in the middle of the decade was simply one more reminder of national military weakness.14
The permanent sense of uneasiness within the ranks of those responsible for national strategy and defense over the country’s military inadequacy led them to place primary emphasis on the question of matériel. The absence of a domestic industrial base meant that the armed forces were locked into dependence on foreign suppliers. Contracts for the naval program of 1904-7 went to British and Italian builders, and the only new vessel acquired after 1914 was a submarine, purchased from Italy in 1927. With regard to munitions, the fleet, meanwhile, was, in the words of the minister of navy in 1920, merely a “tributary of England.” The army, too, was almost totally dependent upon imports—in 1900 it even ordered carrier pigeons from Belgium. Germany was the major prewar source of hardware. Beginning in 1892 the Krupp firm became the “undisputed” supplier of cannon, while by the turn of the century the Deutschen Waffen-und-Munitionsfabriken in Berlin, which controlled the marketing of Mauser arms, had “practically a monopoly” on the sale of carbines to Brazil and sister companies provided various other articles. Indeed, during the 1890s “Brazilian military reviews looked like German arms displays.”15 After Fonseca’s visit to Germany in 1908 and the subsequent dispatch of junior officers there—the future “young Turks”—to serve with German regiments, Rio de Janeiro placed orders for Luger pistols, bought several hundred thousand Mauser rifles, awarded additional contracts to Krupp, and bought gunpowder and optical equipment from other German firms.16 The Madsen company in Denmark supplied automatic weapons and much of the canvas used to make personal field equipment came from British mills.17 The elimination of German firms from the postwar arms trade, coupled with the presence of a French Military Mission (FMM) in Brazil after 1918, made France the source of most of the modest purchases of mortars, machine guns, artillery, and used armored cars in the 1920s.18 France, furthermore, thanks to an aviation mission in Brazil, also furnished the planes, engines, and machine guns for the army’s fledgling air corps, while the navy purchased aircraft from the United States, Britain, and Italy.19
The disadvantages of dependence were painfully obvious to national strategists. The cost of foreign hardware, for one thing, often seemed exorbitant; certainly the requirements in foreign exchange exceeded Brazil’s means at various junctures. A lack of exchange, in fact, plagued administrations throughout the era. Declining revenues in the early 1900s made it difficult for proponents of a bigger army and navy to insist on greater defense expenditures. President-elect Pena and his financial advisers in 1905, for example, worried about future financing of the naval modernization program then under way, especially in view of the economy-minded Congress. During his ensuing administration, problems mounted: foreign creditors were disgruntled because Rio de Janeiro was spending money on the armed forces, work on the army’s new powder factory was hampered by delays in making payments to contractors and workers, funds for a new naval arsenal were short, Fonseca angrily submitted his resignation because the army’s budget for 1909 was slashed, and there were no funds for the emergency acquisition of ships that Rio Branco urged.20 The government ultimately had to rescind a contract for one battleship because of its limited foreign exchange, a problem that became increasingly acute in following years. Early in World War I, after having to resort to a new funding loan, the minister of finance was forced to promise the House of Rothschild that “every nerve will be strained in every department so as to bring about the strictest economy and retrenchments,” creating a situation in which, to the disgust of Minister of War José Caetano de Faria, the administration had to scrape up “almost nickel by nickel” the money to meet basic obligations.21
In the 1920s the financial crisis worsened. Pressed by the military, Pessoa championed a greater defense effort, agreeing to a sizeable order for French artillery and urging Congress, in vain, to vote credits for a naval arsenal. His successor, Artur Bernardes (1922-26) also wanted to bolster the armed forces, but the government’s financial situation, he confided to a former minister of navy, was “much more grave than we supposed.” The navy ultimately was compelled to scrap a building program, while the army had to nullify its largest artillery contract and abandon other aspects of its modernization plans. After examining the state of the treasury, Bemardes’s successor, Washington Luis (1926-30), told Tasso Fragoso, now head of the Estado-Maior do Exército (EME), or army general staff, that the “tanks are empty” and that he consequently had to “close the taps.”22
Brazilian officials found additional cause for disgruntlement in the aggressive sales methods frequently used by foreign agents who, in their zeal to edge out rivals, allegedly were not above “adulterating” the facts about their products.23 Certainly competition among arms exporters was keen and Brazil sometimes did receive inferior articles. Ships hastily ordered from the United States during the naval revolt in 1893, for example, were said to be in pathetic condition. At the turn of the century, the Ministry of War bought almost 750,000 Mauser cartridges that turned out to be defective; smokeless powder that arrived for its Krupp artillery also proved unsuitable and had to be exchanged. Military technicians in 1906 discovered an “extremely high percentage” of cracked shells among a consignment for testing weapons, and in 1911 tests conducted on 145,000 recently purchased Mauser rifles showed the barrels to be structurally weak, which led to two years’ delay in securing and adapting new barrels from Germany.24 Shipments of equipment, moreover, occasionally reached Brazil incomplete or in improper sequence, which meant further delays in achieving operational status. There were also cases in which foreign companies failed to meet production schedules or in which shipments to Brazil went astray.25 The need to import gunpowder revealed another drawback in obtaining matériel from external sources: stocks often deteriorated in Brazil’s warm climate before they could be used. In the case of a wartime order placed by the navy with British suppliers, the powder arrived only after a lengthy delay and had been so “crudely manufactured” that its active life was considerably shortened.26 Then, too, there were sometimes disheartening difficulties in obtaining the necessary ammunition for arms previously purchased.27
A fundamental disadvantage of dependence on foreign manufacturers was that the flow of matériel was governed by the interests or needs of supplier countries and therefore was vulnerable to events over which Brazil had no control. This became unhappily evident when war broke out in Europe and the British blockade disrupted the contracts with Krupp and other German firms to which Rio de Janeiro had paid large sums in advance.28 Unable to acquire weaponry in Europe, Brazil gave contracts to suppliers in the neutral United States, but when the latter mobilized for war in 1917, Washington informed Rio de Janeiro that its arms would have to be reserved for United States troops. Brazilian authorities ran into the same problem with a naval purchasing program that had to be shelved because no Western country would sell vessels. Brazil’s own break with the Central Powers naturally led to the nullification of remaining contracts with German companies, and in 1920 the government itself was trying to find a way to obtain the prewar Krupp matériel it had ordered, which included items indispensable to the proper functioning of some weapons that had arrived years before.29 International politics, i.e., the defeat of Germany, largely accounted for Brazil’s decision to contract the FMM, an idea that had been criticized because it might lead to the adoption of French equipment and thus to a further mélange of matériel. The mixing of weapons, in fact, had already become a problem; in some cases it occurred within the same unit.30 With the temporary eclipse of Brazil’s traditional German suppliers, that very thing happened. Plans for modernization of the fleet, on the other hand, ran afoul of the disarmament movement in the 1920s. In 1924, for example, the State Department, for broader policy reasons of its own and with total disregard for Brazil’s strategic concerns, threatened to withdraw Washington’s naval mission contracted two years earlier if Rio de Janeiro proceeded with a naval build-up.31 The disarmament debates in Europe under the aegis of the League of Nations also seemed to jeopardize efforts to import armaments, since proposals frequently contained limitations on private sales to foreign governments. Brazilian delegates saw in such schemes the hands of stronger countries that wanted to maintain military superiority over weaker nations.32
The alternative to dependency was autonomy—this was an axiom affirmed with regularity by top-ranking military and civilian authorities after the turn of the century. The minister of war in 1903, for instance, urged the development of munitions production because it would make the armed forces “entirely independent” from overseas markets and eliminate “obstacles and difficulties” in obtaining supplies. Pena told Congress the same thing in 1908, and General Fonseca, as minister of war and then as president (1910-14), repeatedly stressed the importance of expanding domestic military manufactures in order to “free ourselves from foreign markets” and “thus achieve the independence we need in a matter related so intimately to our security.” Wartime leaders saw in the European conflict stark proof of the need for greater military-industrial autonomy. Spokesmen for the EME were emphatic in 1917: “We need to manufacture our explosives and powders, our rifles and machine guns; cast our cannon and battleships; build our vessels, our airplanes and dirigibles, our submarines and minesweepers; make our canned goods and fodder; weave our cloth, [and produce our] gear and utensils, from the raw material to the delicate finishing touch.”33 The lessons of the war were not lost on later leaders. Military industries had to be organized, said President Delfim Moreira in 1919, “whatever the sacrifices required.” Military commanders in the 1920s understandably pressed for greater industrial autonomy, and their pleas found strong resonance in executive circles. For Bernardes in 1926, “if we do not produce our own war materials, freeing ourselves from the foreign market, our national defense will always be precarious.”34
Some progress was made during the period in expanding military production, but the problem was complex. Government defense establishments were few in number, poorly organized, ill-equipped, and deficiently manned. When Brazil entered the century, there were army arsenals in Rio de Janeiro, Pôrto Alegre and Cuiabá, naval arsenals in the federal capital, Belém, and Mato Grosso, and three munitions plants— one in Realengo, a suburb of the capital, for cartridges; one at Estrela, in the state of Rio de Janeiro, for manufacturing powder; and a moribund powder plant in Mato Grosso. The immediate task, as military experts saw it, was to achieve greater autonomy in the production of munitions, which meant that Realengo was a primary target of modernization efforts. The government purchased a considerable amount of machinery from Germany in the early 1900s, but the lack of technicians hindered operations. Production rose from a half million finished cartridges in 1900 to six million in 1914, but this was a far cry from the projected level of 45 million a year.35 General Caetano de Faria, who was responsible for creating the DMB in 1915, pressed for larger budgetary allotments in order to expand Realengo’s activities to include the manufacture of artillery munitions, but little was accomplished in that sense, except to contract European technicians to help impose organization.36
The results of the endeavor to intensify and diversify work at the army arsenals were also uneven. An early decision was taken to build a new Arsenal de Guerra in Rio de Janeiro (AGRJ), and Krupp received most of the contracts for machinery and equipment, which were delivered in 1900 along with the “entire metallic structure” of the new buildings. Over the next few years considerable expansion of the physical plant took place and machinery was installed, but the problem of skilled labor again impeded progress. Fonseca ordered additional machinery in 1911, but the European crisis disrupted deliveries. One small triumph that a pleased wartime chief executive did report was that the AGRJ had started making many of the iron articles for the cavalry that formerly had been imported.37
As for naval repair and construction, the major need was a modern arsenal to replace the scattered ramshackle installations known collectively as the Arsenal da Marinha do Rio de Janeiro (AMRJ). Discussion of the subject began in 1890, but the financial squeeze and a division of opinion over the ideal location for new facilities caused seemingly interminable delays.38 Finally, in 1910, the government awarded a contract to a French company to build what became known as the Arsenal da Marinha da Ilha das Cobras (AMIC), but perennial financial problems and then the war led to abandonment of the project. A consortium of British shipbuilders submitted a proposal in 1918 for an arsenal that would produce “war matériel of all descriptions,” and official interest sharpened. The new arsenal, Pessoa told Congress optimistically, repeating his minister of navy, would “liberate the country … from foreign tutelage.” By the early 1920s, after several years of neglect, the government had to start over. The British group, joined by Bethlehem Steel, presented the only proposal judged viable in public bidding, but engineering doubts and what seemed excessive costs led the administration to give a contract to a São Paulo firm in 1922. Even so, it took Congress another four years to vote funds for the project.39
The principal achievement in the federal sector during the Old Republic, aside from launching work on the AMIC, was the establishment of a modern powder factory, but here, too, the results were spotty. Underlying the project was the desirability of producing a more powerful, “double-base” powder, i.e., one that contained nitroglycerine, for more effective use of artillery shells. The government in the early 1900s purchased three farms near the small town of Piquete in the state of São Paulo and there built a dam and hydroelectric plant to power the future factory. The Dupont company in the United States supplied all the machinery and technical assistance, and in 1908 the project was completed. For good measure, Piquete was equipped to manufacture “simple-base” powder as well, a fortuitous decision since the high command subsequently opted to continue using such powder in the army’s field pieces, which meant that much of the new machinery went unused.40 After taking over the Ministry of War in 1919, Calógeras, who saw in Piquete a means of freeing the armed forces from their “bondage, ” had additional facilities erected there for the production of trotyl (TNT) and also revived the idea of making double-base powder, placing orders in Europe for new machinery, a program continued by his successor, General Fernando Setembrino de Carvalho.41
The nationalization of all stages of production was not yet the official crusade that it would be after 1930, but government leaders during the Old Republic became increasingly committed to that goal. Bras proudly announced in 1918, for example, that the troops were now using purely domestic ingredients in several items of personal equipment. Navy spokesmen in the mid-1920s called for a survey of the military possibilities of national raw materials in order to stimulate their development, and Captain Thiers Fleming, head of Bras’s Gabinete Militar during the war and now the navy’s ordnance chief, was particularly active in trying to promote autonomous munitions production.42 One important aspect of the Piquete project was that it was designed originally to make explosives from purely domestic raw materials. Dupont had insisted, however, on using United States cotton, potassium nitrate, and pyrite for the trials, and thereafter the army continued to import those items. The war-generated supply crisis underscored the dangers of such dependence, though, so army specialists began sounding the need to substitute imports. Captain Egydio Castro e Silva, one of the army engineers responsible for building Piquete, gave a series of lectures to the Clube Militar in 1916 on the theme of nationalization of defense production that attracted the attention of his superiors, and when Calógeras assumed the portfolio of war, he drafted Castro e Silva, now a major on duty with the EME, to serve on his personal staff as an industrial expert. Beginning late in 1919, after a local firm offered to supply pyrite to Piquete, the major stumped energetically on behalf of eliminating unnecessary imports. Brazil’s vulnerability to a blockade, he argued in 1920, made it vital that defense plants be as autonomous as possible. Calógeras, who as a congressman twenty years earlier had advocated the establishment of an explosives factory that used “exclusively national resources,” was easily convinced and issued orders to Piquete to use not only domestic pyrite, but cotton as well.43
Frequently voices were raised in favor of developing metallurgical industries, especially iron and steel, in order to enhance national security through a greater range of defense manufactures. Early in the century there were only two small steel mills in Brazil, clearly an inadequate base for a military-industrial sector of any consequence. Calógeras was an early advocate of expanded steel production and the Chamber of Deputies in 1907 justified the idea of government loans to a company that would organize a large-scale steel plant on the ground of the “imperious necessity of emancipating the country militarily.” Fonseca’s trip to Germany converted him to the cause, and Castro e Silva became an influential disciple, arguing that not only military industries, but the general economy, demanded the processing of the country’s coal and iron ore. Since autonomous naval construction was impossible without similar metallurgical self-sufficiency, navy spokesmen were firm champions of steel development, particularly in view of the lessons of World War I.44
As a result of wartime restrictions, interest in steel manufacture heightened. Although unenthusiastic about official industrial activity, General Caetano de Faria, to cut costs, decided to revive and transform an obsolete government foundry at Ipanema, in São Paulo, that had been shut down in 1896. He put Major Antonio Mendes Teixeira, a metallurgical expert, in charge of the project and sent him to the United States in search of modern steel-making equipment in 1917. The following year Congress approved the “Wenceslau Bras Law,” which authorized the government to make loans to private companies to develop or increase steel production, and three firms obtained such aid.45 By the end of the war, increasing sectors of the elite had come to share the high command’s concern over the fact that the absence of domestic steel capacity left Brazil’s defense plants helpless “tributaries” of foreign markets. Both Pessoa and Bernardes sought to spur steel manufacture. “Without it,” Pessoa declared, “our arsenals and factories will never have a life of their own nor can we be assured of an efficient defense.” Bernardes became famous for his xenophobic advocacy of national steel enterprise—“the first condition for our economic autonomy,” he said. During both their administrations the 1918 law was renewed; in 1923 it was modified to permit profit guarantees for a firm that agreed to make steel rails and the “war matériel that the government may need.” It was during Pessoa’s government that Percival Farquhar’s Itabira Iron Ore Company received its controversial and ill-fated concession to export ore and build a steel mill. The contract, finally approved by Congress during the Luis administration, obligated the future plant to produce “special steels for the government’s war and naval arsenals.” The Belgo-Mineira Steel Company was also launched in the early 1920s, and military planners made studies of the possibility of establishing a huge “military port” in Angra dos Reis that would include a mill that could make steel for ships, cannon, and shells.46
One critical question addressed during the Old Republic was that of the proper relationship between the public and private sectors. The Chamber of Deputies, on authorizing loans for steel production in 1907, opined that state control was “incompatible” with healthy development of that branch of industry, and Fonseca, the following year, speaking in broad terms, was likewise unequivocal: “The State, as an industrialist, should undertake no action except to fill gaps left by private industry; [and] never compete with it.” The general, consequently, was in favor of turning over to civilian manufacturers the production of as many military supplies as possible since they could do so “with economic advantage.” General Pedro Ivo Henriques, director of the AGRJ, concurred, arguing in 1912 that by sharing the manufacture of war matériel with private industry in peacetime, the government would be facilitating the task of possible emergency mobilization. In his talks to the Clube Militar, Castro e Silva made essentially the same point. Nationalize defense production, yes, he said, in the sense of reducing dependence on foreign markets, but leave it as much as possible to the private sector, where a valuable pool of specialized labor would be formed and the bureaucratic inertia of public enterprise could be avoided. Ideally, he declared, the army’s role would be limited to that of technical supervision. As long as private capital displayed “ineptitude or fear,” however, he thought the state should take the initiative. Calógeras agreed that the burden of military production should rest on the civilian sector, but he cautioned against excessive subsidization of private manufacturers. “The only thing that we can and should do is stimulate their production by guaranteeing a market,” he wrote privately. And like his military colleagues, he saw in peacetime government-industry collaboration a “preliminary rehearsal for industrial mobilization.” Calógeras’s lack of enthusiasm for official industrial endeavors probably explains why, as minister of war, he jettisoned the Ipanema project.47
Naval authorities echoed army spokesmen in arguing in favor of civilian predominance in defense production. At the turn of the century, Captain Duarte Bacellar lectured at the Escola Naval to President Manoel de Campos Salles and other high officials on the need for official incentives for private metallurgical establishments, and through the press he sought to spread the same message. Fleming, before the war, also spoke out on behalf of government assistance to private industry in the fields of steel and naval construction, and in the 1920s he urged official aid for the creation of private munitions factories. The “industrial state, ” he said, had to be avoided because it brought “inconveniences and disadvantages of all kinds.” Admiral Alexandrino Alencar, the minister of navy, reached the same conclusion in 1924. Brazil, he remonstrated, should follow the lead of such countries as the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy, which left defense production to the private sector. State monopolies, he declared, stifled initiative, whereas profit-minded civilian manufacturers sought to improve their products through research. All the army should do, he concluded, was exercise technical control over its contracts.48
The extent of civilian participation in defense work is not clear. Since the backbone of manufacturing activity during the era was the textile sector, logically the major civilian role would be that of supplying clothing, bedding, and the like. The minister of war reported in 1900 that, when he opened public bidding for a contract to furnish uniforms, there had been a “huge” number of respondents. But in addition, there was a vast array of light manufactures that the armed forces obtained from local industry. In the early 1900s, for example, the army bought shoes, dishes, building materials, and paper from domestic companies. The navy, for its part, was doing business on the eve of World War I with more than sixty firms, excluding shipbuilders, that provided scores of products, from acids, inks, and soap to carbon paper and wire. Early in the war Captain Estevão Leitão de Carvalho, a “young Turk” and member of General Caetano de Faria’s staff, persuaded footwear manufacturers to make special boots for the army modeled on those worn by German troops. By the 1920s the military was acquiring, besides those items, myriad other articles, among them iron beds, nails, canvas, khaki, silverware, glass, and rain gear.49
The owner of the Usina Esperança, one of the two prewar steel mills, failed to secure official assistance for his proposal to expand his operations to include the manufacture of projectiles,50 but the Bras administration did later award a contract to a small plant that managed to supply several hundred tons of iron to the army before going bankrupt. During Calógeras’s tenure as minister, moreover, he and Castro e Silva devised a sizeable building program that was farmed out largely to the construction firm owned by Roberto Simonsen. Simonsen ultimately built more than forty barracks and several hospitals and depots, relying on various civilian suppliers (and the United States) for materials.51 Fleming used his authority as head of the navy’s Diretoria de Armamento during this period to establish ground-breaking contacts with industrialists interested in possible contracts for artillery projectiles. Of greater practical significance was the navy’s cooperation with private shipyards. Already at the turn of the century it had given contracts for the assembly or construction of smaller vessels because of the reduced cost of civilian work and also, according to the navy minister, in order to encourage the industry. The leading private yard was Lage & Irmãos, later the Companhia Nacional de Navegação Costeira (CNNC), which continued to receive contracts in ensuing years. As a result of a plea by the CNNC in 1915, the government eliminated import duties on naval construction materials, and subsequently it established a system of cash prizes for ships built domestically. Having pressed several Lage vessels into government service during the war, the Bras administration persuaded Congress in 1918 to help defray the cost of new facilities for the CNNC, whose defense work continued throughout the 1920s.52 The aviation industry, of course, was in its infant stage everywhere, so it was apparently not until the late 1920s that serious discussion of the feasibility of domestic production began. In mid-1927 the FMM urged the establishment of a plant to build airplanes designed to use French engines, and the army’s air director pushed the idea, suggesting that the high command try to interest civilian entrepreneurs.53
In the broad view of the evolution of Brazil’s military-industrial complex, the Old Republic looms as a key period not so much because of the statistics of production (which are not available) and actual material achievements, but because of the emergence then of a growing realization of the need for greater defense modernization and autonomy. It was also during that period that important questions about defense production were first raised and answers supplied that, by and large, would satisfy ensuing generations. That more was not accomplished was the result primarily of factors beyond government control. The take-off in military production and military-civilian industrial cooperation had to await increased centralization of political authority, the onset of true industrialization, and the recruitment of broader sectors of the political and industrial elites to the cause of military autonomy, developments that would occur under the stimulus of depression and war during the Vargas era.
The intensified official campaign to develop a national industrial-military capacity after 1930 was a function in large part of elite perceptions of the somber challenges of the period. The aggressive behavior of Japan in Asia, Italy in Africa, and Germany in Europe posed, in the eyes of both military and civilian leaders, an implicit threat to Brazil, and instability in South America, where war raged between Bolivia and Paraguay for three years, was an immediate and grave menace. Brazilian analysts attributed to historic adversary Argentina major responsibility for that conflict, which they regarded as part of a systematic encirclement policy on the part of Buenos Aires that was intended to weaken Brazil politically and economically. At the same time, Argentina’s energetic military buildup was cause for special disquiet.54
Brazil’s own capabilities remained extremely limited and military spokesmen worried constantly about the armed forces’ lack of equipment and weaponry. “We are disarmed and Argentina’s military superiority over us is incontestable …" exclaimed Chief of Staff Tasso Fragoso in 1931. The civil war the following year laid bare the military’s logistical weaknesses, and throughout the remainder of the decade the high command sounded a constant alert about the lack of preparedness, a phenomenon stressed by foreign experts as well. Minister of War Eurico Dutra summed up the pervasive disgruntlement in 1938 when he labeled the army “a painful fiction. ”55 If the army was ill-equipped for combat, the navy was virtually useless. Comparative analyses of Brazilian and Argentine strength left policy-makers bitterly pessimistic. The nation’s maritime defense, warned the Estado-Maior da Armada (EMA) in 1931, rested “almost exclusively’’ on the two prewar battleships since the rest of the units simply had “no value. ” The maneuvers of 1935 revealed the pathetic condition of most of the fleet, leading Admiral Henrique Guilhem, the minister of navy, to warn Vargas in 1936 that it was “no longer a factor of combat.”56
The need for matériel of all kinds was patent, but the options remained limited. The first priority, because of the speed of execution and domestic industrial weakness, was to place orders abroad, but national experience in this regard continued to be frustrating. The navy met with irritating rebuffs in 1931 and 1932 when it sought aid from the United States and British governments, and a new naval program in 1933-34 met with similar problems. The State Department actively discouraged United States shipbuilders from bidding for contracts, arguing that Brazil’s expenditures might spur a naval race in South America and would reduce the amount of money available to that country for “necessary purposes. ” The attitude of European governments was less paternalistic, but difficulties arose when Brazil’s financial situation forced it to insist on barterlike (compensation) arrangements that would allow it to pay for ships essentially with raw materials, which brought negotiations back to square one.57
Washington’s attitude seemed to change in 1935 when certain officials, including Franklin Roosevelt, gave repeated assurances that Brazil would be able to purchase soon-to-be-decommissioned cruisers. Early in 1936, however, Argentine authorities got wind of the negotiations, and their protests, coupled with the worsening European situation, led Washington to renege on its pledges to Brazil, causing a resentful Vargas government to sound London about acquiring destroyers and to close contracts with Italian builders for three submarines.58 The final humiliation in naval negotiations with the United States came in 1937 when, after proposing to lease six aged destroyers to Brazil, the Roosevelt administration once more backed down because of an outcry from Buenos Aires. Disillusioned Brazilian authorities immediately opened talks with European suppliers, signing contracts at the end of 1937 for the construction of three destroyers in England. But here, too, the disadvantages of dependence were made painfully clear: less than three weeks after the outbreak of World War II, the Foreign Office informed Itamaraty that the British government had requisitioned the destroyers.59
The army’s experience with dependence during the period was likewise frustrating. The São Paulo revolt in 1932 forced army leaders to scramble to acquire munitions and hardware abroad. The French government, bowing to public pressure, refused to honor a contract for ammunition, while the State Department delayed delivery of airplanes in order to avoid “embarrassing incidents,” such as the bombing of towns. In all, Rio de Janeiro placed orders in eight countries, but did not take delivery of the vast bulk of the matériel until the fighting was over.60 Efforts to acquire artillery during the general era were similarly disappointing. Financial problems caused lengthy delays in negotiations and it was not until 1937 that the first contract for field artillery was signed with Krupp, which agreed to deal on a compensation basis. The following year Krupp received a major contract for delivery of approximately 900 pieces of artillery over six years, but once again Brazilian plans ran afoul of foreign troubles: Berlin in 1940 requisitioned important segments of the orders, while the British blockade hindered, and ultimately prevented, shipments of other consignments for which Rio de Janeiro had made advance payments.61
The primary reason that Brazilian interest in German arms remained keen after war had spread across Europe was that there were no alternative suppliers. Washington, despite its heavy pressure on Rio de Janeiro after 1939 to participate effectively in its hemispheric defense program and despite firm promises from Roosevelt himself that it would help equip Brazil’s armed forces, failed to provide effective assistance until 1942. All that the War Department offered in 1939-40 were small British-made mobile guns of World War I vintage that had never been fired, for which there was neither ammunition nor ballistic information available, and which United States ordnance experts admitted were earmarked to be “cut up and sold as junk. ”62 So desperate was Brazil’s situation that Rio de Janeiro nonetheless ordered nearly a hundred of the cannon. It then took Washington over a year to deliver them and it was not until late 1942 that Brazil succeeded in obtaining 6,000 rounds of ammunition from England. Aside from these weapons, the only modern matériel sent to Brazil by the United States before Pearl Harbor consisted of “a few searchlights and a token shipment of automotive equipment and light tanks.”63
Brazilian leaders made no secret of their resentment at being led down what Chief of Staff Pedro de Góes Monteiro called a “trail of promises” during 1940-41—the ambassador in Washington complained in “scathing” terms to the State Department at one point in 1940—and in 1942, after breaking relations with the Axis in January, their disgruntlement heightened. Dutra not only complained to Vargas, but vented his irritation within the officer corps as well.64 Eventually, after a fitful start in which the State Department worked hard to overcome the reluctance of harried War Department planners, United States aid finally started to flow, albeit slowly and not in the quantities desired by Brazilian authorities, who found themselves forced into the war in August by German submarine attacks.65
What made arms dependence all the more unpalatable was the knowledge that Brazil’s defense supplies were governed by the interests of other governments and could be jeopardized by events beyond its control. The Italo-Ethiopian crisis combined with a desire on Washington’s part to appease Argentina, for example, had blocked the transfer of United States ships in the mid-1930s. The European war then had interrupted the delivery of ships and cannon. And the very existence of arms negotiations with Washington after 1939 was primarily a function of United States and not Brazilian strategic concerns; i.e., the sudden United States interest in Brazilian defense stemmed from preoccupation with the northeastern bulge, which Washington judged vulnerable to Nazi machinations aimed at the United States, whereas the chief threat to Brazil, in the eyes of planners in Rio de Janeiro, came from Argentina.66 Washington’s anxiety about the Axis challenge in Brazil became even more dramatic after Pearl Harbor, which was the motive for the renewed commitment to arm Brazil. But what would happen if the United States priorities changed? When Allied forces landed in North Africa in November 1942, virtually eliminating the remote possibility of an Axis intrusion into the Northeast, Brazil’s bargaining power plummeted. Leitão de Carvalho, now a general and Brazil’s senior military negotiator in Washington, quickly alerted Vargas to probable difficulties in obtaining hardware as a consequence, setting in motion a process of discussion that culminated in a proposal by Rio de Janeiro early in 1943 to prepare an expeditionary force for possible service in Europe—all as a means of ensuring continued deliveries of United States arms to bolster defenses vis-à-vis Argentina.67 Rio de Janeiro, in other words, was compelled to undertake a major policy demarche, one that it had not planned to make, because of its dependence upon a foreign power for the means of national defense.68
Despite that gambit, Brazil’s participation in the war obviously was incidental to victory. Late in 1943 United States military spokesmen cautioned that the demands of more urgent theaters would have to be satisfied before Brazil’s, a possibility that once more generated alarm in Rio de Janeiro. Again Brazil’s defense preparations apparently were jeopardized by external factors beyond national control. Fortunately, in this case, Washington’s growing interest in a postwar aviation agreement, and especially sudden disquiet in the United States over a revolution in Bolivia seemingly effected with the connivance of Buenos Aires, sustained deliveries to Brazil.69 That assistance, however, failed to meet Brazilian expectations. In April 1944, Vargas wrote personally to Roosevelt reminding him of Argentine obstructionism and asking for extensive naval aid, but Roosevelt’s reply two months later was that the “strategic situation” did not permit transferral of the ships. The lesson again was clear: Brazil’s rearmament program remained at the whim of foreign strategic concerns. The end of the war in Europe drove the point home when Washington informed Rio de Janeiro that Lend-Lease assistance could be continued only to those allies at war with Japan, a warning that obligated Vargas to go through the farce of declaring war on that country in June 1945 in the vain hope of maintaining the flow of United States equipment.70
The commonsense conclusion that Brazilian leaders drew from their experience with arms dependence after 1930 was that national security demanded greater military-industrial autonomy. The Vargas government consequently launched a determined and remarkably successful campaign for general industrialization in which security considerations played an important role.71 With specific regard to defense production, Vargas, two months after taking power, promised military leaders that his regime would make “the greatest efforts” to develop war industries, and in ensuing years the need to do so became gospel in policy-making circles.72 Because of the economic crisis the accomplishments of the 1930s were modest, but a significant start was made. Early in 1931 a special military commission, headed by (Captain) Sylvio Raulino de Oliveira, was set up to survey the country’s metallurgical establishments in order to determine which might be able to furnish items to the armed forces, a move that helped to define needs and possibilities. The Pirelli affiliate in São Paulo, for example, displayed an interest in military contracts for electrical and rubber articles, while the Belgo-Mineira reported that, with the proper equipment and government financial assistance, it could manufacture cannon and machine guns.73
Later that same year Vargas created the Comissão Nacional Siderúrgica (CNS), or National Steel Commission, a mixed civilian-military body under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War, to examine the export and industrial possibilities of Brazil’s iron ore resources. Oliveira and his colleague on the metallurgical commission, (Captain) Edmundo Macedo Soares e Silva, represented the army on the CNS, whose members also included Calógeras and a naval officer. One immediate accomplishment of the CNS was to persuade Vargas to ban the exportation of scrap metals. Used steel, especially in the form of discarded rails, would be excellent raw material for artillery shells, Macedo Soares explained. The military experts felt no sense of urgency regarding implantation of the so-called grande siderurgia. Asked for an opinion about the possible revision of Farquhar’s contract, they argued emphatically that the questions of ore exports and steel should be separated. The only defense requirement that might be made of a steel concessionaire, said the CNS, after consulting the EME and EMA, would be steel for naval construction. Indeed, said the CNS in February 1932, the eight mills then operating could produce all the low-technology steel that was needed; the only impediment was a lack of markets. The high command was thus more interested in protecting and expanding existing mills than in creating a new complex. The Belgo-Mineira could meet the present requirements of army factories, wrote General Benedito Silveira, head of the EME in 1934, and long-range general military needs should be carefully gauged and then farmed out “as much as possible” to existing plants.74
In addition to the metallurgical and steel commissions, Vargas early in 1932 established another to study the feasibility of installing an aircraft plant in Brazil, but its work was interrupted by the São Paulo revolt that year. The civil war forced the central authorities to make an emergency industrial effort that required great improvisation,75 at the same time that it left government leaders all the more determined to strive for more military-industrial self-sufficiency. At the end of the conflict, new machinery was ordered from Germany to equip federal plants to make ammunition, rifle barrels, and artillery shells, and in May 1933 a special military commission sailed for Europe to make additional purchases and study war industries there. Late that same year, Vargas, explaining that a “military-industrial complex” (parque) would, besides its defense functions, serve as a stimulus to steel production and to “subsidiary civilian industries,” decreed the establishment of three new federal war plants. At the same time the aircraft study group, urged on by the EME, resumed its work.76
When Góes Monteiro, the most outspoken critic of national military weakness, assumed the portfolio of war in January 1934, one of his first acts was to instruct the commission in Europe to hasten the purchase of machinery for the new federal factories. What the government really needed, he officially told Vargas twice in March, was a national policy of autonomous defense production, and by the middle of the year his staff had devised an army reorganization scheme designed, in the twisted English of the United States military attaché, to “make Brazil as nearly self-sufficient for war materials as could be had.” To help finance the plan, Góes Monteiro’s friend General Pantaleão Pessoa, head of the Casa Militar, urged in vain the establishment of a special military fund through increased consumer taxes, remonstrating that development of defense industries was an “imperious necessity.”77 The difficulties of financing a rearmament program, of course, were what led at this time to barter negotiations with potential European suppliers.78
Within severe budget constraints, the government intensified its military-industrial program in subsequent years. Army plants, using new machinery from Germany, produced artillery shells, bombs, rifle barrels and parts, explosives, fuses, signal rockets, and gas masks in increasing quantities. The army’s air branch organized an assembly plant that by the late 1930s was turning out small numbers of planes of Brazilian design that used United States engines.79 Most of the army’s public share— secret credits were also involved—of the five-year plan that Vargas promulgated in January 1939 was earmarked for defense plants.80 The navy during this period had moved to end the hiatus in national construction since the empire by laying the keel of a monitor at the recently completed AMIC in June 1936. A year later, armed with blueprints obtained from Washington and secret credits, the Ministry of Navy began assembly of three destroyers—work enormously handicapped by a lack of skilled laborers. Over the next two years not only the monitor, but six minesweepers as well, were launched. Since shipbuilding played the major role in the navy’s long-range program, 60 percent of its share of the five-year plan was destined for the two arsenals in Rio de Janeiro, the AMIC and the old naval yard. By the end of the decade, furthermore, the navy had completed at the Galeão air base assembly of more than a score of Fokk-Wolf training planes, which it had started in 1936 with German technical assistance and engines.81
Plans for an aircraft factory matured during this period as a project of the Ministry of Transportation, headed by Colonel João Mendonça Lima. Military experts decided that it would be best to place the undertaking in the hands of private industry. They selected the future site of the plant—Lagoa Santa, a backwater village located on small lake in Minas Gerais—and in September 1938 opened public bidding. According to government terms, the contractor would have to use Brazilian materials whenever possible, give priority to official orders, and allow military and federal civilian personnel to serve apprenticeships in the factory. The only bidder was Construções Aeronáuticas, a Franco-Brazilian company in Rio de Janeiro, whose offer was accepted in September 1939.82
During the 1930s the army made significant progress toward eliminating one of the critical bottlenecks in military production: the absence of technicians. Late in 1930 it established its Escola Técnica, where many of the specialists who later staffed factories and industrial laboratories were trained. Aside from courses in metallurgy, chemistry, electricity, armaments, and the like, the Escola brought in guest lecturers—(Major) Macedo Soares spoke there on “Industrial Mobilization” in 1937—and provided field experience, i.e., visits to, and apprenticeships in, civilian firms. Since the equipment and technology for defense plants had to be imported, Dutra decided in mid-1937 to create military commissions in the major arms-exporting countries whose primary tasks included arranging technical courses or apprenticeships in foreign industries for Brazilian officers. On the eve of World War II, the high command gave priority in its technical training program to engineers who specialized in armaments, chemistry, and metallurgy.83
During the years that preceded the war, military planners defined an industrial policy that, without major modification, would remain Brazil’s approach in ensuing decades. The critical concept and goal underlying the program was “nationalization,” by which they meant not only domestic manufacture of an increasing range of articles, but all possible utilization of national raw materials or semifinished components. In 1933 the minister of war decreed that the use of imported raw materials in army plants was “definitively prohibited” except in cases of “manifest impossibility.” A “Study Committee for the Use of National Raw Materials” was set up under Oliveira to determine such cases, and thereafter army planners with increasing success pushed consumption of domestic resources. The DMB was especially anxious about such critical industrial materials as copper, lead, aluminum, and zinc, urging their production “at any price” in order to reduce imports. The relevant war plants during the mid-l93Os began using locally produced acids, lubricating oils, and low-grade steel.84 In the campaign for nationalization, the high command had in Vargas not only a firm ally, but a watchdog on the alert for lapses.85 The constitution that he announced late in 1937 to launch the Estado Novo contained an article calling for the “progressive nationalization” of all industries deemed “basic or essential to the nation’s economic or military defense,” and the terms of the subsequent bidding for the Lagoa Santa project reflected the government’s general intentions. In the spring of 1939, as the European situation worsened, Dutra instructed General Sylvio Portella, head of the DMB, to make an all-out effort to increase the use of Brazilian products, and Portella passed the word along to the directors of war plants. In dealing with civilian manufacturers, Portella added, preference should be given to those that utilized national ingredients.86
Military leaders during the 1930s studied carefully the question of the relationship between the state and private industry in the area of national defense and, in general, they reached the same conclusions that colleagues had during the Old Republic. Góes Monteiro’s plans in 1934 for “industrial mobilization” and the vital allied issue of metallurgical production prompted emphatic arguments that industrial activity was best reserved to the private sector, with the military logically assuming the role of technical superviser in the case of defense contracts. Dutra, then head of the air branch, vigorously championed the integration of civilian manufacturers into defense work, arguing, with regard to the future airplane factory, that if it could not count on domestic industrial support, it would be of little interest to national defense. Oswaldo Aranha as minister of finance (1931-34), had supported the new government war plants, but he was “radically opposed” to federal production of aircraft, artillery, machine guns, and the like. “Private industry, having guaranteed consumption, [and] with small initial favors, can and should manufacture all this and with great advantages,” he told a receptive Góes Monteiro in 1935. For General Pessoa, chief of staff that year, continued government initiative was necessary in the first stage of creating an industrial defense establishment, especially in areas of little appeal for private companies and in order to form a reservoir of technical skills. As he commented to Vargas, the state had to “take the lead and prepare officers and workers capable of adapting and utilizing private industry in time of war. ”87 The high command logically opposed the idea of an official steel company, advocating instead that, when the time came to set up a large-scale complex, the government have a controlling interest.88
To help determine what might be obtained from industry, military planners not only surveyed metallurgical installations early in the decade, but the Ministry of War also ordered the creation of a confidential register of all firms that made munitions, explosives, and arms. The army air branch, to define “air industrial mobilization” possibilities, sent questionnaires to more than 2,600 companies in 1934, and by the end of the decade its new “industrial mobilization section” maintained files on some 3,500 establishments, while the navy’s Diretoria de Armamento kept similar track of manufacturers in a position to handle defense work for the fleet.89 By the outbreak of war in Europe, army leaders divided industries into two broad categories: those that turned out only war supplies, and those that produced, or could produce, for both civilian and military consumption. The latter group, which included “especially all basic industries,” was to be left “entirely in the hands of the civilians,” although military technicians would be at the disposal of both classes of industry. The armed forces actually would prefer to leave all production to the civilian sector, Portella explained, admonishing his subordinates to take all steps to share armaments technology with private manufacturers. Aside from furnishing technical information, machines, and even engineers, the army supported cooperative firms with contracts and it endorsed their applications for tax exemptions and federal loans. The statutes of the Banco do Brasil, in fact, were modified in April 1939 to permit it to underwrite the establishment of private factories that were judged necessary for national defense by the EME or EMA and were approved by Vargas.90
A wide range of companies collaborated with the armed forces during the 1930s. When civil war broke out in 1932, military authorities, lacking virtually everything in sufficient quantities, hastily appealed to the private sector for myriad articles, from clothing to bombs. So intense was the need and the cooperation that the EME recommended creation of an emergency “technical organ especially designed to supervise industrial mobilization.” Manufacturers on the Paulista side were mobilized by the Federação das Industrias do Estado de São Paulo (FIESP), under the leadership of Simonsen, and made a prodigious effort to supply the rebel troops with everything from uniforms to makeshift armoured cars, a promising sign of military industrial potential. During Góes Monteiro’s sixteen months as minister of war, the high command actively sought to encourage firms whose activities were endorsed by the raw materials committee. A report by (Major) Oliveira’s metallurgical study group in 1934 pointed out that civilian industry could furnish the steel for rifle barrels and artillery shells, and, with the army’s technical aid and contracts, laminated nonferrous metals. In the latter regard, the committee specifically had in mind the Matarazzo organization in São Paulo, which had indicated an ability to provide laminated aluminum, copper, tin, lead, and zinc. At the same time, Dutra’s air branch gave orders to civilian manufacturers for tools, fuses, and parts; later, as minister, he awarded contracts to various suppliers, among them a manufacturer of tires and steel wheels, a steel producer, and a recently founded electrochemical company in Rio de Janeiro that used strictly national raw materials and not only received army contracts, but had its request in 1938 for a government loan endorsed by the EME and the Conselho de Segurança Nacional.91 Throughout the period the Ministry of War facilitated the importation of chemicals, acids, fuses, and other products by firms that made explosives, matches, and similar items.92 For their part, naval authorities originally wanted to farm out the construction of minesweepers to private yards, but found none in a position to do so on acceptable terms. Nonetheless, Admiral Guilhem advised Vargas early in 1940, the private sector was furnishing “a great variety” of products to the navy, and São Paulo manufacturers were going to supply all the electrical material for the destroyers the navy was then building.93
By 1940 civilian industries collaborating with the military included the electro-chemical company in Rio de Janeiro and one in Rio Grande do Sul that furnished copper items; a firm in Minas Gerais that supplied aluminum; the Laminação Nacional de Metais, a Paulista enterprise controlled by the Matarazzo interests that made semimanufactured articles and parts; the Belgo-Mineira and another mill in Minas Gerais that were selling over a hundred tons of steel a month to the army; the Companhia Nitro-Química Brasileira (CNQB), which made cellulose and was studying, with army technicians, the possible establishment of a factory to produce synthetic nitric acid; two gaúcho plants that manufactured items for weapons and munitions; four companies in São Paulo that had army contracts to supply the first nationally made machine tools; the Nansen firm in Belo Horizonte and one in São Paulo that made precision parts; a Paulista munitions plant; textile mills in Santa Catarina; Pirelli, which had a near monopoly of the manufacture of electrical transmission materials and which supplied the armed forces “on a large scale”; and the Mesbla corporation, organized that year under United States license and with military contracts, Brazil’s first parachute factory.94
The spread of war across Europe gave powerful impetus to developmentalism in Brazil, and this perforce had increasing military dimensions. War-created restrictions and possibilities now forged a broader alliance between the private sector and the military. Simonsen, speaking for the FIESP, suggested more intense cooperation in mid-1940, sparking the interest of the EME and leading to a nationwide survey of industrial facilities and stocks of raw materials by the Conselho Federal de Comércio Exterior to determine mobilization possibilities.95 “Buy domestic" was the admonition from the Ministry of War and the Conselho de Segurança Nacional to other ministries in 1941, while army spokesmen made specific appeals to industry for defense production and Portella’s DMB strove to help cooperative manufacturers secure critical raw materials from the United States.96 Following Pearl Harbor, the pressure from the high command on civilian administrators for expanded war production was continuous, and in 1942 Vargas decreed a series of measures designed to discipline the economy according to military requirements. As Góes Monteiro put it at a meeting of generals in September, the government had to increase industrial output “everywhere and by all means.”97
Military assistance to private firms during the war followed prewar guidelines, with the additional benefits of draft exemptions for workers and more intense technical aid.98 The CNQB, through the army’s influence, obtained special freight rates, tax exemptions, a Banco do Brasil loan, and a contract for gun cotton. Later in the war the army worked out an arrangement with the CNQB, whose majority stockholder was the Klabin family in São Paulo, for establishment of a trotyl plant and vigorously defended the project against the argument of Finance Minister Artur Souza Costa that it would be best to create a state monopoly of munitions production.99 In another instance, the Ministry of War offered one Roland Laraque a contract to establish an arms and machinery factory. The contract, ratified by the Conselho de Segurança Nacional, obligated him to maintain a workers’ training school, allow army apprentices to work in the factory, and import only items not available in the domestic market; in return, he was to enjoy exemption from import duties and would have guaranteed government orders during a sixteen-year period.100 In other cases the army championed loans for chrome, zinc, copper, and aluminum plants, pushed long-term contracts for artillery shells with a Paulista firm to which it rented United States Lend-Lease machinery, for detonators and shell casings with the Nansen company, and for grenade casings with a steel mill.101 To replace its antiquated Hotchkiss automatic weapons, the army in 1943 devised a plan for the manufacture of Madsen machine guns by Laminação Nacional de Metals.102 During the same period the Ministry of War, interested in binoculars and range-finders, threw full weight behind a civilian engineer named Décio Vasconcellos, who first landed a contract to make telescopes and then elaborated, with military support, plans to set up an optical instruments factory.103
The Lagoa Santa project had possessed military dimensions from the very beginning. The contract between the Ministry of Transportation and Construções Aeronáuticas, signed in 1940 for the building of the Fábrica Nacional de Aviões (FNA) was a fifteen-year cost-plus arrangement. The government guaranteed the company a 15 percent profit on its orders and granted it the standard exemptions from sales and import taxes. After its creation in January 1941, the Air Ministry placed an officer in charge at Lagoa Santa and used special credits to speed up construction. The plan was to start assembling and gradually manufacture, under license with the North American Aviation Corporation, single-engine primary trainers beginning late in 1943. Supply shortages in the United States, political problems,104 and financial difficulties caused delays, but by the end of the war the FNA had started to turn out planes for the Air Ministry, which had increased its orders and made advance payments in order to help the company.105
Activity in federal war plants was substantial, as output reached an all-time high in 1942 and then increased another 60 percent the next year.106 The high command became involved in several new federal or federally controlled projects, most actively of course in those that promised some tangible military benefits within a relatively short period. The famous Volta Redonda steel enterprise, in part a Ministry of Transportation undertaking, was not an immediate priority of military leaders, but they supported it. Army technicians, such as Macedo Soares, were involved in early negotiations with Washington for loans, equipment, and technical assistance, and (Colonel) Oliveira, who also took part in those negotiations, was invited in 1942 to become vice-president of the Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional, a mixed enterprise organized to execute the project. “The purchase of its equipment,” the colonel wrote to Vargas, “is for the country’s economic defense what that of armaments is for its military [defense].”107 Plans for a national engine factory, the Fábrica Nacional de Motores (FNM), bore fruit during the war, despite difficulties in importing United States equipment. Colonel Antonio Guedes Muniz, an army engineer, was the driving force behind the project, which belonged to the Ministry of Transportation and was designed to turn out Curtiss-Wright engines.108
Late in the war the high command’s major industrial goal was the acquisition of complete arms factories from the United States, a possibility raised by Brazilian negotiators in Washington in 1943. Dutra and his advisers wanted to avoid further direct state undertakings, if possible, so they sounded civilian firms about running any such factories and the response was positive. The Conselho de Segurança Nacional was enthusiastic about the venture, judging it a “very rare” opportunity to reduce dependence on “problematical” foreign suppliers. Once again the Ministry of Finance suggested that the projected factories might better be run as “state or para-state” enterprises, but Vargas backed the military.109 The plan was included the following year in joint negotiations with Washington for weapons standardization, but then United States interest in the scheme dissipated with the end of the war.110
Elite perceptions of external challenges and national needs changed little in the period of renewed international instability generated by the collapse of Germany and Japan in 1945. The world, Foreign Minister João Neves da Fontoura wrote in 1946, “is mad, with few possibilities of cure. The Cold War, with its manifold repercussions around the globe, was an ominous development. “We are going through a period similar to that which preceded Munich … ,” warned Aranha from his new post at the United Nations in 1947, voicing widespread conviction in Brazilian policy-making circles.111 Military leaders during the Dutra presidency (1946-50) attentively followed East-West antagonisms and feared another general conflagration; at least, they sensed, the West was in for a protracted siege. The outbreak of war in Korea in 1950 only deepened their pessimism.112 Within the hemisphere the historic threat from La Plata assumed sharper profile as the Juan Perón regime aggressively sought to forge a neutralist bloc of Spanish-speaking countries as a counterweight to Brazilian and United States influence. Especially disturbing were Argentina military preparations, including the continued expansion of defense industries.113 If the threat remained clear, so did the necessary response: just as in the crisis-laden prewar years, Brazil had to beef up its armed forces and modernize its equipment.114
The national experience with arms dependence also did not change in the postwar era, much to the disgruntlement of Brazilian leaders. Negotiations with the North Americans in 1944-45 had raised hopes, hut Lend-Lease aid quickly dried up. By December 1945 the new navy minister was complaining that Washington’s attitude had “modified the situation completely,” while a Ministry of War spokesman cautioned the United States embassy that resentment was festering within the high command over the delay in executing rearmament commitments, a sign that Washington was “inclined to treat Brazil as a small brother, rather than an important nation pledged to full military cooperation.” As the State Department and Congress successfully fought against a program of postwar military aid to Latin America, Brazilian dissatisfaction heightened. While Argentina was expanding its military potential, Minister of War Canrobert Pereira da Costa groused in 1947, Brazil was still waiting for matériel “solemnly promised” by Washington more than two years before.115
The Korean crisis laid bare once more the various disadvantages of dependence. The high command hoped to capitalize on United States insistence on emergency hemispheric mobilization to transform Brazil, with Washington’s aid, into the “second great industrial center” of the Americas, one that could supply finished goods to ourselves and to our allies, including the United States.” The Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas, a postwar creation then headed by Góes Monteiro, foresaw expanded production of not only steel, textiles, chemicals, machinery, and nonferrous metals, but a wide range of arms and munitions as well. All three services elaborated specific industrial requests: the air force wanted raw materials and semimanufactured items in order to continue building planes at Lagoa Santa and Galeão, and it sought machinery to enable the FNM to turn out “vital parts” for airplane engines and combat cars; the army hoped to acquire equipment, loans, and technology to develop nonferrous metals and increase production of arms and munitions; and the navy placed priority on equipment to make cannon, torpedoes, depth charges, mines, and electronic apparatuses.116 United States mobilization, however, made acquisition of materials for war plants both problematical and expensive, if not impossible.117 Hardware, too, especially on a preferential basis, was difficult to secure. In one revealing episode, it took a direct complaint to President Hairy Truman to close a contract for two used cruisers promised before the Korean conflict began; even so, actual delivery was made only after much greater delay and cost than originally projected because of the war-generated demands on United States repair yards.118 None of the plans formulated by Navy Minister Renato Guillobel (1951-54) to purchase ships from the United States proved feasible, a fact that led him at one point to threaten not to renew the contract of the United States Naval Mission. As for the army, its difficulties in obtaining matériel were compounded by Rio de Janeiro’s refusal to contribute troops for the United Nations effort in Korea.119
Dissatisfaction with dependence on the United States in the postwar period led to intensified efforts to diversify sources of supply, as well as to expand domestic military production. The army in 1947 opened negotiations with Bofors, the Swedish armaments firm, for artillery, subsequently placing orders, and later it prodded the government about trying to obtain Krupp arms to fulfill the prewar contracts. During Vargas’s second presidency, after unsatisfactory discussions with Washington, the air force in 1952-53 purchased sixty jet fighters from Great Britain on a compensation basis, with cotton the item of exchange. And Admiral Guillobel, in his frustration over financial difficulties and fruitless pleading with United States authorities, acquired landing craft and transport vessels in compensation transactions with Holland and Japan, and he ordered warships from France.120
The real goal, however, remained the achievement of greater military-industrial autonomy, an oft-heard theme of postwar elite commentaries. The admonition by General João Amorim e Mello, secretary-general of the Conselho de Segurança Nacional in 1949, that steps be taken to remove all obstacles to national industrialization reflected military priorities.121 The central idea behind the establishment of the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG) that year was that industrialization was the key to national security. “Consequently,” recalled General Idálio Sardenberg, one of the organizers of the ESG, “the country needed to create the means by which it could manufacture its weapons in the future.” The goal of the ESG, which became the most influential articulator of the ideology of development, was to inculcate, particularly among civilian elites, the doctrine that national security and industrialization were inseparable. In other words, the message that the ESG sought to transmit to political and business circles was, as Sardenberg put it: “We need to have national arms and we want you to help us in this regard. We believe that, freeing ourselves from the importation of arms, we will be a country with greater international authority.”122 That conviction, of course, underlay the decision to give priority to industrial cooperation in talks with Washington regarding mobilization to meet the Korean crisis.123 “What we want and aspire to,” Minister of War Newton Estillac Leal publicly explained in 1952, “is a Brazil that with its own means satisfies its defense needs.” Vargas, the following year, candidly said that his development program had “security” as one of its main objectives and that the Conselho de Segurança Nacional “continuously” studied the “civilian,” i.e., industrial, aspects of that linkage.124
The strategy of military-industrial development in the postwar period followed closely the guidelines established earlier. It now became rigid policy of the services, for example, before placing orders abroad or authorizing the importation of war-related materials by private firms or police agencies, to try to locate a suitable domestic product. 125 Because much of Brazil’s hardware was United States-made or, in the case of the navy and air force, constructed in Brazil with United States materials, and because some machinery and industrial raw materials were not available inside the country, they were not always successful,126 but the point is that domestic industry had priority in the armed forces’ procurement policies. Technical expertise was a central ingredient in military self-sufficiency; the army, consequently, strove to improve its technical training program, creating specialized courses in war matériel, for example, and it sent larger numbers of engineers to Europe and the United State.127 The Ministry of War at the same time imported European technicians and engineers for its defense plants. “Although the state should not be the main producer of war matériel,” Pereira da Costa wrote in justification, “… to the state falls the study of prototypes and the analysis of the effects of weapons and their modifications, using ... its factories as laboratories for experimental industrial production.”128 An important postwar endeavor was establishment of the Marambaia weapons-testing center, an “essential element” of a military-industrial sector, said Góes Monteiro, who, as minister of war in 1946, also created a new Departamento Técnico e de Produção do Exército (DTPE) to oversee defense production.129
Efforts to cut technological corners were not always successful. The high command’s keen interest in importing from Germany, France, and the United States complete factories for making arms, steel, and military vehicles, for instance, brought no immediate results, probably because army leaders could find no civilian entrepreneurs willing to face the responsibility and risks in assuming ownership, as Pereira da Costa insisted. 130 To avoid “our remaining tributaries of the North American market,” the army hoped to obtain “a few” munitions plants from the United States, but the State Department’s reluctance and postwar inflation forced a reduction of the scope of the program to machinery for a single plant and also delayed the undertaking until the early 1950s.131 An army plan in 1949 to purchase 30,000 semiautomatic Belgian rifles did clear the Conselho de Segurança Nacional and the Ministry of Finance without great difficulty because the proposed contract called for the cession of patents, blueprints, and machine tools to permit local manufacture.132 The high command attached special significance to the contract with Bofors for antiaircraft guns because it included a similar provision and thus would make it possible, Pereira da Costa exulted in 1947, for the army to “create” a national cannon industry. The contract also allowed Brazilian army officers to undergo technical training in Bofors plants in Sweden. The AGRJ early in 1954 turned out the first cannon and by the end of that year “three great industrial establishments” were working on the initial order of fifty guns.133
Naval planners during the postwar years concentrated first on finishing construction of six destroyers begun earlier by the Lage yard. Several smaller vessels were also built in the “new” Arsenal da Marinha, a fusion of the AMIC and the old arsenal, and by 1950 the high command had formulated plans for torpedo and artillery factories,134 the latter becoming a pet project of Guillobel, who negotiated with Bofors for the arming of the corvettes purchased from Holland and for the cession of patents so that future artillery could be manufactured in Brazil. The transfer of technology, in fact, became a cardinal principle in Guillobel’s negotiations with foreign suppliers. The contracts for corvettes and landing craft awarded to Japanese and Dutch firms required standardization of motors and the opening of a branch factory for the manufacture of spare parts, while the agreement for French warships stipulated that half the vessels would be assembled in Brazil and that all of them would be armed with Bofors guns.135 As for the Air Ministry, its major endeavors were establishment of the Parque Aeronáutico in São Paulo and construction of the Centro Técnico da Aeronáutica in São José dos Campos (São Paulo), which, according to the 1946 project, would include “great laboratories for the development of industries in general” and which was completed in 1953.136
The armed forces continued to figure prominently in mixed ventures such as the Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional, where various army engineers were assigned and which (General) Oliveira eventually headed.137 The FNM, under a plan devised by (General) Muniz, was transformed in the late 1940s into a mixed company with the state controlling a majority of the shares. While continuing to do repair work on aircraft engines, the FNM began converting to the production of agricultural machinery, truck motors, and automotive parts. Then, with an army colonel as president of the company and another colonel and admiral on the board of directors, it signed a contract with Alfa-Romeo for the assembly and gradual manufacture of trucks, in increasing stages of nationalization beginning in 1952. The first year, with equipment and technical assistance from the Italian corporation, the FNM turned out a thousand trucks. In mid-1953, furthermore, it signed a contract with an Italian consortium led by Fiat for the manufacture of tractors.138 The interest of the military in petroleum development has been assessed, but it is worthy of note here that the president of the Conselho Nacional de Petróleo was an army colonel.139
Civilian manufacturers benefited substantially from the assistance or interest of the armed forces during the first postwar decade. Contacts between the military and industry were continuously broadened. In view of the widespread international instability, the high command intensified its now permanent study of the mobilization and conversion potential of private industry, extending significantly its statistical coverage in 1950.140 Military and industrial representatives worked closely together on various agencies and councils involved in promoting general economic development, such as the Conselho Federal de Comércio Exterior, directed by General Anápio Gomes in the late 1940s, the Joint Brazil-United States Development Commission (1950-53), the ESG, of course, and the Comissão de Desenvolvimento Industrial (CDI), established in 1951. Colonel and soon-to-be-general Carlos Berenhauser Júnior was president of the CDI’s subcommittee charged with stimulating “nonexistent or insufficient” industries, a group whose members included (General) Macedo Soares and that actively encouraged import substitution.141 It was a subcommittee headed by Commander Lúcio Meira that drew up the plan in 1952 for creating an automobile industry by imposing progressive restrictions on imports of automotive parts and banning after July 1953 the importation of complete vehicles.142
Admiral Guillobel, both as director of the AMIC during the Dutra presidency and subsequently as minister, insisted as a matter of policy on leaving manufacturing activities to civilian firms. In the 1950s he pressed for and obtained a special Naval Fund, which in part was intended to stimulate industry through naval procurement. The Fund was never as large as the navy desired, but Guillobel and his subordinates assiduously cultivated closer ties with the private sector, opening a purchasing office in São Paulo and holding personal meetings and discussions with industrial representatives.143 The Air Ministry continued to support the Lagoa Santa plant with contracts in the postwar period, and it also granted orders for light planes to a new company set up in São Paulo.144
The Ministry of War, working through its new Diretoria de Fabricação (Department of Manufacturing), a division of the DTPE, naturally intensified its efforts to integrate key elements of the private sector into its industrial program. “The cooperation of private industry is gaining daily in importance and becoming increasingly more necessary … ,” Pereira da Costa commented to Dutra early in 1949.145 In one case, the high command pushed through a Banco do Brasil loan for a Paulista machinery firm that had agreed during the war to set up a plant for the manufacture of artillery casings, made advance payments on orders, insisted in 1948 on a multiyear contract for the company, and, in effect, kept it afloat in the early 1950s despite its general financial weakness and the strong opposition of the Banco do Brasil.146 Another São Paulo enterprise that had established a small branch for producing grenade casings received successive contracts as well as army backing for import tax exemptions and cargo space on federal railroads.147 Engineer Décio Vasconcellos, destined to be a pioneer in the optical instruments field, landed a ten-year contract for binoculars at the end of the war. The Ministry of War also smoothed the way for him to bring over Italian and German technicians, while General Pereira da Costa personally wrote to the governor of São Paulo in support of Vasconcellos’s bid for state financing and intervened to facilitate importation of equipment for the firm. By 1950 Vasconcellos had supplied more than 18,000 sets of binoculars to the army and was employing 250 technicians. When he asked the government to increase its orders, the EME argued that it was a “patriotic duty” to assist him.148
During this same period the Ministry of War, among other steps to aid individual establishments, urged sales tax exemptions for its orders with ammunition companies;149 worked out a plan with the CNQB for the expanded production of caustic soda and synthetic nitric acid;150 supported another firm engaged in a similar venture by giving it contracts, ensuring that it received scarce fuel oil, and endorsing its imports of materials;151 purchased electrical items from Pirelli;152 placed repeated orders with Nansen for grenades;153 provided technical assistance to a company that wanted to start manufacturing industrial explosives, and gave contracts to several others for fuses, shells, grenades, and arms;154 licensed myriad firms all over the country, including Matarazzo, to import special industrial raw materials;155 pressed Itamaraty and the Ministry of Labor for work permits and visas for European technicians destined for private industry;156 and offered general encouragement to producers of aluminum, steel, special textiles, and glass.157
Some of the above-mentioned and similar measures encouraged, and others were a result of, the formulation by the EME of a broad plan late in the Dutra administration for civilian manufacture of war materiel. The matter was urgent from a military standpoint, said the EME, and would bring general “economic advantages” in the form of reduced dependence. Both the Ministry of Finance and the Conselho de Segurança Nacional, which late in 1949 had called for general measures of support for industries “of interest to national security,” blessed the plan early in 1950.158 Details of the program are not known, hut its execution required funds, and correspondence among the high command, the Ministry of Finance, and Vargas reveals constant budgetary problems. Indeed, early in 1954 Minister of War Cyro Espírito Santo Cardoso pleaded for the creation of a Special National Defense Fund to overcome the difficulties in meeting the army’s needs. Vargas at this time reported that private firms had received military contracts the previous year totaling more than 56 million cruzeiros, but budgetary impediments still threatened manufacture of war items in ensuing months, at least in the quantities sought by army leaders. Vargas’s last minister of war complained strongly in June about cuts in army allocations and warned that the “rhythm” of defense production inevitably would be lessened.159
By the end of the Vargas era something important clearly had occurred in the military-industrial sector during the preceding quarter of a century. Before the Revolution of 1930, Brazil neither built nor assembled airplanes, naval construction was exceedingly limited, and its few arms and munitions plants were poorly equipped, inadequately manned, and their range of activities severely circumscribed, focusing primarily on small arms cartridges and weapons repair. The role of the private sector in defense production was minimal, and was limited to light manufactures and low-technology items. Under the impact of grave international challenges in the 1930s and 1940s, however, national leaders gave systematic emphasis to industrial “mobilization” as a means of strengthening the country against external threat. The supreme goal of autonomy was a distant one, but at every hand they sought to reduce dependence on overseas arms’ markets whose interests, history had demonstrated, often diverged from Brazil’s. The collaboration of private industry was judged vital to a modern system of national defense; indeed, military authorities throughout the first half of the century were firmly opposed, both as a matter of principle and on practical grounds, to extensive state industrial activity. That was why, especially after 1930, military authorities, while expanding the output of indispensable federal plants, energetically strove to attract an increasing variety of private firms to defense work through contracts, loan endorsements, tax favors, and technical assistance. Directly responsible for defense tasks, the high command logically stressed industrial projects with more immediate military application. In Vargas’s case, a long-range vision of economic greatness conditioned his policies and allocation of resources, but he was also acutely sensitive to the urgent necessity of defense production and in that regard he and his military counselors marched shoulder-to-shoulder. By the mid-1950s an array of civilian factories was cooperating with the armed forces, and projects such as the automotive industry were under way that would open up new dimensions for military production. Clearly the experience of World War II and the manifold threats posed by the Cold War had convinced increasing segments of the elite that it was necessary to give an industrial character to national preparedness. The Vargas era was thus crucial to the definition of the concept of “security and development,” Brazil’s national motto since the 1950s.
David Harvey, “Latin America and North American Arms,” Defense & Foreign Affairs Digest, 7 (1979), 16.
Joaquim Nabuco to D. Alves Ribeiro, Nov. 6, 1899; Nabuco to Nilo Peçanha, Oct. 15, 1906, Arquivo Nacional (hereinafter cited as AN), Rio, Joaquim Nabuco Papers; Brazilian Minister (Washington) to Ministério das Relaçōes Exteriores (hereinafter cited as MRE), Jan. 31, May 18, 1900, Palácio Itamaraty (Rio), Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty (hereinafter cited as AHI); Brazilian Minister (Montevideo) to Baron of Rio Branco, Nov. 27, 1902; Nabuco to Rio Branco, Sept. 2, 1902, Jan. 18, 1908, AHI, Rio Branco Papers; Federal Deputy Laurindo Pita, speech, June 7, 1904, in Julio Noronha, Programa Naval de 1904 (Rio, 1950), p. 155; Gen. Pedro Ivo Henriques, Os Arsenaes de Guerra da República (Rio, 1912), p. 11; Lt. Col. Augusto Villeroy, memo, July 20, 1908, Ministério da Guerra (hereinafter cited as MG), Rio, Arquivo do Exército (hereinafter cited as AEX); Ambassador Domicio da Gama (Washington) to João P. Calógeras, Nov. 23, 1911; Gama to Hermes da Fonseca, Dec. 29, 1911, Instituto Histórico Geográfico e Brasileiro (hereinafter cited as IHGB), Rio, Domicio da Gama Papers (hereinafter cited as Gama Papers).
Percy A. Martin, Latin America and the War (Baltimore, 1925), pp. 30-106; Thomas E. Skidmore, Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought (New York, 1974), pp. 149-161; Adm. Carlos Souza e Silva to MRE, Apr. 21, 1925, AHI; Stanley E. Hilton, “Brazil and the Post-Versailles World: Elite Images and Foreign Policy Strategy, 1919-1929,” Journal of Latin American Studies (hereinafter cited as JLAS), 12 (Nov. 1980), 342-344.
MRE to Brazilian minister (Santiago), Nov. 22, 1901, AHI; Brazil, Câmara dos Deputados, Mensagens Presidenciaes (hereinafter cited as Mensagens), 4 vols. (Rio, 1912-22), I, 364, II, 19; Rio Branco to Minister of War (hereinafter cited as MW), Mar. 9, 1906, AEX; Afonso M. Pena to Fonseca, June 24, 1908, AN, Afonso M. Pena Papers (hereinafter cited as AMP); Rio Branco to José Carlos Rodrigues, Aug. 21, 1908, IHGB, José Carlos Rodrigues Papers (hereinafter cited as JCR); Rio Branco to Pena, Dec. 11, 1908, AN, Afonso Pena Jr. Papers (hereinafter cited as APJ).
Minister of Navy (hereinafter cited as MN) to Rio Branco, Mar. 12, 1904; Rio Branco to MN, May 2, 1904, Mar. 11, July 27, 1905, AHI; Rio Branco to MW, Feb. 8, 1908, AEX; E. Bradford Burns, The Unwritten Alliance: Rio Branco and Brazilian-American Relations (New York, 1966), pp. 40-49.
MRE circular, Aug. 23, Dec. 10, 1927, AHI; Hilton, “Brazil and the Post-Versailles World,” 346.
Seward Livermore, “Battleship Diplomacy in South America, 1905-1925,” Journal of Modern History, 16 (Mar. 1944), 31–45; Fonseca to Pena, Feb. 22, 1908, AMP; Ruy Barbosa to Pena, May 7, 1908, AMP; Burns, Unwritten Alliance, pp. 143, 185.
Estado-Maior da Armada (hereinafter cited as EMA) to MN, May 28, 1915, Ministério da Marinha (hereinafter cited as MM), Rio, Arquivo da Marinha (hereinafter cited as AM); Brazilian Military Attaché (Buenos Aires) to Estado-Maior do Exército (hereinafter cited as EME), Oct. 2, 1917, Oct. 12, 1918, AEX; Souza e Silva, memo, Nov. 10, 1917, Museu da República (Rio), Nilo Peçanha Papers (hereinafter cited as NP); Souza e Silva, memo (“A Situação Sul-Americana”), Aug. 1918, AHI.
Souza e Silva to MN Raul Soares, Aug. 10, 1920, Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea (hereinafter cited as CPDHC), Rio, Raul Soares Papers (hereinafter cited as RS); United States Military Attaché (Rio) to War Department (hereinafter cited as WD), May 23, 1922, July 30, 1925, National Archives (hereinafter cited as NA), Washington, Record Group (hereinafter cited as RG) 165, Records of the WD General Staff, docs. 2657-K-13, 2006-6-1; Gen. Nestor Passos to Artur Bernardes, Aug. 6, 1926, APJ; Hilton, “Brazil and the Post-Versailles World,” 348-350.
Frederick M. Nunn, “Military Professionalism and Professional Militarism in Brazil, 1870-1970: Historical Perspective and Political Implications, ]LAS, 4 (May 1972), 33; Gen. Miguel Girard to Prudente de Morais, July 22, July 24, 1897; Gov. M.F. de Campos Salles (São Paulo) to Morais, July 28, 1897; Gen. Artur Andrade Guimarães to MW, Aug. 5, 1897, IHGB, Prudente de Morais Papers. See, too, Raimundo de Menezes, Vida e Obra de Campos Salles (São Paulo, 1974), pp. 136—137; Celis Debes, Campos Salles: Perfil de um Estadista (São Paulo, 1977), pp. 71-72; Tristão de Alencar Araripe, Expedições Militares contra Canudos: Seu Aspecto Marcial (Rio, 1960), p. 221.
Fonseca to Pena, Oct. 12, 1906; Rodolfo Paixão to Pena, Dec. 9, 1907, AMP; Rio Branco to Gama, Dec. 15, 1908, Gama Papers; Mensagens, I, 284-285, 339, 362-363; Commander, Division of North, to EMA, Apr. 5, 1918; EMA to MN, June 22, 1918, AM. On the campaign in the south, see José Maria Bello, A History of Modern Brazil 1889— 1964, trans, by James L. Taylor (Stanford, 1966), p. 224.
Calógeras, Problemas de Administração: Relatório Confidential Apresentado em 1918 ao Conselheiro Rodrigues Alves […], 2d ed. (São Paulo, 1938), p. 119; Augusto Tasso Fragoso to Military Attaché Alfredo Malan (Paris), Mar. 10, 1919, in Tristão de Alencar Araripe, Tasso Fragoso: Um Pouco de Historia do Nosso Exército (Rio, 1960), p. 481; Calógeras to Epitácio Pessoa, Jan. 4, 1922, IHGB, Epitácio Pessoa Papers (hereinafter cited as EP). Cf. Souza e Silva to Soares, Apr. 2, 1920, RS; MG, Relatório Apresentado ao Présidente da República [… ] 1920 (Rio, 1920), p. 28. For additional insights into the military’s effectiveness during this general period, see Frank D. McCann, Jr., “The Nation in Arms: Obligatory Military Service during the Old Republic,” in Dauril Alden and Warren Dean, eds., Essays Concerning the Socioeconomic History of Brazil and Portuguese India (Gainesville, 1977), pp. 211-243.
Hilton, “Brazil and the Post-Versailles World,” 346-347.
The story is told in Neil Macaulay, The Prestes Column: Revolution in Brazil (New York, 1974). As the campaign dragged on, one general expressed the fear that the idea of federal military inadequacy was “taking root in the public mind.” Passos to Bernardes, Aug. 6, 1926, APJ. For a field commander’s lament about material deficiencies, see Gen. Alvaro Mariante to MW Fernando Setembrino de Carvalho, May 19, 1926, AEX.
MM, Relatório […] 1906 (Rio, 1906), p. 5; Brassey, The Naval Annual 1909 (Portsmouth, 1909), p. 39; Brassey, The Naval Annual 1914 (Portsmouth, 1914), p. 58; MM, Relatório […] 1920, p. 27; MG, Relatório […] 1901 (Rio, 1901), pp. 152-153; Gerhard Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien 1889-1914 (Cologne, 1971), pp. 265-266.
Hermes da Fonseca Filho, Maréchal Hermes (Rio, 1961), pp. 75-79; MW to Brazilian Military Commission in Europe, Feb. 17, Apr. 10, Apr. 29, 1909, June 10, 1911, AEX; Calógeras to MRE, May 31, 1920, AHI; memo (“Stellungnahme der Fried. Krupp …”), n.d. [19381, NA, Department of State (hereinafter cited as DS), Microfilmed Records of the German Foreign Ministry (hereinafter cited as RGFM), roll 229, frame 194559; Gerhard Brunn, “Deutscher Einfluss und deutsche Interessen in der Professionalisierung einiger lateinamerikanischer Armeen vor dem 1. Weltkrieg (1885-1914),” Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas, 6 (1969), 332, 334.
MW to Minister of Finance (hereinafter cited as MF), Jan. 11, Mar. 2, May 5, June 15, 1916; Calógeras to Diretor de Contabilidade (MG), Oct. 31, 1919, AEX; Col. Anápio Gomes, “O Problema do Equipamento,” Revista de Intendenda, 16 (Jan.-Feb. 1942), 5.
Calógeras to Brazilian Military Commission in Europe, Jan. 3, 1922, AEX; Pantaleão da Silva Pessoa, Reminiscências e Imposições de uma Vida, 1885-1965 (Rio, 1972), p. 54.
Calógeras to Brazilian Military Commission in Europe, Jan. 23, 1920; Passos to EME, May 17, 1927, AEX; Nelson Lavanère-Wanderley, História da Força Aérea Brasileira, 2d ed. (Rio, 1975), pp. 33, 60, 67, 78, 99.
MF to Pena, Nov. 18, Dec. 7, 1905; Calógeras to Pena, Nov. 29, 1905; Pena to Senator João Pinheiro da Silva, Dec. 11, 1905; Pena to David Campista, Aug. 3, 1908, May 5, 1909; Brazilian Chargé (Paris) to Pena, Oct. 30, 1908; Sen. Arnolfo Azeredo to Pena, Aug. 12, 1908; Pena to MN, Nov. 11, 1908; Fonseca to Pena, Nov. 15, 1908, AMP; Rio Branco to Gama, Dec. 15, 1908, Gama Papers.
United States Naval Attaché (Rio) to Office of Naval Intelligence, Apr. 12, 1923, RG 59, General Records of the DS, doc. 832.34/177; Rothschild & Sons to Rodrigues, Jan. 12, 1915, JCR; José Caetano de Faria to Setembrino de Carvalho, Jan. 29, 1915, CPDHC, Fernando Setembrino de Carvalho Papers (hereinafter cited as FSC). On the financial crisis of the 1920s, see Annibal Villela and Wilson Suzigan, Política do Governo e Crescimento da Economia Brasileira, 1889-1945 (Rio, 1973), p. 155.
E. Pessoa, “Os Trabalhos da Ilha das Cobras,” [ornai do Comércio (Rio), Apr. 16, 1933; Bernardes to Setembrino de Carvalho, Oct. 27, 1922, FSC; Bernardes to Soares, Nov. 23, 1922, RS; Artur Bernardes, Mensagem Apresentada ao Congresso National […] 1925 (Rio, 1925), pp. 99-100; Gen. Hastimphilo de Mount (Diretoria de Material Bélico [hereinafter cited as DMB]) to MW, Feb. 1, 1924, AEX; Setembrino de Carvalho, Memorias: Dados para a Historia do Brasil (Rio, 1950), pp. 262-263; Tasso Fragoso, “A Revolução de 1930,” in Araripe, Tasso Fragoso, p. 525.
Capt. Pargas Rodrigues, “Matériel de Artilharia Francez e Alemão,” A Defesa National (hereinafter cited as ADN), I (Jan. 1910), 117.
Murilo Ribeiro Lopes, Bui Barbosa e a Marinha (Rio, 1953), pp. 120-121; MG, Relatório […] 1900 (Rio, 1900), pp. 57-58; Comissão Técnica Militär, memo, Apr. 28, 1906, NP; ADN, I (Feb. 10, 1914), 165; ADN, I (Mar. 10, 1914), 206.
Egydio Castro e Silva, As Indústrias Militares em Nosso País: Conferências no Clube Militarem 1916 (Rio, 1940), p. 86; MW to Brazilian Military Commission in Europe, May 11, 1909, June 10, 1921, AEX.
Mensagens, III, 294; MM, Relatório […] 1920, p. 27.
This happened, for example, in the case of two battleships sent to the United States for refurbishing at the end of World War I, where small cannons were installed, but once the initial stock of projectiles had been fired, it proved impossible, despite lengthy negotiations, to obtain more, which forced the navy to seek suppliers in Europe. In another instance, a United States firm sold torpedoes to the navy in 1923, but none of them was test-fired for more than two years because the company failed to deliver the explosive charge. Secretary of Navy to DS, June 29, 1928, RG 59, 832.34/207.
Foreign Minister (hereinafter cited as FM) to MW, Jan. 28, 1915, AEX; MG, Relatório […] 1916 (Rio, 1916), p. 9; MG, Relatório […] 1917 (Rio, 1917), pp. 12-13.
United States Chargé (Rio) to DS, Apr. 13, 1917; Secretary of War to DS, July 30, 1917; DS to United States Chargé (Rio), Aug. 8, 1917, RG 59, 832.24/8, 20; Lt. Col. Alípio Gama (Comissão Militär Brasileira de Estudos e Compras nos Estados Unidos), “Primeiro Relatório Parcial […] Julho de 1918,” (typewritten), AEX; MW to FM Peçanha, Jan. 4, Nov. 4, 1918, NP; Calógeras to Brazilian Military Commission in Europe, Mar. 22, Mar. 23, Apr. 25, 1921, AEX; Calógeras to MRE, May 31, 1920; MRE to Brazilian embassy (Paris), June 25, 1920, AHI.
ADN, I (May 10, 1914), 241-242; ADN, 2 (Oct. 10, 1914), 31.
DS, Foreign Relations of the United States 1924, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1939), I, 323-326 (hereinafter cited as FRUS, year).
MN to FM, Apr. 20, 1922; Admiral José Penido (Paris) to MRE, July 15, 1922; Souza e Silva to FM Felix Pacheco, Apr. 15, 1924, Mar. 4, 1925; Pacheco to Ambassador Afrânio de Melo Franco (Geneva), June 13, 1925, AHI; unsigned memo (“Opinião Naval Brasileira sobre a Limitação de Armamentos”), n.d. , Felix Pacheco Papers (private), Rio; Estevão Leitão de Carvalho, Memórias de um Soldado Legalista, Tomo II (Rio, 1962), pp. 144-145.
MG, Relatório […] 1903 (Rio, 1903), p. 7; Mensagens, I, 619, II, 32, 371, III, 37, 135, 292, 477, 485; MG, Relatório […] 1915 (Rio, 1915), p. 13; MG, Relatório […] 1916, p. 9; MG, Relatório [… ] 1917, p. 13; Boletim Mensal do Estado Maior do Exército, 11 (Jan.-Feb. 1917), 7.
Mensagens, IV, 77, 188, 314, 443; Col. Francisco Moraes (Intendente da Guerra), "Relatório Apresentado ao Director de Administração da Guerra […] no Anno de 1919” (mimeo), AEX; Capt. Artur Pamphiro, “Indústria Militar,” ADN, 10 (Feb. 10, 1923), 551-552; Setembrino de Carvalho, Memórias, p. 242; Souza e Silva to MRE, Apr. 15, 1924, AHI; MM, Relatório […] 1924 (Rio, 1924), pp. 9-10, 53-54; MM, Relatório […] 1925 (Rio, 1925), pp. 48-50; Bemardes, Mensagem […] 1926 (Rio, 1926), p. 152.
João P. Magalhães, A Evolução Militar do Brasil (Rio, 1958), pp. 336-337; Mensagens, I, 515; Egydio Castro e Silva, A Margem do Ministério Calógeras (Rio, 1962), pp. 181-182; Castro e Silva, Indústrias Militares, pp. 83-87; MG, Relatório […] 1901, p. 233; ADN, I (May 10, 1914), 258-259, (Aug. 10, 1914), 366.
Estevão Leitão de Carvalho, Discursos, Conferêndas e Outros Escritos (Rio, 1965), pp. 207, 210; Mensagens, II, 371.
MG, Relatório […] 1901, pp. 153, 178; Mensagens, I, 284, 338, 516; MG, Relatório […] 1911 (Rio, 1911), p. 88; Castro e Silva, Ministério Calógeras, pp. 186-187; Mensagens, III, 477.
MM, Relatório […] 1900 (Rio, 1900), p. 63; Thiers Fleming, Λ Mudança do Arsenal de Marinha do Rio de Janeiro (Rio, 1914), pp. 13—22, 129-168; Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco, Rodrigues Alves: Apogeu e Declínio do Presidencialismo, 2 vols. (Rio, 1973), II, 486-488.
Thiers Fleming, O Novo Arsenal de Marinha na Ilha das Cobras (São Paulo, 1927), pp. 21, 30; memo (“Proposta dos Snrs. Armstrong, Whitworth and Co. Ltd. e Vickers Ltd.”), May 22, 1918; British minister to Peçanha, June 18, 1918, NP; Mensagens, IV, 314; Fleming to Soares, Jan. 17, 1920; Souza e Silva to Soares, June 23, 1920, RS; Presidential Secretary to E. Pessoa, Feb. 9, Apr. 1, 1921, EP; Pessoa, “Os Trabalhos da Ilha das Cobras.”
MG, Relatório […] 1903, p. 7; Mensagens, I, 514; MG, Relatório […] 1907 (Rio, 1907), p. 13; MG, Relatório […] 1916, p. 10; Castro e Silva, Ministério Calógeras, pp. 30—32.
Calógeras, Problemas de Administração, p. 66; Calógeras to Col. José Leite de Castro (Paris), Mar. 6, 1922, AEX; Mensagens, IV, 629; Thiers Fleming, Carvão, Munições e Navios (Rio, 1927), p. 49.
Mensagens, III, 477; MM, Relatório […] 1924, p. 9; Fleming, Carvão, passim.
MG to MF, Feb. 17, June 3, 1916; Calógeras to Delegado do Tesouro Brasileiro (London), Jan. 31, Mar. 20, 1920, AEX; Castro e Silva, Ministério Calógeras, pp. 147-174; Castro e Silva, Indústrias Militares; Calógeras to Pena, July 29, 1899, AMP; MG (Calógeras), Relatório […] 1920, p. 52; Calógeras to E. Pessoa, n.d. , Mensagens, IV, 629.
Calógeras to Pena, Nov. 1, 1906, Apr. 2, 1907, Aug. 8, 1908, AMP; Câmara dos Deputados, [Resolution] N. 197-1907, NP; Fonseca Filho, Marechal Hermes, pp. 189-190; Castro e Silva, Indústrias Militares, pp. 53-54; Capt. Duarte Huet de Bacellar, lecture (“Indústria de Guerra e Marinha de Guerra”), Escola Naval, May 28, 1902, in Duarte Huet de Bacellar, Problemas Navais (Rio, 1952), p. 38; MM, Relatório […] 1904, p. 19 (annex); MM, Relatório […] 1917 (Rio, 1917), p. 4; MM, Relatório […] 1918 (Rio, 1918), pp. 24, 26.
Lt. Col. Democrito Silva to Fonseca, Dec. 14, 1908; Antonio Mendes Teixeira to Leite de Castro, Mar. 17, 1931, AEX; Fleming, Carvão, p. 70.
MG, Relatório [… ] 1919, pp. 33-40; Elysio de Carvalho, Brasil Potência Mundial (Rio, 1919), p. 5; Mensagens, III, 37, 477, IV, 78, 188; Bernardes, Mensagem [. .,]1926, p. 152; Law 4632, Jan. 6, 1923, Collecção das Lets [… ] do Brasil de 1923, 2 vols. (Rio, 1924), I, 36; Memorial Apresentado pela Itabira à Comissão Militar de Estudos Metalúrgicos, n.d. ; Teixeira, memo (“Ante-Projeto de uma Usina Siderúrgica em Angra dos Reis”), Dec. 11, 1922, AEX. For a survey of steel development during the period, see Humberto Bastos, A Conquista Siderúrgica no Brasil (São Paulo, 1959), pp. 101-129. On Percival Farquhar and the Itabira project, see Charles A. Gauld, The Last Titan, Percival Farquhar (Stanford, 1964).
Câmara dos Deputados, [Resolution] N. 197-1907, NP; MG (Fonseca), Relatório […] 1908 (Rio, 1908), p. 89; Henriques, Os Arsenaes de Guerra, pp. 5-10; Castro e Silva, Indústrias Militares, pp. 125-127; Calógeras, Problemas de Administração, pp. 98-101; Teixeira, “Ante-Projeto.” Editorialists for the nationalist military review ADN, launched by the “young Turks" before the war, energetically opposed state industrial activity in the 1920s, arguing instead that public authorities, in the case of defense-related manufactures, should make “judicious concessions” to private entrepreneurs. “Necessidades Industrials da Defesa Nacional—A Indústria Civil e Militar e os Arsenaes de Guerra,” ADN, 10 (Apr. 10, 1923), 570-571.
Bacellar, “Indústria Siderúrgica e Marinha de Guerra,” p. 38; Bacellar, “O Novo Arsenal de Marinha,” Jornal de Comércio, Feb. 24, 1906, in ibid., p. 43; Fleming to [?] Marques, Apr. 12, 1912, in Fleming, A Marinha de Guerra em 1912 (Rio, 1954), p. 17; Fleming, Carvão, p. 54; MM, Relatório […] 1924, pp. 54—57.
MG, Relatório […] 1900, p. 54; MW to MF, June 2, June 8, June 12, 1893, AEX; MM, Relatório […] 1913 (Rio, 1913), pp. 59-69 (annex); Leitão de Carvalho, Memorias, I, 202; memo (“Cópia da Demonstração Enviada ao Congresso Nacional …”), Sept. 12, 1921, EP.
JJ. de Queiroz Júnior (Usina Esperança), memo, July 10, 1909, NP. Among other things, Queiroz Júnior asked for prepaid orders, customs favors, and free transportation on federal railroads.
Mensagens, III, 477; Calógeras to Diretor de Contabilidade (MG), Dec. 18, 1919, Jan. 6, Feb. 26, 1920, AEX; Castro e Silva, Ministério Calógeras, pp. 89-115; Roberto Simonsen, A Construção dos Quarteis para o Exército (São Paulo, 1931).
Fleming, Carvão, pp. 76-78, 97-98, 106-107; MM, Relatório […] 1900, p. 65; Henrique Lage to MF, May 5, 1921, EP.
Mission Militaire Française, “Rapport au sujet de l’aviation: Programme de matérial et organisation de la fabrication nationale” (typewritten), June 28, 1927; Mariante (Diretoria de Aviação) to MW, June 22, Aug. 2, Oct. 15, 1928; EME to MW, Feb. 23, 1929, AN, Pedro de Góes Monteiro Papers (hereinafter cited as PGM).
Brazilian Naval Attaché (Buenos Aires) to EMA, May 12, June 3, 1936, AM; Brazilian Ambassador (Buenos Aires) to MRE, July 28, 1936, Mar. 9, 1939; Brazilian Ambassador (Berlin) to MRE, May 19, 1936, Aug. 14, 1937, May 7, 1938, MRE to MG, Feb. 25, 1932, July 31, 1937, Mar. 3, 1938, AHI. Elite perceptions of general international conditions in the 1930s are documented in Stanley E. Hilton, Brazil and the Great Powers, 1930-1939: The Politics of Trade Rivalry (Austin, 1975), pp. 5-15.
Tasso Fragoso to MW, Oct. 29, 1931, IHGB, José Carlos de Macedo Soares Papers (hereinafter cited as JCMS); MW to MF Oswaldo Aranha, Dec. 12, 1932, CPDHC, Oswaldo Aranha Papers (hereinafter cited as OA); Gen. Pedro de Góes Monteiro to Getúlio Vargas, Aug. 29, 1934; Gen. João Gomes Ribeiro to Góes Monteiro, Oct. 29,1935, PGM; Gen. Eurico Dutra to MF Artur Souza Costa, Feb. 10, 1938, CPDHC, Artur Souza Costa Papers (hereinafter cited as ASC). See, too, Hilton, Brazil and the Great Powers, pp. 111—121.
Admiral Augusto Souza e Silva to FM Afrânio de Melo Franco, Jan. 7, 1931, Bibilioteca Nacional (Rio), Afrânio de Melo Franco Papers (hereinafter cited as AMF); EMA to MN, Oct. 29, 1931, JCMS; MM (Henrique Guilhem), “Relatório […] 1936” (typewritten), n.d. [Jan. 8, 1937], AN, Coleção Presidência da República (hereinafter cited as PR).
EMA to MN, Nov. 6, 1931, JCMS; MN to MRE, Nov. 24, 1931; Brazilian Ambassador (Washington) to MRE, Dec. 1, 1931; Brazilian Ambassador (London) to MRE, Dec. 23, 1931, Dec. 30, 1932, AHI; United States Ambassador (Rio) to DS, Dec. 1, 1931; DS to United States Ambassador (Rio), Dec. 1, 1931; DS memoranda, Dec. 6, 1933, Mar. 15, Aug. 15, 1934, RG 59, 832.24/213, 236; Public Records Office (London), Records of the Foreign Office (hereinafter cited as RFO), docs. A1417/979/6, A8064/979/6, A7797/979/6, A1658/267/6; J. Samuel White & Co. to Souza Costa, Sept. 19, 1934, ASC; Stanley E. Hilton, “Military Influence on Brazilian Economic Policy, 1930-1945: A Different View,” HAHR, 53 (Feb. 1973), 78-80.
Aranha (Washington) to Vargas, Jan. 18, May 3, May 28, 1935, Jan. 10, Feb. 27, 1936, CPDHC, Getúlio Vargas Papers (hereinafter cited as GV); Ambassador Alexander Weddell (Buenos Aires) to DS, Mar. 18, Mar. 20, 1936, RG 59, 832.24/264, 265; Weddell to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Mar. 20, 1936; Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles to Hull, Mar. 31, 1936, Library of Congress, Cordell Hull Papers, box 38, folder 88; Welles to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Mar. 25, 1936, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (Hyde Park), Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers (hereinafter cited as FDR), Official File 366; Aranha to Vargas, May 27, 1936, OA; Ambassador Hugh Gibson (Rio) to Welles, July 17, 1936, Hoover Institute (Stanford), Hugh Gibson Papers, box 48, Welles folder; EMA to Guilhem, June 17, 1936, AM; MRE to Brazilian Ambassador (London), Sept. 3, 1936, AHI; British Naval Attaché (Rio) to Director of Naval Intelligence (London), Oct. 28, 1936, RFO 371, A987/251/6. On the Italian contract, see Hilton, “Military Influence,” 89-90.
Aranha to Vargas, July 19, 1936; Vargas to Aranha, July 21, Aug. 6, 1936, GV; Macedo Soares to Vargas, Jan. 26, 1937; Welles to Macedo Soares, Feb. 10, 1937, JCMS; Souza Costa to Aranha, Aug. 18, 1937, OA; Brazilian Ambassador (Berlin) to Auswärtiges Amt, Aug. 12, 1937, BGFM 229/194511; MM, “Relatório […] 1937-1938-1939” (typewritten), AM; British Ambassador to MBE, Sept. 18, 1939, AHI. The general outlines of the destroyers episode of 1937 are traced in Bryce Wood, “External Restraints on the Good Neighbor Policy,” Inter-American Economic Affairs, 16 (Autumn 1962), 3-24.
EME to MW, July 12, 1932, AEX; MW to Aranha, July 21, July 31, 1932; Aranha to Banco do Brasil (hereinafter cited as BB), July 27, Aug. 10, Aug. 18, Aug. 25, Sept. 3, 1932, OA; MW to FM, July 23, July 28, Aug. 16, Aug. 25, AEX; DS memo, Sept. 7, 1932, RG 59, 832.248/64; United States Military Attaché (Rio) to WD, Feb. 2, 1933, Jan. 1, 1934, RG 59, 832.24/78. 87.
Hilton, Brazil and the Great Powers, pp. 118-129, 186-190; German Ambassador to FM Aranha, Apr. 11, 1940, AHI; Aranha to Vargas, Jan. 2, 1941, OA; Dutra, “Boletim Especial Secreto,” n.d. [Jan. 1941], GV; British Ambassador to Aranha, Dec. 6, Dec. 15, 1940, AHI. According to Dutra, Brazil took delivery of only one-eighth of the 1938 contract, yet it made payments valued at 35 percent more than the materiel received. Souza Costa to Vargas, Aug. 1943, PR. On the British blockade and German arms shipments to Brazil, see Frank D. McCann, Jr., The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937-1945 (Princeton, 1973).
Aranha to Vargas, Feb. 14, 1939; Monteiro to Vargas, July 7, 1939; George C. Marshall to Góes Monteiro, Oct. 5, 1939, GV; Lt. Col. Lehman Miller to Lt. Col. [?] Buchman, Sept. 11, 1939, George C. Marshall Institute (Lexington, Va.), George C. Marshall Papers, box 58, folder 13; Herbert Feis (DS) to Welles and Hull, Oct. 30, 1939, RG 59, 832.24/180; Ordnance Office (WD) to Assistant Chief of Staff, Feb. 14, 1940, RG 165, 309-T-25.
Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense (Washington, D.C., 1960), pp. 268, 271, 302.
Góes Monteiro to Dutra, Nov. 13, 1940, MG (Rio), Arquivo do EME (hereinafter cited as AEME); DS memo, Aug. 27, 1940, RG 59, Office of American Republics Affairs, Brazil Memoranda, vol. 3; Góes Monteiro to Dutra, Aug. 28, 1940; Dutra to Vargas, Nov. 20, 1940, Feb. 25, 1942, AEME; Miller to Lt. Col. Arthur Wilson (WD), quoted in Wilson to Marshall, May 12, 1941, Marshall Papers, 58/14; MG (Dutra), "Boletim Especial Secreto n. 10," Mar. 23, 1942, OA.
Dutra to Souza Costa, Mar. 24, 1942, AEME; Air Minister Pedro Salgado Filho to Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, Oct. 27, 1942; Salgado Filho to Adm. Jonas Ingram, Oct. 29, 1942, AN, Pedro Salgado Filho Papers (hereinafter cited as PSF).
The closest thing to a national war plan that Brazil possessed was one elaborated in 1937-38 and predicated on a surprise attack by Argentina, and from the beginning of politicormilitary negotiations with Washington in 1939, Brazilian army leaders insisted on their concept of strategic priorities. Aranha, wartime foreign minister, candidly told Caffery in mid-1941 that his major worry was that Argentina might attack Brazil if the latter openly sided with the United States against Germany. Hilton, “Military Influence,” 88; Stanley E. Hilton, “Brazilian Diplomacy and the Washington-Rio de Janeiro ‘Axis’ during the World War II Era,” HAHR, 59 (May 1979), 211; Caffery to DS, July 16, 1941, RG 59, 810.20 Defense/1329.
L. Carvalho to Vargas, Nov. 27, 1942; L. Carvalho to Aranha, Dec. 23, 1942, Jan. 27, 1943; Dutra, memo, Jan. 6, 1943 (with Vargas notation); Vargas to L. Carvalho, Mar. 29, 1943; L. Carvalho, “Relatório dos Trabalhos da Delegação do Brasil à Comissão Mista de Defesa Brasil-Estados Unidos” (typewritten), June 1943; Dutra to L. Carvalho, July 17, 1943, IHGB, Estevão Leitão de Carvalho Papers (hereinafter cited as ELC). See, too, L. Carvalho’s A Serviço do Brasil na Segunda Guerra Mundial (Rio, 1952), passim.
The expeditionary force, true, would bring postwar political benefits, but at the time there was little enthusiasm at the policy-making level for the venture. See, for example, Salgado Filho to Gen. Eduardo Gomes, Oct. 6, 1943, PSF; Góes Monteiro to Dutra, Dec. 10, 1943, ELC.
Carvalho to Dutra, Nov. 20, 1943; Carvalho to Aranha, Feb. 15, 1944, ELC; Hull to Roosevelt, Jan. 18, 1944; Roosevelt to Hull, Jan. 12, Jan. 14, 1944, FRUS, 1944, 7 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1965-67), VII, 567-569.
Vargas to Roosevelt, Apr. 13, 1944; Roosevelt to Vargas, June 8, 1944; Vargas to FM Pedro Leão Velloso, May 26, June 5, 1945; Leão Velloso to Vargas, May 30, 1945, GV.
Stanley E. Hilton, “Vargas and Brazilian Economic Development, 1930-1945: A Reappraisal of His Attitude Toward Industrialization and Planning,” Journal of Economic History, 35 (Dec. 1975), 758, 769-771.
Getúlio Vargas, A Nova Política do Brasil, 11 vols. (Rio, 1938^5), I, 85. For commentaries on the need for defense-related industries, see P. Pessoa, memo, n.d. [Oct. 1932]; P. Pessoa to Vargas, Feb. 17, 1934, Pantaleão Pessoa Papers (private), Rio; Aranha to Vargas, Mar. 25, 1933, GV; Góes Monteiro, interviews, O Jornal (Rio), Nov. 5, 1933, Jornal do Comércio, Jan. 20, 1934; Góes Monteiro to Vargas, Jan. [?], 1934, GV; Góes Monteiro to Vargas, Mar. 9, Mar. 12, 1934, PGM; EME to MW, Nov. 3, 1933, PR; Gen João Castro Junior (DMB) to MW, Feb. 5, 1935, AEX; Souza Costa, lecture (“Mobilização e Finanças de Guerra”), EME, Oct. 23, 1937, ASC.
MG, Departamento de Pessoal, Boletim do Exército, 19 (Jan. 25, 1931), 158; Pirelli S.A./Companhia Nacional de Condutores Elétricos, “Resposta ao Questionário da Comissão Militär de Estudos Metalúrgicos,” n.d. ; [Belgo-Mineira], memo (“Matériel de Guerre”), n.d. , AEX.
Edmundo Macedo Soares e Silva to MW, Aug. 31, 1931; Comissão Nacional Siderúrgica, memo, Feb. 11, 1932; Comissão Nacional Siderúrgica to Monteiro, Mar. 2, 1934, AEX; Gen. Benedito Silveira (EME) to Góes Monteiro, Mar. 21, 1934, PGM.
Capt. Victor Carvalho e Silva, memo, Jan. 26, 1932, PR; EME to DMB, July 23, Aug. 29, 1932; DMB, bulletin, Aug. 3, 1932; MW to Minister of Transportation, Oct. 13, 1932, AEX.
MW to Aranha, Sept. 27, 1932; DMB to Haupt & Cia., Oct. 13, 1932, OA; MW to FM, May 24, 1933, AHI.
Góes Monteiro to Comissão Militär Brasileira na Europa, Jan. 18,1934; Góes Monteiro to Vargas, Mar. 9, Mar. 12, 1934, PGM; United States Military Attaché (Rio) to WD, June 2, 1936, RG 165, 2724— K—5/3; P. Pessoa notebook, P. Pessoa Papers; Pessoa, Reminiscendas, pp. 159-160.
J. Samuel White Co. to Souza Costa, Sept. 19, 1934, ASC; German Minister (Rio) to Auswärtiges Amt, Jan. 14, Jan. 28, 1935, RGFM 4465/226276, 226287; Comissão de Estudos para a Instalação de uma Fábrica de Aviões (hereinafter cited as CEIFA) to FM, MN, MW, Feb. 18, 1935, JCMS.
United States Military Attaché (Rio) to WD, Mar. 17, June 2, 1936, RG 165, 2006-142/4, 2724-K-5/3; MG, Relatório […] 1938 (Rio, 1938), p. 72; MG, Relatório Apresentado […] pelo […] Diretor da Aeronáutica do Exército, 1939 (Rio, 1940), pp. 7-8, 11-12, 28.
Dutra to Vargas, n.d. [Jan.-Feb. 1939], PR; Hilton, “Military Influence,” 93-94.
MM, “Relatório […] 1936”; MM, “Relatório […] 1937-1938-1939,” AM; United States Navy Department to United States Naval Mission (Rio), Nov. 11, 1935, NA, RG 80, L11-7/E712; Brazilian Charge (Washington) to MRE, Apr. 16, 1937, AHI; Souza Costa to Vargas, May [?] 1939, PR.
MG, Diretor de Aviaçāo (Dutra), “Relatório Anual 1934,” (typewritten), AEX; CEIFA to FM, MN, MW, Feb. 18, 1935, JCMS; United States Military Attaché (Rio) to WD, Oct. 21, 1936, Dec. 27, 1938, RG 59, 832.248/145, 170; Ministerio da Viação e Obras Públicas, concorrência Pública para o Establecimento de uma Fábrica de Aviões (Rio, 1938); Caffery to DS, June 2, Sept. 22, 1939, RG 59, 832.248/196, 205.
MG, Inspetoria Geral do Ensino, “Relatório Sumário do Ano de 1937,” (mimeo), annexed to Gen. Pedro Cavalcanti de Albuquerque to Dutra, Mar. 17, 1938; Dutra to Director, Departamento de Pessoal (MG), July 28, 1937; DMB, Boletim 190 (Aug. 14, 1939), AEX.
Boletin do Exército, n. 30 (May 31, 1933), p. 1148; MG, Relatório [… ] 1936, pp. 92-93; United States Military Attaché (Rio) to WD, June 2, 1936, RG 165, 2724-K-5/3; MG, Relatório […] 1940, Secreto, AEME.
See, for example, Souza Costa to MW, Mar. 30, 1935, June 22, 1936, ASC.
Article 144, Constituição dos Estados Unidos do Brasil, 1937 (Rio, 1937), p. 39; DMB, Boletim 85 (Apr. 11, 1939), AEX.
MN to Vargas, Nov. 17, 1932, OA; Góes Monteiro to Vargas, Mar. 12, 1934 (with enclosure), PGM; MG, Diretor de Aviação (Dutra), “Relatório Anual 1934”; Aranha to Góes Monteiro, Mar. 29, 1935; Góes Monteiro to Aranha, June 5, 1935, OA; P. Pessoa to Vargas, Oct. 3, 1935, GV.
Silveira to Góes Monteiro, Mar. 21, 1934, PGM; MM, Relatório […] 1935, p. 2.
MW to DMB, Dec. 2, 1932, AEX; MG, Diretor de Aviação (Dutra), “Relatório Anual 1934"; MG, Relatório […] pelo […] Diretor da Aeronáutica, 1939, p. 12; MM, “Relatório […] 1937-1938-1939.”
Sylvio Raulino de Oliveira, memo, July 5, 1940, AN, records of the Conselho Federal de Comércio Exterior (hereinafter cited as CFCE), box 81, file 1060; “Crédito Agrícola e Industrial,” O Observador Econômico e Financeiro, 5 (Dec. 1940), 135.
Comissão de Compras (MG) to Diretor de Intendência (MG), Sept. 7, 1932; EME to DMB, Aug. 26, 1932, AEX; Clovis de Oliveira, A Indústria e o Movimento Constitucionalista de 1932 (São Paulo, 1956); Góes Monteiro to Companhia Nickel do Brasil, May 28, 1934; Góes Monteiro to Vargas, June 7, 1934; Comissão Militar de Estudos Metalúrgicos, memo (“Necessidades Imediatas do Exército”), n.d. (annexed to Góes Monteiro to Vargas, Mar. 12, 1934), AEX; MG, Diretor de Aviação (Dutra), “Relatório Anual 1934”; Souza costa to Dutra, Oct. 23, 1937, ASC; Companhia Eletro-Química Fluminense to Vargas, Apr. 27, 1938; Companhia Eletro-Química Fluminense, memo, Jan. 18, 1939, OA.
See, for example, MW to FM, Jan. 21, Feb. 26, 1932, Jan. 6, Jan. 12, 1938, Jan. 13, Jan. 27, 1939, AEX.
MM, “Relatório […] 1937-1938-1939.”
Oliveira, memo, July 5, 1940, CFCE 81/1060; Capt. Arnaud Veloso, “Fardamento e Equipainento,” Revista de Intendência, 16 (Sept.-Oct. 1942), 628; memo (“A Pirelli S.A. em Face do Decreto n. 4166”), May 22, 1943, OA; Caffery to DS, Aug. 28, 1940, RG 59, 832.24/248.
Oliveira, memo, July 5, 1940, CFCE 81/1060; Conselho Federal de Comércio Exterior, memo, July 5, 1940; Conselho Federal de Comércio Exterior to Monteiro, Sept. 10, 1940, CFCE 82/1060.
Conselho de Segurança Nacional (hereinafter cited as CSN), circular to ministries, July 29, 1941, PR; O Estado de São Paulo, July 18, 1941; Gen. Sylvio Portella (DMB) to Aranha, Apr. 29, 1941, AHI.
Dutra to Souza Costa, Dec. 11, 1941, Mar. 24, 1942; Dutra to Vargas, Feb. 22, Feb. 25, 1942, AEME; MG (Gabinete), memoranda, Mar. 19, July 9, Sept. 5, 1942; EME, minutes, Sept. 21, 1942, AEX.
MG (Gabinete), memoranda, Apr. 30, Nov. 6, 1941; Dutra to Vargas, Jan. 21, 1942; Dutra to CSN, May 26, 1943; Dutra, Aviso 219, Jan. 27, 1944, AEX.
United States Vice-Consul (São Paulo) to DS, Jan. 27, 1940; Caffery to DS, Mar. 8, 1940, RG 59, 832.24/198, 204; Souza Costa to Vargas, Jan. [?], July [?], 1943, PR; MG (Gabinete), memoranda, Feb. 3, June 6, 1944, Jan. 4, 1945, AEX.
Souza Costa to Vargas, May [?], Sept. [?], 1941, PR; MG (Gabinete), memoranda, May 29, Aug. 6, Dec. 11, 1941, AEX.
Souza Costa to Vargas, Jan. [?], May [?], 1942, June [?], 1943, PR; Dutra to Vargas, Dec. 2, 1943, AHI; MF to Dutra, Nov. [?], 1946, PR.
Welles to Secretary Henry Stimson, Apr. 28, 1943; Stimson to Welles, May 8, 1943, RG 59, 832.24/1578; Souza Costa to Vargas, June [?], Oct. [?], 1944, PR.
MG (Gabinete), memoranda, Dec. 23, 1943, June 1, 1944, Mar. 3, 1945, AEX; Souza Costa to Vargas, Apr. [?], Dec. [?], 1944, PR.
René Couzinet, founder of Construções Aeronáuticas, was on the State Department’s list of undesirable aliens and was finally forced to turn his holdings over to a Matarazzo-controlled company. Welles, memo, Oct. 19, 1942; DS memo, Dec. 30, 1942, RG 59, 832.24/448, 460; Couzinet to Salgado Filho, Dec. 10, 1942, PSF.
“Fábrica Nacional de Aviões,” O Observador Econômico e Financeiro, 7 (June 1942), 27-28; Souza Costa to Vargas, Feb. [?], 1942, PR; Col. Vasco Alves Secco (Washington) to Salgado Filho, Nov. 17, 1942, PSF; Marshall to L. Carvalho, Dec. 12, 1942, ELC; Lavanère-Wanderley, Historia da Força Aérea, p. 331.
Dutra to Vargas, Mar. 18, 1942; Dutra, Portaria 5862, Jan. 4, 1944, AEX; Dutra to Souza Costa, Apr. 12, 1944, AEME.
Soares e Silva to Minister of Transportation João Mendonça Lima, July 26, 1941; Soares e Silva to Export-Import Bank, Oct. 16, 1941, PR; Oliveira to Vargas, Oct. 24, 1942, GV.
Antonio Guedes Muniz to Salgado Filho, Feb. 19, 1941, PSF; Muniz to Mendonça Lima, July 12, Sept. 19, Oct. 3, 1941, PR; DS memoranda, Dec. 28, 1943, Jan. 21, 1944; Hull to Caffery, Apr. 18, 1944, RG 59, 832.248/295, 496, 498A; Souza Costa to Vargas, Jan. [?], 1945, PR.
CSN to Vargas, Feb. 27, 1943; Souza Costa to Vargas, Aug. , 1943, PR.
CSN to Vargas, July 20, 1944, Apr. 17, 1945; Souza Costa to Vargas, Oct. 26, 1944, PR; Gen. Alvaro Fiuza de Castro to Joint United States-Brazil Military Commission, Nov. 27, 1944; Air Ministry memo, Jan. 22, 1945; Salgado Filho et al., memo (“Missões e Pianos da Força Aérea Brasileira”), Apr. 12, 1945, PSF.
João Neves da Fontoura to Góes Monteiro, Aug. 9, 1946, PGM; Aranha to FM Raul Fernandes, Sept. 25, 1947, OA. For similar commentaries, see Fernandes to Aranha, Nov. 16, 1947, OA; Hildebrando Acioly (MRE) to Aranha, Oct. 8, 1947, Hildebrando Acioly Papers (private), Rio; MF to Dutra, Mar. 9, 1948, PR.
See, for example, Military Attaché (Gen.) Angelo Mendes Moraes (Paris) to Góes Monteiro, Jan. 29, Feb. 12, Apr. 20, 1946, PGM; Monteiro to EME, Mar. 11, 1946, AEX; Gen. Alcio Souto to Dutra, Sept. 2, 1946, PR; Gen. Oswaldo Cordeiro de Farias, speech, O Jornal, May 19, 1949; Lt. Col. J. H. Garcia, “A Outra Guerra," ADN, 37 (May 1950), 95-96; Gen. A. Castro Nascimento, “A Preparação para a Guerra," ADN, 37 (June 1950), 5-14; Gen. Aurélio de Lyra Tavares, O Brasil de Minha Geração, 2 vols. (Rio, 1976-77), I, 241-246, 259-260.
Military Attaché Cordeiro de Farias (Buenos Aires) to Góes Monteiro, Mar. 21, May 21, June 24, 1946; Góes Monteiro to Cordeiro de Farias, Mar. 21, July 10, 1946; PGM; MW Canrobert Pereira da Costa to Dutra, Feb. 5, 1947, PR; Castro Arnon de Mello, “Situação Político-Militar da Argentina e suas Relaçōes com o Brasil" (typewritten), Dec. 22, 1948, Biblioteca Nacional.
MN to President José Linhares, Dec. 2, 1945; MN to Dutra, Mar. 15, 1946, PR; Gen. Juarez Távora, Uma Vida e Muitas Lutas: Memórias, 3 vols. (Rio, 1973-76), II, 206; MW to Aranha, Feb. 24, 1947, OA; Acioly to Aranha, Mar. 13, 1947, Acioly Papers.
MN to Linhares, Dec. 2, 1945, PR; United States Chargé (Rio) to DS, Dec. 28, 1945, FRUS, 1945, 9 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1967-69), IX, 620-621; Pereira da Costa to Dutra, Feb. 5, 1947, PR. For further details, see Stanley E. Hilton, “The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War, 1945-1960: End of the Special Relationship,” Journal of American History, 68 (Dec. 1981), 601-602.
Góes Monteiro to Vargas, Mar. 7, 1951; Góes Monteiro to EME, Mar. 20, 1951, AEX.
MW to Dutra, Nov. 22, 1950; MF to Dutra, Nov. 24, 1950, July 25, Sept. 19, 1951, PR.
MF to Dutra, Nov. 17, 1950, Aug. 1, Aug. 13, Aug. 22, Oct. 17, 1951, PR; Góes Monteiro to EMA, July 30, 1951, PGM.
Renato de Almeida Guillobel, Memórias (Rio, 1973), pp. 541-543; Góes Monteiro (Washington) to EME, Aug. 3, Sept. 20, Sept. 29, 1951, PGM. Góes Monteiro was in Washington to conduct negotiations for military cooperation vis-à-vis the Korean crisis. See Hilton, “The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War,” 611.
DS memo, Oct. 24, 1945, RG 59, Office of American Republics Affairs, Brazil Memoranda, vol. 10; MW to Departamento Técnico e de Produção do Exército (hereinafter cited as DTPE), Dec. 16, 1949, AEX; CSN to Dutra, Sept. 26, June 22, 1950; MF to Dutra, Aug. 19, 1949, PR; London Times, Oct. 29, Nov. 14, 1952, Feb. 11, 1953; Guillobel, Memórias, p. 362; MM, Relatório da Comissão Fiscal da Construçâo de Navios no Japão (Rio, 1973), pp. 1-2.
Gen. João Amorim e Mello (CSN) to Dutra, Feb. 15, 1949, PR. For elite emphasis on the need to industrialize, see Cristovam Dantas, “A Despensa da Europa,” O Jornal, July 18, 1946; Lt. Col. Carlos Berenhauser, Jr., “Mentalidade Industrial, Boletim do Circulo de Técnicos Militares, 9 (June 1947), 80; MW to Dutra, Jan. 8, 1949, AEX; editorial, Correio da Manhã (Rio), Mar. 9, 1949; editorial, O Jornal, May 26, 1949; Valentim Bouças to Dutra, Apr. 4, 1948, PR; MN Sylvio de Noronha, Cinco Anos de Governo (Rio, 1951), p. 8; Lyra Tavares, O Brasil de Minim Geração, I, 266-272, 283.
Idálio Sardenberg, interview, Apr. 27, 1980, in Lourenço Dantas, ed., A Historia Vivida, 2 vols. (São Paulo, 1980-81), II, 362-364. See, too, Gen. Augusto Fragoso, "A Escola Superior de Guerra,” Problèmes Brasileiros, n. 88 (Dec. 1970), 19-34.
Hilton, “The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War,” 611-612.
Newton Estillac Leal, speech, ]ornal do Comércio, Jan. 6, 1952; Getúlio Vargas, O Governo Trabalhista do Brasil, 4 vols. (Rio, 1952-69), III, 302.
See, for example, MG to Secretário de Segurança Pública (São Paulo), Jan. 13,1947; MG to Conselho Federal de Comércio Exterior, Feb. 10, 1947; MG to BB, Dec. 6, 1949; MG to Tribunal de Contas, Dec. 20, 1949; MG to Superintendêncla da Moeda e do Crédito, June 7, 1954, AEX.
Noronha, Cinco Anos de Governo, p. 4; MW to FM, May 13, 1947; MW to Dutra, Aug. 18, Sept. 8, 1948, Apr. 26, July 5, Nov. 8, 1950; MG to BB, June 25, 1951; MG to Diretoria de Fabricação do Exército, Jan. 2, Feb. 5, 1952, AEX; MN to Dutra, Mar. 5, 1950; MF to Dutra, June 2, 1950; Min. Air to Vargas, Mav 11, 1951; MW to Vargas, Sept. 9, 1953, Jan. 27, 1954, PR.
MW, Aviso 246, Mar. 19, 1948; MW to DTPE, Jan. 3, 1947; MW to Dutra, Jan. 8, 1949; MW to FM, Jan. 10, Aug. 27, 1947, Aug. 16, 1950, AEX.
MW (Pereira da Costa) to Dutra, Dec. 4, 1946, AEX; Coleção das Leis de 1948— Volume V (Rio, 1949), p. 131; MW to Min. of Labor, Feb. 28, 1950; MW to Chief, Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas, Feb. 3, Mar. 8, 1950, AEX.
Góes Monteiro to Linhares, Oct. 31, 1945; MW to Dutra, Jan. 8, 1949; MG to Camara dos Deputados, Sept. 3, 1951, AEX; MG, Regulamento do Departamento Técnico e de Produção do Exército (Rio, 1946).
MW to FM, Jan. 11, 1947; MW to Dutra, Sept. 22, 1948; MG to DTPE, Apr. 12, 1949, AEX.
MF to Linhares, Oct. [?], Nov. 16, 1945, PR; MW to Dutra, June 7, 1947, Apr. 19, 1950, AEX; MF to Dutra, Dec. 1, Dec. 22, 1949, Aug. 11, 1950, PR; MG to Presidential Secretary, July 10, 1951, AEX; MW to Vargas, Jan. 28, 1953, PR; ADN, 40 (Sept. 1953), 131.
MF to Dutra, Dec. 29, 1949; MW to Dutra, Jan. 18, 1950, PR.
MW to Dutra, Aug. 27, 1947, AEX; CSN to Dutra, Sept. 26, 1947, PR; MG to Delegaçāo do Tesouro Brasileiro (New York), Nov. 1, 1947; O Estado de São Paulo, Jan. 27, 1954; MG to BB, Nov. 18, 1954, AEX.
MF to Dutra, Jan. [?], Mar. 15, 1946, June 9, Aug. 25, 1950, PR; Noronha, Cínco Anos de Governo, p. 4.
Guillobel, Memórias, pp. 304, 308.
MF to Dutra, May [?], June 14, 1946, Nov. 11, 1950; Dutra to Air Minister, Aug. 27, 1946, PR; São José dos Campos, O Centro Técnico da Aeronáutica: Informações Gerais (Sāo José dos Campos, 1953).
MW to CSN, May 13, 1947, AEX.
MF to Dutra, Aug. [?], 1946, Sept. 15, 1948, Oct. 27, 1949; Muniz to Dutra, Apr. 2, 1947, PR; United States Embassy (Rio) to DS, Oct. 4, 1949, RG 59, 832.24/10-449; ADN, 40 (Jan. 1953), 137; Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico, Grupo Misto de Estudos, memo, Feb. 15, 1953, OA; ADN, 40 (Oct. 1952), 154, (Sept. 1953), 131-132.
John D. Wirth, The Politics of Brazilian Development, 1930-1954 (Stanford, 1969), pp. 161-183; Peter S. Smith, Oil and Politics in Modern Brazil (Toronto, 1976), pp. 49-74.
MW to Dutra, Jan. 22, 1947; MW, Nota Circular no. 18 (to Regional Commanders), Feb. 22, 1950, AEX.
Comissão de Desenvolvimento Industrial (hereinafter cited as CDI), “Relatório de 1952” (mimeo), OA.
Ibid.; ADN, 40 (Nov. 1952), 175, (Dec. 1952), 138.
Guillobel, Memórias, p. 307; Guillobel to Vargas, Mar. 19, Apr. 15, 1953, PR; Vargas, Mensagem ao Congresso Nacional […] 1953 (Rio, 1953), pp. 45-48; O Estado de São Paulo, Jan. 27, Apr. 29, 1954.
MF to Dutra, July 12, 1946; CSN to Dutra, Aug. 30, 1948, PR; Lavanère-Wanderley, Historia da Força Aérea Brasileira, pp. 333-334; ADN, 40 (Sept. 1953), 131.
MW to Dutra, Jan. 8, 1949, AEX.
MF to Dutra, Apr. [?], 1946, June 24, 1948, CSN to Dutra, Oct. 14, 1948, PR; MW to Dutra, Feb. 4, Sept. 22, 1948, Jan. 19, 1949, May 24, Dec. 8, 1950; MG to BB, Oct. 24, Nov. 10, Nov. 17, 1950, AEX; BB, memo, n.d. [Feb. 1954], OA.
MW to Dutra, Aug. 15, 1946; MG to Estrada de Ferro Central do Brasil, Nov. 9, 1950, AEX; MF to Dutra, Nov. [?], 1946, Aug. 5, 1948, PR.
MF to Dutra, Sept. [?], 1946, PR; MW to FM, Dec. 26, 1946, June 22, 1949; Pereira da Costa to Governor of São Paulo, Aug. 9, 1947; MW to MF, May 26, 1948; MW to Dutra, Dec. 13, 1950, AEX; MF to Dutra, Dec. 12, 1951, PR.
MF to Linhares, Dec. [?], 1945; MF to Dutra, Feb. [?], 1946, PR.
MF to Dutra, Aug. 27, 1948, PR.
MG to MRE, Dec. 31, 1946, Mar. 9, 1948, Dec. 2, 1949, Dec. 5, 1950; MW to Conselho Nacional de Petróleo, Jan. 30, 1948, AEX.
MG to Companhia Industrial Brasileira Pirelli, Mar. 28, 1950, AEX.
MG (Gabinete), memo, Aug. 24, 1949; MW to Dutra, Mar. 31, May 10, July 26, Aug. 2, 1950, AEX.
MF to Dutra, Sept. 22, 1948, May 13, 1949; MF to Vargas, Feb. 21, 1951, PR.
See, for example, MG to MRE, Dec. 13, 1946, Jan. 15, 1947, Mar. 12, 1948, Dec. 2, 1949, June 28, 1950, AEX.
MW to FM, Sept. 15, 1947, Feb. 26, 1951; MW to Minister of Labor, Mar. 10, 1949,Apr. 19, 1950, AEX.
MW to DTPE, Apr. 18, July 16, 1947; MG to Companhia Textil Agro-Industrial, Jan. 14, 1949; MG to Otica Milando, Feb. 4, 1950; MG to BB, May 6, 1954, AEX.
CSN to Dutra, Sept. 8, Sept. 27, 1949; MF to Dutra, Mar. 16, Oct. 11, 1950,PR.
MW to Vargas, Feb. 18, June 22, 1954; MF to Vargas, Apr. 14, 1954, PR; Vargas, Mensagem ao Congresso Nacional […] 1954 (Rio, 1954), p. 49.
The author is Professor of History at Louisiana State University.