Thomas Anderson’s book falls within the genre of literature on Central America that deals with questions of regional integration and disintegration. He focuses on the Soccer War of 1969 between El Salvador and Honduras that slowed the movement toward economic integration by disrupting trade patterns within the Central American Common Market. Anderson attributes the outbreak of violence in 1969 to four major factors. First, tension between the historical drive for Central American unity and the search for individual state autonomy set the stage for military conflict. Second, the existence of disagreements dating back to 1861 between the two countries concerning territorial boundaries provided a national focus for smouldering resentment. Third, Salvadoran and Honduran military leaders (Fidel Sánchez Hernández and Oswaldo López Arellano) faced major sources of internal opposition to their policies during the late 1960s; this made an external enemy an attractive source of domestic unity. Finally (and most important), large numbers of Salvadorans had migrated to Honduras during previous decades, creating pressures on Honduran agricultural land. When the Honduran government became serious about land reform, it found that displacement of the Salvadoran immigrants offered an attractive and presumably low-cost solution to the problem.
Although Anderson’s interpretations are not new, they are carefully buttressed by personal experience and observation. He visited the war zone during the conflict and provides a firsthand account of activities there. In addition, he later interviewed many of the key decision-makers and individuals involved in decision implementation. His treatment of the 1967 border incidents that set the stage for the conflict is particularly insightful. Emphasis is placed on activities of the Salvadoran government, which may have aimed at toppling López Arellano.
Anderson may somewhat overemphasize elements of continuity that link the Soccer War to past border problems and regional conflicts. One missing ingredient (missing also in other writings on the Soccer War) is the impact of increased institutionalization within the Salvadoran, and especially the Honduran, armed forces. Border issues “smouldered” during earlier decades largely because neither side had the military capabilities or transportation to do much about them. By 1969, the Honduran army not only was capable of responding to such threats; it had no choice but to do so, given its new institutional mission. The Soccer War was partially a modern phenomenon reflective of the military “nation building” that occurred in both countries during previous decades.
