The author herein recalls a half century of Latin American diplomatic experience, which includes ambassadorships in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Cuba. This work is a compendium of the major issues in Latin America–United States relations, each one first described with historical objectivity and then evaluated subjectively. Ambassador Beaulac displays acute sensitivity to changing issues, but his response to them ordinarily is traditional, some might say old-fashioned. His is the gospel of the absolute free trader, the pure capitalist, the complete noninterventionist, the private bilateral diplomat. His views follow.
On politics: Political instability, a legacy of the Spanish-Indian heritage, is the curse of Latin America. Politicians and bureaucrats view government as a source of wealth rather than as an opportunity for public service. Democracy is rendered impossible by lack of trust among parties and among citizens. Opportunistic civilian urging is responsible for military intervention. The armed forces are the only stable political institution, although there are good and bad military governments. “Augusto Pinochet rescued Chile from anarchy,” but “Juan Velasco Alvarado had disastrous effects on Peru’s politics and economy” (p. 51).
On imperialism: United States imperialism is a myth created by Latin American intellectuals and politicians. United States intervention took place in republics where its investments were negligible and under presidents hostile to United States investors. The real imperialist in the area today is Soviet Russia. Its Marxist followers in the universities, the political parties, and the Church are responsible for economic nationalism, political destabilization, anti-Americanism, and communist subversion.
On economic problems: Latin America’s material wealth remains underutilized because of weak human resources. Marxist influences color ECLA’s analysis of the problem. Socialist planning has failed in Castro’s Cuba, Allende’s Chile, and Velasco’s Peru. Latin American economic integration has not worked. Agrarian reform is no panacea for it disrupts production and destroys peasant-patron social relationships. Collective agricultural experiments in Mexico, Cuba, Chile, and Bolivia have been disappointments. The family farm is a quixotic ideal. Commodity agreements have undesirable effects upon consumers. State economic intervention has been counterproductive. Private capital, both foreign and domestic, is more efficient. The dependency concept is a Marxist myth.
On United States aid: The Alliance for Progress exacerbated rather than helped resolve the area’s economic and social problems. It smacked of interventionism and it failed. Trade, not aid, and “hands off” are the correct policies. In view of ecological concerns, encouragement of too much economic development might not be a good thing.
On Pan-Americanism: Multilateral diplomacy is a device through which weaker countries strengthen their bargaining position vis-à-vis the more powerful. The OAS is less a forum for improving relations than one Latin Americans were using to exert public pressure on the United States” (p. 191). Chronic domestic political instability rather than alleged United States economic aggression is the real impediment to Latin American economic development.
On democracy and human rights: Presidents Wilson and Kennedy tried and failed in their efforts to promote democracy. President Carter’s human rights campaign has not worked either. Allende, rather than Pinochet, was the real violator of democracy and human rights in Chile. The principal targets of the human rights crusade “were the very nations that were trying hardest to restore conditions favorable to respect for human rights (p. 204). Multilateral interference in countries like Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile, which are “struggling against great odds to restore democracy,” (p. 219) should be avoided. Should a Marxist dictatorship emerge in Nicaragua, however, the United States ought to consider multilateral intervention.
