In the spring of 1975 the Institute of Latin American Studies at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, conducted a two-week-long conference entitled “Chile, 1970–1973.” Twenty-three participants either presented papers or took part in the discussions. Included in the conference were representatives from Salvador Allende’s Popular Unity government, leaders of the opposition, and United States scholars who specialize in various aspects of Chilean life and development. This volume includes the papers and commentary presented at the conference.
Organizers sought to deal with two basic questions: (1) was the Chilean socialist model workable, and (2) was the military coup a response to the Popular Unity government or, rather, the result of forty years of Chilean history? Participants described Allende’s government, explored the causes of its failure, looked into the nature of the military regime that overthrew it, and explored the effects of Chile’s experience on other countries.
The papers pointed to both internal and external causes for Allende’s overthrow. Some observers noted that much of the blame had to fall on the Popular Unity government itself because within the coalition different parties had different solutions to the problems that developed. Others blamed the problems of the government on the Christian Democratic party (PDC) and on the Eduardo Frei administration for failing to resolve many of the problems that remained to plague Allende. Radomiro Tomic, a PDC leader and his party’s 1970 presidential nominee in opposition to Allende, argued that the PDC was not at fault. He insisted that the PDC had tried to reach an accord with Allende, but had been rebuffed because the Marxists within the coalition did not want to make an accommodation with the Christian Left forces in Chile.
The organizers of the conference, who also edited this volume, are to be commended for bringing together so many people with high-level, firsthand knowledge of the Allende government, along with well-informed scholars. The result is a volume that will retain its significance for many years because it contains the thoughts of members of the Allende government, expressed soon after the military coup. As such, it will provide important information for future researchers of this period in Chile’s history. At the same time, the scholarly assessments by United States and Chilean intellectuals will continue to be of importance in placing the event in perspective.
Held just a year and a half after the overthrow of Allende, the conference apparently was remarkably calm, studied, and thoughtful. There is in this volume no hint of the hysteria that one finds in many books and articles published in that same chronological period. The book is well balanced in the views presented and, while disagreements logically occur, they do not deteriorate into hyperbole or name calling. In summary, this is a valuable historiographic work, well conceived and admirably presented.
