Researched and written over fifteen years ago, this study does not reflect the broadening and deepening of scholarship on Brazilian government and politics which has marked the past decade. Moreover, it drops the story two years before the fundamental political system change of 1964 which ushered in a series of five military presidents. Yet while one could wish for an assessment of the dramatic events of 1964 if not the impact of the sweeping administrative reform of 1967, this volume does hold some interest as a case study.
Professor Siegel effectively reconstructs the birth of the Administrative Department of the Public Service in the mid-1930s as part and parcel of the centralization and rationalization which characterized the Vargas dictatorship. He also recounts the bureaucratic infighting which ensued and demonstrates the difficulties encountered in adapting to the democratic interregnum of 1946-1950. The treatment of DASP’s role in Vargas’ effort to govern constitutionally (1951-1954) and in the subsequent democratic experience under Kubitschek (1956-1960) focuses upon narrow budgetary and personnel questions rather than systematically pursuing the deeper political changes underway. Interpretation of events during 1961 and into 1962 reflects the author’s firsthand experience at this juncture and also casts some light upon the shortcomings of intensive U.S. technical assistance efforts in the period immediately preceding the breakdown of democracy in Brazil.
