With the publication of the first of what promises to be four succinct volumes on Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and Peru, Laura Randall follows in the path of other economists who have turned to the history of Latin America.
The heart of the initial volume, devoted to Mexico, consists of three chapters on preconquest, colonial and post-colonial Mexico to 1910, plus a chapter introducing what will ultimately be the four country case studies. In fact, the introduction presents a set of conclusions rather than hypotheses or problems. First, the key to understanding Latin America’s economic history lies in analysis of market size, size and skill of the labor force, and governmental economic policies. Second, it remains difficult to compare the economic performance of the four colonies, although Randall concludes that at about 1810 “all lacked the institutional basis for further economic growth.” Third, nineteenth-century economic performance must be measured by export growth which occurred within the framework of “existing structures.” Fourth, growth in the nineteenth century was stimulated by U.S. and British demand for raw materials, a demand met by an increase in the labor force and by subsidized infrastructure, largely railroad construction.
Using published primary and secondary materials on Mexico available as of 1969, Randall’s presentation, periodization and broad interpretation of the colonial phase are conventional and generally unexceptional. One example of the exceptional, however, is the statement about income derived from questionable data, that the preconquest Aztec tribute burden was appreciably higher than that of the Spanish peasant. The author’s general conclusion about the interaction of colonial silver, “military expenditure, and inflationary credit” upon Spain is in general accurate—“the acquisition of Mexico was not economically profitable for Spain” (p. 113)—yet it skirts the issue of how a metropolis distributes the gains of colonial enterprise.
Randall’s handling of nineteenth-century Mexico is also unexceptional. The decades (1821-1854) of political disorder and declining per capita income constitute “a total disaster;” the next twenty years under Juárez brought “heavy” government outlays on infrastructure while under the Porfiriato the achievement of long-elusive political stability and the continuation of Juárez’ developmental emphases brought economic growth which nonetheless failed to match population growth. Randall concludes that the “first century of Mexican independence was not a success” because Díaz’ fiscal and monetary policies followed the “entire pantheon of liberal ideas in a country little resembling England . . . [which] doomed his program and his country to failure” (p. 190).
Few will take issue with Randall’s sector-by-sector treatment of the Mexican economy and many will profit from a variety of often ingenious statistical manipulations and their resulting tables. However a number of observations scattered throughout the work will prove arresting.
