Elections in the City of Buenos Aires during the First Yrigoyen Administration: Social Class and Political Preferences

In recent years a growing number of scholars have sought to analyze Argentine elections to determine the socioeconomic bases of political party support in that country. Many have focused on the post-World War II period, especially the dramatic presidential victory of Juan Perón in 1946.¹ Others have studied the early part of the twentieth century and a few the late nineteenth century.²

An important contribution to these efforts was the the publication in 1968 of Darío Cantón’s two-volume compilation of national presidential and congressional election results.³ Using Cantón’s data, social scientists have correlated election returns with a variety of information drawn from municipal, provincial, and national censuses. Although these censuses contain a wealth of information, they also pose several major problems. They appear irregularly, making the development of socioeconomic indicators over an extended period difficult. The categories employed and the completeness of coverage vary greatly from one census to another. Moreover, most census material describes general characteristics of voting districts, but not necessarily of the voters themselves.

In 1955, sociologist Gino Germani called attention to these deficiencies in his own study of elections in the 1940s.⁴ He suggested that more meaningful analyses could be derived from data taken directly from voter registries. Several scholars have begun to use these registries for the city of Buenos Aires. Their work to date is suggestive but fragmentary, based primarily on sample precincts rather than the city as a whole.⁵

With these considerations in mind, this study proposes to examine congressional and municipal elections in the city of Buenos Aires during the first administration of Radical President Hipólito Yrigoyen (1916-1922). The results of these elections, by party and by circunscripción (ward), compiled from Cantón, newspapers, and reports of the national ministry of the interior, will be correlated with occupational data taken directly from the actual list of registered voters for the entire city of Buenos Aires for the year 1918. These correlations will provide a statistical indication of the class bases of support for the main parties in these contests, the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR), or Radical party, the Partido Socialista (PS), or Socialist party, and the Partido Demócrata Progresista (PDP) or Democratic Progressive party. In addition, using the same data, each election will be examined and described in detail to determine the particular issues, personalities, and conditions of the moment which might have affected party performance.

Aside from the availability of data, a concentration on the years 1916 to 1922 can be justified in other ways. For one thing, it was a period in which a new political party, the Radical, controlled the national executive for the first time in the twentieth century. It was also an important and formative period for Argentina’s “experiment with democracy,” an experiment which eventually would end in failure. As will be noted below, under Yrigoyen, and unlike the case with most previous administrations, elections in the capital were honest and valid reflections of popular sentiment. Also, during these years the electorate expanded significantly. With this expansion, new social groups, particularly the urban working and middle classes, markedly increased their weight and value within the electorate. Yrigoyen’s Radicals, and their competitors, sought to represent the interests of these new groups and aimed their appeals to attract their support. Basically, the Radicals claimed to champion the middle classes, the Socialists the working classes. However, as will be seen, in these years political parties attempted to move beyond single class support and develop a multiclass constituency, establishing a tradition which would persist throughout the twentieth century. One of the main objectives of this study, therefore, will be not only to determine the basic class backing of the major parties, but also to gauge their successes and failures in trying to develop a broader base of support.

Using the federal capital of Buenos Aires as a focus provides advantages and disadvantages. A major advantage is that in contrast with many elections held outside the capital during this period, those in Buenos Aires were generally regular and free from fraud and violence.⁶ However, the capital was a very special case, and voting patterns there should be used with care when generalizing for the entire republic. First, Buenos Aires was exceptional in that it was home for both the elite of the country and Argentina’s greatest concentrations of middle class, urban working class, and immigrant groups.⁷ Also, as a group, the electorate of Buenos Aires was probably the most politically aware and politically active of any in the republic. Most major parties located their national headquarters and published their principal propaganda organs in the capital city. In addition, the porteño, living in Latin America’s major publishing center, enjoyed easy access to a wide range of general newspapers, periodicals, and books, which covered many political subjects, both domestic and foreign. Moreover, the voters of the capital were by far the most literate in the republic, the third national census gauging the literacy rate of registered voters in the capital at just over ninety-six percent, well above the national average of about fifty percent.⁸ Finally, capital turnout in congressional and presidential elections was consistently fifteen to twenty percent higher than the average for the republic as a whole.⁹

Another notable characteristic was the rapid growth of the city and the related growth of the electorate. Between 1895 and 1914, the population of the capital more than doubled, from 663,854 persons to 1,576,597,¹⁰ and by 1936, it had reached 2,415,142.¹¹ Between 1914 and 1922, the number of registered capital voters, representing about twenty percent of the national total, grew from 147,689 to 246,567, the number of actual voters from 109,461 to 174,940 (see Table I). These increases were attributable not only to general population growth but also to the effects of the Sáenz Peña electoral reform of 1912, which made voting in national elections secret and obligatory for all Argentine males over the age of eighteen. It should be noted, however, that even with these increases the number of registered voters in these years represented only a little more than ten percent of the total population. This relatively small electorate can be explained by the fact that women and foreigners were not allowed to vote in national elections. Foreign males were permitted to vote in municipal elections, but only under very limited conditions.

These factors, then, describe a well-informed, active, and growing electorate in Buenos Aires. Moreover, these voters were probably less influenced or intimidated by political bosses than their country cousins. Also, they were free from the consequences of federal intervention, an instrument by which the national executive often controlled politics and government outside of the capital. Although additional comparisons must await further investigation of politics in the provinces, it can be assumed that party leaders were cognizant of the special nature of the capital voter and devised strategies and articulated programs which would appeal directly to these qualities. Undoubtedly, they also were aware of the significance of the capital vote, both in terms of actual numbers and the psychological impact of victories or defeats in this prestigious arena.

Although, as Table I indicates, many parties participated in national and municipal elections in Buenos Aires, the two main competitors for the votes of this sophisticated and growing electorate were the Radical and Socialist parties.¹² These two parties will be the center of attention for this study. However, the position and performance of the Democratic Progressive party, generally a less frequent and less successful competitor, also will be considered when relevant.

The differences between the Socialists and Radicals were numerous. The Socialist party, organized in the 1890s, was patterned on European models, professed an internationalist view and connections, presented a detailed program for social and economic change, and preferred evolution, gradualism, and reform to violent revolution. The party participated in every capital election from 1896 and saw its membership in the city grow from about 100 in the 1890s to almost 3,000 in 1918. Nevertheless, the membership figure represented only a small fraction of the total votes which the party received in capital elections, indicating its appeal to many independent voters.

In contrast with the Socialists, the Radicals, also formed in the 1890s, professed to be a purely Argentine, criollo party. Unlike the Socialists, the Radicals presented little in the way of a program beyond support for free suffrage, efficient and honest public administration, and respect for provincial autonomy. During the 1896 to 1912 period, the Radicals refused to participate in the electoral process until reforms were made to assure honest voting. Although agreeing with some aspects of the Socialist program, the Radicals rejected the Socialists’ analysis of Argentine development along the lines of class conflict and instead argued that they represented a broad, national consensus of various groups which sought to harmonize social differences. The Radicals particularly stressed their nationalism in contrast to socialism’s internationalism and defended creole values of idealism, Catholicism, and federalism against what they perceived to be the materialism, anticlericalism, and centralism of the Socialists. Finally, the number of persons who belonged actively to the UCR, at least in the capital, far outstripped the number of Socialists. According to David Rock, in Yrigoyen’s first term the number of Radicals participating in internal party affairs in the city grew from 20,000 to 30,000.¹³

Although extensive data on the class composition of the two parties are not readily available, the extant information does indicate certain contrasts. The Socialist leadership came predominantly from urban, professional, middle-class backgrounds. However, party directors and congressmen also included some working-class representatives. The rank and file of the party generally approximated the composition of the capital electorate overall, mostly skilled working class and whitecollar middle class.¹⁴ Radical committee members and congressional candidates also came from middle-class backgrounds but, in some instances, from what Peter Smith has called the upper-class “aristocratic” sector.¹⁵ In 1916, for example, of the UCR’s seven candidates for congress from the capital, three belonged to the Sociedad Rural Argentina, the nation’s leading defender of the interests of wealthy landowning groups.¹⁶ Few, if any, from the working class served as Radical deputies or held important party positions. General impressions of rank-and-file Radicals also indicate little active working-class representation. Most Radical party members in the capital probably were public employees, directly dependent for their livelihood upon Radical control of the national government.¹⁷

The basic organization of both parties in the capital exhibited certain similarities. Both established committees in each of the city’s twenty circunscripciones and most of its circuítos (precincts). A central committee oversaw and coordinated the activities of these smaller groups which distributed propaganda, provided information on electoral procedures, organized rallies, and got voters to the polls. In terms of function, the Radical organization depended to a much greater extent on the dispensation of material rewards to its actual and potential adherents than did the Socialists. These rewards included gifts of food, clothing, sometimes money, and, most importantly, employment, either within the party structure or more commonly in the Radical-controlled municipal or national government.

The general pattern of campaigning for both parties was essentially the same. Active electioneering began one to two months before the actual balloting. Party leaders and candidates gave frequent speeches (conferencias) throughout the city, sometimes in open squares, sometimes in meeting halls or theaters. Party newspapers, La Vanguardia for the Socialists and La Epoca for the Radicals, were important propaganda instruments. All parties plastered posters on the city’s walls and distributed thousands of printed leaflets. Several days before the election the parties organized massive rallies for the final presentation of candidates. These rallies, attracting tens of thousands of people, usually began at night in one of the city’s main plazas. There, the assembly heard fiery speeches extolling the virtues of the party holding the meeting and condemning the vices of the opposition. Following these speeches, partisans marched down one of the central avenues, accompanied by banners, torches, appropriate music, and displaying certain symbols; for the Radicals, the white beret; for the Socialists, the red flag or armband.¹⁸

Party unity was an important factor in determining campaign effectiveness. During this period both the Socialists and the Radicals were subject to violent internal disagreement and resultant fragmentation which weakened campaign efforts. The Socialists suffered three major schisms, in 1915, 1918, and 1921, producing three new parties led by former Socialists and competing for Socialist votes. During the same period, the Radicals, while not experiencing formal schisms, were wracked by internal dissension which severely affected their performance at the polls.

Although party leaders in their campaigning probably did not have as precise an idea of the occupational profile of the city’s voters as provided in this article, the results of the third national census did tell them something about the composition of the electorate overall. From this data, it could be determined that eligible voters were rather evenly distributed between working class and middle class. Significant groups earmarked in the census were 55,169 Argentine males over fourteen years of age in industries and manual arts (of 197,990 total), 36,551 in public administration, 26,181 in commerce, 14,229 in education (including students), and 13,135 in transportation.¹⁹

The census data did not provide occupational breakdowns by circunscripción, but by 1916, party leaders had gained a reasonably sophisticated understanding of the socioeconomic distribution of the electorate throughout the capital. Reviews of campaign literature indicate that parties tailored their speakers and their appeals to the particular composition of individual districts. Moreover, politicians were keenly aware of the relationship between public policies, the concentration of certain kinds of voters in certain districts, and party performance. For example, during a September 12,1919 congressional debate on budget allocations for postal employees in the capital, conservative critics observed that the passage of increased sums would benefit directly the Radical party in circunscripciones 12 and 13, both with large concentrations of public employees.²⁰

Before turning to the elections themselves, some further introductory comments are in order. First, the occupations listed in the voter registry for 1918 have been grouped according to the classification suggested by Mark D. Szuchman and Eugene F. Sofer and ranked in absolute and percentage terms for each of the city’s wards (see Table II).²¹ The eight principal subgroups were also aggregated for totals of blue collars (working class), nonmanuals (middle class), and professionals (upper class).²² The two largest subgroups, skilled workers (with blacksmiths, bricklayers, carpenters, conductors, electricians, mechanics, and painters the largest groups represented) and low nonmanuals composed 63. 2 percent of all voters. Of the 50,673 low nonmanuals, 42,754 were white-collar employees, two-thirds of whom were probably government employees.²³ Of the 17,028 in the middle non-manual category, 16,704 were comerciantes, or mostly small businessmen. Except for students, the remaining subgroups were more diversified, without heavy concentrations of any single occupation.

The distribution of voters by occupational groups, as described in Table II, corresponds roughly to what one would expect from general descriptions of the city.²⁴ Blue-collar voters were concentrated primarily in the southern districts (1-4, 6-8) and the large outlying circunscripciones (15-18). Nonmanual voters were found in largest proportion in central districts (8-14, 3, 5 and 20). Professionals clustered in central and near northern wards (10, 11, 13, 14, 19 and 20), areas including and immediately surrounding the city’s main governmental and commercial heart. Students also could be found in greatest proportion in roughly these same districts.

No circunscripciones were pure in terms of class composition. Even aristocratic 19 and 20, where James Scobie has noted “the striking contrasts of slums and mansions,” had significant percentages of working-class voters.²⁵ Many districts (3, 6-8, 17-18) were almost evenly balanced between blue-collar and nonmanual. Certain wards, however, did exhibit striking class concentrations. District 4, for example, had the highest percentage of blue-collar workers in the city. This district was a stronghold of the Socialist party until 1946. On the other hand, sections 5 and 12 through 14 had the highest percentages of nonmanuals in the capital and ranked at the bottom in terms of blue-collar voters. During the period under consideration, these districts regularly turned in large margins for the UCR over the Socialists, although on occasion conservative parties captured 14, the district with the second highest percentage and number of professionals in Buenos Aires. Circunscripción 5, in particular, was considered the strongest Radical district in the city. It should be noted that 5, along with 12 through 14, contained the highest percentage of low nonmanuals, presumably representing mostly governmental employees (see Table II).

The relationship between social class and party performances, as described in Tables III-V, was determined by correlating percentages of each occupational group with the percentage of the total of registered voters gained by the principal competing parties in each circunscripción.²⁶ The formula used was Pearsons r, with a .05 significance level = +, -.45. Although other methods might have been employed, Pearson’s r was considered most appropriate for the data, which provide essentially only two variables, class composition and voting percentages. This method gives a clear and straightforward measure of the strength or weakness of the relationship between these two variables.

It should be noted that although the election data used covers an eight-year span, the occupational data is only for the year 1918. Ideally, of course, we should have an occupational profile for each election year, particularly for outlying districts such as 1, 15 and 16, which experienced extremely rapid growth at this time. However, since this information is not presently available, we must assume that the basic social composition of each district remained approximately the same. Certain impressionistic observations suggest that this was the case, but the need for more specific evidence remains.²⁷

Finally, the discussion of the particular elections which follows will concentrate primarily on major issues and trends. Each contest is worthy of much greater attention and undoubtedly occurred within more varied and complex circumstances than can be described in a few paragraphs. Practical limitations dictate a summary approach. Also, it would be burdensome to discuss all party relationships with all groups in all elections. Instead, only those issues considered most important will be noted. The tables, however, can be used by the reader to answer many overlooked questions.

The Elections of April 2, 1916

The 1916 congressional elections in the capital occurred simultaneously with the presidential contest and were overshadowed by the national competition for the chief executive office. Nevertheless, Radicals and Socialists considered the Chamber of Deputy positions important and campaigned hard to win them.

The Socialists chose their candidates in convention two months prior to election day and began active campaigning shortly thereafter. The Socialist program sought to reach both working-class and middle-class voters. It stressed the elimination of repressive legislation, general political reforms, increased state aid to secular education, separation of church and state, tax reform, and social legislation.²⁸ But specific programmatic issues remained less prominent than severe partisan criticism of the Radicals and their leader and presidential candidate, Hipólito Yrigoyen. The Socialists took particular aim at the Radicals’ programmatic vagueness, the few differences they perceived between Radicals and conservatives, and what they considered the excessive personalism of Yrigoyen.²⁹

The Radicals, for their part, chose deputy candidates in convention about one month prior to the election. These candidates then appeared daily and nightly throughout the city, relaying the Radical message to the voters. The message was a diffuse one, basically a repetition of the main themes of the Radical presidential campaign. Those themes had been decided at the UCR presidential nominating convention on March 22, where a detailed and specific forty-point program had been rejected in favor of a general promise to adhere to the principles of constitutional government. A March 31 “manifesto to the people” from the Radical National Committee assured the electorate that a UCR administration would bring the country a “profound renovation of its ethical values” and a “fundamental reconstitution of its moral and material structure.”³⁰ Beyond this fanciful rhetoric, the Radicals made their first serious bid for the working-class vote with generous dispensations of material favors and sharp attacks on the Socialist opposition, which up to 1914 had strong support in proletarian districts.³¹ (See the results for 1914 in Table VI.)

Intense maneuvering accompanied the presidential contest as conservative forces sought to deny Yrigoyen the victory. In the capital, the Democratic Progressive party, at that time a conservative coalition, urged its adherents to support the Socialist presidential ticket, ostensibly because the Socialist and Democratic program coincided on many points.³² This last-minute ploy did not work. The Radical slate of presidential electors comfortably defeated the Socialist slate by a vote of 61,550 to 52,898. Nor did this strategy have much influence on the congressional contest, where the Democrats ran their own slate. The Socialist deputy candidates ran about 10,000 votes behind their presidential ticket, the Radicals about 2,500 behind.³³

The Radical victory in the capital congressional contest was spectacular and definitive. The leading UCR candidate bested the leading Socialist by 17,310 votes, a dramatic reversal from 1914 when the Socialists had defeated the Radicals by 5,750 tallies (see Table I). Moreover, the UCR swept eighteen of the capital’s twenty voting districts. The Socialists, who fell about 1,500 votes and almost nine percentage points from their previous effort, probably were hurt by the defection in 1915 of former Socialist congressman Alfredo L. Palacios and his participation at the head of the ticket of the recently formed Partido Socialista Argentino.³⁴ However, even without this schism it is doubtful that the Socialists could have bested the Radicals in this election.³⁵ The Democratic Progressives finished with less than ten percent of the total vote.

In terms of support from particular occupational groups, the Socialists suffered a slight decline in their backing from blue-collar districts from a coefficient of .78 in 1914 to one of .68 in 1916. Socialist attempts to expand their class base came to naught, as the relationship of their votes with nonmanuals (-.60), professionals (-.61), and students (-.56) were strongly negative. The Radicals, for their part, showed strong correlations among the very groups with whom the Socialists did poorly (.81 for nonmanuals, .65 for professionals, .70 for students), and a strong negative correlation (-.85) with blue collars. The Democratic Progressive vote, as was the case throughout this period, showed strong correlations with high nonmanuals (.86), students (.82), and professionals (.88). (See Tables III, IV, V.)

The Elections of March 3, 1918

The first two years of the Yrigoyen administration provided the Radical party a wide range of political opportunities and problems. Many of these were related, directly and indirectly, to World War I, which had serious consequences for the Argentine economy. The war disrupted the flow of exports and imports and prompted unemployment, rising prices, and labor agitation. At the same time, as German submarines attacked ships carrying Argentine goods, pressure mounted on Yrigoyen to abandon diplomatic neutrality and enter the conflict on the side of the Allies. All of these matters were felt most keenly in the federal capital, the Argentine city most closely tied to international affairs.

Yrigoyen responded to the various war-related crises with a number of economic measures intended to alleviate pressures on the Argentine consumer. With regard to the conflict itself, he steadfastly pursued a course of strict neutrality. The Radicals’ political strategy during this period was to hold on to the middle-class vote, already reasonably secure, and to cut into the Socialists’ apparent hold on the working class. Accordingly, the president intervened actively on the side of labor during a number of important strikes and evidenced more sympathy for the trade union movement than any previous executive.³⁶

As the 1918 congressional elections approached, the Socialists led a growing chorus of criticism of the Yrigoyen administration. The first two articles of their program underscored what they considered the inadequacies of Yrigoyen’s response to current economic difficulties. They called for an end to taxes on basic necessities and the imposition of a progressive tax on land, the nation’s greatest source of wealth. Unlike the president, the Socialist leadership favored active support of the Allies and advocated an end to secret diplomacy and the direction of foreign relations by congress.³⁷ In addition, articles in La Vanguardia attacked the administration’s protectionist tariff policy and sought to shake loose Radical strength among public employees by noting that UCR senators had voted against a proposal to establish a minimum wage for state workers.³⁸ Finally, the Socialists labeled Yrigoyen’s apparent sympathy for the working class as demagogic, insincere, and concocted only for political purposes.³⁹

Without survey data on the political opinions of the city’s voters, it is difficult to determine the precise impact of these issues on the election of 1918. Moreover, while the above-noted items were the most frequently debated in the campaign, other matters, such as provincial interventions and nascent economic nationalism, also might have influenced the outcome. Nevertheless, the results of this contest indicate general support for Yrigoyen’s policies. The Radical candidates, who still eschewed a formal program but ran clearly on the basis of what they claimed to be the accomplishments of their national administration, defeated the Socialists by almost 25,000 votes. In the process, they captured every capital circunscripción except the faithful Socialist four. The Socialists blamed their defeat on the patronage policies of the Radical government and the demoralizing attacks of those who had left the parent party to form rival organizations. Alfredo L. Palacios did register 35,281 votes in this contest, but ran well ahead of the rest of the Partido Socialista Argentino ticket, which ranged between 4,173 and 5,111 tallies.⁴⁰ The Partido Socialista Internacional, formed by those who opposed the older party’s stand on the war, polled only 2,753 votes (see Table I). In terms of votes, then, the competition from these two factions was only a minor factor affecting Socialist performance; of much greater significance was the burgeoning Radical hold on the general electorate and what appeared to be the UCR’s growing strength in working-class areas.

The magnitude of the Radical victory in 1918, as in 1916, was impressive, but should not be overstated. Although the Radicals increased their absolute vote significantly from the previous contest, their proportion of the total grew by only 3.3 percent. The Socialists also improved in absolute terms and retained about the same percentage of the total vote (see Table I).

Looking at the relationship between occupational groups and party performance, the correlation between blue collars and Socialists in 1918 was .55, as compared with .68 in 1916, suggesting some slippage in this base of support. The Radicals’ correlation with their main base, nonmanuals, dropped from .81 in 1916 to .59 in 1918. Among students and professionals, it was .09 and .04 in 1918, as compared with .70 and .65 respectively in 1916. The correlation between UCR votes and blue collars in 1918, was -.35, as compared with -.85 in 1916. This result would suggest that the party did less poorly among these voters than it had previously and indicates some moderate success for the Radical prolabor strategy.

The Elections of October 6, 1918

The municipal elections of October 6, 1918, the first held for the capital’s city council, provided the most dramatic reversal of Radical fortunes in any contest during the first Yrigoyen administration. The elections occurred at a time of great internal dissension within Radical ranks. The underlying division was between the more conservative, upper-class, officeholding wing of the party, the so-called Azul or Blue faction which opposed many of Yrigoyen’s methods and policies, and those persons, mostly middle-class and holding secondary positions of leadership, who firmly supported the president.⁴¹

The split revealed itself openly in the elections of local UCR committee officers in the capital and in the selection of council candidates. These selection procedures were marked by delay, confrontation, and resignations throughout the month of September as each faction sought to control the internal party apparatus and the candidate list. Active campaigning began late in September, but up to a few days before the election, there were rumors that members of one faction would cross out the names of representatives of another on the ballot to indicate their displeasure with the party’s choices. As late as October 3, La Prensa reported that the UCR was considering abstaining from the contest altogether because of its internal difficulties.⁴²

One of the major points of criticism from the Azul faction was the party’s lack of a program. Accordingly, in this contest the Radicals published a nine-point platform which promised gradual elimination of taxes on basic necessities, municipalization of public services and utilities, amplification of various free services and benefits for the working class, construction of inexpensive public housing, and appointment of municipal employees by merit only.⁴³ Radical candidates stressed various aspects of the program, emphasizing particularly measures to improve public health, working and living conditions in the city’s poorer districts, and legislation to lower the cost of living.⁴⁴

The Socialists, free for the moment from any important internal differences, prepared for the municipal contest with characteristic efficiency. In late August, they produced an extensive program which called for a minimum wage and improved working conditions for city employees, regulation of hygiene in low-cost housing, municipalization of all markets, price controls on consumables, restrictions on the sale of alcoholic beverages, and revenue reform.⁴⁵ The party chose its candidates on September 2 and campaigned energetically throughout the month. Socialist spokesmen stressed the role the party had played in implementing the municipal election reform, the importance of a popularly elected council to counterbalance the influence of the federal government which appointed the city’s mayor, and the need to clean up notorious corruption at the local level.⁴⁶

In the balloting the Socialists notched a surprising victory, edging the Radicals by 838 votes (see Table I). The Socialists regained the advantage in wards with significant working-class groups, such as 2 through 4, 15 and 18, districts lost to the Radicals only a few months earlier. As Table IV indicates, the Socialists enjoyed renewed support among blue collars, with the correlation between Socialist votes and this category rising from .55 in 1918 to .70 in October of that year. The correlation between Socialist votes and skilled workers, in particular, increased from .52 to .73 for the same period.

However, what was most significant in this election was not Socialist gains, but rather Radical losses. The Socialists, indeed, declined by some 1,389 votes between March and October. The Radicals, however, dropped 27,061 votes between the two contests. The losses, as Table III reveals, did not occur with blue-collar voters, where the correlation with Radical performance changed from -.35 to .03 between March and October, but rather among nonmanuals (from .59 to .26), professionals (.04 to -.37), and students (.09 to -.19). These findings are consistent with an interpretation which emphasizes the importance of the internal party dispute in explaining the Radical debacle since nonmanuals composed the rank and file of party membership most affected by these dissensions.⁴⁷

The Elections of March 23, 1919

The elections of March 23, 1919, to fill one senate seat and two deputy positions, found the Radicals under heavy fire from several fronts. The internal disputes continued unabated. Following the municipal election defeat of October 1918, leaders of the Azul faction, charged with analyzing the reasons for the UCR loss, published a report which severely criticized the directors of the party in the capital and reiterated objections to Yrigoyen’s personalistic style of administration.⁴⁸ In January 1919, the dissidents managed to force the resignation of the pro-Yrigoyen members of the capital committee, and in early February, succeeded in capturing the top committee posts for themselves.⁴⁹ The first order of business for the new directors was to select candidates for the upcoming elections, but this process was delayed until the end of February, due to difficulties in assembling the nominating convention.

These internal party maneuvers took place within the context of a major labor disturbance, the famous Semana Trágica of January 1919. The nationwide general strike and resultant violence of this week had the greatest impact on the federal capital. Yrigoyen who was slow to respond to the crisis lost support from all sides. Labor objected to the harsh measures used to quell the disturbance. Middle-class and upper-class elements criticized the president both for his past prolabor sympathies which, they believed, encouraged the outbreak and his failure to react more firmly once the series of strikes began. Following the “tragic week,” Yrigoyen, fearing possible military intervention against his own government, moved cautiously to rebuild his bridges with the working class and at the same time to reassure his middle-class constituents and conservative supporters that he was also concerned with the reestablishment of order and the prevention of further violence.⁵⁰

The Socialists sought to capitalize on the opportunities afforded by Yrigoyen’s difficulties. A preelectoral party manifesto to the voters of the capital concluded by especially urging the workers of the city to support an “organic” party with their long-term interests at heart.⁵¹ Socialist deputy candidate, Federico Pinedo, attacked the Radical administration for its alleged failures in the social realm, its antilabor position in certain strikes, and its responsibility for the “frightful tragedy of January.”⁵²

The results of the contest underscored the continued Radical decline begun in October 1918. The UCR did capture the senatorial position, conservative Radical Vicente C. Gallo besting Socialist Juan B. Justo by a vote of 50,843 to 48,078. In the deputy election, however, Socialist Pinedo captured the first seat with 56,418 votes while the Radicals’ José O. Casas took the second seat with 54,749.⁵³

In this election the Socialists held on to the advantages in working-class districts regained five months earlier. However, once again Radical losses represented the most significant factor.⁵⁴ Whereas in October the UCR had declined among nonmanuals and improved among blue collars, in 1919 the reverse held true. The correlation between blue collars and Radical votes decreased from .03 to -.41, while the correlation with nonmanuals increased from .26 to .68. This would suggest that although internal disputes hindered organization and campaigning, their negative influence on election returns was diminishing. On the other hand, Yrigoyen’s actions in January apparently cost the Radicals much of their hard-earned working-class support. Perhaps the capture of the UCR capital committee by conservatives also alienated proletarians.

The Elections of March 7, 1920

In the year between the congressional elections of March 1919 and March 1920, the Radical government made some major adjustments in its political strategy. Yrigoyen, shaken by the Semana Trágica, increasingly gave in to conservative pressures, particularly those exercised by the ultranationalist Liga Patriótica Argentina and the Argentine military. As a consequence, the administration not only toned down its sympathy for labor, but on occasion reacted with restrictive repressive measures against union activity. At the same time, to counteract the Liga’s growing influence and popularity, the UCR increasingly stressed its populist and nationalist attributes. Also, Yrigoyen expanded his use of the patronage system to retain middle-class support and introduced other measures to hold down the cost of living to regain some of his lost backing among the working class.⁵⁵

Yrigoyen’s use of patronage helped to undercut the Azul position on the capital committee although the conservative Radicals still managed to place many of their supporters on the candidate list for the 1920 deputy elections. The Radical campaign in 1920, in contrast with the two previous efforts, was well organized and operated smoothly. UCR candidates ran on Yrigoyen’s record and underscored the party’s national roots. Although they still eschewed a detailed program, the Radicals promised they would push for specific social legislation in upcoming congressional sessions.⁵⁶

The Socialists continued to press the advantage they discerned in Yrigoyen’s changing relationship with labor. During the course of 1919, party leaders incessantly criticized the administration’s repressive policies and its tolerant attitude toward the violent antilabor actions of the Liga Patriótica. They repeated the charge that Yrigoyen’s benevolent attitude toward labor had been insincere and politically motivated. The Socialists also claimed that the Radicals’ economic policies, ostensibly designed to hold down prices for consumers, in reality only served the interests of wealthy landowning groups.⁵⁷

The results of this election satisfied all parties. The Radicals captured sixteen of the twenty-three seats contested with 60,347 votes and the Socialists gained seven positions with 54,992 votes. The Demócratas, essentially the Democratic Progressive party, won no seats but came in a strong third with 41,750 votes.

The Socialists held on to blue-collar wards, the Radicals swept non-manual districts, and the Democrats captured 14, 19 and 20 (see Table VI). The correlation between Socialist votes and blue-collar voters increased markedly from 1919, from .59 to .85, indicating renewed strength among the main core of the party’s supporters. The Radical vote correlation with blue collars (-.18) and professionals (-.20) was negative. The principal source of UCR backing remained in the non-manual category, with a positive correlation of .50.

The Elections of November 21, 1920

The Radical party, having learned from its defeat in the municipal contests of 1918, prepared for those of 1920 with greater care, unity, and effort. The main target of UCR attacks was, as usual, the Socialist party, whom the Radicals accused of being as obstructionist on the city council as in the national congress. Sounding much like the Liga Patriótica, the Radicals also questioned the Socialists’ patriotism and sought to link the opposition party, at that time initiating a debate over adherence to the Communist International, with international bolshevism. A bold-faced box, which ran frequently in preelection editions of La Epoca, concluded with the following rhetorical question to the city’s voters: “Will you give your votes in the next municipal election to the Socialist candidates, who in governing the city will place the interests of the Russian proletariat and the demands of anarchic communism above those of the Nation? The Unión Cívica Radical [in contrast to the Socialists] honors the nation and respects its flag.”⁵⁸

Yrigoyen sought to aid his party directly in this contest. One week before the election, he personally toured the flood-stricken Nueva Pompeya district in the southern part of the city and ordered Mayor José Luis Cantilo to do all he could to compensate flood victims and to prevent future disasters.⁵⁹ Also, the national administration expeditiously moved to enact measures which would lower the price of basic foodstuffs, especially bread, the cost of which had skyrocketed in the past year.⁶⁰

The Socialist municipal campaign in 1920 was not much different from its effort in 1918. The party’s program remained essentially the same, emphasizing particularly and prominently benefits for municipal workers.⁶¹ In response to Radical attacks on Socialist patriotism, the Socialists made a major issue of the support that UCR city councilmen had given earlier in the year to a fare increase on the capital’s British-owned streetcars. The Socialists, who had voted against the increase, accused the Radicals of being more concerned with the interests of foreign capitalists than of Argentine consumers and of backing a measure which contributed significantly to higher living costs.⁶²

The results of the contest produced few changes or surprises. In contrast with 1918, the UCR won this second municipal election by about 4,700 votes over the Socialists. The Radicals’ total of 56,760 votes represented an increase over their previous municipal tally, but a slight decline in their performance from the March 1920 deputy contest. The Socialists retained their margin in the southern part of the city, despite Yrigoyen’s visit to Nueva Pompeya. The correlation between Socialist votes and blue-collar voters remained a strong .86. Correlations between Radical performance and blue collars (-.10), nonmanuals (.36), students (-.03), and professionals (-.29) remained about the same as for the deputy election earlier in the year.

Conclusions

In a 1969 article on the class basis of Argentine political parties, political scientist Peter Snow argued: . . . it now appears that prior to the 1943 revolution . . . correlations between social class and voting behavior were quite insignificant.”⁶³ The results of this study, however, indicate that, at least for Argentina’s federal capital between 1916 and 1922, there was a strong relationship between social class, voting behavior, and party performance. In other words, social status was a crucial factor in determining which party a porteño voter supported in any particular election.

The relationships between social class and voter preference analyzed here generally serve to buttress traditional assumptions and impressions. As would be expected, most Socialist support came from the blue-collar category in which positive correlations for this period ranged from .55 to .86. Correlations between Socialist votes and skilled workers were particularly strong, varying from .52 to .87. Contrary to contemporary charges that the Socialists enjoyed backing only from the elite of the working class, the correlations between party percentages and semiskilled and service workers were uniformly positive in these years, ranging from .46 to .66. Socialist attempts to broaden their party’s base were largely futile as correlations with all other groups were consistently negative from 1914 to 1922.

Basic Radical support remained generally constant and came essentially from the public employee sector. Correlations between UCR percentages and low nonmanuals were consistently positive, ranging from .45 to .71. Correlations with middle and high nonmanuals, however, evidenced considerable fluctuation, as did Radical performance with every other group. Among professionals, for example, correlations oscillated between a positive .65 and a negative —.50. These ups and downs reflect the changing fortunes of the party in power, which sought, with only sporadic success, to attract different elements to its ranks. They also mirror the growing tensions within the party, which, eventually, in 1924, would lead to an open division.

Of all the parties considered, the Democratic Progressives showed the strongest relationships between their votes and certain occupational groups. From 1916 to 1920, the correlation between the percentage of PDP votes and high nonmanuals ranged from .86 to .93; with total professionals, from .88 to .96; and with students, from .82 to .91. Unfortunately for the Democratic Progressives, the correlations between their votes and the two largest groups in the electorate, low nonmanuals and workers, were generally weak or strongly negative.

In sum, the Socialists drew most of their support from the working class, the Radicals from the middle class, and the Democratic Progressives from the upper class. One major surprise which does emerge from these findings was the failure of either the Socialists or the Radicals to do well among students. Both parties supported the university reform movement of 1918 and actively sought to recruit from youth groups. The Radicals especially would seem to have had an appeal to university youth since they controlled government employment and access to the sorts of jobs young graduates normally would desire. It may have been, however, that in these years the university reform, which aimed to open the nation’s institutions of higher learning to the middle and working classes, had yet to take effect. Assuming that most students still came from upper-class families, these results would suggest that they voted much as did their fathers.⁶⁴

The preceding analysis indicates how essential it is for historians to examine closely and in detail Latin American elections. Although the results in this instance confirm nonquantitative impressions, there is no guarantee that the same will follow for every case. By using statistical analysis mixed with traditional sources, the historian can produce strong and precise evidence for new insights into and a clearer understanding of political developments and historical processes in an area of the world where voting and elections have received relatively little scholarly attention.

Author notes