From 1829 until his overthrow in 1852, Juan Manuel de Rosas dominated Argentina. Although he called himself a federalist, Rosas used a combination of terror, assassination, and economic power based on the strategic location of Buenos Aires to impose a centralized tyrannical regime.
Together, these two books cover the final twelve years of Rosas’ administration culminating in the defeat of the Rosistas at Monte Caseros by a combined allied force of Brazilians, Uruguayans and Argentines led by Justo José de Urquiza, the governor of Entre Ríos.
La santa federación is a superficial examination of military, diplomatic, economic and social events of the decade of the 1840s. The scope of the book is vast and the author presents many ideas, particularly when he is dealing with economics and class structure, which are interesting and provocative. But the book fails because the author often makes assertions which are not developed completely through logical argumentation. As an example, Carretero disagrees with the view that Rosas achieved power purely because of his personal ability as a gaucho leader and asserts that his triumph in the political arena was the legitimization of the economic power of a cattle-raising oligarchy. This thesis is probably correct, but to prove it requires more than a demonstration that Rosas had close family ties with people who were wealthy cattle raisers (pp. 104-105). Failure to provide adequate documentation is another major deficiency which makes it impossible for the serious scholar to use the book with any feeling of security.
Hacia Caseros is much more limited in scope and time. It covers the diplomatic maneuvering associated with forging the alliance between Urquiza and the Brazilians and the military campaign which began in Uruguay and ended at Monte Caseros. This is old-fashioned narrative history but it is well written and thoroughly documented.
