This volume represents a serious effort to offer a comprehensive account of the origin and evolution of the Cuban armed forces. It makes a commendable start toward filling a gap in the expanding Cuban bibliography. In spite of the evident failure of the Cuban “guerrilla formula” when it was tried in other Latin American countries, the majority of the studies on the Cuban revolution continue to concentrate on the actions and heroism of the revolutionaries, paying scant attention to the condition of the army which was opposing them. What kind of military instrument was it? How could a band of guerrilla fighters defeat it? Professor Louis A. Pérez, of the University of South Florida, has provided us with some basic answers to those questions.
The author begins by tracing the origin and evolution of the Cuban armed forces from the formation of the Rural Guard in 1900 to the defeat of Batista’s army in 1958. According to him, American intervention in the creation and organization of the Cuban military instrument created, from the very beginning, a dangerous cleavage between the people and the army. “The provisional government endowed the republic with an armed force molded by a foreign occupation . . . and made a ‘national’ relationship between the Cuban armed forces and its countrymen impossible” (p. 15). After the failure of the Rural Guard in 1906—when it proved incapable of crushing a Liberal uprising—the new American provisional government decided to create a Cuban army. But, because of the Cuban situation, that army was immediately immersed in the political struggles. Liberal and Conservative governments sacrificed merit for political loyalty and promoted officers aligned with their party. The possible professionalization of the army suffered a severe blow in 1933, when a sergeants’ rebellion eliminated and substituted all the army officers. From then on, exsergeant Batista and his improvised commanders controlled the army. There was a civilian interregnum (1940-1952), but by 1952, through a military coup, Batista and many of his old comrades were back in power. Once more the army was subjected to political shuffling. This was the army which, commanded by many unfit officers, demoralized by internal corruption, faced the insurgent forces of Fidel Castro in 1956. The army’s incapacity to defeat the guerrillas allowed the opposition to expand and doomed Batista’s regime. The author quotes Claude Julian, “The triumph over Batista was not exactly a military victory but a moral and popular victory” (p. 162).
The book is well documented and offers valuable insights on many untouched aspects of the Cuban process. Particularly important is the author’s analysis of the division of Batista’s officers (pp. 145-151) between puros, professional academy officers, and marcistas, political appointees of the dictator. Nevertheless, the reader is left with a sensation of mild disappointment. The book does not fully cover all the aspects of such a fascinating subject. The political atmosphere which influenced the army is sometimes vaguely mentioned; clarifying explanation of certain episodes—the Liberal uprising of 1916—are lacking. And the author tends to forget the important Cuban national forces which, inside and outside the Army, opposed American influence. It is perhaps true, as Professor Pérez says (p. 54), that “by the late 1910s and the early 1920s, a mercenary political culture has reached full fruition” in Cuba—even if the word “mercenary” sounds a little too strong. But it is also true that the rebelling forces of Cuban nationalism deserve more credit than the author gives them.
The omissions do not essentially impair the merits of the book. Professor Pérez has made a very valuable contribution to a better understanding of the Cuban historical process.
