In recent years students of comparative political development have begun to emphasize the importance of the timing, sequence, and pace of change. These variables have been used, in particular, to explain the failure of Latin American and other Third World countries to follow a liberal democratic model of development.1 In view of this theoretical work, Chile’s political experience during the 1891-1925 period is extremely interesting and deserves greater attention. Above all, the politics of these years are important for understanding Chile’s peculiarly strong tradition of constitutional government and procedural democracy. At a time when Chile is ruled by the military, it may seem paradoxical, if not perverse, to emphasize this tradition; but it is central to any analysis of modern Chilean politics, including the election and overthrow of Salvador Allende.
Surprisingly little research has been done on the Chilean parliamentary period. Devoid of major political crises, international adventures, and, at least until 1920, colorful presidential personalities, it is usually seen as an interregnum: a fruitless, corrupt period which can be summed up in a few critical phrases. According to Fredrick B. Pike, for example, “The complexity of politics in the parliamentary period is exceeded only by its unimportance.”2 Such assessments may have seriously underestimated the larger significance of the era. As this study will emphasize, the parliamentary period witnessed the growth of organized political competition under conditions favorable to elite acceptance of liberal democracy. In contrast with most other Latin American countries, particularly neighboring Argentina, party development in Chile occurred relatively early, gradually, and prior to the growth of widespread political participation, thus facilitating future development along a pluralist path.3
The Development of Political Parties
Prior to the civil war of 1891,4 which introduced the parliamentary period, several relatively durable political factions existed in Chile: the Radicals, Conservatives, Nationals, and Liberals.5 These groups were more than just cliques bound together by personal loyalties and family connections, inasmuch as they shared certain political beliefs and had developed a sense of partisan loyalty and identity over time.6 Nevertheless, it would be misleading to describe them as parties.7 They did not engage in coordinated activity to win popular support, largely because the political system in which they were operating offered them few incentives or opportunities to do so. Before 1891, the national administration generally selected candidates for public office in Chile.8 Moreover, these groups were not organized outside the legislature. The Radicals, who established asambleas in various localities, are a partial exception to this generalization, but until 1888 they had no national structure or central authorities.9
This situation began to change after 1891. The victory of the congressional forces in the civil war marked the culmination of a long struggle to limit the power of the national executive,10 and it produced fundamental changes in the Chilean political system.11 The principle of cabinet responsibility was introduced, shifting the locus of political power from the executive to the legislature. Governmental control over electoral outcomes was also eliminated, permitting relatively free competition for electoral support. In response, political groups in Chile began to establish national political structures in an effort to coordinate electoral activities and control the selection of government authorities. In short, the civil war of 1891 led to the development of political parties and organized competition in Chile.12
This important change has been largely ignored by students of the parliamentary era; in fact, the politics of this period have been portrayed in terms of the dissolution rather than the organization of parties. The confusion surrounding this issue in the first instance results from the very large number of competing political groups and, in the second, from the fact that factions persisted alongside parties. Multi-partyism, as Maurice Duverger pointed out in his classic study of parties, can easily be confused with the absence of parties.13 Edwards Vives, who had few flattering things to say about political parties after 1891, recognized this in 1903 when he wrote that the chief problem was not the lack of organized parties but the absence of any powerful parties, for which the dissolution or fusion of some would have been necessary.14 Given the mixture of multi-partyism and factional politics, the possibilities of confusion are even greater. The term “party system,” although technically applicable, hardly begins to convey the real complexity and character of the situation.
The Radicals
The Radicals, who were formed as a pressure group in the 1850s,15 were the first in Chile to organize along the lines of a political party. In November 1888 they held their first national convention in Santiago. Agreeing on a party constitution and platform, they established the basis for a political association with a national structure, explicit program, and formally recognized leadership. The constitution, which was to become something of a model for other parties, called for the formation of a junta central or central committee, elected by the local Radical asambleas, to coordinate the work of the party at the national level.16
The program adopted at this first convention directed itself primarily to the need for political reform. It called for the strict responsibility of the cabinet to parliament, decentralization of government, reform of the public administration, municipal autonomy, proportional representation in congressional and municipal elections, and “the most absolute respect for the right of suffrage.”17 Other important planks incorporated in the program include free, secular and compulsory primary education; the improvement of the legal position of women; a progressive system of taxation; the improvement of the condition of the working class; and state protection of national industry.18
Anti-clericalism and political reform are themes which the Radicals had emphasized since the middle of the nineteenth century. The concern for socio-economic issues was newer, reflecting the changing composition of the party as well as an effort to secure a more widespread base of popular support.
During the course of the 1891-1925 period the orientation of the party gradually changed, and its commitment to state intervention to solve basic socio-economic problems became more explicit. The turning point was the third party convention of 1906 which was marked by a famous debate between Enrique Mac-Iver and Valentín Letelier. Letelier, who won the support of the majority, attacked Mac-Iver’s laissez-faire conception of government, arguing that “all the cultured peoples of the world have at this moment something of socialism.”19 The resulting program was not socialist, but it did assert the obligation of the government to assist the helpless and destitute and called for state intervention in the critical areas of health and housing.20
By 1919 the party had completely abandoned its laissez-faire posture, approving a platform which included demands for free public education up to the university level, social security and minimum wage legislation, progressive taxation, state involvement in labor disputes, the regulation of female and child labor as well as hours and working conditions, the promotion and protection of national industry, and the improvement of housing conditions.21 Despite this reorientation, tensions between those who thought the party should actively concern itself with the plight of the lower classes and those who held a more traditional conception of the Radicals’ mission persisted throughout the parliamentary period. Central to the difficulty was the fact that the social composition of the party was far from homogeneous, including as it did elements of the middle sectors as well as northern mine owners and southern hacendados.22
At the time of their first convention the Radicals held only seven seats in the Chamber of Deputies and one in the Senate.23 In the years that followed, however, their importance was exceeded only by that of the Conservatives.24 This gain in influence may be attributed to several factors. First, the civil war made it possible for the Radicals to compete with other political groups on more equal terms. Whereas the intervention of the executive had previously deprived elections of all meaning, their outcome was now largely determined by the number of votes counted. This does not suggest that electoral abuses were eliminated. Every election was succeeded by heated debates over the disqualification of candidates on grounds of fraud, and the impartiality of the administration was frequently questioned.25 However, most observers agree that after 1891 fraud became less systematic and centralized and was perpetrated not by public officials, but by party agents whose chief instrument was bribery.26
Socio-economic changes also enhanced the party’s influence. Following the War of the Pacific and the incorporation of the valuable northern nitrate territories, Chile experienced a period of rapid economic growth. Between 1870 and 1890 exports increased from $68,376,207 to $144,381,805 pesos of 18 pence.27 By 1910 exports were valued at $328,827,176 pesos, nearly 85 percent of which were mining products.28 This export boom spread out to other sectors of the economy, encouraging industrial and commercial activities and the expansion of urban middle sector and working-class groups.29 Between 1885 and 1920 the proportion of the population living in cities with over 20,000 inhabitants increased from 14.3 to 27.8 percent.30 In addition, the country’s literate population grew rapidly, increasing from 28.9 to 50.3 percent of the total population between 1885 and 1920.31 These trends were highly favorable to the growth of the Radical party, because they released large numbers of men from the hegemony of the hacienda, enlarging the social base from which the party might draw support.
The gains made by the Radicals after 1891 may also be related to their organizational efforts. Between 1888 and 1899, when the party held its second convention, the number of asambleas quadrupled, reaching eighty-five.32 By 1919 there were 107 plus a number of youth clubs.33 As the Radicals were quick to point out, and with some pride, no other party in Chile had a comparable organization. Others, however, were quick to imitate the Radicals’ initiative.
The Democrats
The Democrats, who emerged as a distinct political faction during the administration of José Manuel Balmaceda, were the first to follow the Radical lead. The party was founded formally on November 20, 1887 by a group of Radical dissidents, under the leadership of Malaquías Concha and Avelino Contardo, who sought to establish a party to defend the interests of the working class. The program announced at this first meeting defined as the Democrats’ objective social and economic emancipation of the Chilean people. To this end it called for free, secular and obligatory education, state support for the aged and infirm, the abolition of taxes on food and industrial production, progressive taxation, and a protective customs policy. Furthermore it addressed itself to several political reforms: the reduction of the armed forces, the incompatibility of legislative and administrative posts, and municipal autonomy.34
Party leaders amplified this program at their first convention of July 1889 when they underlined the need for a protective customs policy and demanded the abolition of taxes on food and artisan and industrial activities. Greater emphasis, however, was placed on political reform. The improvement of the socio-economic condition of the worker was seen to be inseparable from the problem of achieving a more democratic form of government and, in particular, effective and widespread participation in elections. Finally, to mention two planks relating specifically to the economic position of the working class, the platform advocated metallic conversion to establish monetary stability and the prohibition of foreign immigration.35
During the civil war Democrats supported President Balmaceda, causing their organization to be suppressed until 1892. In July of that year they held a second national convention, and in the months that followed established over thirty local party units.36
Importance is attributed to the Democratic party in the historical literature chiefly because it was the first party in Chile to identify with the working class.37 It should be noted, however, that it also represented the interests of small domestic industry. Among its most prominent leaders were men such as Artemio Gutiérrez and Angel Guarello: men originally of low social rank who owned, or whose families owned, workshops, factories, and small firms.
The Democrats’ influence was quite restricted throughout the parliamentary period. Valparaíso elected the party’s first deputy, Angel Guarello, in 1894, but it was not until 1912, when four Democrats were seated in the lower house, that the party succeeded in electing a senator. Significantly, in that year the party suffered a serious split as Luis Emilio Recabarren, one of its more militant leaders, broke away to form the Socialist Labor party. A central dilemma facing the Democrats after 1892 was that influence could only be secured through inter-party electoral pacts which tended to compromise its basic principles. Splits over electoral strategy had developed on previous occasions, most notably at the convention of 1906 when the party decided to cooperate with the Conservatives. Recabarren’s dissatisfaction had similar origins.
The Socialist Labor party was considerably more militant than the Democratic party. Together with the Federación Obrera de Chile (FOCH) it affiliated with the Communist International in the early 1920s. Its formation, however, scarcely affected the distribution of political power, reflecting the relatively weak level of political consciousness and organization of the working class at this time. Its membership, generously estimated, was only 2,000 in 1922; and although it was well financed and directed, publishing five daily newspapers plus a number of periodicals,38 its electoral importance was negligible. Socialists received less than 0.5 percent of the vote in 1915 and 1918, and only 1.4 percent in 1921.39
The Conservative Party
The Conservatives, whose origins date back to the conflict over church-state relations of the 1850s,40 were unquestionably the most powerful and unified political group in Chile after 1891. They were the chief beneficiaries of the growth in political competition, increasing their legislative representation from a small fraction in 1888 to the largest bloc in the years that followed. They accomplished this feat largely through the influence of large landowners.41 In this connection it should be emphasized that authority to register voters and supervise elections was placed entirely in the hands of the largest taxpayers in each electoral district. This authority could be and was abused for partisan purposes, giving the electoral system a decidedly upper-class bias.42 Other parties used this to their advantage, as in the northern province of Tarapacá, where mining rather than agriculture was the principal source of wealth;43 but in most districts the Conservatives were in the best position to profit from the decentralization of electoral administration.
The influence of the church was also a considerable asset. As Valentín Letelier noted with reference to the elections of 1891 and 1892, the clergy actively supported Conservative candidates.44
Although the role of large landowners remained important, after 1900 the Conservatives, influenced by the encyclical Rerum Novarum of Pope Leo XIII, as well as by practical considerations, made serious efforts to increase their popular appeal and strengthen their organization. The party established a nominally democratic structure based on local assemblies and took an increased interest in socio-economic issues. The program presented by a group of Valparaíso Conservatives to the convention of 1901 illustrate this tendency. In complete harmony with recently espoused Catholic social doctrine, it proposed the construction of cheap housing for workers, the regulation of hours and working conditions in factories and workshops, the prohibition of child labor, workmen’s compensation for industrial accidents, legislation to protect tenant farmers, the colonization of public lands, and the expansion of educational opportunities of all types.45
The Conservatives described themselves as “advanced reformers”46 and were acutely aware of the need to adopt a more popular image.47 The system of departmental and communal assemblies with local directorates which the party set up in imitation of the Radical party was undoubtedly designed with this in mind. There is no indication that it actually functioned in a democratic manner; however, it did permit greater coordination of party activities, broader diffusion of Conservative propaganda, and a widening of the party’s social base.48
The Liberal Democrats
The Liberal Democrats or balmacedistas consisted largely of the remnants of Balmaceda’s government: former legislators, army officers, public officials and friends. Scattered by persecution and exile after the civil war, they reunited in June 1892 to form a new party under the leadership of Manuel Arístides Zañartu, a former minister of finance. In November 1893 they held their first national convention in Talca electing national officers, promulgating a constitution, which provided for the popular election of departmental leaders, and adopting a platform, which essentially endorsed Balmaceda’s ideas on questions such as the superiority of presidential over parliamentary forms of government.
The party contested the elections of 1894 and, despite a certain amount of official harassment, did surprisingly well. It emerged, with twenty-six seats, as the second largest bloc in the legislature after the Conservatives who held twenty-nine.49 Its representatives worked chiefly to obtain a law of amnesty and pensions for officials dismissed after the civil war. The party held no cabinet posts in Jorge Montt’s administration (1891-1896), but thereafter the Liberal Democrats were constantly at the center of political intrigue, shifting support from one coalition to another, making and breaking ministries. Paradoxically, no one played the parliamentary game with more zest and to greater effect than the members of the party whose chief and distinguishing tenet was the return of the pre-1891 presidential system.
The activities of the Liberal Democrats between 1896 and 1901 are confusing because in this period the party was divided into two personal factions: the vicuñistas, who followed Claudio Vicuña Guerrero, and the sanfuentistas, who responded to the leadership of Enrique Sanfuentes, Balmaceda’s hand-picked successor. This split meant that at many points one faction of the party was represented in the government while the other joined the opposition. The union of these factions under the leadership of Juan Luis Sanfuentes, the brother of Enrique, during the administration of Germán Riesco (1901-1906) greatly increased the party’s influence and involvement in ministerial shuffles.50
By all accounts Juan Luis Sanfuentes was the most dexterous and powerful figure in Chilean politics until the end of his term as president in 1920.51 With six different political groups competing for power, success depended not only on electoral resources but on the possibility of negotiating advantageous electoral alliances. Since complex electoral pacts and governing coalitions could only be worked out at the national level, a premium was placed on the centralization of authority. The Liberal Democrats carried this tendency to an extreme, and thus Sanfuentes had much more freedom in which to maneuver than did the leaders of other parliamentary groups. In addition, the Liberal Democrats were relatively pragmatic, even opportunistic, and were prepared to form an alliance with any party. The Conservatives and the Radicals, on the other hand, had ideological commitments which prevented such flexibility, while the Liberals were simply too fragmented to make full use of their parliamentary strength.
Although the Liberal Democrats were not founded by Sanfuentes and survived his retirement from politics,52 the tremendous influence he wielded raises questions about the structure of the party. If most important decisions were made in the casa azul of Sanfuentes, as Edwards Vives implies,53 did the formal constitution of the party have any reality or were the Liberal Democrats merely a legislative faction? Several facts suggest that the Liberal Democrats did develop a national party structure. First, although the local units of the party did not enjoy much autonomy, they were not just paper organizations. The national committee issued circulars to the provincial directorates asking that they coordinate their activities,54 and contemporary newspapers indicate that party meetings were held at the local level to nominate candidates.55 Moreover, the national junta ejecutiva and larger directorio seem to have met frequently to decide party strategy.56 Sanfuentes was capable of acting in a rather cavalier fashion, bypassing both these bodies; but interestingly, his influence owed less to the support of Liberal Democrats in the legislature than to his control over formal party institutions.57
The Liberals, Nationals and Independents
In contrast to the parties described above, legislators played a critical role in the leadership of the Liberals and Nationals. For much of the parliamentary period neither of these two groups was well organized. The Nationals, whose origins date back to the presidency of Manuel Montt (1851-1861), were basically a small legislative group with no distinctive program. At times they were not even a separate group. After the civil war the Nationals and Liberals attempted to unify and form an influential Liberal party under the leadership of José Besa Infantes. The unity of this coalition was precarious, but during the administration of Federico Errázuriz Echaurren (1896-1901) the Nationals virtually disappeared. Referring to this period in a speech before the Senate in 1911, Arturo Besa said, “We Nationals had no president, no directorate, no secretaryship; we all met at the house of Ismael Tocomal [a Liberal].”58
The nomination of Pedro Montt, a National, to the presidency in 1901 revived the separate identity of the group, since the majority of the Liberals refused to support his candidacy. With only the backing of the Conservatives and Nationals, Montt lost the election; but in 1906 the hopes of the Nationals were finally realized. In this election Montt received support from the Radicals, Nationals, a Liberal faction, and a small group of Conservatives called the monttinos.59 Since the main body of the Liberals sided with a coalition of Conservatives, Liberal Democrats and Democrats, the election further widened the gap between the Liberals and Nationals. Thereafter the latter acted quite independently. However, there is little evidence that the Nationals developed a national party structure, and for all practical purposes they might be considered a Liberal faction.60
The Liberals were unquestionably the least disciplined party and were seriously divided in every presidential election. The party consisted of two main factions. One, the Liberal doctrinario, which traced its origins back to the dissident Liberals of President Santa María’s time (1881-1886), tended to align with the Radical party. Whenever the Liberals joined the Coalition, the electoral alliance whose nucleus was the Conservative party, the liberales doctrinarios split off to operate independently. The other faction, liberal coalicionista, was more flexible. Although it usually cooperated with the Conservatives in presidential elections, it readily entered into alliances with the Radicals.
Until the middle of the parliamentary period the Liberals had no party structure. Elections were essentially a do-it-yourself operation, which is to say that virtually anyone with enough money and influence could proclaim himself a Liberal candidate. After 1907, when the party held a national convention, the situation began to change. Under the leadership of Ismael Valdés Valdés, who was president of the party from 1906 to 1912, the Liberals, imitating the Radical party, set up a system of departmental assemblies.61
The 1907 convention also prompted innovations in the Liberal program. It was broadened to include not only traditional planks relating to freedom of suffrage, the separation of church and state and other political reforms, but demands for socio-economic reforms.62 However, the Liberals went much less far in this direction than the Conservatives. As late as 1919 their platform was still basically one of political reform, although emphasis was given to the expansion and improvement of the state educational system.63
To complete this sketch of the forces competing in Chilean politics, it should be mentioned that a number of parliamentary seats were regularly filled by independent candidates: men such as Augusto Bruno, a Senator from Antofagasta from 1915 to 1921 with nitrate interests and links with the Liberals, who had enough money and prestige to defeat regular party candidates.
The System, of Competition
Table I shows the relative strength of the parties described above in the legislative elections of 1912 and 1915. These are the first elections after 1891 for which official data are available64 and, significantly, the first Chilean elections for which information on the distribution of the vote by political party was published. It should be noted that a coalition of at least three parties was necessary to secure a majority in the Chamber of Deputies after both these elections. The need for coalitions was typical of the period as a whole.
During most of the parliamentary period Chile was governed by one of two basic alliances: the Coalition, built around the Conservative party and usually a portion of the Liberal party or the Liberal Democrats, and the Liberal Alliance, which was the name applied to any alliance including the Radicals and liberales doctrinarios. Usually the Democrats participated in the Liberal Alliance as well. Beyond this one cannot generalize. Alliances were made and broken with tremendous rapidity, and the only stable points of reference in the whole system were the two parties with strong views on the issue of relations between church and state.
The Radicals, intensely anti-clerical, attacked all forms of state support for religion, from religious ceremonies in the armed forces to subsidies to religious institutions. The most controversial issue of all, however, was state control of education. The Radicals were deeply entrenched in the state’s educational establishment and sought to extend public education at the expense of private schools, particularly religious ones. Almost all their programs included demands for free, secular and compulsory education, and many attacked the church even more directly. The Radical program of 1912, for example, called for the abolition of the university’s faculty of theology and the replacement of religious instruction in secondary schools with courses in “scientific morality.”65 The Conservatives, in contrast, fought the extension of the public school system and demanded “freedom of teaching,” which basically meant that they wanted degrees obtained in ecclesiastical schools placed on the same footing as those granted by the state, a demand which aroused considerable passion because only the latter were recognized in the appointment of public officials.66
For other parties, however, the religious issue had lost most of its former significance. It thus failed to produce a stable alignment of parties.67 Other questions of a socio-economic nature were becoming more important, but they cut across party lines and the pre-existing religious cleavage. Monetary policy, for example, was a great source of political controversy, but it was not generally considered a party question.68 The Radicals and Democrats favored monetary conversion and the stabilization of the peso on the grounds that the inflation associated with the constantly depreciating peso tended to reduce the living standards of the working class, while the Liberal Democrats resolutely opposed such a policy.69 The other parties were thoroughly divided. Many of their members, particularly in the National party, favored monetary stability in principle, but often not in practice.70
Party lines were even less firmly drawn on commercial policy, although here the two extreme ends of the political spectrum were held by the Conservatives, who generally favored free trade except where agricultural imports were concerned, and the Democrats, who enthusiastically supported protectionism, again with the exception of agricultural imports. The Radicals were formally committed to protectionism too, although prominent figures within the party, notably Enrique Mac-Iver, took a different line.71
On the issue of social reform the party alignment was different but again not clearly defined. The Conservatives had much in common with the Democrats and Radicals, arguing that if efforts were not made to solve social problems, workers would turn to socialism and the entire social order would be jeopardized.72 Their attitude was thoroughly patronizing and most of their concrete proposals related only to urban workers. Nevertheless, during the 1892-1925 period they probably sponsored as many reforms as the Radicals and Democrats, and they certainly outdistanced the Liberal Democrats and Nationals.73 Typically it is difficult to generalize about the Liberals, but certain individuals within the party did take a serious interest in social problems.74
Not surprisingly, even contemporaries found it hard to define the differences between the parties in programmatic terms. Abraham König, a Radical, observed in 1913 that nothing important separated the Radicals from the Liberal Democrats, Nationals or Liberals. Their distinct identities were the result of “historical memories, nothing more.”75 Similarly Ramón Subercaseaux, a Conservative, argued that the Conservatives and Liberals were not divided by any significant issues. In fact, he proposed that the two parties should unite—a suggestion, he later admitted, which was made from want of political experience.76
As these comments indicate, partisan identities in this period were primarily political in origin, reflecting past conflicts rather than contemporary socio-economic realities. Structures of competition had developed very gradually in Chile, and several parties could trace their origins back to the middle of the nineteenth century. The early solidification of partisan differences had important consequences for the system of competition, because the old political rivalries which persisted over time were cross-cut by new issues, creating the system of intersecting cleavages described above. Thus the obstacles to the formation of a governing alliance on programmatic grounds were truly formidable.
Arising out of and intensifying these difficulties was the clientelistic character of the Chilean party system.77 Party leaders were chiefly concerned with providing tangible rewards for their followers, rather than fulfilling party programs.78 Given the necessity for coalition government, some gap between program and practice was probably inevitable, but the issue is not merely one of political compromise in the ordinary sense. Disagreements over the allocation of public posts overshadowed all others and more often than not were responsible for the collapse of ministries. The appointment of governors, intendants, and diplomats, as well as disputes over contested elections, were a particular source of tension, but differences also arose over lesser appointments. Because demands for patronage came from every quarter, it was almost impossible to hold a ministry intact for more than a few months.79 Between December 1891 and December 1920 there were eighty different ministries, an average of one every four months and ten days, and this excludes partial changes of government.80
This cabinet instability worked against lower-class interests. As long as party leaders were preoccupied with meeting demands for special favors, social reforms of any type were improbable. Indeed, since these preoccupations encouraged the formation of very heterogeneous coalitions, positive action on redistributive as opposed to purely distributive issues was almost inconceivable.
The electoral system must be held partially accountable. Not only did proportional representation discourage the consolidation of parties, but districts were small. On the average there were only 1,300 voters per deputy,81 making legislators vulnerable to pressures from their constituents, particularly wealthy ones.82 Even more to the point, elections were incredibly expensive. Estimates vary, but in his autobiography Ramón Subercaseaux claimed he spent 30,000 pesos as a candidate in the 1906 elections (roughly $9,000 at the time) and offers that this was relatively cheap, since he did not have to buy votes but only provide a small “gratification” to encourage voters to go to the polls.83 This observation is quite possible: figures as high as one million pesos have been quoted, although the usual price for a seat in the upper house was in the area of 100,000 pesos and for the Chamber of Deputies 10,000.84 Politicians used these sums mainly to bribe voters —a practice which became deeply established in this period.85 Moreover, as mentioned above, electoral regulations gave the economic elite tremendous control over the registration of voters and supervision of elections. Again, the implications for the political influence of the “have-nots” in Chilean society were anything but positive.
Even if two or three parties did agree to give general policy objectives precedence over others of a more particularistic nature, it was difficult to form a viable coalition. The distribution of seats in the two houses of the legislature, both of which could overturn a ministry, did not necessarily correspond. Since neither house could be dissolved, ad hoc ministries were frequently necessary. Party factionalism constituted another persistent source of difficulty, particularly among the Liberals. There was no guarantee that a coalition negotiated by the executive committee of the party would be accepted by its legislative members, nor even that Liberals in the Senate would support a ministry backed by Liberal deputies. Party discipline was more developed among other parliamentary groups, leading to complaints that party leaders were vested with too much authority and influence;86 however, because the number and relative strength of the parties made it difficult to form a majority, the defection of just a few individuals could be critical. It should also be noted that opportunities for congressional obstruction were enormous. There was no limit on debate in either chamber, so virtual unanimity was required for laws to be passed.87
These obstacles to the representation of popular interests were related to and exacerbated by the low rates of electoral participation prevailing throughout the period. After 1874 all literate, adult males over the age of twenty-five were eligible to vote,88 but only a very small proportion exercised this right. Significantly, the growth of party competition did not alter this situation. Even in the last decade of the parliamentary period, when voters as a proportion of adult, literate males rose from 29.4 to 39.2 percent,89 the electorate remained relatively restricted. This is clearly indicated by Table II, which includes figures for the 1940s for the purposes of comparison.
The small size of the electorate may be related to several factors. First, literacy requirements excluded many from the system. Second, other electoral regulations combined with socio-economic conditions permitted powerful elites to manipulate the electoral system and contain pressures from below. Such manipulation was particularly prevalent in the countryside, because the late nineteenth-century mining boom left the traditional rural social structure largely unaffected. In addition, the complicated and multi-polar parliamentary system created few incentives for the expansion of the electorate. Competing groups could hope to increase their influence through the formation of new alliances rather than the mobilization of new support.
The Election of Alessandri and the Collapse of the Parliamentary System
Even after 1915, when there was an upsurge in the strength of the Liberal Alliance and a concomitant increase in the salience of the social as opposed to the religious question, cabinet instability persisted. In that year an alliance of Radicals, Democrats, and a faction of the Liberal party made serious inroads into areas of Coalition strength and secured a majority in the Senate, although they lost the presidency and failed to gain a majority in the lower house. Most notable was the election of Arturo Alessandri to the Senate from the northern province of Tarapacá, previously an area firmly in the control of the Liberal Democrats. Alessandri, who recognized the potential of socio-economic electoral appeals, championed the cause of the oppressed northern mining workers and generated tremendous popular enthusiasm.
Five years later Alessandri led another remarkable and successful campaign, this time for the presidency. Against a background of widespread unemployment, labor agitation, and economic depression—products of the disastrous post-war collapse of the nitrate market—he rallied the middle classes and proletariat, promising fundamental political and social reforms.90 For the first time in Chile organized labor took an active part in the campaign.91
Whatever view one takes of Alessandri’s objectives, and some cynicism is quite justified,92 his triumph in the presidential election brought the mounting social problems of early twentieth-century Chile to the forefront of national politics. The electorate polarized along new lines and the stakes of political competition suddenly increased. These changes were reflected in the 1921 legislative elections in which the Democrats and Radicals polled 42.8 percent of the vote.93
The parliamentary system was strained to the point of collapse. Forces seeking to defend the status quo concentrated on blocking Alessandri’s reforms, but with the country in a state of serious social unrest and economic depression, the almost complete paralysis of government proved too much for the military. In 1924, encouraged by politicians on all sides to intervene, they took matters into their own hands and ended the stalemate.94 A series of reforms, including legislation on social security and state arbitration of labor disputes, were pushed through the legislature,95 and in 1925 a new constitution was promulgated, formally ending the parliamentary system of government.
The Timing, Pace and Sequence of Political Change
In summary, political party development in Chile was not accompanied by a restructuring of conflict along socio-economic lines or by a rapid expansion of the electorate. Throughout the period cabinets represented heterogeneous legislative majorities and were formed less on the basis of general issues than on questions of particular interest, material gain, or electoral advantage. The resulting ministerial instability did not completely disrupt government, given the continuity of administration,96 but it did limit the impact of cabinets on public policy, making it extremely difficult for political authorities to pursue policies involving more than the distribution of short-term tangible benefits. Most important of all, the structure of competition did not allow the electorate to make meaningful choices. Party lines were blurred on most issues, and with constant shifts in party alliances and the related rotation of cabinet officials, no distinction could even be drawn between the “ins” and the “outs.” Consequently, the electorate had no effective means of making its preferences felt or of holding elites responsible for public policy.
The scope of political participation also remained extremely limited. Thus it was not until the end of the period that parties representing middle-sector and urban working-class interests came close to holding a majority of seats in the legislature. Even then the structure of conflict and rules of the game precluded policy innovations designed to deal with the social discontent and economic dislocations associated with the collapse of Chilean export markets.
In short, political party development in Chile did not produce a more equitable distribution of political power. The main beneficiaries of the parliamentary system were the already privileged: commercial, agricultural, and mining elites who stood to profit most from congressional obstruction and government inaction and who could buy votes, make large contributions to electoral campaigns, and otherwise use president but many subsecretaries and senior officials in their posts. Luis Izquierdo, their resources to control electoral outcomes.97 Nevertheless, one should not minimize the significance of the period. The fact that socio-economic elites were able to retain and perhaps even augment their influence in the face of a new competitive system is a basic key for understanding Chile’s constitutional tradition.
The importance of Chile’s experience during the parliamentary period is emphasized by comparison with Argentina. In the latter country the introduction of a competitive system in 1912 virtually overwhelmed conservative forces. As a result, Argentine elite commitment to liberal democracy was extremely tenuous. When the depression struck Argentina, native elites seized the opportunity to oust the Radical leader, Hipólito Irigoyen, and ended Argentina’s initial experiment with competitive party rule. Since 1930 conservative groups in Argentina have continued to question the legitimacy of liberal democracy, contributing to perennial political crises, instability, and military intervention.
In contrast, the military ended the first period of competitive party rule in Chile in response to reformist rather than conservative pressures. Since that time Chile has enjoyed an exceptionally long period of stable constitutional government and a tradition of formal democracy sufficiently strong to permit the election of a Marxist president. The coup of 1973 indicated the extent to which that tradition had depended on the support of privileged groups in Chilean society. In other words, the differential response of elites in Chile and Argentina to the introduction of a competitive system reflected their relative success in retaining influence under a new set of political rules and appears to have had long-term consequences for the viability of liberal democracy in the two countries.
The contrasting experiences of Chile and Argentina tend to support Eric Nordlinger’s hypotheses about the importance of the rate and sequence of political change. In particular, Nordlinger has observed that “there appears to be an inverse relationship between the rate at which the franchise was extended and the bourgeoisie’s and aristocracy’s acceptance of democratic government.”98 He argues that a competitive system is likely to flounder when structures of competition develop rapidly (i.e., when proto-parties do not precede full-blown parties and a mass suffrage) and when the expansion of the suffrage is rapid. In Chile structures of competition developed gradually and before the growth of pressures for mass political participation. In Argentina, on the other hand, an extended and effective suffrage was was introduced almost overnight into an oligarchical regime. The proportion of the population voting in the Argentine elections of 1916 was higher than in any Chilean election until the 1950s.99 Partially as a result, Argentine elites not only found it much more difficult to adjust to party competition than their Chilean counterparts, they even failed to organize an effective national party to defend their interests.100
In conclusion, during the 1891-1925 period Chile made the difficult transition to a competitive party system. National structures for organizing popular support, winning elections and securing influence over the selection of political authorities were developed, along with norms of freedom of expression and opposition. To dismiss the period as a corrupt, do-nothing era of oligarchical rule may miss the point. The development of a relatively well-institutionalized party system in Chile during the parliamentary period provided the basis for future political stability and development along a pluralist line precisely because it did not result in a significantly more egalitarian distribution of political power.
See, in particular, Eric A. Nordlinger, “Political Development: Time Sequences and Rates of Change,” World Politics, 20 (April 1968), 494-520; Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, Mass., 1962); Glaucio Ary Dillon Soares, “The New Industrialization and the Brazilian Political System,” in lames Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, eds., Latin America: Reform or Revolution? (Greenwich, Conn., 1968), pp. 186-201; Karl de Schweinitz, Jr., “Growth, Development, and Political Modernization,” World Politics, 22 (July 1970), 518-540; Philippe C. Schmitter, “Paths to Political Development in Latin America,” in Douglas A. Chalmers, ed., Changing Latin America: New Interpretations of Its Politics and Society (New York, 1972), pp. 83-105; James R. Kurth, “Patrimonial Authority, Delayed Development, and Mediterranean Politics,” paper prepared for Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, Sept. 1973; Leonard Binder et al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton, N.J., 1971); and David Collier, “Timing of Economic Growth and Regime Characteristics in Latin America,” Comparative Politics, 7 (April 1975), 331-359.
Chile and the United States, 1880-1962 (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1963), p. 87. See also Federico G. Gil, The Political System of Chile (Boston, 1966), pp. 49-50; Alberto Edwards Vives, ha fronda aristocrática (6th ed., Santiago, 1966), p. 177; José Antonio Alfonso, Los partidos políticos de Chile (Santiago, 1902?); idem, El parlamentarismo i la reforma política en Chile (Santiago, 1909); Guillermo Subercaseaux, Estudios políticos de actualidad (Santiago, 1914).
It should be emphasized that this article only seeks to demonstrate that party competition in Chile developed under conditions highly favorable to elite domination and hence acceptance of formal democracy. It does not attempt to provide a complete explanation for the persistence of pluralist institutions in Chile over time. For an effort of this type see Maurice Zeitlin, “The Social Determinants of Political Democracy in Chile,” in Petras and Zeitlin, Latin America, pp. 220-234. For more general theories of democratic political development see Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, N.Y., 1960); Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, 1971); Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde, “Towards a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model,” American Political Science Review, 61 (March 1967) , 72-79; Deane E. Neubauer, “Some Conditions of Democracy,” American Political Science Review, 61 (Dec. 1967), 1002-1009; Robert W. Jackman, “On the Relation of Economic Development to Democratic Performance,” American Journal of Political Science, 17 (Aug. 1973), 611-621; Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston, 1966).
See Harold Blakemore, British Nitrates and Chilean Politics, 1886-1896: Balmaceda and North (London, 1974); Hernán Ramírez Necochea, La guerra civil de 1891: Antecedentes económicos (Santiago, 1943); M. H. Hervey, Dark Days in Chile: An Account of the Revolution of 1891 (London, 1891); José Miguel Yrarrázaval Larraín, La política económica del Presidente Balmaceda (Santiago, 1963).
See Alberto Edwards Vives and Eduardo Frei Montalva, Historia de los partidos políticos chilenos (Santiago, 1949).
From President Montt’s time onward most members of the Chilean legislature can be classified according to partisan affiliation. See, for example, the election results presented in Ricardo Donoso, Las ideas políticas en Chile (Mexico, 1946), pp. 408-435, passim. The growth of partisanship can also be traced in the political press. See Francisco Antonio Encina, Historia de Chile, 20 vols. (Santiago, 1922), XIX, 63-64.
This study employs a concept of party which is based on the work of William N. Chambers, “Party Development and Party Action: The American Origins,” History and Theory, 3 (1963), 91-120; Political Parties in a New Nation: The American Experience, 1776-1809 (New York, 1963); “Party Development and the American Mainstream,” in William N. Chambers and Walter D. Burnham, eds., The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development (New York, 1967), pp. 3-32. Parties are distinguished from other social structures seeking power within the political arena by four defining characteristics: (1) a set of consciously shared perspectives, opinions or beliefs; (2) continuing and regularized connections or relationships between political leaders at the center and local leaders or party activists; (3) a durable base of popular support; and (4) coordinated activity to win popular support in order to exercise control over the selection of government authorities and the formulation of public policy. Party in this sense could be something short of a mass-based organization, but it would be more than a faction, interest group, or formless opinion aggregate.
Armando Donoso, Recuerdos de cincuenta años (Santiago, 1947), p. 210; Abdon Cifuentes, Memorias, 2 vols. (Santiago, 1936), I, 147-150; Femando Campos Harriet, Historia constitucional de Chile (Santiago, 1956), p. 477; José Miguel Yrarrázaval Larraín, “Las elecciones de 1888,” Boletín de la Academia Chilena de Historia, 21:50 (1954), 71-87; Chile, Cámara de Diputados, Boletín de las sesiones ordinarias de la Cámara de Diputados (Santiago, 1888), pp. 565-566; “The Chilean Revolution,” Contemporary Review, 60 (July-Dec. 1891), 122-123.
Peter Gordon Snow, “The Radical Parties of Chile and Argentina” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Virginia, 1963), pp. 21, 58-59.
See Ricardo Salas Edwards, Balmaceda y el parlamentarismo en Chile, 2 vols. (Santiago, 1925). See also Atilio A. Borón, “La evolución del régimen electoral y sus efectos en la representación de los intereses populares: El caso de Chile,” Revista Latinoamericana de Ciencia Política, 2 (Dec. 1971), 395-431; R. Donoso, Las ideas, pp. 409-431; Campos Harriet, Historia constitucional, pp. 475-484; Domingo Amunátegui y Solar, El progreso intelectual y político de Chile (Santiago, 1936), pp. 132-139.
It should be noted that this was achieved without basic changes in the legal framework of government. The constitution of 1833 remained in effect until 1925.
For an analysis of the causes of party development in Chile see Karen (Remmer) Vincent-Smith, “Party Competition and Public Policy: Chile and Argentina, 1890-1930” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Chicago, 1974), pp. 18-119. This issue lies beyond the scope of the present study, which is concerned with the consequences rather than the causes of party development during the parliamentary period.
Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, Barbara and Robert North, trans. (2d ed., London, 1959), p. 228.
Edwards and Frei, Historia de los partidos políticos, pp. 11-12.
On the history of the party see Snow, “The Radical Parties,” and Luis Palma Zuniga, Historia del partido radical (Santiago, 1967).
Palma Zuniga, Historia del partido radical, pp. 63-64 reprints the constitution.
Luis Galdames, Valentín Letelier y su obra, 1852-1919 (Santiago 1937) pp. 291-293.
Ibid.
Palma Zúñiga, Historia del partido radical, pp. 84-86, 95-97; see also Galdames, Valentín Letelier, pp. 366-381.
Palma Zúñiga, Historia del partido radical, p. 99.
Ibid., pp. 127-130.
For a contemporary view of the party’s social composition see Rafael Luis Gumucio, El partido conservador (Santiago, 1911), p. 19.
Encina, Historia de Chile, XIX, 117-118.
See Table II, infra.
See, for example, Chile, Congreso Nacional, Boletín i actas de las sesiones celebradas por el congreso nacional en 1906 con motivo de la elección de Presidente de la República (Santiago, 1906).
A. Donoso, Recuerdos de cincuenta años, interview with Enrique Mac-Iver, p. 139; Edwards Vives, La fronda, p. 178; Manuel Rivas Vicuña, “Recuerdos electorales de 1918,” El Mercurio (Santiago), 17 Jan. 1924 reprinted in Manuel Rivas Vicuña, Historia política y parlamentaria de Chile, Guillermo Feliú Cruz, ed., 3 vols. (Santiago, 1964), II, 398-401; Encina, Historia de Chile, XX, 341; Guillermo Feliú Cruz, Chile visto a través de Agustín Ross (Santiago, 1950), p. 110; Pike, Chile and the United States, p. 88; Luis Galdames, A History of Chile, Isaac Joslin Cox, trans. (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1941), p. 368.
Chile, Oficina Central de Estadística, Anuario estadístico de la República de Chile, 1918, Vol. VI: Hacienda, p. 64.
Ibid.; Chilean Legation (London), Resumen de la hacienda pública de Chile desde 1833 hasta 1914 (London, 1915), p. 94.
See Oscar Muñoz Gomá, Crecimiento industrial de Chile, 1914-1965, Publicaciones del Instituto de Economía y Planificación, no. 105 (Santiago, 1968); Ricardo Lagos Escobar, La industria en Chile: Antecedentes estructurales (Santiago, 1966); Chile, Oficina Central de Estadística, Séptimo censo jeneral de la población de Chile levantado el 28 noviembre de 1895, 4 vols. (Santiago, 1900); Chile, Comisión Central del Censo, Censo de la República de Chile levantado el 28 de noviembre de 1907 (Santiago, 1908).
Chile, Censo, 1907, pp. 1266-1267; Chile, Dirección General de Estadística, Censo de población de la República de Chile levantado el 15 de diciembre de 1920 (Santiago, 1925), p. 104.
Chile, Censo, 1907 and 1920.
Palma Zúñiga, Historia del partido radical, p. 79.
Ibid., pp. 115, 127.
Hernán Ramírez Necochea, Historia del movimiento obrero en Chile (Santiago, [1956]), pp. 214-215.
Feliú Cruz, Agustín Ross, pp. 126-128; Encina, Historia de Chile, XIX, 55.
Jordi Fuentes and Lía Cortés, Diccionario político de Chile (Santiago, 1967), p. 147.
Julio César Jobet, Ensayo crítico del desarrollo económico-social de Chile (Santiago, 1955), p. 128.
Rollie Poppino, International Communism in Latin America: A History of the Movement, 1917-1963 (Glencoe, Ill., 1964), pp. 67-68.
Ricardo Cruz-Coke, Geografía electoral de Chile (Santiago, 1952), p. 53.
See J. Lloyd Mecham, Church and State in Latin America: A History of Politico-Ecclesiastical Relations (rev. ed., Chapel Hill, N.C., 1966), pp. 209-210; Alberto Edwards Vives, El gobierno de don Manuel Montt, 1851-1861 (Santiago, 1932), pp. 173-250, passim.
Conservatives could be astonishingly frank about this. See Julio Subercaseaux Browne, “Reminiscencias,” Boletín de la Academia Chilena de la Historia, 28 (Segundo Semestre, 1961), 239-240.
Arturo Olavarría Bravo, Chile entre dos Alessandri: Memorias políticas, 4 vols. (Santiago, 1962-1965), I, 129.
See the debate on the 1906 elections in Tarapacá, 13 June 1906, Chile, Camara de Diputados, Sessiones ordinarias, particularly the comments of Oscar Viel Cavero, pp. 119-120 and Luis Izquierdo, p. 162.
Valentín Letelier, La lucha por la cultura (Santiago, 1895), p. 210.
Convención Conservadora, Ideas para la convención: Programa y estatutos, preséntalos a la convención un grupo de conservadores de Valparaíso (Valparaíso, 1901).
Gumucio, El partido conservador, p. 10.
At the Conservative convention of 1918 there was even a move to nominate a member of the working class to the national legislature from Santiago. The assembly of that province proposed, “that it is necessary to define officially the democratic concept of the party to shelter it from all criticism or charges to the effect that it is an oligarchic party.” “Convención Conservadora,” El Mercurio (Santiago), 2 Oct. 1918, p. 15.
See Gumucio, El partido conservador, p. 10, for comments on the party’s social composition.
Germán Urzúa Valenzuela, Los partidos políticos chilenos (Santiago, 1968), p. 57.
It should be noted, however, that the legislative branch of the party was not completely unified even after 1901. See the comments of Arturo Besa in Chile, Congreso Nacional, Cámara de Senadores, Boletín de las sesiones ordinarias de la Cámara de Senadores, 16 Aug. 1911, p. 511.
Edwards and Frei, Historia de los partidos políticos, p. 178.
Sanfuentes retired from politics in 1920 at the end of his presidential term. The Liberal Democratic party survived until 1932 when it united with other liberal groups.
Edwards Vives, La fronda, p. 177.
Partido Liberal-democrático, Carta política del Señor Ismael Pérez Montt (Santiago, 1903), p. 29.
See, for example, El Mercurio (Santiago), 1 Dec. 1914, p. 11; 10 Dec. 1914, p. 9.
Between September 1901 and September 1902 the thirty-eight member executive committee met forty-nine times; the directorate ten times. Partido Liberal-democrático, Carta política, p. 28.
See the account of Sanfuentes’ conflict with the majority of Liberal Democrats in the legislature in 1907. Speech by Luis Antonio Vergara, Cámara de Senadores, Sesiones ordinarias, 9 Aug. 1911, pp. 476-479.
Ibid., 16 Aug. 1911, p. 510.
It should be noted that this was one of the few occasions when the Conservative party suffered a definite split.
As late as 1914, by which time other political groups had established active local units and at least a nominally democratic framework, the National’s executive committee was still selecting candidates. El Mercurio (Santiago), 11 Dec. 1914, p. 11. Reports on the Radical party at this time indicate, in contrast, that there was not only popular participation in party affairs at the local level, but real competition in the nomination of candidates (ibid., 1 Dec. 1914, p. 10).
Rivas Vicuña, Historia política, I, 145.
Fuentes and Cortés, Diccionario político, p. 276.
“Convención Liberal,” El Mercurio (Santiago), 16 Sept. 1919, p. 15.
See Borón, “Evolución del régimen electoral,” pp. 410-422.
Palma Zúñiga, Historia del partido radical, p. 110.
Paul S. Reinsch, “Parliamentary Government in Chile,” American Political Science Review, 3 (Nov. 1909), 518.
Guillermo Subercaseaux, Estudios políticos, passim, argues that the issue was completely sterile.
Alfonso, Los partidos políticos, p. 36.
See the debate on this issue during July 1898 in Cámara de Diputados, Sesiones ordinarias, pp. 317ff, particularly the comments of Enrique Mac-Iver, who led the Radical opposition to a new law of emission (pp. 321-334), and on the other side the comments of Liberal Democrats such as Roberto Meeks (pp. 390-401). In the voting which followed on July 20 the Conservatives, Liberals, Nationals, and Liberal Democrats favored, almost without exception, a new emission; the Radicals and Democrats were solidly opposed (p. 457).
On 23 July 1895, for example, fifty-one deputies supported a resolution favoring monetary stability, ibid., p. 567.
Ibid., 14 July 1897, p. 493; 12 July 1897, p. 453.
Gumucio, El partido conservador, pp. 38-39. See also Luis A. Undurraga’s speech on the social issue of 12 July 1923 in Chile, Cámara de Diputados, Sesiones ordinarias, pp. 667-671, 673-675.
The most comprehensive social reform project presented to the legislature before Arturo Alessandri assumed office was sponsored by the Conservatives. Submitted on 2 June 1919, their bill included provisions to regulate hours of work, protect female and child labor, and ensure wages were paid in cash. It also sought to involve the state in trade union activities and labor conflicts. Unions, regulated by the government, were to be established in all manufacturing, mining, and transport firms employing more than twenty-five workers, and with funds contributed by the employer they were to administer a full range of social security benefits for their members. Chile, Cámara de Senadores, Sesiones ordinarias, 2 June 1919, pp. 40-46. On the attitude of the Liberal Democrats and Nationals see Feliú Cruz, Agustín Ross, p. 133.
Ibid., pp. 132-133; Pike, Chile and the United States, pp. 116-117.
La constitución de 1833 en 1913 (Santiago, 1913), p. 683.
Memorias de ochenta años, 2 vols. (2d ed., Santiago, 1936), II, 75. See also the comments of Arturo Besa, Cámara de Senadores, Sesiones ordinarias, 16 Aug. 1911, p. 510.
For an extended treatment of clientelism, a term which refers to patterns of political behavior based on patron-client relationships, see John Duncan Powell, “Peasant Society and Clientelistic Politics,” American Political Science Review, 64 (June 1970), 411-425. See also René Lemarchand and Kenneth Legg, “Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis,” Comparative Politics, 4 (Jan. 1972), 149-178; Alex Weingrod, “Patrons, Patronage, and Political Parties,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 10 (July 1968), 377-400; Sidney M. Greenfield, “Charwomen, Cesspools, and Road Building: An Examination of Patronage, Clientage, and Political Power in Southeastern Minas Gerais,” in Arnold Strickon and Sidney M. Greenfield, eds., Structure and Process in Latin America: Patronage, Clientage, and Power Systems (Albuquerque, 1972), pp. 71-100.
See Rivas Vicuña, Historia política, I, 140.
Arturo Alessandri Palma, Recuerdos de gobierno, I (Santiago, 1952), 61-66; idem, Parlementarisme et régime presidentiel, Jacqueline Ch. Rousseau, trans. (Paris, 1930), pp. 33-34; German Riesco, Presidencia de Riesco, 1901-1906 (Santiago, 1950), pp. 89-155.
Encina, Historia de Chile, XX, 342.
Alfonso, El parlamentarismo, pp. 26-27.
Memorias, II, 203.
Galdames, A History of Chile, p. 368; Alfonso, El parlamentarismo, p. 24; Feliú Cruz, Agustín Ross, p. 110; see also the comments of Malaquías Concha on the role of money in elections in Chile, Cámara de Diputados, Sesiones ordinarias, 7 June 1915, pp. 163-166.
See Rivas Vicuña, Historia política, II, 400.
Galdames, A History of Chile, p. 365.
Moisés Poblete Troncoso, El balance de nuestro seudo régimen parlamentario (Santiago, 1920), pp. 8, 55.
The age was reduced to twenty-one in 1889.
Borón, “Evolución del régimen electoral,” p. 429.
Alessandri’s program, reprinted in Alessandri, Recuerdos, I, 431-439, called for institutional reforms to correct the increasingly obvious drawbacks of the parliamentary system. It also called for socio-economic measures such as tax reform, social security legislation, monetary stability, the regulation of female and child labor, and the intervention of the state in labor disputes. See also Alessandri’s message of 1 June 1921, Mensaje leído por S.E. el Presidente de la República en la apertura de las sesiones ordinarias del congreso nacional (Santiago, 1921).
Olavarría Bravo, Chile entre dos Alessandri, I, 81-82. See also ibid., I, 86, where the author describes the activities of working-class leaders after it became known that the electoral outcome was inconclusive. There was real fear that the election would be decided against Alessandri in the legislature.
Not only was Alessandri’s conversion to the cause of social reform sudden and late (he had been a legislator since 1897), but none of his concrete proposals was the least revolutionary. Alessandri’s own comments about the reception he received at the Centro Radical “Juan Castellón” in Concepción just before his nomination are revealing: “The traditional Radicals, the old guard of the party who feared my social ideas which they regarded as subversive, understood, once they listened to me, that what I was doing was precisely to defend the public order through the evolution required by the times in which we were living . . .” Recuerdos, I, 31. For a disparaging assessment of Alessandri see Pike, Chile and the United States, pp. 170-177, who describes Alessandri’s electoral program as consisting of little more than “mild palliatives.” Not surprisingly, Allessandri (Recuerdos, I, passim) and his secretary, Olavarría Bravo (Chile entre dos Alessandri, I, 62-93) provide a different view. See also Ricardo Donoso, Alessandri: Agitador y demoledor, 2 vols. (Mexico, 1952).
Cruz-Coke, Geografía electoral, p. 53.
See Emilio Bello Codesido, Recuerdos políticos (Santiago, 1954); Frederick M. Nunn, Chilean Politics 1920-1928: The Honorable Mission of the Armed Forces (Albuquerque, 1970); Clarence E. Haring, “Chilean Politics, 1920-1928,” HAHR, 11 (Feb. 1931), 1-26.
Laws Nos. 4053-4059, Chile, Consejo de Estado, Recopilación de leyes por orden numérico arreglado por la secretaria del Consejo de Estado (Santiago, 1925).
The parade of ministers and other public appointees left not only the Nuestro sistema político ante el senado (Valparaíso, 1916). See also Riesco, Presidencia de Riesco, p. 343; Encina, Historia de Chile, XX, 343.
For an analysis of public policy in this period see Vincent-Smith, “Party Competition and Public Policy.”
Nordlinger, “Political Development,” p. 518.
Darío Canton, Materiales para el estudio de la sociología político en Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1968), vol. I.
It should be noted that this argument does not imply that parties in general were stronger in Chile than in Argentina. If anything, the reverse was true, particularly after 1912. The crucial difference between the countries was not party strength, but elite acceptance of formal democracy, a difference which can be related to the timing, sequence and pace of political change.
Author notes
The author is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of New Mexico.
