As one of the most traumatic moments in the Cold War, the Missile Crisis of 1962 has been analyzed from a variety of perspectives. Herbert L. Dinerstein, Professor of Soviet Studies at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, does not reject these earlier analyses. But, he adds other dimensions by arguing that Soviet and American leaders were prisoners of their peculiar historical and strategic perceptions, and by placing the crisis in the broader context of the United States-Soviet rivalry in the underdeveloped world.
During the latter part of 1950s, Dinerstein argues, Nikita Krushchev increasingly asserted the role of the Soviet Union as protector of left-nationalist regimes. The main tactic in this policy was the threat about the possible use of Soviet nuclear arms. The Russian leader seems to have convinced himself (as the Soviet press argued) that such warnings had protected Egypt in 1956 and China in 1958.
In July 1960, he made his first threat concerning Soviet missile protection of Cuba, and Dinerstein argues that Krushchev believed this threat deterred the United States from active involvement during the Bay of Pigs operation. After this, he notes, some Soviet writers projected an image of the United States as, “a harmless tabby begging for indulgence . . .” (p. 159). Thus in 1962 Krushchev decided that he could use the tactic of nuclear blackmail to dramatically increase the striking power of a relatively weak missile force through the establishment of Cuban bases. In so doing he seriously misjudged the American position, just as United States leaders had not understood left-nationalism in either Guatemala (1954) or Cuba (1959).
This volume does not contain much new data. Its particular strong point is Dinerstem’s in-depth analysis of Soviet publications and public statements. Until the archives of both nations are opened, this is probably the best that historians can do, and this book will stand as one of the more competent contributions to our understanding of the October 1962 crisis.
