Beginning with the latter part of the nineteenth century and continuing up to and through the Red Scare of the early 1920s, there was a merging of social traditions in American life which resulted in the screening out of both the alien and the radical. Historians like William Preston, author of Aliens and Dissenters, have dealt with the antialien and antiradical efforts of the federal government during this period. Surprisingly, however, the fate of Mexican aliens and radicals, referred to officially by the Mexican government as los revoltosos, has been overlooked by U.S. historians during this so-called “Progressive Era” of American history.1 From the point of view of the Mexican community in the United States, this period might more accurately be described by U.S. historians as the “Repressive Era” of American history.
Immediately before and during this period, U.S. economic interests, in the form of capital and industrial surplus, extended into Mexico and continued to expand during the administrations of Roosevelt and Taft. This was especially the case in the northern Mexican states of Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Tamaulipas where U.S. investors controlled substantial mining, timber, ranching, and agricultural enterprises. Following the lead of Roosevelt, Elihu Root and other policy makers moved the country towards interventionism (including covert operations in Panama) and “dollar diplomacy.” In order to protect this mesoamerican market, the Roosevelt administration pursued the very modern practice of containing competing empires in Latin America, especially Germany, and, by 1906, curtailing revolutionary nationalism in Cuba and Mexico (the two countries of Latin America in which U.S. investments were greatest prior to World War I).2
Although differing from Roosevelt in temperament and tactics, Taft, and his Secretary of State Philander C. Knox, shared the former president’s assumptions concerning the need for maintaining existing markets and for finding new outlets for U.S. capital and goods. In fact the situation was even more critical for Taft because, by 1910, for the first time, U.S. exports of manufactured goods exceeded the foreign sales of raw products. To avoid the perils of overproduction and a glutted home market, direct government intervention in support of U.S. enterprise was necessary. Thus the Panamanian, Cuban, and Mexican policies of Roosevelt were continued throughout Taft’s administration.3
Across the border in Mexico, Roosevelt and Taft found a good friend and colleague in Don Porfirio Díaz. Coming to power in 1876, Díaz did not relinquish his presidential authority until forced to do so by Francisco Madero early in 1911. Sharing with North Americans their faith in liberal capitalism, Díaz stubbornly held to the belief that government cooperation with private enterprise would lead to progress and modernization for Mexico. Private enterprise in many instances meant foreign, especially U.S., investments and Díaz was determined to attract and hold U.S. capital in Mexico. This he accomplished through a variety of policies designed to make U.S. capital safe and profitable. Low taxes, liberal concessions, friendly courts, police protection, and a legal framework adjusted to the international legal order of the developed countries succeeded all too well in making Mexico “the mother of foreigners and the stepmother of Mexicans.” As historian Robert Freeman Smith noted, “ . . . foreign businessmen and government officials considered Porfirian Mexico to be one of the most well-behaved ‘backward’ nations in the world.”4
The result of these policies was a society which was partially developed economically, but only in its extractive sector; and an aging president and government which could not or would not make room for social groups which had been politically mobilized by the limited modernization.5 In particular these were agrarian workers, peones, industrial workers, railroad employees, miners, middle class intellectuals, and in a few instances, hacendados who had been excluded from the system.6 The leaders of these groups formed a kind of “precursor movement” to the Revolution of 1911. More than that, their activities, which included issuing manifestos, arming strikers, pronouncing revolutionary programs and propaganda, and using guerrilla or foco tactics, set the stage for Madero’s successful revolt.7
Although the revoltosos in this pre-revolutionary era were varied and many in number, the best organized and most extensive was the Junta Organizadora del Partido Liberal Mexicano (PLM). Reorganized in 1905 in St. Louis, it soon had developed a party platform and a revolutionary manifesto. For propaganda purposes the newspaper Regeneratión was renewed and sent through the U.S. and Mexican mails to subscribers along the border and the Mexican interior. The initial leadership of the Junta consisted of Ricardo Flores Magón (President), Juan Sarabia (Vice President), Antonio I. Villarreal (Secretary), and Enrique Flores Magón (Treasurer).
As a reflection of growing class and national consciousness (including Yankeephobia) among the urban and rural poor, the “precursor movement” had evolved from a traditional liberal, anticlerical movement in 1900 into a radical “socialist” (and “anarchist”) movement after 1906. Revoltoso activity accelerated governmental terrorism, and this in turn fed the ever developing forces of revolutionary nationalism. The rebels sought the end of U.S. economic dominance and the overthrow of Díaz. The threat of this kind of revolutionary nationalism became, naturally enough, a major preoccupation for Díaz and his lieutenants between 1906 and 1911. These matters also concerned United States officials. The judicial and police authority of the state, whether U.S. or Mexican, seldom hesitated to protect capital in any struggle with labor, even if the capital were U.S. and the labor Mexican.
The machinery for eliminating radicalism and containing revolutionary nationalism at home and abroad involved an elaborate international espionage and police structure. Surveillance and intelligence reports, originating with either private detectives, lawyers and informers in the pay of the Mexican government, or with U.S. Army Intelligence officers, Secret Service agents of the Treasury Department, and, after 1909, Bureau of Investigation agents, were directed to higher authorities. U.S. and Mexican consular officers coordinated much of the field work, hiring private detectives and working in cooperation with state governors, military commanders, and federal authorities on both sides of the border.8
In addition to the consuls, other groups on the local level were important for the proper functioning of the system. The “eyes and ears” of the postal authorities and inspectors in Mexico and the United States aided in the interception of the mails.9 For example, the Mexican consul in St. Louis estimated that he intercepted about three thousand letters between 1906 and 1909.10 Other regional authorities included federal attorneys and marshals, local sheriffs and police, city detectives, customs and immigration officials, territorial and state police (such as the Arizona and Texas Rangers), and private citizens (for example, Colonel William Greene) who had the services of labor spies, lawyers, and manufacturers’ associations.
On the national and international level the offices of both the President of the United States and the President of Mexico involved themselves directly. Ambassadors for both countries played an active role in forwarding consular and other intelligence information to the President, the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Relations, and the U.S. Department of State. Whereas the U.S. Ambassador, who was David E. Thompson between 1906 and 1909, tended to work directly with President Díaz, the Mexican Ambassador usually communicated with the Secretary of State or his assistant secretaries. For the most part, Enrique C. Creel, whether as Governor of Chihuahua, or Mexican Ambassador to the United States, or even, as in 1911, as Minister of Foreign Relations, coordinated all espionage activities on the national level. Vice President Ramón Corral’s office was also important since Corral, ex-governor of Sonora, was also Minister of Domestic Affairs (Gobemación) and as such directed Mexico’s famous federal Rurales. Others involved on the U.S. side included top-ranking officials in the Departments of State, Justice, War, Treasury, Commerce and Labor.11
The American government’s legal rationale for its activities against the revoltosos was its public responsibility to enforce the existing laws on immigration and neutrality and its agreement with Mexico under the terms of the February 22, 1899 Treaty of Extradition (as amended by the June 25, 1902 Convention signed in Mexico).12
In spite of the rationale, many of the government’s activities were of questionable legality. Illegal means, most often used on the local rather than the national level, included kidnappings, forced deportations by customs officials, and violations of civil liberties (such as arrests being made without a warrant). Other violations of legal rights included the charging of excessive bail, the violation of the right of privacy by intercepting the mails, and the detainment of aliens for several months while awaiting trial (often without any evidence being brought against them). Equally questionable governmental activities included closing down alien newspaper offices, seizing their properties, and harassing the editors.13
Not only did this latter practice violate guaranteed freedoms of press and speech, but it also constituted a violation of neutrality laws which specifically disallowed the government from moving against editors critical of a foreign government.14 Finally, both Roosevelt and Taft, in spite of the latter’s legalism, pursued a most liberal interpretation of the neutrality laws which allowed search and seizure missions in order to stop arms and munitions from going into Mexico. This was not a violation of the neutrality laws until the Arms Embargo Act of 1912.15 These issues of minority rights, civil liberties, intelligence activities, and other dimensions of the “diplomacy of suppression” are well illustrated in the history of United States-Mexican relations between 1906 and 1911, beginning with the Cananea, Sonora strike in June of 1906.
The Cananea strike marks a most important phase in the history of the Mexican Revolution. On June 1, workers in the Oversight Mine went out on strike. Their immediate grievance centered on a new contract arrangement which could mean lower wages and layoffs. Inequities between wages paid U.S. workers and their Mexican counterparts were at issue, as well as proprietor William C. Greene’s restrictive practice of hiring U.S. citizens for managerial positions. Before the three-day strike was concluded several workers had been killed (estimates range from twenty to over two hundred, depending upon the source),16 a volunteer army from Bisbee, Arizona had crossed the border and marched into Cananea, and the Mexican troops of Colonel Kosterlitzky, the famed “Eagle of Sonora,” had pacified the resistance and arrested the strike’s leaders.17 The question most often asked by historians, and seldom answered adequately, was whether this event was simply a strike for higher wages or an abortive attempt at revolution?
In the context of the present study, the effects of the Cananea strike are more important than the causes and motives. At the least it can be stated that Cananea was a kind of “catalyst” of revolution and suppression in the history of Mexico’s “precursor” movement. The St. Louis Junta, aware before the strike that events were leading to a collision in Cananea, had not provided sufficient means for a successful political revolt. The local leaders acted without the benefit of PLM ideology and direction. Whatever the Junta’s hopes, the strike had been a failure—either as a labor protest or as a political revolt. The need now was for more energetic leadership, propaganda, and organization. Thus the PLM, beginning with the July 1906 manifesto and continuing throughout the summer, increased the level of violence and conflict with the hope of unseating the dictator by the end of that year. As for Díaz, it was necessary to act quickly to suppress the revoltosos, before they became successful revolucionarios. And since many of Díaz’ enemies were in exile in the United States, cooperation from U.S. officials and businessmen was essential.
From the beginning, Porfirio Díaz had few doubts that the Cananea strike was political in nature, and had been precipitated and financed by the St. Louis Junta with the aid of their socialist allies in the United States. Even before the strike, Díaz had in his possession correspondence linking Flores Magón in St. Louis with correligionarios in Cananea, some of which openly (and unrealistically) requested thousands of arms and much ammunition.18 On May 31, 1906, Colonel Kosterlitzky sent a note to President Díaz in which he enclosed a copy of his recent correspondence (May 29) with Mr. A. S. Dwight, one of the Cananea Company managers. In this letter Dwight contended that a revolution was brewing in Cananea with the express purpose of expelling all foreigners and overthrowing Díaz.19
As early as June 1, Kosterlitzky reported to his immediate superior, Commandant Juan Fenochio, that the strike was caused by Gutiérrez de Lara and others who were ". . . writers of that filthy scurrilous sheet (Regeneración)Fenochio, in turn, along with the editor of the Cananea Herald, reported to Díaz that the strike was the work of several socialist groups in the United States, including agitators from the Denver office of the Western Federation of Miners.20 Acting on this intelligence, Díaz did not hesitate to request from Ambassador Thompson assurances that the United States government would assist in curtailing magonista activity.
Two days after the outbreak of the strike, Ambassador Thompson met personally with Díaz. At that meeting he was informed by Díaz that the strike had been initiated by at least twenty revolutionaries who were inspired from headquarters in St. Louis. This information the Ambassador dutifully reported to the State Department the same day.21 On June 19, Thompson, having received several copies of Regeneration from President Díaz, forwarded them to the State Department. In the accompanying dispatch he said that:
. . . He [Díaz] has told me the publishers of the paper are anarchists in all that they advocate and on his expressed sentiment, I venture to suggest that if these men could be dealt with as such men should be, the President would feel a deep gratitude. . . .22
Throughout the summer, with rumors of impending anti-American uprisings on all sides, Thompson continued to provide the Acting Secretary of State with data and information about the editors of Regeneración, each time indicating, as he did on August 28, that “. . . President Díaz would be most grateful if these individuals were treated as anarchists . . ." and their publication suppressed.23
On July 5, having been urged to act by Thompson, and following the advice of the State Department’s legal adviser, Robert Bacon, the Acting Secretary of State, ordered copies of Regeneración forwarded to the Attorney General’s office. Referring to the “alleged Mexican anarchists” living in St. Louis, Bacon’s Assistant Secretary indicated that ". . . the [State] Department would be glad to have your views [the Attorney General’s] as to what measures, if any, can be taken against the newspaper in question.”24
By July 12, the U.S. Attorney for eastern Missouri, David P. Dyer, was ordered by the Justice Department to begin an investigation of the St. Louis Junta. On July 16, copies of Regeneración had been forwarded to Dyer’s office. After examining the copies, Dyer concluded that the Junta members could be punished under both civil and criminal law. In addition, he noted that “. . . if the Editor of this publication is an alien and an anarchist, it seems that he can be deported. . .” under the provisions of the Immigration Act of 1903. In order to expedite the investigation, Dyer requested that a Secret Service agent be assigned to his office. By the end of August, operative Joe Priest was ordered by the Treasury Department to report to Attorney Dyer.25
The rumors which had been circulating throughout the summer about an impending anti-American uprising in Mexico, came to fruition during the early weeks of September. Ambassador Thompson reported that an army of five hundred to eight hundred men were planning to move against Cananea from Arizona on September 10.26 President Roosevelt reacted to the news by alerting the Departments of War, Treasury, Justice, and Commerce and Labor.27 On September 4, immigration inspector Murphy, accompanied by Arizona Rangers, arrested several “agitators” who, it was feared, were planning to lead an army of miners into Nogales, Sonora in order to attack the customhouse and arsenal.28 In reporting these events to Dyer, J. L. B. Alexander, the U.S. District Attorney for Arizona, noted that the arrests had led to the acquisition of letters and notes which implicated the St. Louis Junta. For Attorney Dyer this meant that the stakes were now much higher. This was not simply an obscure immigration violation or a libel case being initiated by an irate citizen; this was the big time—a violation of the neutrality laws of the United States of America.29
Dyer was ready to act against the St. Louis editors of Regeneración, but events were moving too quickly from another direction. On September 12, before the St. Louis Attorney had enough time to complete his investigation, a group of deputy sheriffs and private detectives seized the office of Regeneración on Lafayette avenue. The sheriff took charge of the property under provisions of an attachment and libel suit for $2,500 filed in the circuit court by Norton Chase, a New York lawyer who represented William C. Greene, the copper magnate of Cananea.30
Greene, well aware of the Arizona arrests and fearing that a new series of revolutionary uprisings were about to occur on September 16 (Mexico’s national independence day), decided, in conjunction with St. Louis immigration inspector James R. Dunn, to strike a fatal blow at the central Junta before the revolution could begin. Because Chase had advised him that the federal court did not have jurisdiction in this matter, he instituted a civil suit in the Missouri State Court. This, in turn, led the State Department to request of Governor Joseph W. Folk of Missouri that he use his state authority to suppress the newspaper. Unfortunately for Greene and the federal officers, the governor reported that the laws of Missouri did not provide for any summary possession of the Regeneración office.31
The sheriffs action was seemingly illegal, but it was not ineffective. Flores Magón’s publication would not appear again until June 1907, when the Junta resurrected it under the new name of Revolución from their headquarters in Los Angeles. And, even though the PLM leadership was not in St. Louis at the time of the seizure (being scattered between Canada and Texas), the few remaining members of the Junta were eventually either arrested or forced to flee from official harassment.32 Nor did the questionable legality of these operations prevent the authorities from acting similarly in the future. Within two weeks of the St. Louis action, Ambassader Thompson requested the suppression of La Reforma, a revoltoso publication in El Paso. Again the wheels of “justice” were set in motion with Thompson’s request being forwarded to the Attorney General and the Governor of Texas.33 Between 1906 and 1910, at least ten revoltoso publications were seized by American authorities, the properties attached and the editors arrested. The more infamous of these acts included the suppression of the aforementioned Revolución in Los Angeles and Práxedis Guerrero’s Punto Rojo in El Paso.34
Greene’s activity in St. Louis in September 1906 was neither the beginning nor the end of his crusade against the PLM and their American allies. He was persuaded that the St. Louis Junta had engineered the Cananea strike. To State Department officials, Greene alleged that Manuel Sarabia, an editorial writer for Regeneración and one of the founders of the central Junta, had been in Cananea during the last days of May and had left only two hours before the strike started. Sarabia, Greene contended, had published handbills, made inflammatory speeches, and aided in organizing the mob. In 1907, Greene was alone in his defense and justification of the Mexican government’s attempted kidnapping of Manuel Sarabia, an action which was not approved by most state and federal authorities.35
Greene was particularly disturbed by the activity of Lázaro Gutiérrez de Lara, President of the Club Liberal de Cananea. Speaking of Gutierrez de Lara’s role in the Cananea riot, Company Manager A. S. Dwight said that “. . . De Lara’s part in this uprising was that of a virulent local agitator, who did all he could to stir up race hatred against the Americans.” Of all the local strike leaders, only Lázaro Gutiérrez de Lara succeeded in escaping from his captors, first fleeing to Tucson, later going to Los Angeles. When Greene learned of Gutiérrez de Lara’s presence in Los Angeles, he arranged for his arrest and had charges brought against him for stealing firewood from Greene’s Mexican property. This case, which was initiated in 1907, referred back to an incident which had taken place in 1903 when Gutiérrez de Lara, a practicing lawyer, had advised his client to cut wood on disputed land in order to establish the client’s claim of ownership. Because Greene could not demonstrate to the court’s satisfaction his ownership of the land in question, the case was dropped and Gutiérrez de Lara escaped extradition.36
After the closing of the St. Louis office of Regeneración, Greene and his lawyer Norton Chase continued to pursue the radicals. According to the testimony of Senator Albert B. Fall, one of Greene’s closest friends and partners, Chase delivered a large portion of the material seized at St. Louis to U.S. border authorities. These materials included PLM membership lists and a directory of revolutionary agents.37 It is very likely that this information aided the Mexican and American authorities in their mid-October arrests of Juan Sarabia and Antonio I. Villarreal, in Ciudad Juárez and El Paso respectively.
On December 1, Greene was in El Paso as a government witness in the indictment against Villarreal. Shortly thereafter he joined Chase in San Antonio, from where they jointly traveled to New York City. Before going to New York, Greene and Chase were influential in persuading Vice President Ramón Corral to hire Judge J. G. Griner of Del Rio, Texas as a special assistant and informer. Judge Griner was charged with investigating the Jiménez rebels. Both Chase and Corral were hopeful of extraditing the sixty-three persons who had followed Juan José Arredondo in a raid on Jiménez, Coahuila during the past September.38
One reason for Greene’s persistence in these matters was his conviction that representatives from the Western Foundation of Miners had been involved in the strike at Cananea. In his memorandum to company officials on June 11, 1906, he stated:
. . . that a socialist club had three meetings at midnight on the night of the 30th of May. . . [and] that agitators of the Western Federation of Miners had been through the mines inciting the Mexicans, and that they had been furnishing money for the socialistic club that had been established at Cananea.39
In investigating the links between the W.F.M. and the PLM, Greene had the services of a hired labor spy by the name of Rowen, as well as the intelligence services of the Manufacturers’ Information Bureau of Cleveland, Ohio.
Rowen actually worked his way into the inner circles of the W.F.M. leadership in Denver. By July, he could report that, for several months, funds originating with the local in Butte, Montana had been redirected through the Denver headquarters to a W.F.M organizer in Bisbee, Arizona. From Bisbee, the organizer, Joe Carter, distributed literature and money to agitators in Nacozari and Cananea.40 From the Manufacturers’ Information Bureau Greene received copies of the “Official Proceedings” of the May 1906 convention of the W.F.M. in Denver.41
As late as December of 1906, Greene had the services of a special agent in Denver. At this time his informant suggested in very strong language that Greene’s New York City business rivals were financing the W.F.M. with the hope of undermining his operations in Mexico.42 No wonder that the Colonel, whose health and business were both beginning to fail, was so preoccupied with revoltoso fever.
The man who had aided Greene in 1904 by granting to him a chain of concessions to timber resources in Chihuahua was Governor Enrique C. Creel. Son-in-law of the wealthy and powerful hacendado, Luis Terrazas, Creel became an important public official during the last years of the Porfiriato. Between 1906 and 1911 he served variously as state governor, the Mexican ambassador to Washington, and finally, Secretary of Foreign Relations. In all three positions he was the essential man who directed and coordinated Porfirio Díaz’ attack against first, the magonistas, and subsequently, the maderistas.43
Creel, as informal head of Díaz’ espionage service, secured the cooperation of U.S. authorities and employed several detective agencies in the United States to assist in the arrest and prosecution of revolutionary exiles. The most important detective agency was the Furlong Secret Service Company of St. Louis, Missouri, owned and managed by Thomas Furlong. Creel coordinated the activities of the Furlong detectives with those of governmental authorities, forwarding intelligence reports from Furlong to Vice President Ramón Corral, the U.S. Department of State, and the various consulates in the United States (especially Los Angeles, El Paso, San Antonio, and New York City).
In order to expedite investigations, Creel, by an agreement with Corral, would often authorize key individuals to receive Furlong’s secret reports. Such individuals included special legal advisers and informants such as Judge Griner of Del Rio, John W. Foster of San Antonio, and, of course, William Greene’s attorney Norton Chase. To facilitate intelligence on the Mexican side, Creel, as govenor, circulated wanted posters, interrogation instructions, and general directions to the Mexican secret police, the state and military governors of Sonora (Luis Torres), Nuevo León (Bernardo Reyes), and Coahuila (Miguel Cárdenas), as well as important jefes políticos in the border districts.44 U.S. consuls, like Luther Ellsworth in Ciudad Porfirio Díaz, were also a part of Creel’s espionage system.45
The October 19 arrests of Antonio Villarreal and Lauro Aguirre in El Paso, and of Juan Sarabia in Ciudad Juárez, had been facilitated by Creel. The success of this event, the result of a simultaneous raid by separate police authorities on both sides of the international border, testify to the efficiency of Creel’s communications and espionage network. Of special importance was the undercover work of double agent Adolfo Jiménez Castro, a captain of the federal soldiers stationed in Ciudad Juárez, who provided information about magonistas on both sides of the river to Silvano Montemayor, jefe político of the Bravos District (which included Ciudad Juárez).46
The October arrests also provided Governor Creel with additional information about magonista plans and activities. El Paso consul, Francisco Mallén, forwarded to Creel all of the documents taken from Villarreal during the night of his arrest. He also sent him copies of radical newspapers published in Texas, including La Reforma Social, La Democracia, El Clarín del Norte, and La Bandera Roja. From these and other sources Creel learned of Flores Magón’s military strategy, contributors, subscribers, arms requests, complaints about postal authorities, plans for a revolution in Puebla, and tactics to engage and enlist the military in the magonista cause.47 All of this information proved most useful to Thomas Furlong in tracking down the magonistas in the United States.
Probably the most important branch of Creel’s spy service was that of private detectives in the United States. Much confusion has been generated by historians about this aspect of the “diplomacy of suppression,” indicating that some of the dust from the Cananea uprising has still not settled! Most writers assert that the famous Pinkertons were hired by the Mexican government to trace the everchanging paths of the revoltosos. The results of my own research indicate little if any Pinkerton involvement.48 As noted above, the most important private detective firm was the Furlong Secret Service Company, which worked for Creel and the Mexican government from 1906 to the eve of Revolution in 1911.49
In addition to Furlong’s group, the Hurst Detective Agency of Los Angeles worked in conjunction with the Mexican consul of that city, Antonio Lozano. I. S. Hurst and his agents were hired primarily to investigate the activity of magonistas in southern and Baja California during the early months of 1911.50 In New York City, the Bums and Sheridan National Detective Agency was hired to investigate the activities of revoltosos, especially those attempting to send arms and finances to maderistas in Texas and Mexico. Bums and Sheridan also had detectives on assignment in Chicago.51 Creel employed this company on the recommendation of the U.S. Attorney General, George Wickersham, who noted that they ". . . have supplanted the Pinkerton Agency in all national bank work.”52 Creel also hired individual detectives and informants to do specific jobs such as E. J. Thavonat, head of a secret police company in San Francisco, or the aforementioned Thomas Foster, a special operative and legal adviser in San Antonio.53 Finally, some Secret Service personnel, nominally working under the direction of the Departments of Justice and Treasury, had their travel and living costs paid for by the Mexican government.54
The exact date when Furlong first went to work for Creel and the Mexican government cannot be determined with accuracy, although his agent Ansel Samuels had infiltrated the office of Regeneración by the summer of 1906—with Samuels soliciting advertisements for the newspaper. In November of that year the Mexican consul at St. Louis, M. E. Diebold, was ordered by the Minister of Foreign Relations to employ the services of Furlong’s Secret Service Company. Shortly thereafter, Furlong personally went to Toronto and Montreal in search of Ricardo Flores Magón. On December 16, 1906, Furlong was in Mexico City being briefed by the authorities.55 At that time the abundance of information collected by Creel and Corral after the El Paso arrests was made available to Furlong. Shortly after his return to the United States in January 1907, Furlong located Ricardo Flores Magón in Los Angeles.
It was also at this time that the Mexican government was experiencing its first major failures in extraditing the revoltosos, first the release of Librado Rivera and Aaron López Manzano in St. Louis, and later the Arredondo rebels in Texas, because of this, Furlong was instructed to return to St. Louis and not arrest Flores Magón. The government wanted more evidence—of the type which could be used in a neutrality case—and thus needed more time. In the meantime, Furlong traveled to Monterrey, Nuevo León, and aided in the arrest of the same Aaron López Manzano (after which López Manzano eventually went to Mexico City’s Belén Prison). In June of 1907 he was ordered to Los Angeles by Creel where he subsequently arrested Flores Magón, Villarreal, and Rivera. He remained in Los Angeles until February 1908 to help in the preparation of the government’s case.66
During 1908 Furlong sent several agents throughout Texas, Arizona, and Oklahoma. He also testified against Flores Magón in Tombstone, Arizona that year (successfully, for Flores Magón and the others were, on May 16, 1909, sentenced to eighteen months in the territorial prison of Arizona). In September of 1908 a Furlong agent arrested Antonio de P. Araujo in Waco, Texas (Araujo was accused and convicted of leading the Las Vacas attack in June of that year).57
Furlong continued his operations for the Mexican government during 1909. Toward the end of that year he and his employees had located Lauro Aguirre, the editor of Reforma Social, in El Paso. In October, Furlong agents in El Paso aided a group of Mexican detectives in the arrest of “socialists” who, it was feared, threatened the security of Presidents Díaz and Taft who were meeting in Ciudad Juárez and El Paso. At the end of October, at the urging of the Mexican government, Furlong personally traveled to San Antonio. While there he discovered that “anarchist” Práxedis G. Guerrero, wanted by the government for his involvement in the Las Vacas uprising, was meeting with John Murray, the American socialist, and with other Mexican radicals.58
From San Antonio Furlong was sent to New York City to follow Bernardo Reyes into exile. He then left New York at the end of the year to travel to Los Angeles. He went to the west coast to handle a scandal which had erupted with the recent arrest of Lázaro Gutiérrez de Lara.59 Throughout 1910 Furlong’s services were retained in order to locate and arrest that new threat to Díaz’ rule, Francisco Madero. As late as December 29, 1910, Furlong reported that Madero was not in San Antonio but had not, as yet, entered Mexico.60
In pursuing Francisco Madero, Furlong and his sleuths faced a challenge much greater than that of the magonistas. Madero had resources not available to Flores Magón. Some of the wealthiest men of Mexico supported him. Madero himself came from a prosperous hacendado household. He was aware that the “precursors” had demonstrated time and again the duplicity of Mexican consuls and authorities along the border. For quite some time the sympathies of the majority of the members of the Mexican community in the United States had been with the revoltosos. Even Furlong reported that as of December 1910, “. . . all the Mexicans near El Paso are in favor of the Liberals.”61 Having ample finances, and the sympathies of the border population, Madero was able to develop a revolutionary apparatus far more efficient and successful than that of the magonistas.
Madero, unlike Flores Magón, was not seeking a broadly based social revolution. His purposes and program were most narrow, being nothing more than a traditional coup d’etat. Thus Madero’s organization was small and compact, with all resources being directed at overthrowing the dictator. As a child of the upper class, Madero had access to the tools of that stratum. Madero’s organization shaped and used its resources to develop an espionage operation not unlike that already being used against him by the Mexican government (of course, of a smaller magnitude). This included the services of competent lawyers, a revolutionary secret police, hired detectives, and paid informants.
One of Madero’s lawyers was Sherburne G. Hopkins, counsel and director of the revolutionist’s secret service in the United States. In this role it was his responsibility to funnel monies to the various operatives. As Madero’s legal adviser, it was Hopkins’ job to enable the maderistas to get military matériel into Mexico without violating the neutrality laws. For his services over an eight-month period he was paid $50,000 by the Madero family.62
Many of Madero’s secret service agents worked in conjunction with established private detective firms, such as the Thiel Detective Service Company of El Paso. Thiel’s manager, Henry C. Kramp, a man who had earlier uncovered data on revolutionaries in Douglas, Arizona, was hired by Gustavo Madero (Francisco’s brother) to work for the maderista cause. Revolutionary leader Abraham González brought Kramp into the revolutionary circle and arranged for him to have free access to work with the revolutionaries in Ciudad Juárez. One of Krump’s lesser duties included delivering mail to the revolutionaries, not the least of whom was Giuseppe Garibaldi.63
González was also influential in hiring another lawyer for Madero, a shadowy figure by the name of C. F. Z. Caracristi. He provided valuable service to Madero by compromising the Mexican consul in El Paso, Antonio Lomelí. Lomelí bartered useful information about federal troop movements in Chihuahua in return for a three thousand dollar payment in installments of three hundred dollars a week.64 Lomelí’s services also included the spreading of false information to U.S. authorities about rebel entries into Mexico, along with accusations about the laxity of the Bureau of Investigation.65 All of these activities were undertaken to generate confusion, undermine credibility, and overtax the manpower resources of the United States Department of Justice.
Nor was Lomelí the only consul successfully compromised by Madero. Not only did Madero succeed in enticing four employees of the consulate in San Antonio to act as revolutionary spies, he, again with the aid of Gustavo Madero’s checkbook, was able to engage the services of Enrique Ornelas, the consul himself.66 Thus, as these few examples illustrate, Madero’s movement, drawing upon the organizational and legal skills of González, Gustavo Madero, and Hopkins, was a professional one—an operation which had none of the “amateurism” characteristic of other revoltoso groups.
And while it is true that neutrality laws were not enforced against Madero with the degree of effectiveness that was used against the magonistas, this ineffectiveness tells us more about Madero and the border situation, than it does about Taft’s ‘legalistic” neutrality-diplomacy. The international police and espionage structure was still intact, but its efficiency was undermined by the open sympathy shown the rebels by many U.S. citizens and Mexicans living along the border. Enforcement against Madero was weak because he had been careful in his activities (following the advice of Hopkins) and had influential friends along the border who both refrained from aiding the U.S. authorities and, as in the case of consul Lomelí, confused federal investigators with misinformation. Madero was always able to hire his own secret agents, private detectives, and informants—unlike Flores Magón, he had the wealth and talent to successfully “fight fire with fire.”
Thus, in spite of Madero’s success, the general record of the Roosevelt and Taft administrations is clear. They had aided the Mexican government in its efforts to neutralize the revoltoso opposition, especially that of the PLM. The leadership had been harassed and its job made difficult. The major successes came, of course, with the arrests and convictions of Ricardo Flores Magón between 1907 and 1909, and 1911-1912. Yet, politically speaking, arrests and detentions, not convictions, were all that were necessary to effectively disrupt the revoltosos. By preventing the PLM from overthrowing Díaz in 1906, and again in 1908, the United States government not only protected the Mexican government (and the private interests of its investors in Mexico), but also prevented the PLM from having the political victories it needed to maintain its leadership and organization intact.
The mantle of revolution then fell to the aristocratic and politically moderate Francisco Madero (who had broken with Flores Magón in 1906). Unlike the magonistas, Madero was able to operate out of Texas without effective governmental harassment. Taft liked Díaz, but with Madero’s success, he, like Woodrow Wilson after him, could learn to live with the liberal reformer, especially if the alternatives to Madero were advocates of class warfare and revolution.
William Preston, Jr., Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903-1933 (New York, 1963). The merging social traditions referred to were, according to Preston, the identification of “alien” with "radical” which emerged out of the nativist movement of the 1880s and 1890s and was firmly implanted in the public mind at the turn of the century. McKinley’s assassination was invoked when this image was institutionalized with the Immigration Act of 1903 which excluded, for the first time, anarchists, that is, any “ . . . person who disbelieves in or who is opposed to all organized government . . . .” See U.S. Dept. of State, Statutes at Large, Vol. XXXII, 1214 & 1221.
For Roosevelt’s “hemisphere diplomacy” see George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of Modern America, 1900-1912 (New York, 1962), chap. 8. For U.S. investments in Mexico see Marvin D. Bernstein, Foreign Investment in Latin America (New York, 1966), pp. 39-46.
Walter V. Scholes and Marie V. Scholes, The Foreign Policies of the Taft Administration (Columbia, Missouri, 1970), pp. 27-31.
The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico, 1916-1932 (Chicago, 1972), p. 5.
This interpretation follows the model developed by Samuel P. Huntington in his Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968), pp. 264-343.
William D. Raat, “Ideas and Society in Don Porfirio’s Mexico,” The Americas, 30 (July 1973), 34—40.
The most complete work in English on the “precursor movement” is James D. Cockcroft’s intellectual history, Intellectual Precursors of the Mexican Revolution, 1900—1913 (Austin, 1968). A good general survey is Florencio Barrera Fuentes, Historia de la revolutión mexicana: La etapa precursora (México, 1970). An important source for printed documents is Isidro Fabela, ed., Documentas históricos de la Revolución Mexicana, 27 vols. (México, 1960-1973), X and XL Charles C. Cumberland’s “Precursors of the Mexican Revolution,” HAHR, 22 (May 1942), 344-356, although a pioneering effort, contains some errors in fact. See also his “Mexican Revolutionary Movements From Texas, 1906-1912,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly, 52 (Jan. 1949), 301-324. Another article worth consulting is Lyle C. Brown’s “The Mexican Liberals and Their Struggle Against the Díaz Dictatorship, 1900-1906,” Antología MCC (México, 1956). See also José C. Valadés, “Los Precursores de D. Francisco I. Madero,” La Opinión (Los Angeles), December 13, 1929—January 24, 1930. Two excellent studies are Ward Albro, “Ricardo Flores Magón and the Liberal Party: An Inquiry into the Origins of the Mexican Revolution of 1910,” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Arizona, 1967) and Ellen Howell Myers, “The Mexican Liberal Party, 1903-1910,” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Virginia, 1970). See also the following: Manuel González Ramírez, La revolutión social de México, 3 vols. (México, 1960-1966), I, 39-114; the introduction by Sinclair Snow to John Kenneth Turner, Barbarous Mexico (Austin, 1969), pp. xi-xxix.
The following quotation from Luther Ellsworth, U.S. consul at Ciudad Porfirio Díaz, provides a classic example of this kind of intragovernmental cooperation: “There is evidence on both sides of border line of serious unrest and intrigue. Have situation on American side of border well in hand and with assistance of federal officers of Customs, Immigration, etc., United States Marshals, Bureau of Investigation Agents, United States Secret Service men, and United States Cavalry will keep it so . . . .” See Luther Ellsworth to the Secretary of State, Ciudad Porfirio Díaz, Nov. 19, 1910, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Records of the Department of Justice, Record Group 60 (hereafter cited as RG 60), file 90755/285.
Jesús Flores Magón indicated that the General Post Office in Mexico was working with the foreign office in order to impede and detain the circulation of Regeneración. See Jesús Flores Magón (Chu) to Ricardo Flores Magón, México (n.p.), Sept. 26, 1905, Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley, Silvestre Terrazas Collection (hereafter cited as STC), box 26, folder 2a. To see how Francisco Mallén, consul in El Paso, intercepted the mails in order to provide lists of magonistas in Texas and Mexico for Governor Enrique Creel of Chihuahua see “Indice compendiado de la correspondencia adjunta” by F. Mallén, Oct. 22, 1906, STC, box 27, folder 9b.
Manuel González Ramirez, ed., Epistolario y textos de Ricardo Flores Magón (México, 1964), pp. 172-173.
These generalizations are based upon archival work in the Archivo General de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores de México (hereafter cited as AREM), Mexico City. See esp. Asunto 1910-1920, Revolución Mexicana durante los años de 1910 a 1920, Agencias Secretas, L-E-855; L-E-854; L-E-627; L-E-622; L-E-614; L-E-724; L-E-716; L-E-616. In spite of the series title, the materials referred to above are for the years 1906 through 1910. For a description of these legajos and expedientes see Berta Ulloa, Revolución Mexicana, 1910-1920 (México, 1963), pp. 41-113.
The section of the neutrality laws most often applied against the revoltosos was Sec. 5286, Revised Statutes, 1873, relating to hostile expeditions: “Every person who, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, begins, or sets on foot, or provides or prepares the means for, any military expedition or enterprise, to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominions of any foreign prince or state . . . with whom the United States are at peace, shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor. . . Quoted from John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law, 8 vols. (Washington, 1906), VII, 908-909. Concerning extradition, the Treaty of 1899 specifically excluded any crimes and offenses of “a purely political character.” See Charles Bevans, comp., Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 12 vols. (Washington, 1968-1974), IX, 900-907, 918f.
Several examples of persecutions of Mexican citizens by the government of the United States came out of the House debate of 1910. See U.S., Congress, House, Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., April 21, 1910, 45, pp. 5135-5138.
The problem of whether or not the Bill of Rights applies in its entirety to aliens, illegal immigrants, and naturalized citizens is a most complicated one. Beginning with Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the courts have generally held that aliens (and by implication all “persons,” including illegal immigrants) have constitutional rights and are covered by the “equal protection” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, in spite of a vigorous tradition of minority dissents, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed on several occasions the original decision of Fong Yue Ting v. U.S., 149 U.S. 711 (1893) in which the congressional powers of exclusion and deportation were considered plenary; this power is not limited in any way by the Bill of Rights. In other words, an alien enjoys constitutional rights in ordinary civil and criminal cases, but not in exclusion and deportation hearings. See Milton R. Konvitz, Civil Rights in Immigration (Ithaca, N.Y., 1953), pp. 44-49, 103-109.
“The U.S. government has no power, under our Constitution and laws, to interfere with publications in the states criticising foreign governments or encouraging revolts against such governments.” From Moore, A Digest of International Law, VII, 980.
For Roosevelt’s order of the Arizona-Sonora embargo see William Loeb to H. M. Hoyt (Acting Attorney General), Oyster Bay, July 24, 1906, RG 60, file no. 43718.
Cf. León Díaz Cárdenas’ account with William Greene’s in C. L. Sonnichsen, Colonel Greene and the Copper Skyrocket (Tucson, 1974), pp. 191f. Making it more complicated for the historian to estimate the number of dead is the fact that Mexican authorities supervised burial squads that only worked during the night. Even Greene reported with some incredulity that “ . . . the number of Mexicans killed has been reported at about twenty and stands at that figure, although the burial squad was at work three nights after reporting twenty as the number killed . . .” See Colonel W. Greene, Memorandum, June 11, 1906, “Brief resumé of the recent disorders in Cananea,” in the files of the Compañía Minera de Cananea, S.A. de C.V., Cananea, Sonora, México (hereafter cited as CM files). As of this writing these files are being held privately in Tucson, Arizona and are not open to the public.
The most authoritative account of the Cananea strike is Manuel González Ramirez, Fuentes para la historia de la Revolución Mexicana, 4 vols. México, 1954-1957), III, La huelga de Cananea.
For example, see Guadalupe Mendoza to Ricardo Flores Magón, Cananea, November 2, 1905, Colección Porfirio Díaz, Cholula, Mexico (hereafter cited as CPD), leg. 31, doc. 006229. The authenticity of this letter is in some doubt since the author uses formal Spanish, yet the letter contains usage and spelling errors common to native English speakers.
Kosterlitzky to Díaz, Magdalena, Sonora, May 31, 1906, CPD, leg. 31, docs. 6183-6184.
Kosterlitzky to Fenochio, Magdalena, June 1, 1906, CPD, leg. 31, doc. 006187; W. T. O’Donnell to Fenochio, Cananea, n.d. (June 4?), with a duplicate copy to Díaz, CPD, leg. 31, docs. 006201 and 006202.
Thompson to Díaz, June 3, 1906, CPD, leg. 31, doc. 007217. See also Thompson to Díaz, June 5, 1906 and Thompson to Sec. of State, June 3, 1906 (copy to Díaz), CPD, leg. 31, docs. 007221 and 007222.
Thompson to Sec. of State, June 19, 1906, U.S. National Archives Publication, Washington, D.C., Despatches from U.S. Ministers in Mexico, 1823-1906, despatch no. 96 (microcopy 97, vol. 183, roll 178; hereafter cited as Dip. Des.).
Thompson to Robert Bacon, August 28, 1906 (copy to Díaz) CPD leg. 31, docs. 010505-010507.
James Brown Scott to Bacon, July 2, 1906, Dip. Des., no. 79; Alvey Adee to the Acting Attorney General, July 5, 1906, National Archives Microfilm Publication, Washington, D.C., Record Group 59, Domestic Letters of the Department of State (microcopy 40, vol. 291, roll 170).
See the following: Act. Att. Gen. to Dyer, July 12, 1906; Act. Att. Gen. to Dyer, July 16; Dyer to Act. Att. Gen., August 24; Act. Att. Gen. to Act. Sec. of Treasury, August 27; Act. Sec. of Treas. to State, Aug. 29, 1906—all from RG 60, file no. 43718.
Thompson to Bacon, Sept. 5, 1906, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Records of the Department of State, Numerical Files, 1906-1910, Record Group 59, case 100/20 (hereafter cited as NF).
Bacon to Roosevelt, September 6, 1906, NF, case 100/20.
Several of these individuals were deported in one party by immigration officials at Douglas, in spite of the legal opinion rendered by the State Department’s Solicitor, James Brown Scott, who held that political offenders were expressly exempt from the operation of the immigration laws. One of those deported, Gabriel Rubio, claimed that he had been a resident of the United States continuously for the past fifteen years. See Scott, “Memorandum in regard to the expulsion of certain Mexican citizens now held as prisoners at Nogales by Inspector Webb of Arizona,” September 10, 1906, NF, case 100/30. For Rubio’s case, see “Statements of Aliens and Related Findings of Board of Special Inquiry, 1905-1908; statement by G. Rubio, September 10, 1906,” in Records of field offices, District No. 15 (El Paso), National Archives, Washington, D.C., Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Record Group 85.
Alexander’s telegram is quoted by Dyer in his letter to the Attorney General, St. Louis, September 16, 1906, RG 60, file no. 43718.
St. Louis Globe-Democrat, September 13, 1906.
Greene to Bacon, New York City, September 12, 1906, NF, case 100/39; Folk to Bacon, Jefferson City, Mo., September 17, 1906, NF, case 100/81.
See the Sf. Louis Post-Dispatch, November 21, 1906 and the St. Louis Globe-Democrat, December 3, 1906.
Alvey Adee to Thompson, Sept. 29, 1906, NF, case 100/106.
Armando Bartra, Regeneración, 1900-1918 (México, 1972), pp. 51-64.
Greene to Bacon, July 5, 1907, NF, case 7418/5.
For both Dwight’s and Gutiérrez de Lara’s account, see U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Rules, Providing for a Joint Committee to Investigate Alleged Persecutions of Mexican Citizens by the Government of Mexico: Hearings on H.J.R. 201, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., 8-14, June 1910, pp. 20ff and 95.
Fall to President Woodrow Wilson, July 30, 1913, Papers from the Senate Office Files of Senator Albert Bacon Fall Relating to Mexican Affairs, Huntington Library, San Marino, California (hereafter cited as Fall Papers). As Greene’s lawyer, Chase spent much of his time in Mexico City keeping in touch with the political establishment.
Norton Chase to Ramón Corral, San Antonio, Dec. 1, 1906, AREM, L-E-854, 118-R-5. For the hiring of Griner see Enrique Ornelas to Ignacio Mariscal, San Antonio, Dec. 6, 1906, AREM, L-E-854, 118-R-5.
Greene, “Brief resumé,” June 11, 1906, CM files.
Rowen to Greene, Denver, July 20 and 23, 1906, Fall Papers. The W.F.M. was active in organizing Bisbee from early 1906 through 1907. It is quite likely that some W.F.M. organizers drifted from Bisbee to Cananea before June 1, 1906-—at the least it is understandable why Greene would suspect W.F.M participation in the Cananea strike. For W.F.M activity in Bisbee, see Vernon H. Jensen, Heritage of Conflict (New York, 1968), pp. 357-360.
H. J. Temple to Greene, Naco, Arizona, June 25, 1906 (with an enclosure of M. G. Turner to H. J. Temple, Cleveland, June 19, 1906), Fall Papers.
David Cole to Greene, Cananea, December 12, 1906, Fall Papers.
Florence C. and Robert Lister, Chihuahua: Storehouse of Storms (Albuquerque, 1966), pp. 178, 205.
See Creel’s correspondence in STC, box 26, folder 72 & box 27 folders 11d and 13a.
See Dorothy Pierson Kerig, “A United States Consul on the Border During the Mexican Revolution: The Case of Luther T. Ellsworth” (M.A. Thesis San Diego State University, 1974).
S. Montemayor to Creel, Ciudad Juárez, October 20, 1906, STC, box 27, folder 12a.
Mallén to Creel, El Paso, Oct. 29 and Nov. 20, 1906, STC, box 26, folder 2b & box 27, folder 9a respectively. Also see the magonista correspondence which was in the possession of Creel in STC, box 26, folder 2a.
James Cockcroft has Pinkertons running throughout his narrative, crediting them with the arrest of Enrique Flores Magón in San Antonio in 1905 and of Ricardo Flores Magón in Los Angeles in 1907. He even refers to that “Pinkerton detective Thomas Furlong.” Although Cockcroft’s book remains the finest study in English on the precursors, in this matter he is seriously in error, i.e., he shares the bias of the anonymous, left-wing account which he cites as authority. Other writers who refer to Pinkertons in the context of this essay are Juan Gómez-Quiñones, Bernard Axelrod, and William Beezley.
The contemporary literature is also filled with allegations about Pinkerton crimes. For example, John Kenneth Turner states that, during the Cananea riot “ . . . Greene’s Pinkertons were sent about the streets for another shoot-up of the Mexicans.” The socialist editors of the St. Louis Labor spoke of “The Blood-Stained Pinkerton Agency” which sent operatives to Cananea in order to incite the Mexicans into rebellion.
See the following: Cockcroft, Intellectual Precursors, pp. 121, 125-129, 134, 146; Juan Gómez-Quiñones, Sembradores, Ricardo Flores Magón y El Partido Liberal Mexicano: A Eulogy and Critique (Los Angeles, 1973), p. 25; Bernard Axelrod, “St. Louis and the Mexican Revolutionaries, 1905-1906,” Bulletin (of Missouri Historical Society), 28 (Jan. 1972), 97; William Beezley, Insurgent Governor: Abraham González and the Mexican Revolution in Chihuahua (Lincoln, 1973), p. 11; Turner, Barbarous Mexico, p. 184; and the St. Louis Labor, August 4, 1906.
Finally, in a letter to the author from W. C. Linn of Pinkerton’s Inc., from New York City, August 17, 1973, Linn states that “We have heard from many sources that we are involved in the investigation of the activities of a Mexican revolutionary group in the years cited in your letter. Nevertheless, we have no records to substantiate the allegations.” It would appear that the term “Pinkerton” has become generic, to mean “private detective” in general—a use which is historically inaccurate and misleading.
Furlong’s own faulty memory records 1907 as the year when he was first hired by Creel. See his Fifty Years a Detective (St. Louis, 1912), p. 138.
Hurst to Lozano, Los Angeles, Feb. 4, 1911, AREM, L-E-627, R-10-2.
Creel to Cayetano Romero (Consul General, New York City) México D.F., February 7, 1911, AREM, L-E-627, R-10-3.
Wickersham to the Mexican Ambassador (Francisco de la Barra) November 17, 1910, RG 60, file no. 90755.
Re Thavonat see Consul General to Creel, San Francisco, November 29, 1910, AREM, L-E-616, R-4-l. Also see Thomas Foster to Creel, San Antonio, February 1, 1911, AREM, L-E-627, R-10-2. This last letter is particularly illustrative in that it reveals the working relationship between Foster, consul Luther Ellsworth, and Stanley W. Finch, chief of the Bureau of Investigation. Together they succeeded in enlisting several Mexican informers who infiltrated Madero’s organization in San Antonio.
Enrique Ornelas to Ignacio Mariscal, San Antonio, June 17, 1907, AREM, L-E-855, 118-R-5.
González Ramírez, Epístolario, pp. 173-174.
Ibid., pp. 174f. See also Furlong’s Fifty Years a Detective, pp. 140-148.
González Ramírez, Epistolario, pp. 175f.
[José C. Valadés], “Siguiendo la pista a politicos mexicanos,” La Opinion (Los Angeles), April 23, April 30, May 7, May 14 and May 21, 1939.
Ibid., June 4 and June 11, 1939.
See John U. Menteer to Creel, St. Louis, December 29 and 31, 1910, AREM, L-E-622. Also see Furlong to Creel, St. Louis, Dec. 29, 1910, AREM, L-E-622.
Ibid., Furlong to Creel.
See S. Hopkins testimony, U.S., Congress, Senate, Investigations of Mexican Affairs, 2 vols., 66th Cong., 2d Sess., Doc. 285, 1920, II, 2520—2574.
See both the photographic evidence of Henry Krump in the Aultman Photo File, El Paso Public Library, and the Citizens Vertical File, H. C. Krump, El Paso Public Library.
Beezley, Insurgent Governor, p. 47.
For example, see Eugene Nolte (U.S. Marshal) to the Attorney General, San Antonio, December 31, 1910, RG 60, file no. 90755/394 (in which is enclosed a letter from El Paso Deputy Marshal H. R. Hillebrand to Nolte; and a letter from Lomelí to Hillebrand).
Wickersham to Sec. of State, Dec. 5, 1910, RG 60, file no. 90755/331. This information was obtained by the Bureau of Investigation from Judge Griner.
Author notes
The author is Associate Professor of History, State University of New York, Fredonia. Research for this project was financed in part by a SUNY Grant-in-Aid.
