During the wars for Spanish American independence, the Viceroyalty of Peru was considered a bulwark of royalism because of the presence there of an army which had been greatly strengthened by Viceroy José Fernando de Abascal y Sousa during the period 1808-1816.1 Abascal’s military measures have been viewed by some historians as the culmination of a program of military reform which began with Viceroy Manuel de Amat y Junient in 1761. Upon receipt of the news of Spain’s entrance into the Seven Year’s War in 1762 Amat had created a large militia in Peru, an action which allegedly enabled Peru to withstand the furious Indian revolts which had erupted during the period 1780-1783. Thereafter, the Army of Peru deferred the coming of independence long after its arrival elsewhere in South America.2

This paper constitutes an effort to re-examine the military reorganization which occurred in Peru after 1761 and to assess the army’s performance during the revolt headed by José Gabriel Condorcanqui, or Túpac Amaru II. While it is clear that Peru was never militarized prior to 1780, the causes for the failure of the reform are imperfectly understood. A complex set of circumstances conspired to weaken the army during the greatest internal crisis of the late colonial period. Ineffective leadership, both in Lima and Madrid, inefficiency and corruption, lack of adequate financial resources, and particularly the shortcomings of the Caroline reforms promulgated in Peru by Visitor-General José Antonio de Areche, all served to weaken the military.

The visitation to Peru headed by Areche in 1777 sought to reorganize the Peruvian treasury and promote administrative reform. Areche’s instructions from the Crown indicate that his mission was essentially economic, stressing the need to economize resources and develop additional sources of revenue.3 All reform measures would henceforth be measured in terms of cost reductions. Because manpower was the most expensive item in the military budget, Areche zealously sought to reduce troop strength to its lowest possible level, subordinating the principle of preparedness to that of economy. His harsh fiscal policies also helped foment a series of tax revolts in 1780 and weighed heavily in the Indian rebellions of the same period.

The Crown’s belief that Peruvian creoles had masterminded the revolts of 1780 in an effort to discredit the visitation resulted in a further reform of the army after 1783. The Crown ordered a major demobilization of the militia created by Amat in 1784 and sent Spanish regular troops to garrison the interior. It also denied creole militia officers promotions and subsequently made every effort to transform the army into a more traditionally Hispanic institution. Moreover, the growing tempo of violence which the visitation occasioned required that the army change its primary function—defending the viceroyalty against external attack—in order to provide security against internal rebellion instead. After 1784, the Army of Peru served primarily as an agency of internal security. The Tupac Amaru revolt had indicated that the real enemy were the Peruvians themselves.

The foregoing constitutes a military situation quite different from that elsewhere in Spanish America during the same period. In new Spain, for example, the army remained largely untested by massive internal revolt following the creation of the militia in 1763. Its militia received regular training and with it, considerable privileges. This powerful and privileged militia may have also served as a vehicle for social change as well.4 While considerable similarities exist within the armies of Spanish America in the waning years of the colony, the Peruvian reform indicates crucial differences also. Further research on these institutions is required to determine whether these differences can help to account for variations in military behavior during and after independence and the subsequent development of praetorianism.

A brief summary of the structure, distribution, and function of the Army of Peru prior to 1780 helps to explain the nature of subsequent changes in the military. It should be recognized first that viceregal power in Peru prior to 1760 had traditionally rested on a civil and religious, rather than a military, base.5 Prior to the creation of the Viceroyalty of New Granada in 1739, the viceroy in Lima was responsible for the defense of the entire South American continent, excepting Portuguese Brazil, an area ten times the size of Spain itself. In 1615, the fijo, or fixed Battalion of Callao had been established in response to the presence of English and later Dutch pirates. The primary duty of the battalion was to defend the capital of Lima located just east of the harbor. Because Callao was the entrepôt for all shipping along the coast and for the dispatch of silver bullion overseas, its defense was as crucial to Peru as that of Vera Cruz was to New Spain.

Although Peru established the Battalion of Callao on a footing of 500 men, because some were detached to the presidios of Chile and others were at sea with the Royal Navy, Lima was only defended by about 275 soldiers at any given time. In 1771 Peru and Upper Peru, which included the Audiencia of Charcas, an area roughly equivalent to modern Bolivia, had only 1,362 soldiers, one of the smaller contingents in Spanish America.6

Foreign military observers and Spanish officers alike agreed that Peru was badly-defended during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.7 The degree to which Peruvian viceroys depended upon factors of geography—contrary winds, shifting sandbars, the arid coastal desert and the great distance between Peru and Europe—indicates their lack of concern with a proper defense.8 On the other hand, military service was exceedingly unpopular with most Peruvians, and viceroys spoke frequently of the difficulties encountered in securing a sufficient number of recruits to bring the battalion to full strength.9 Seventeenth and eighteenth-century commentators indicate that the soldiers were largely drawn from the lowest social elements of Lima: Negroes, transients, and mixed-bloods of all varieties, whose low birth afforded them few other opportunities.10 Veteran Spanish soldiers assumed the responsibility for training and organizing the units and held the senior ranks in the officer corps.

From the late sixteenth century it had been traditional to supplement the presence of the fixed battalion with militiamen, or citizen-soldiers, to defend Lima during times of emergency. Residents were grouped and organized into companies according to their social status or trade guild affiliation. In Lima, for example, the viceroy in 1760 reported the presence of companies of Spaniards, Indians, mulattoes, free blacks, and merchants. Callao organized its militia companies vocationally: sailors, fitters, caulkers, etc.11 Since the Crown was unwilling to provide funds to train and equip these units, municipal corporations such as the town council or merchants’ guild sponsored them, but they possessed insufficient resources to provide arms, equipment, uniforms, or regular training to the soldiers. Peru mobilized its militia only twice during the period 1740-1760 and the results were not encouraging. In 1740, British Admiral George Anson attacked and captured the northern port city of Paita. So disorganized and unarmed was the local militia that it resorted to loading their cannon with pesos fuertes in a ludicrous effort to save the city. The revolt led by Juan Santos Atahualpa in 1742 in the Gran Pajonal region near Tarma east of Lima prompted a second mobilization. Panic and disarray ensued, including the desertion of many members of the fixed battalion. These military measures were so expensive and fruitless that no military call-up occurred for another two decades until the declaration of war against England in 1762.12

The early Bourbon viceroys’ failure to provide a proper defense for Peru created fear and alarm among limeños upon receiving the news of Spain’s entrance into the Seven Year’s War in May, 1762.13 This may, however, have simply reflected the energetic measures taken by Viceroy Manuel de Amat y Junient, who had taken command in Peru in 1761. A career military officer with distinguished service throughout Europe, Amat was the finest example of the Bourbons’ efforts to place the American viceroyalties in capable military hands. In short order, Amat completed work on the fortress “Royal Phillip” at Callao, which had been destroyed during the earthquake of 1746, and placed the port city under new leadership. In addition, he built an artillery factory, powder magazines, and a school of mathematics. Amat was uncompromising in his demand that military virtues and discipline be manifested throughout the viceroyalty and sought to impose the idea of service to the King on every Peruvian.14

Amat’s primary achievement, however, was in securing the support of the creole nobility of Lima to raise, arm, and outfit a vastly expanded militia. As Table I indicates, between 1760 and 1776, the strength of the Army of Peru increased dramatically largely owing to the creation of numerous companies of militia, both in Lima and the other provinces. Within a two-year period, the militia build-up had resulted in a tenfold increase in the size of the Army of Peru to 50,000 men. Provincial militia formation continued after 1763 because of the continuing English presence in the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands off southern Patagonia in the South Atlantic. Even with the creation of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, the Crown accepted the need for a large militia in the interior of Lower Peru to protect Upper Peru from attacks originating along the eastern seaboard. By 1776, the viceroy estimated the presence of nearly 100,000 soldiers, a number he believed capable of defending the viceroyalty from attack.

It seems clear from a review of the service records of the militia units that Peruvian creoles were the primary financiers and supporters of the reform.15 By providing wealthy creoles with militia officer-ships, memberships in the military orders, and other privileges, Amat secured the creation of a militia at virtually no cost to the royal treasury. Not indicative of Amat’s true estimation of Americans, creole incorporation reflected the wishes of King Charles III and the Committee for Imperial Defense that the militia assume a larger share of defensive responsibility and that it be formed as cheaply as possible.16

Although the buildup of the militia was impressive, it can hardly be said to have militarized Peru. A variety of reasons help to explain the failure of the militia to develop into an effective tactical force prior to 1780. First, the Spanish Crown does not seem to have been particularly concerned with the Peruvian military situation after 1763. José de Gálvez, who assumed the Ministry of the Indies in 1776, correctly believed that the outbreak of the North American Revolution reduced the dangers of a seaborne invasion. Rather than concentrating on Peruvian defenses, Gálvez concerned himself primarily with securing Spanish America’s eastern flank (which he did with the creation in 1776 of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata) and with elevating Chile to a separate captaincy-general in 1778.17

Secondly, the Crown had failed to oversee effectively the military activities of Viceroy Amat. Upon his arrival in Peru in 1776, Viceroy Manuel de Guirior, Amat’s successor, informed Gálvez that only a fraction of the militia had been properly trained and organized.18 Nor did the weak Guirior have the opportunity to rectify the situation. The arrival shortly thereafter of Areche and the members of the visitation placed the new viceroy in an untenable situation, especially after the visitor was granted the superintendency of the royal treasury, which assured him virtual control of Peru’s economic life.19

Third, the efforts made after 1776 to reorganize the militia took place within a deepening financial crisis in Peru. The Peruvian economy had in fact been deteriorating since midcentury, causing Spanish officials to resort to extortion to locate every available source of revenue from their subordinates.20 This economic crisis was accentuated by the transfer of the audiencia of Charcas from the control of Peru to the Viceroy of the Río de la Plata in 1776. By granting to Buenos Aires control over the rich silver mining districts of Oruro and Potosí, the Crown provoked an intense rivalry between Lima and its former territory. Trade between the two areas was paralyzed and the immediate drop in Peruvian revenues led to the speculation that Platine prosperity was being purchased at Peruvian expense.21 To make matters worse, Buenos Aires’ lack of financial resources caused the Crown to require Peru to provide an annual situado, or military subsidy, for the defense of the new region.22 The economic exigencies forced a drastic reduction in Peru’s military expenditures, further retarding the military reform program.23

Finally, the military reform took place in an increasingly turbulent society after 1777. The creation of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata had, by removing Peruvian control over Charcas, reduced the possibility of military cooperation between the two areas, accentuated their natural rivalry, and assured that the Upper Peruvian militia would receive no training or inspection. The continuing rivalry between the creolist Guirior and the anti-American Areche took the viceroy’s mind off policy matters and demanded that he exercise restraint in all areas of government. At the same time, Areche launched an attack on the creole majority in the audiencia of Lima, a reflection of Gálvez’ desire to reduce American influence in the civil bureaucracy of Spanish America.24

Although Areche had no mandate to reform the militia, his suspicion of the creole “Men of Affairs—rich landowners and merchants who wear the braid and epaulets of soldiers—without possessing military virtues,” led him to attack this group in reports to the Crown.25 Since the proliferation of militia units had the economic impact of exempting the soldiers and officers from the tax rolls, Areche quite naturally viewed the group as a threat to the success of the visitation. He thus complained to Gálvez that Peru possessed an officer corps larger than that of Spain itself, creole residents of Lima who officered imaginary provincial companies and exercised full military privileges. In order to prevent this situation from deteriorating further, Areche continually used his vote on Guirior’s War Council to defeat proposals to further train the militia.26 Spanish enlisted men from the fixed Battalion of Callao were given acting officerships and attached to the militia providing whatever training the militia received. Creoles were obviously aware of the discrimination against them and may have responded by avoiding militia service. Some even used the militia to redress their own grievances against the Crown.

Opposition to the visitation surfaced several times during the period 1777-1780, especially following Spains entrance into the North American Revolution in 1779. Areche suspected local militia of complicity or at least thought them to be sufficiently sympathetic to the revolts which broke out during these years to question their loyalty. Because Areche collected census data as part of his tax measures, and these also served as the basis for militia recruitment, opponents of the visitation normally were hostile towards military service as well. As early as 1779 Areche’s efforts to impose a “military contribution” on mulattoes had produced a revolt by mulatto militiamen in Lam-bayeque, which served as a model for later tax revolts in Cuzco and Arequipa.27 That same year, when Guirior attempted to assemble the limeño militia for the war with Britain, only a fraction appeared, leading the viceroy to believe that they were forbidden to muster by their white employers.28 So understrength was the fixed battalion that Guirior complained it was “incapable of defending its own barracks,” and forced levies were re-instituted after “all gentle means” of securing recruits had failed.29

By 1780 several veteran officers had noticed the rising tempo of violence in Peru and had requested that strong military measures be taken to insure public saftey.30 Yet these proposals were rejected by Guirior on the grounds of expense, probably out of the belief that Areche would exploit the situation for his personal benefit if any expenditures were made. Nor was leadership on the issue forthcoming from Madrid. Gálvez constantly sought information concerning the militia but was unwilling to authorize funds to insure adequate training and inspection. The massive amounts of information forwarded by the audiencias to the Crown seemingly convinced Gálvez that there was no military solution for Indian violence. Since prior to 1780 Indian recalcitrance had been largely restricted to frontier areas of Peru and did not directly threaten Lima or the mining regions the Crown felt little cause for alarm.31

The events of 1780 are well-known and need only be briefly recounted here. Tax revolts in Cuzco and Arequipa, inspired by Areche’s increase in the alcabala, or sales tax, from four to six per cent, produced attacks on the customshouses of the cities and their directors. Guirior’s passive response, refusing to dispatch units from the fixed battalion, led Areche to convince Gálvez that the viceroy was indeed an enemy of the visitation, actively conspiring with the creole land owners. A Royal Order of July 21, 1780 ordered him replaced by Colonel Agustín de Jáuregui, the Captain General of Chile.32

On November 4, 1780, José Gabriel Condorcanqui, the cacique of Tinta, a small town in the Vilcamayu Valley about eighty miles south of Cuzco, the former imperial capital of the Inca Empire in the central sierra, captured the corregidor de indios, Colonel Antonio de Arriaga. Taking the name of Túpac Amaru II, in honor of his lineal descendant Tupac Amaru I, the last Inca ruler of Peru, Condorcanqui accused Arriaga of numerous extortions against the Indians of the district. He spoke passionately against the repartimiento and of the abuses of mita, or labor service which the Indians were forced to make in the silver mines of Upper Peru. These practices, he asserted, reduced the Indians to a condition of indentured servitude. They also disrupted the Indian family by increasing migrancy and forcing Indian women into prostitution to support their families during their husbands’ absences. On November 10, Arriaga was publicly executed as an example to the King, who was asked to abolish the corrupt corregidor system and its abuses.33

At least three elements set the Túpac Amaru revolt apart from the numerous Indian revolts which punctuated Peru during the late colonial period, causing it to develop into the most severe threat to Spanish authority in Peru prior to independence. First, Túpac Amaru was a leader of uncommon stature, a masterful recruiter, and a charismatic personality.34 Secondly, he chose a vulnerable opponent in the person of Arriaga, continually asserted the legitimacy of his movement, and secured the support of important creoles such as the Bishop of Cuzco Juan Manuel de Moscoso, and other non-Indians producing a popular uprising which would force the viceroy to accept his demands.35 Finally, the revolt took place in an area which was heavily populated by Indians and mestizos whose hostility to Spanish authority had been assured by the overbearing Areche. As later events would clearly demonstrate, Cuzco was militarily helpless to defend itself against attack.36

Reports emanating from Cuzco confirm the panic which gripped the defenseless city. Following the receipt of the news of Arriaga’s capture, the corregidor Fernando Inclán Valdés assembled the War Council which dispatched a courier to Lima at 3:45 a.m. on the morning of November 13 with a petition. The petition requested that fixed troops from Lima be sent to aid Cuzco since the militia was too weak to resist an attack.37 Apparently the War Council was deeply divided internally regarding the actions to be taken and certain officers had even fled the city to save their own lives. Recruitment for the militia proved impossible even when full military privileges were promised. Several observers felt that a majority of cuzqueños openly favored the rebels and believed therefore that at least 2,000 trained soldiers would be required to garrison the city adequately.38

On November 17 two provincial corregidors whose districts had been overrun by the rebels assembled a militia of 604 men and 700 loyal Indian auxiliaries and set out for Tinta. In the evening they reached the small village of Sangarara and camped near the main square, planning to attack the rebel stronghold the following day. Their approach, however, had been observed by the rebels who attacked at dawn. Túpac Amaru, at the head of an army of 6,000 men, forced the militia to take refuge in the local church. After refusing an offer of safe passage for all Americans, the Spaniards suffered heavy casualties when the church was fired and a powder magazine exploded. In all, 576 persons died in the battle, 390 of whom were militiamen. By demolishing the myth of the invincibility of Spanish arms, the rebel victory at Sangarara gave renewed strength to the revolt.39

Suspicions that many cuzqueños may have been sympathetic to the revolt hampered Inclán Valdés’ efforts to defend the city. In order to hold the loyalties of the Indians of the immediate region, the corregidor commissioned several of the caciques, and employed the urban militia Company of Merchants as a civic guard. Much of the military leadership seems to have been provided by the clergy. Bishop Moscoso, who may have turned away from Túpac Amaru following the Sangarara massacre, placed the moral authority of the Church on the Spanish side by excommunicating the rebel leader and collecting 110,881 pesos with which to raise troops and construct fortifications. The clergy even raised their own militia under the command of Manuel de Mendieta, the dean of the cathedral chapter. The arrival of several provincial corregidors in Cuzco by mid-December made available an estimated 3,000 men for the defense of the city.40

Upon receiving news of the revolt on November 24, Jáuregui dispatched veteran Colonel Gabriel de Avilés to Cuzco with 200 soldiers from the militia Regiment of Mulattoes, the most loyal and well-trained of the limeño units. On reaching the city on January 1, 1781, Avilés reported that defenses were in a shambles, directed by a small group of corregidors and untrained Indian irregulars. He characterized the cuzqueño militia as insolent and unwilling to take orders from anyone but the corregidors, which forced the colonel and his staff to jail 200 of them and spend an excessive amount of time on disciplinary matters.41 Prior to this, Valdés had utilized the militia Company of Merchants and Indian auxiliaries to dislodge the rebel Indians from the heights of Picchu surrounding the city. Túpac Amaru, because he disliked fighting Indians, whom the Spanish employed as frontline troops, and because negotiations with Cuzco had broken down, lifted the seige of the city and returned to Tinta to regroup his forces. This proved to be a turning point in the struggle. The arrival of Areche and del Valle allowed the Spaniards to mount an offensive from Cuzco in March, 1781. They captured the Inca the following month.42

Upon receipt of the news of the Sangarara slaughter Areche complained to Gálvez that the creole town council of Cuzco had mismanaged the war and informed him that he was leaving immediately as the viceroy’s personal representative. He noted that the officers of the limeño militia had, with a single exception, refused to volunteer their companies for service in Cuzco.43 In subsequent letters Areche warned Gálvez that the Peruvian militia were nothing but “unarmed gangs lacking any knowledge of tactics or discipline.” He called the creoles “cowards who fled to the cities and the coast to avoid service.” Jáuregui, Moscoso, and del Valle were characterized as weaklings who should be immediately replaced.44

With the news of the Sangarara bloodshed in hand, and fearful of the fall of Cuzco, Jáuregui on December 12 issued an edict offering a pardon to all who would agree to desert the rebel cause and announced the abolition of the repartimiento.45 While this edict was intended to defuse the revolt, it revived it instead as Indians defiantly claimed the order as a victory over the corregidors. In retaliation, the corregidors registered their displeasure by refusing to release supplies or soldiers for the expedition marching to Cuzco, claiming that they were needed for local defense. En route to Cuzco at the head of 200 fixed soldiers and a contingent of mulatto militia, Royalist officers complained that corregidors would rather see the King’s soldiers defeated than lose to the army a single Indian who might owe them a bolt of cloth. In Cuzco, Commissar of War José del Lagos reported that cuzqueños hid their mules and refused to sell the army provisions.46

Incensed at the turn of events, Areche moved swiftly to assume control of the war effort. In January Jáuregui had issued a circular order allowing corregidors to call up two militia companies for defense of their districts. Areche, using his control over the royal treasury, subsequently notified these officials that he would not release funds to cover the payment of the militiamen. In a letter to Gálvez he stated that the militia were all employees, retainers, and dependents of the corregidors who used them for their own corrupt purposes. He estimated that he had saved the Crown 2.26 million pesos annually by refusing to support these units and urged that in the future militiamen be paid by the Commissariat of War in Cuzco rather than individual corregidors in order to further reduce their power.47

While Cuzco was under military administration, Areche and the other Spanish members of the visitation imposed their will on the general public, which they suspected of disloyalty. The visitor’s mania for reducing costs dictated that the war be financed through voluntary means but cuzqueños were slow to respond to the hated visitor’s overtures. In retaliation, Areche brushed aside their claims for reimbursement for prior service. He refused, for example, to pay the men who had defended the \ Bridge which connected Cuzco and Lima, allowing the Spanish expedition to enter the city. Areche’s unwillingness to excuse faithful Indian caciques from tribute payments proved to be a serious deterrent to recruitment. Army officials hotly criticized the practice, noting that the provincianos would rather suffer punishment than enlist. Del Valle told Jáuregui that forced levies provoked terrible violence. He also painted a sordid picture of profiteering among the soldiers who had cornered scarce foodstuffs and were selling them to the people at highly inflated prices.48

Aware of the cuzqueños’ hatred of the military, Areche chose to by-pass all but a few existing militia units in mounting an expedition to attack the rebel stronghold in Tinta. Instead, he utilized fixed soldiers from Lima and the loyal corregidors, the latter primarily because of their control over the caciques and loyal Indians of the region. Taking advantage of longstanding rivalries among ayllus, or clans, and between Indian villages, and using a variety of false promises, the visitor raised an army of 15,000 men, 14,000 of whom were loyal Indian conscripts. Placing them and their caciques and corregidors under the command of regular Spanish officers, Areche put a formidable army into the field (see Table II). Although the army wreaked havoc in the countryside, its loyalty, ability to fight the rebels on their own terms, and the advantage of forestalling the need to recruit among other social groups, combined to bring about the capture of Túpac Amaru, his family, and lieutenants in April, 1781. Areche triumphantly conducted the captured rebel chief through the streets of Cuzco. Túpac Amaru was tried and found guilty of sedition and on May 18, Areche commanded that he and his followers be executed.49

Far from ending the revolt, Túpac Amaru’s death seemed to further fan the flames of rebellion. Other supporters and allies of the Inca took the revolt into Upper Peru and other parts of South America during 1781 and 1782. This extension of the war further taxed the logistical capacities of the Army of Peru and indicated its inability to quell internal insurrections of this magnitude. Following the capture of Túpac Amaru, an Indian siege of Puno, located on the northwest bank of Lake Titicaca, forced the army to march into Upper Peru. Because Puno controlled the overland route between Cuzco and La Paz, Areche referred to it as “the Sagunto of America” and considered its retention crucial to avert the spread of revolt throughout the highlands.50 Yet massive desertion among the loyal Indian troops recruited in Cuzco following Túpac Amaru’s capture forced the recruitment of new auxiliaries in Tinta. These also deserted en route to Puno due to the frigid winter weather and the broken promises of Spanish recruiters. In September, del Valle abandoned Puno and returned to Cuzco with only 1,100 men from an expedition which had left with 15,000. The fall of Puno, by allowing the rebellion to spread to La Paz and beyond, stimulated Areche’s efforts to oust del Valle and Jáuregui. The mutual recriminations which resulted within the viceregal administration also fully exposed the weaknesses of the Army of Peru.51

The termination of the revolts in Upper Peru was accomplished by veteran detachments sent out from Buenos Aires at Jáuregui’s request. These seasoned troops lifted the sieges of La Paz and broke the back of the Indian offensive. The strain of constant warfare on both parties allowed negotiations to begin in late 1781. Jáuregui’s offer of a negotiated settlement and a general pardon to the rebel leaders, coupled with the persuasion of the clergy, convinced Diego Túpac Amaru and his 30,000 supporters to surrender in January, 1782. On August 23, Jáuregui felt confident enough to notify Gálvez that the revolts had been crushed and that Peru was once again at peace.52 To insure its preservation, Areche tried the surviving rebel leaders and had them executed by July, 1783.

The close of the last Inca revolts forced the introduction of several administrative and personnel changes in Peru. The Crown replaced the discredited Viceroy Jáuregui in 1783 with Teodoro de Croix, the governor of New Spain’s Interior Provinces, a man well-versed in Indian affairs. Upon del Valle’s death the same year the King named Brigadier General Manuel de Pineda as Inspector-General of Troops, and replaced Areche with Jorge de Escobedo y Alarcón, who became visitor-general and intendant of Lima when that system supplanted the corregimientos in 1784.53 Although the intendancy system completed the program of administrative centralization begun with the creation of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, the intendants had primarily economic and administrative functions and did not solve the problems of providing an internal defense. By 1784 the Spanish Crown had decided to end the militia experiment in Peru and to transform the army into an agency of internal control whose mission would be primarily to defend the viceroyalty from its lower classes rather than from a seaborne enemy. In so doing, the Caroline administration functionally altered the primary mission of the army after 1784.

The rationale for these changes stemmed from the Crown’s belief that the creoles had been the guiding force behind the revolts of 1780. Since the militia was largely a creole institution, financed and officered by limeños, suspicions of creole involvement in the revolts besmirched the militia’s reputation. In February, 1781, Colonel Demetrio Egan, a senior Royalist officer, reported to Gálvez that the creoles had initiated the Túpac Amaru revolt with the hope of seeming independence for Peru as the British colonists in North America had done. Since the creole militia was disloyal, he asked that 5,000 regular troops be sent from Spain to reestablish Royal authority.54

It is clear that the Crown accepted these allegations at face value. In 1782 Gálvez notified Escobedo of his fears and secretly ordered Jáuregui to immediately train as many Europeans as possible in order to protect Lima from an attack.55 His instructions to Viceroy Croix also assumed that the creoles had masterminded the revolt but admitted that definite proof was lacking. Characterizing the militia as useless, Gálvez announced the dispatch of two complete Spanish infantry regiments to Peru to dispel any illusion that Royal arms there were weak.56

Local Spanish officials in Peru shared Gálvez’ apprehensions. Jáuregui believed, as did many others, that it was foolhardy to maintain a militia in the interior regions where nearly all the inhabitants were untrained and disloyal mestizos or Indians, especially when Cuzco was filled with “unfaithful subjects of high dignity and character” who might lead them.57 A variety of private citizens called the militia “untrained libertines” whose depredations, condoned in wartime, were inexcusable in time of peace.58 Lagos reiterated these opinions and asked the Crown to expand opportunities for members of the castas, in order to separate them from their Creole masters.59

The decision to demobilize the militia in 1784 also reflected the Crown’s continuing desire to reduce fixed costs. Although it had permitted the temporary expansion of the fixed Battalion of Callao to regimental strength during the revolts, the arrival of the regular regiments in 1784 allowed a reduction in the strength of this unit.60 Military commanders in Cuzco favored the deactivation of the militia there since the economy was in a shambles and the cuzqueños could no longer afford to support it. Captain Simón Gutiérrez urged Areche to station a large regular force in the city to allow militiamen to return their farms to production and thereby stimulate the economy.61 Areche agreed to do this and estimated that an annual savings of one-half million pesos might be made if the militia was drastically reduced in size.62

The reduction of the militia was not accomplished without some opposition. Inspector-General Pineda delivered a long report to Croix following an inspection of the militia and placed much of the blame for its miserable situation on Areche, whose efforts to keep expenses to a minimum had reduced the militia’s training cadres to the point where they were ineffective. Pineda recognized that Peru was both geographically and sociologically different from other areas of Spanish America and warned that militia regulations devised in Havana or Madrid had little applicability there. Less men were available for service, and those who were, either transients or residents of large haciendas, could not be easily assembled for training. Because an untrained militia produced disasters such as that which had occurred in Sangarara, Pineda recommended that they either be adequately trained or abolished.63 Earlier, Escobedo had presented Gálvez with the unpleasant casualty figures and economic results of the revolts: 100,000 persons had died during the fighting, which had cost the Crown 2.5 million pesos to crush. Still military expenditures remained at 1.5 million pesos annually, 730,000 pesos of which were used to train a discredited and inept militia. Arguing that militia rolls in Peru were even larger than census rolls, Escobedo asked Gálvez to authorize the reforms proposed earlier by Areche.64

In order to implement the militia reduction, Gálvez began by denying promotions to prominent creoles who had served during the revolts. Promotion lists drawn up by Avilés and del Valle, who were more sympathetic than most to creole aspirations, contained promotion and reward recommendations for an almost equal number of Spaniards and Creoles. Since these promotions were crucial to the military career, Gálvez’ selection of certain individuals for honors offers evidence of a continuing pattern of discrimination against Americans, a design also evident in the civil bureaucracy. In his recommendations, Gálvez pointedly denied the requests of several worthy creoles while rewarding Spaniards, corregidors, and faithful caciques.65 In September, 1784, the War Council in Lima voted to dramatically reduce the army by nearly 2,500 men, most of whom were serving as militia trainers, at an annual savings of nearly 580,000 pesos (see Table III). A series of orders also drastically reduced the number of militia units. Shortly thereafter, regular infantry units were dispatched to garrison the cities of Cuzco, Arequipa, La Paz, Oruro, Salta, Potosí, and Chuquisaca.66

This brief examination of the Army of Peru suggests that the Caroline efforts failed to form a large and capable militia which could shoulder a major share of defensive responsibilities in the aftermath of the Seven Year’s War. Unlike other areas of Spanish America, the reform was tested by a massive internal revolt led by the charismatic Túpac Amaru. Yet the evidence indicates that Túpac Amaru’s movement lacked both force and organization when compared with Spanish military resources. That a highly unequal struggle persisted far longer than was necessary resulted from ineffective leadership, most notably the conflicts between Viceroys Guirior and Jáuregui and Visitor Areche, whose overwhelming desire to economize subordinated the principle of preparedness to that of economy.

The ineptitude and suspected disloyalty of the creole militia had the net effect of convincing Gálvez and his successors that a militia was untrustworthy in heavily Indian areas such as Peru. In a 1786 guideline to Charles III, the Conde de Floridabianca, Charles’ Minister of State, held that the traditional Hapsburg system of defense, based on fixed or veteran garrisons, was proper for Peru. Although he conceded that militiamen on the coast might be used successfully to combat a foreign invasion, domestic insurrection posed quite different problems. “Militiamen,” he noted, “as natives bom and educated with [a] dislike and jealousy of Spaniards, are likely to develop alliances with castas, or mixed-bloods, peoples of color, and others seeking to disrupt the peace.” Because creoles and mestizos served in the officer corps, he felt it necessary to always maintain a sufficient number of fixed units, officered by Spaniards, to defend the principal areas of Peru against foreigners and Royal subjects alike. Only the signing of the Peace of Paris in 1783, by allowing Spanish troops to be sent to Peru, had saved the viceroyalty from being overwhelmed.67

The reforms made in the Army of Peru constituted an essential return to the Hapsburg defensive system which had been employed in Peru for the two centuries prior to the Seven Year’s War. After 1784 the Crown restricted the militia component of the army primarily to the coastal intendancies, which were divided into three military commandancies and placed under the control of Spanish command and staff groups. In 1787 the fixed Battalion of Callao was again returned to regimental strength, with preference in the officer corps being given to Spaniards. Viceroy Croix’s contention that Americans were weak, unaccustomed to the rigors of war, and competent as officers only when properly supervised by Spaniards, was reflected in the social composition of the new unit. Of the 157 officers serving in the fixed regiment in 1788, Spaniards outnumbered Creoles ninety-two to sixty-five and, with one exception, held every major rank in the command structure.68

Creoles were aware of the discrimination inherent in the reform measures and reacted accordingly. Some warned the Crown of the consequences of its actions; others may have even actively turned against it. The three Ugarte brothers, for example, members of the cuzqueño nobility who held a mayorazgo and high civil offices, served as militia officers during the revolt, probably to secure information for the rebels. Although the Spanish judges could not elicit a confession of their complicity from Túpac Amaru, the trio was banished from Peru and taken to Spain as prisoners following the revolts. Later the brothers petitioned the Crown for their just deserts, which they claimed were denied them on the basis of their birth. While theirs was an unusual case, creole members of the Town Council and War Council of Cuzco were also uniformly denied any honors. At least one creole militia officer reported that the expense of maintaining his company had so weakened his estate that he was forced to leave the service.69

In general, however, the violence of the Indian revolts increased the social conservatism of Peruvian creoles. In 1814 they served loyally in putting down the revolt of Mateo García Pumacahua in Cuzco. Nevertheless, creoles undertook these ventures only out of self-interest and not to serve the King.70 Peru remained a bulwark of Royalism by virtue of an army of occupation, an alien and increasingly hostile force whose garrisons remained vigilant towards Peruvians and patriots alike.71


John Lynch, The Spanish-American Revolutions, 1808-1826 (New York, 1973), p. 162, Vicente Rodríguez Casado and José A. Calderón Quijano, eds., Memoria de Gobierno del Virrey José F. de Abascal y Sousa (Seville, 1944), plates 8 and 10, following pp. 336 and 352.


This opinion is held by Vicente Rodríguez Casado and Florentino Pérez Embid, eds., Memoria de gobierno del Virrey Amat (Seville, 1947), p. liii; Alfredo Sáenz-Rico Urbina, El virrey Amat. 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1967), I, 238-239; Luis Martín, The Kingdom of the Sun. A Short History of Peru (New York, 1974), p. 144. It has been rejected, however, by Rubén Vargas Ugarte, Historia del Perú. Virreinato. (Siglo XVIII), 1700-1790, (Lima, 1956), p. 324, note 6.


Instrucción que debe observar don José Antonio de Areche en la Visita y arreglo de los Tribunales de Cuenta, Cajas, y Ramos de Real Hacienda en los Reinos del Perú, Chile y Provincias de la Plata, accompanying the Instrucción reservada para interior gobierno del Visitador General del Perú. El Pardo, March 11, 1776. Archivo General de las Indias, Seville, Audiencia de Lima (hereafter cited as AGI, Lima), leg. 1082.


L. N. McAlister, The “Fuero Militar” in New Spain, 1764-1800 (Gainesville, Florida, 1957), and the same author’s “Social Structure and Social Change in New Spain,” HAHR, 43 (Aug., 1963), 349-370, deal with the militia as a vehicle for social change. The work of Christon I. Archer, “To Serve the King: Military Recruitment in Late Colonial Mexico,” HAHR, 55 (May, 1975), 226-250, focuses largely upon the army’s impact on common people in an effort to expand the social history of late colonial Mexico.


Richard Konetzke, Süd und Mittelamerika I: Die Indianerkulturen Altamerikas und die Spanisch-Portugiesche Kolonialherrschaft (Frankfurt, 1965), pp. 157-164; James Lockhart, Spanish Peru, 1532-1560: A Colonial Society (Madison, 1968), pp. 138-140.


Extracto de la revista del Batallon del Callao, December 1, 1758. AGI, Lima, leg. 1490. Estado que manifiesta el actual destino y fuerza de la Tropa que hay en América, Madrid, Jan. 8, 1771, AGI, Indiferente General (hereafter IG), leg. 74. Most of the nearly 45,000 fixed troops in America were situated in the circum-Caribbean region where the threat of an English attack was the most pronounced: Puerto Rico had 2,884 soldiers while New Spain had 6,196. The presence of eleven Portuguese regiments in Brazil required that 4,682 soldiers be stationed in the Río de la Plata.


See the comments of the French military engineer Amadée Frezier, A Voyage to the South-Sea and along the coasts of Chili and Peru, in the years 1712, 1713, and 1714 (London, 1717), p. 103, and of the Spanish naval lieutenants Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, Noticias secretas de América sobre el estado naval, militar y político de los reynos del Peru y provincias de Quito, costas de Nueva Granada y Chile. 2 vols. in one (London, 1826), I, 43-49, 122-123, 164-166, 178, 204-205.


Lawrence A. Clayton, “Local Initiative and Finance in the Viceroyalty of Peru: The Development of Self-Reliance,” HAHR, 54 (May, 1974), 284-304, indicates that the Crown relied upon the private sector of the economy to furnish defenses for Peru during the seventeenth century.


Manuel Fuentes, ed. Memorias de los virreyes que han gobernado el Perú durante el tiempo del coloniaje español, 6 vols. (Lima, 1859), IV, 110-112, 267-272; Viceroy José Antonio Manso de Velasco to Fray Julián de Arriaga, Minister of the Indies, Lima, Feb. 2, 1759, AGI, Lima, leg. 1490, ff. 1-3.


Seventeenth century descriptions of the soldiery include Boleslao Lewin, ed., Descripción del virreinato del Perú. Crónica inédita del comienzos del siglo xvii (Rosario, Argentina, 1958), pp. 41-42, 69, and Robert Ryal Miller, ed., Chronicle of Colonial Lima. The Diary of Josephe and Francisco Mugaburu, 1640—1697 (Norman, 1975), pp. 216, 235. An example of eighteenth century commentary is in Fuentes, Memorias de los virreyes, IV, 262-263.


Fuentes, Memorias de los virreyes, IV, 283-284. Viceroy Manso speaks of a militia located in Lima and its environs which he estimated at between 4,000 and 6,000 men. No militia is mentioned outside of the capital, although presumably some informal companies existed in the larger cities.


Military activities prior to 1760 are covered in Chapter I of my unpublished doctoral dissertation, “The Military Reform in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1762-1800,” (The University of Florida, 1970), pp. 9-24, and in my related article, “The Changing Racial and Administrative Structure of the Peruvian Military Under the Later Bourbons,” The Americas, 32 (July, 1975), 117-133. Anson’s capture of Paita is covered in Vargas Ugarte, Historia del Perú, pp, 189-193; the Juan Santos revolt is described by Francisco Loayza, Juan Santos, el invencible (Lima, 1942).


Alfonso Santa, Assessor of the Royal Tobacco Monopoly, to Fray Juan de Yecla, the Royal Confessor, Lima, Mar. 10, 1766, cited in Sáenz-Rico Urbina, El virrey Amat, I, 215-216.


Amat’s reforms are fully treated in Sáenz-Rico Urbina, El virrey Amat, I, 213-278. His fortification program is described in Vicente Rodríguez Casado and Florentino Pérez Embid, Construcciones militares del Virrey Amat (Seville, 1949).


Lista de los oficiales que con mayor esmero y sobre saliente ferbor en la Guerra proxima pasada, se dedicaron al arreglo egercicio y ensenañza de los soldados de su cargo, Lima, Feb. 23, 1765. AGI, Lima 1491. A complete listing of the creole officers, who came from the most illustrious houses of Lima, is made in Sáenz-Rico Urbina, El virrey Amat, I, 227-232. The militia Regiment of Cavalry of the Nobility, which Amat himself commanded, was so exclusive that the first company was composed exclusively of persons holding titles of Castile. This example caused status-conscious members of the lower social groups to join the militia also.


McAlister, “Fuero Militar,” p. 3.


This lack of concern with Peru was manifested by the dispatch of Brigadier General Francisco Javiér de Morales as inspector-general of troops to Peru to train the militia. Upon the death of the president of the Audiencia of Chile in 1770, he was ordered by Gálvez to remain in Chile as president, which further delayed the training of the Peruvian militia. This lack of training for the militia contrasts with the situation in New Spain described by McAlister, “The Reorganization of the Army of New Spain, 1763-1766,” HAHR, 33 (Feb., 1953), 1-32.


Viceroy Manuel de Guirior to José de Gálvez, Lima, Oct. 20, 1776, ff. 1-2, Archivo General de Simancas: Guerra Moderna (hereafter AGS, GM) leg. 7128. Guirior estimated that only 7,139 infantry and 8,054 cavalry militia were effectively capable of defending Peru from attack. Amat’s Reglamento sobre las milicias del Virreynato del Peru, Lima, Aug. 31, 1766, AGI, Lima, leg. 654, was adapted from the Plan de Milicias, which accompanied a Royal Order to Amat, Madrid, May 16, 1763, AGS, GM, leg. 7128. Not until 1793 was the Cuban Militia Regulation finally re-published in Peru. This regulation provided for regular training but its organizational format, designed for application is a smaller geographic area, made it unsuitable for Peru.


Vicente Palacio Atard, Areche y Guirior; observaciones sobre el fracaso de una visita al Perú (Seville, 1946).


John TePaske, “La crisis del siglo XVIII en el virreinato del Perú,” in Bernardo García Martínez, ed., Historia y sociedad en el mundo de habla española (Mexico, 1970), pp. 263-279. The economic crisis may well have affected the relationship between local corregidors and their Indian subjects. All of the Indian rebellions were in opposition to this official.


The economic effects of the creation of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata are described in Céspedes del Castillo, Lima y Buenos Aires, pp. 97-130. Note the drop in Peruvian revenues between 1774 and 1777, set out in the tables on pp. 81, 145-146.


Figures from the Caja de Lima, furnished me by Professor TePaske, indicate that half, or 1.174 million of the 2.2 million pesos spent for defense, were sent in the form of subsidies to other areas of South America to help bolster their developing economies and provide for their defense. Céspedes del Castillo, Lima y Buenos Aires, pp. 86-88, 103-104, notes that over four million pesos went to Buenos Aires alone during the period 1776-1780.


The later Hapsburg and early Bourbon viceroys to Peru spent an average of thirty per cent of governmental revenues on war and defense items. This figure rose to 89.5 per cent during the Seven Year’s War but by 1777 had dropped to 36.52 per cent, an absolute decrease of fifty-three per cent. All of this reflects the desire of policymakers in Madrid and Lima to subordinate preparedness to economy.


Leon G. Campbell, “A Creole Establishment: Creole Domination of the Audiencia of Lima During the Late Eighteenth Century,” HAHR, 52 (Feb., 1972), 1-25; Mark A. Burkholder, “From Creole to Peninsular: The Transformation of the Audiencia of Lima,” HAHR, 52 (Aug., 1972), 395-415.


Areche to Gálvez, Lima, Apr. 12, 1780, ff. 1-28, AGI, Lima, leg. 1084; Areche to Gálvez, no. 462, Lima, Aug. 18, 1782, ff. 1-3, AGI, Lima, leg. 1087.


Guirior to Gálvez, Lima, July 20, 1778, ff. 1-2, AGI, Lima, leg. 1493. Later Inspector-General José del Valle accused Areche of crippling the militia so that it was ineffective against the forces of Túpac Amaru, del Valle to Gálvez Cuzco, July 17, 1781, ff. 1-10, AGI, Cuzco, leg. 63.


Leon Campbell, “Black Power in Colonial Peru: The 1779 Tax Rebellion of Lambayeque,” Phylon, 33 (Summer, 1972), 140-152.


Guirior to Pedro de Ureta, Secretary to José de Gálvez, Lima, Sept. 28, 1779, ff. 1-2, AGI, Lima, leg. 659.


Guirior to Gálvez, Lima, Oct. 5, 1779, ff. 1-3, AGI, Lima, leg. 1483.


Proyecto del Coronel D. Demetrio Egaña, Caballero de la Orden de Santiago, para la seguridad interior de las provincias del Reyno del Peru y resguardo de sus puertos principales, Lima, Oct. 11, 1779. Biblioteca del Palacio Real, Madrid, Manuscritos de América (hereafter BPR, MA), vol. 2855, 212-254.


An idea of the volume of information reaching the Crown from the Audiencias of Lima, Cuzco, Charcas, and Buenos Aires, concerning Indian revolts in Peru and elsewhere, is given by Francisco Morales Padrón, comp. “Documentos en el Archivo General de Indias referentes a sublevaciones indígenas en el siglo XVIII,” V Congreso Internacional de Historia de América, 5 vols. (Lima, 1971), I, 3-428.


The tax revolts are described in Boleslao Lewin, La rebelión de Túpac Amaru y los orígines de la independencia de Hispano-América, 3rd ed., revised (Buenos Aires, 1967), pp. 131-189. Luís A. Eguiguren, ed., Guerra separatista. Rebeliones de Indios en Sur América. Crónica de Melchor de Paz, 2 vols. (Lima, 1952), I, 84-166. Report from Areche to the Crown, Dec., 1780, ff. 1-4. AGI, Lima, leg. 1039; Royal Officer of Cuzco to Areche, Cuzco, Apr. 12, 1780, ff. 1-3, AGI, Lima, leg. 1039. Gálvez’ annotations in the margin of the Secret Report from Areche, AGI, Lima, leg. 645b (incomplete) states that Guirior was being removed as an enemy of the visitation.


The revolt is treated as separatist by Lewin, La rebelión de Túpac Amaru, and by Carlos Daniel Valcárcel, Túpac Amaru, el revolucionario (Lima, 1970). Lillian Estelle Fisher’s The Last Inca Revolt, 1780-1783 (Norman, 1966), more properly sees it as a reformist movement. Anthropologist John Rowe views the revolt as the culmination of an Inca nationalist movement which appeared early in the eighteenth century. “El movimiento nacional inca del siglo XVIII,” Revista Universitaria, 43:107 (2nd. trimestre, Cuzco, 1954), 17-47.


The charisma of Túpac Amaru is attested to by the Royalist commander José del Valle, who told Gálvez that the rebel leader had had no trouble recruiting an army estimated at 70,000 men. Cuzco, Mar. 1, 1781, ff. 1-4, AGI, Lima, leg. 1044. Oscar Comblit’s interesting article, “Society and Mass Rebellion in Eighteenth Century Peru and Bolivia,” in Raymond Carr, ed., Latin American Affairs, St. Antony’s Papers, no. 22 (Oxford, 1970), pp. 24-27, observes that many Indians moved south to avoid mita service during this period. As forasteros, or foreigners, they were most susceptible to joining a charismatic leader of Tupac Amaru’s type. The whole subject of recruitment during the rebellion remains totally unstudied.


Arriaga had been excommunicated by the Creole Bishop of Cuzco Juan Manuel de Moscoso, who may have been an accomplice in the revolt. In addition, he had distributed 300,000 pesos worth of merchandise in the province when the limit had been established at 112,000 pesos. Fisher, The Last Inca Revolt, pp. 39-43. Moscoso’s exact role in the revolt is unclear. Following the revolt, however, he was exonerated by the Crown and appointed Archbishop of Granada.


Fisher, The Last Inca Revolt, pp. 49-51, and Valcárcel, Túpac Amaru, pp. 204—215, both demonstrate strong Creole support for Túpac Amaru at least in the early stages of the revolt. The clandestine nature of this support makes it very difficult to determine the true social composition of the revolt, but the number of non-Indians placed on trial with Túpac Amaru following the rebellion indicates a broad social backing. Colección documental de la Independencia del Perú, 30 vols. (Lima, 1974), II, part 2, 778-779. This support served to convince Areche that the militia might turn their weapons against the Crown if employed against the rebels. Areche to Agustín de Jáuregui, Cuzco, Mar. 16, 1781, f. 3, AGI, Lima, leg. 1085.


Report of the War Council of Cuzco to Jáuregui, Colección documental, II, part 2, 266-268.


Reports of Bishop Moscoso to the War Council, Cuzco, November 14, 1780, and to Viceroy Jáuregui, Nov. 16, 1780, in Francisco Loayza, ed., Estado del Perú. (Lima, 1944), pp. 134-137; Moscoso to Areche, Nov. 16, 1780, and to Jáuregui, Nov. 21, 1780, in Colección documental, II, part 2, 275-284, 296-301. Moscoso’s views are confirmed by Francisco Laesquilla, the Creole corregidor of Chumbivilcas. Relación de los pasajes acaecidos en esta Ciudad del Cuzco con motivo de la revelion causada por el indio José Gabriel Túpac Amaru, Cuzco, Dec. 3, 1780, ff. 10-20. Bancroft Library, Documentos sobre Túpac Amaru (hereafter BL, TA).


Colección documental, II, part 1, 97-148; part 2, 266-268, 287-289. The exact size of Túpac Amaru’s army at any given time is uncertain but the victory apparently aided recruitment. Lewin, La rebelión de Túpac Amaru, p. 431, estimates that at least 100,000 Indians were mobilized within a 1,500-kilometer radius of Cuzco.


The activities of the clergy in Cuzco are described by Jáuregui in the Relaciones de los virreyes y audiencias que han gobernado el Perú. 3 vols. (Madrid, 1867-1872), III, 320-326.


Avilés to Gálvez, Cuzco, Jan. 28, 1783, ff. 1-3, AGI, Lima, leg. 1483; Relaciones de los virreyes, III, 144-145.


Túpac Amaru’s decision to besiege rather than attack Cuzco in December, 1780 indicates the lack of adequate force and organization of the rebel army. George Kubier, “The Quechua in the Colonial World,” in Juhan Steward, ed., Handbook of South American Indians (Washington, D.C., 1946), p. 386; Julio César Chaves, Túpac Amaru (Asunción, 1973), pp. 153-154.


Areche to Gálvez, no. 249, Lima, Dec. 22, 1780, ff. 1-7, AGI, Lima, leg. 1084. The only militia commander to volunteer for service was Colonel José Antonio Borda of the Regiment of Cavalry of Carabaillo, who was given command of the military treasury.


Areche to the Crown, no. 111, Lima, June 25, 1781, f. 1, AGI, Lima, leg. 1044; Ibid., no. 150, Lima, Apr. 24, 1782, f. 1.


The edict, published in Lima on Dec. 19, 1780, is reproduced in the Colección documental, II, part 2, 289-291, 333-340. Royal approval of the action is granted in the Royal order to Jáuregui, no. 164, El Pardo, July 12, 1781, AGI, Lima, leg. 1040.


Areche to the Crown, Lima, Jan. 26, 1782, f. 1, AGI, Lima, leg. 1041; del Valle to Jáuregui, no. 2, Cuzco, Sept. 16, 1781, ff. 1-2, AGI, Lima, leg. 1044; del Valle to a friend, cited in Clements R. Markham, Travels in Peru and India (London, 1862), p. 128. Lagos to del Valle, no. 16, Cuzco, Sept. 17, 1781, ff. 1-2, AGI, Lima, leg. 1044.


Circular order to corregidors from Viceroy Jáuregui, Lima, Jan. 15, 1781, AGI, Lima, leg. 1085; Relaciones de los virreyes, III, 150-152; Areche to Gálvez, Cuzco, Mar. 20, 1781, ff. 1-17, AGS, GM, leg. 7128.


Areche’s actions are described in the Colección documental, II, part 1, 567-594; part 4, 58-69, 72—74. Manuel de Villalta to del Valle, no. 5, General Barracks (Cuzco), Sept. 14, 1781, f. 1, AGI, Lima, leg. 1044; Ibid., del Valle to Jáuregui, no. 10, Sept. 17, 1781, f. 1; Ibid., no. 11, Sept. 18, 1781, f. 1.


The capture and execution of Túpac Amaru is described in Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista, I, 349-359.


Areche to Joaquín Antonio Orellano, Corregidor of Puno, no. 93, Cuzco, June 26, 1781, f. 1, AGI, Lima, leg. 1040. Saguntum was an Iberian fortress which held out for eight months against Hannibal and the Carthaginians in 219 b.c.


Spanish commanders noticed immediately that Indian intransigence against the army and support for the rebels was stronger in Upper Peru than it had been in Cuzco. Del Valle to Areche, Campo de Yaechata, May 18, 1781, ff. 1-4, Biblioteca Nacional Lima, Documentos sobre la Rebelión de Túpac Amaru (hereafter BNL, TA), leg. C45550. This led to a policy of harsh reprisals against suspected rebel sympathizers which further alienated the army from the people. On July 17, 1781, Areche wrote to Jáuregui from Cuzco, despairing of the chance for a military victory, and giving notice that hereafter he would try to starve the rebels into submission by firing the countryside. AGI, Lima, leg. 1044. del Valle responded to Areche’s criticisms with a long and bitter indictment of Areche and Lagos, whom he accused of sabotaging the expedition. The inspector bitterly concluded tirat his soldiers were better-prepared for the rebels than they were against the officers of the visitation in Cuzco. Del Valle to Gálvez, Cuzco, Sept. 28, 1781, ff. 1-10, AGI, Cuzco, leg. 63.


Jáuregui to Gálvez, Lima, Aug. 23, 1782, f. 1, AGI, Lima, leg. 1082; Colección documental, II, part 3, 99-101; Fisher, The Last Inca Revolt, pp. 348-383.


These changes are covered in J. R. Fisher, Government and Society in Cobnial Peru. The Intendant System, 1784-1814 (London, 1970), pp. 25-28 ff.


Relacion del Coronel D. Demetrio Egan de los alborotos del Peru al Sr, José de Gálvez, Lima, Feb. 20, 1781, ff. 1-11, AGI, Lima, leg. 1493.


Gálvez to Escobedo, no. 21, Apr. 5, 1782, f. 1, AGI, Cuzco, leg. 29; Ibid., no. 151, n.d., AGI, Lima, leg. 1044; Reserved Letter to Jáuregui, Madrid, Oct. 23, 1782, ff. 1-2, AGI, Cuzco, leg. 29.


Informe del Rey a dn. Teodoro de Croix, instruendole de los principales acaecimientos en el Reyno del Peru con el fin de que le sirvan de goviemo estas noticias. El Pardo, Mar. 28, 1783, AGI, Lima, leg. 640.


Jáuregui to Gálvez, no. 7, May 16, 1783, ff. 1-2, AGI, Cuzco, leg. 74; Relaciones de los vireyes, III, 171.


See for example, Decada 4o de la escena en la revelion de José Gabriel Tupac-Amaru, Cuzco, May 22, 1781, ff. 14-15, BL, TA.


Reflexiones a favor de los Reinos del Peru, Madrid, July 10, 1787, 26 ff, AGI, Lima, leg. 1029.


The expansion was to allow the training of militia in Arequipa, Trujillo, and Huamanga during the war with Britain, and to permit the detachment of troops to Cuzco. Relaciones de los virreyes, III, 190-194. In April, 1784, the 2,561 soldiers from the Spanish Infantry Regiments of Soria and Extremadura arrived in Lima.


Colección documental, II, part 3, 25-30; Francisco Loayza, ed., La verdad desnuda. Las dos faces de un obispo. Escrita en 1780 por un imparcial religioso (Lima, 1943), pp. 200-203.


El Visitador y Superintendente general de la Real Hazienda del Peru informa a S.M. con varios planes y documentos el numero y clase de tropas que juzga necesarias para cubrir las atenciones de aquella América y poner en una justa subordinazion a sus vasallos, No. 331. Lima, Nov. 14, 1782, ff. 1-15, AGI, Lima, leg. 1086.


Report from Pineda to Croix, Lima, Aug. 12, 1784, ff. 1—11, AGI, Lima, leg. 667.


Escobedo to Gálvez, Lima, Jan. 16, 1784, ff. 1-2, AGI, Lima, leg. 1100; Escobedo to Jáuregui, Lima, June 2, 1784, ff. 1-2, AGI, Lima, leg. 667. Escobedo’s figures were substantiated by Diego Sáenz de Ayala, superintendent of the royal treasury, who reported to Croix, Lima, June 29, 1784, that a total of 1.26 million pesos was spent on the revolts in 1783, resulting in a deficit to the treasury of over one-half million pesos. AGI, Lima, leg. 667.


List of soldiers recommended for honors, appended to letter from Jáuregui to Gálvez, no. 201, Lima, Mar. 16, 1783, AGI, Lima, leg. 664. Gálvez’ recommendations are included in the Relación cierta de los sugetos que han servido en este obispado del Cuzco. 65 ff., AGI, Lima, leg. 1494.


Relaciones de los virreyes, III, 442; Memorias de los virreyes, V, 235-238.


Cited in William Coxe, Memoirs of the Kings of Spain of the House of Bourbon from the Accession of Phillip the Fifth to the Death of Charles the Third: 1700 to 1788, 3 vols. (London, 1813), I, 484—486; Gobierno del Señor Rey Don Carlos III, o instrucción reservada para dirección de la junta del estado que creó esta monarca; dada a luz por don Andrés Muriel (Madrid, 1839), pp. 261-262.


Croix to Gálvez, Lima, Mar. 16, 1787, ff. 1-3, AGI, Lima, leg. 673. The service records of the Royal Regiment of Lima are located in AGS, GM, leg. 7283. The exception was the aged creole judge Manuel Mansilla, who served as adjutant-general. Campbell, “A Creole Establishment,” p. 24.


Information on the Ugartes is provided in the Relacion cierta, ff. 8, 9, 12, AGI, Lima, leg. 1494; Colección documental, II, part 3, 469-175, 484-488, 529-531; and Fisher, The Last Inca Revolt, pp. 51, 202, 226, 390. The representación of the Creole officers of the Royal Regiment of Lima warned the Crown that if this discrimination continued Americans might fail to respond to future calls to arms. Lima, Aug. 31, 1784, ff. 1—4, AGI, Lima, leg. 667.


In 1816, the Spanish president of the Audiencia of Cuzco told the Crown that the defeat of Pumacahua did not signify support for the army or for Spain. Fisher, Government and Society, p. 232.


Viceroy General Joaquín de la Pezuela y Sánchez Muñoz de Velasco noted in 1816 that “The soldiers of the King have no friends outside of the barracks.” Accounts sympathetic to the patriot side described the army as a virtual prison in which white officers kept nonwhite soldiers under a form of house arrest. W. B. Stevenson, Historical and Descriptive Narrative of a Twenty Year’s Residence in South America, 3 vols. (London, 1829), III, 48-49.

Author notes


Leon G. Campbell is Assistant Professor of History at the University of California, Riverside. Research for this paper was funded by an Inter-Campus Opportunity Grant and an Intramural Research Grant from the University of California. A revised version of the paper was presented at the Forty-First International Congress of Americanists Meeting, Mexico City, September 4, 1974.