Winthrop R. Wright has written a useful monograph. He sketches in broad strokes the history of British-owned railways in Argentina from 1854 until their nationalization in 1948. Within this wider theme he focuses on the relationship between the railways and Argentine governments and demonstrates how that relationship was affected by the growth of economic nationalism. In the nineteenth century Argentine governments strongly supported the foreign-owned railways as the key to a golden future. Railways were synonymous with modernization, integration, and progress. They were seldom criticized by Argentine governments. Official Argentine attitudes with regard to the railways changed abruptly in 1916 with the rise to power of the Radical Party. Indeed, the author argues, from Hipólito Yrigoyen to Juan Perón the railways increasingly “became despised as a chief target of rising economic nationalism” (p. 4).
Particularly effective are Wright’s chapters on the Concordancia. During the 1930s Argentine economic nationalism grew in intensity and was reflected in the railways’ dealings with the government. Increasingly, conservative-dominated regimes were willing and able to sacrifice railway interests to Argentine interests. Constant pressure by Argentine authorities finally forced the companies, in 1935, to abandon their policy of “direct dealing” with the Casa Rosada and to solicit the assistance of the British Government. Little aid was forthcoming. Foreign Office records, well-culled by Wright, indicate that the British government generally refused to back the lines, “except by following an informal and cautious policy” (p. 171).
The book also has shortcomings. Wright asserts in several places that Argentines put to the torch the permanent records of the railways that had been stored in Buenos Aires until 1948. He offers the destruction of records as an excuse for failing to view the Anglo-Argentine railway experience from the internal point of view of the companies. Certainly there was some destruction of files, notably at Plaza Constitución and Retiro, but much valuable material survived. Some of it may be found in the archives of the Ferrocarril Gral San Martín (ex-Pacific); other documents exist in abundance in the archive of the ex-Dirección General de Ferrocarriles, located at Puerto Nuevo, Buenos Aires. Use of these materials would have added a needed dimension to Wright’s book. Moreover, examination of these records would have helped Wright better understand the relationship of the railways with both the Argentine and British Governments in the 1940s. The nationalization of the lines still awaits definitive treatment.
It might be assumed that any study of economic nationalism would make judicious use of political party newspapers. Wright ignores important organs such as La Época and La Vanguardia, save when clippings were enclosed in diplomatic correspondence. Careful attention to newspapers would have bolstered Wright’s contention that Argentine politicians made pragmatic use of economic nationalism, especially during the years of Radical Party control. Despite these failings Wright has authored a good book; it is a valuable study, even if not definitive.
