The Profitability of Slavery in the Colombian Chocó, 1680-1810

The profitability of slavery has become a question of considerable historical importance. Before the detailed study presented by Alfred H. Conrad and John Meyer, a number of North American scholars argued that slavery in the United States was not economically sound, had reached its natural limits, was inefficient and cumbersome, and within a short time would probably have destroyed itself. Conrad and Meyer refuted this contention concluding, “… slavery was profitable to the whole South.”¹ Recently Robert W. Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman exhaustively reviewed the secondary and primary literature and revised estimates presented by Conrad and Meyer upward from 7 or 8 percent rates of profit to slightly over 10 percent.² Thus, Fogel and Engerman argue that slavery in the United States presented an investment “… that compared favorably with the most outstanding investment opportunities in manufacturing.”³

Scholars concerned with Latin American slavery have been remarkably remiss in treating the profitability of slavery. Assuredly many scholars have studied certain economic aspects of slavery, especially with regard to manumission movements in the nineteenth century, but rarely do they examine the specifics of profitability. Clearly there is a need for further investigation along these lines. Such research will help provide explanations for the fluctuations in slave importation, slave prices, and investments in slaveholding regions. Of even greater significance, as Fogel and Engerman have related, profitability can also aid in determining and explaining the structure of slave society.

The major barrier to investigating the profitability of slavery in Latin America has been the lack of available records for some regions and the chore of compiling that material which is extant for others. The attempt to assemble all relevant statistics for Brazil and Cuba will be a monumental task. However, it is possible to determine the limits of profitability and draw some conclusions for certain regions where only one or two basic slave occupations existed. One area of Spanish America where the profitability of slavery can be explored is the Colombian Chocó.

In the Chocó the principal occupation of slaves for more than a century was placer gold mining, and a variety of primary sources are available in Spanish, national, local, and private archives. Slave inventories, bills of sale, wills and testaments, and census reports yield information on number, occupation, age, male-to-female ratios, and slave prices. Quinto (crown tax on mining) records, official and private reports, and estimates concerning gold production and contraband trade can be used to derive reasonable totals on bullion produced. Finally, documents relating to individual holdings present representative models for profitability. Because the data is not always complete, some estimates must be made concerning contraband trade, costs, and depreciation; but these factors have been cross-checked with other computations. Although this study will not attempt to assess the quality of life in the Chocó or the structure of slave society, as did Fogel and Engerman, conclusions are drawn regarding contraband trade, slave prices, rate and desire of investment, fluctuation in the number of slaves in the region, and profitability itself.

The Chocó is located in the northwest corner of Colombia, and borders Panama, the Caribbean, and the Atlantic Ocean on the north and west. The region is hot and humid, and heavy rainfall produces a thick tropical vegetation and countless streams and rivers. The Chocó also contains a highly desired mineral—gold. For a century-and-a-quarter during the colonial period—1680-1810—the Chocó became an important source of gold for the Spanish Empire.

As early as 1511, when the conquistador Vasco Núñez de Balboa entered the area from the north, the Spanish knew that gold existed in the Chocó,⁴ but topography, climate, and hostile natives rebuffed attempts to enter this potential eldorado. The Spanish did not gain a firm foothold in the Chocó until the 1680s;⁵ but, from that date until the end of the colonial period, the Chocó placer mines yielded a treasure of more than $75,000,000 silver pesos (375,000 pounds) worth of gold.⁶

Human activity in the Chocó centered almost exclusively around gold production, and well over 90 percent of the mined metal came from the labor of blacks who were imported to work the gold fields. Whites who resided in the two provinces of the Chocó (San Juan and Atrato) were generally small mineowners or overseers, the crown’s officials, priests, or merchants. The wealthier dueños (owners) of the large slave gangs (cuadrillas) almost invariably lived outside the Chocó in the interior towns of New Granada—especially Buga, Cartago, Cali, and Popayán.⁷ The hot, humid climate of the Chocó was not considered healthy for a white man, and few remained who could hire overseers to handle their affairs.⁸ In the year 1782, for example, when the central Chocó contained a total of 17,898 inhabitants, only 359 were white. The remaining population included 7,088 slaves, 6,552 Indians, and 3,899 freedmen.⁹

Indians were originally used in the mines, but their hostility and apparent inability to sustain systematic labor in the placer mines dictated the early use of black laborers. Many miners, with experience in interior New Granada, doubtless believed that blacks were better suited for labor in the tropical region, both for physical and legal reasons. Hence, by 1704, only sixteen years after the Spanish finally secured the Chocó, over 600 slaves had been imported to the region. In 1724, two decades later, 2,000 slaves resided in the Chocó, and the number steadily increased until 1782 when 7,088 slaves were recorded. During the next two decades, however, the slave population declined. In 1804 slightly less than 5,000 slaves were counted in the Chocó.

Manumission, flight, and death contributed to the numerical decline of the slave population from 1782-1804,¹⁰ but significantly the Chocó slave owners no longer replaced missing members of the cuadrillas with new purchases. The factor of profitability is essential in considering the cause of this decline, since slaves had never been easier to acquire.

During the second half of the eighteenth century the Spanish Crown increasingly loosened Spain’s slave-trade regulations. The Crowns liberalization of these laws reached its zenith in 1791 when any Spaniard was permitted to journey to a foreign colony to procure slaves. Even foreigners could bring slaves to New Granada with few restrictions.

The only real limitation placed upon the free trade in blacks to New Granada was that slaves could only be introduced through the port of Cartagena.¹¹ But the designation of Cartagena as the only slave port posed no hardship for the Chocó slaveholders. The Atrato River, flowing from the central Chocó to the Caribbean, served as a natural supply route from that port. The river, closed to maritime commerce for more than a century in the vain attempt to halt contraband trade, had been declared reopened in 1784.¹² Slaves and other products were thus easily and cheaply imported into the Chocó from the nearby port of Cartagena during the last decades of the colonial period.¹³

Spanish officials also attempted to directly increase production of precious metals in the Chocó by supporting the importation of bozales (blacks directly from Africa) into the region. In 1787 a counsel (fiscal) of the audiencia of New Granada, Vicente Yáñez, recommended that the viceroy purchase 1,500 bozales from foreign sources on the king’s account and sell these blacks to mineowners in the Chocó at attractive prices.¹⁴ When the viceroy appointed Yáñez visitador (inspector) for the Chocó the following year, Yáñez inaugurated his plan. Despite the visitador’s encouragement, and the fact that buyers paid only $300 per prime slave and had five years to pay, only 322 bozales were actually sold.¹⁵

The final inducement for individuals wishing to purchase slaves in the Chocó during the last decades of the colonial period was the low price they had to pay for slaves. Slaves between the ages of 15 and 35 in good physical condition (prime slaves) had been worth over $500 earlier in the century, but they sold for only $300 after 1788. Table II shows the average value in pesos of prime slaves in the Chocó during the eighteenth century and lists the number of observations. These average values were derived from representative cuadrillas and bills of sale and include all prime slaves regardless of sex. Although a few slaves with special skills such as handling canoes (canoero), curing snake bites (curandero de víboras), or slave bosses (capitanejos) were evaluated as high as $600,¹⁶ the normal value for prime slaves from the years 1700 to ca. 1765 was between $500 and $525. The average value of prime slaves declined gradually from the year 1741 until sometime after 1779, when prices suddenly plummeted, reaching a low in 1789 of $305 per prime slave.

Average values were higher at the beginning of the eighteenth century because high bullion production created an immediate demand for slaves. This demand was not easily fulfilled, due to importation restrictions concerning available routes into the Chocó.

The decline in the value of slaves in the 1780s is partially attributable to the opening of the Atrato River to maritime commerce. Mineowners could deal directly with the slave market in Cartagena; agents did not have to be retained; transportation costs were cut in half; and because of the faster, easier route, mortality rates among slaves making the journey also diminished. However, except for the sale of bozales in 1788 and 1789, made especially attractive by liberal time payments, there is little evidence that slave owners bought many slaves from outside the Chocó. The absentee slave owners of the Chocó apparently no longer desired to increase or even maintain the size of their cuadrillas, even though they continued mining operations in the region.

This decision reflects a response to the profitability of slavery in the Chocó. As will be demonstrated, owners over-invested in slaves during the middle of the eighteenth century. Total bullion production dropped (Table VIII), despite the increased number of slaves, and costs increased because there were more slaves to maintain. Rates of profit, therefore, declined for the entire Chocó (Table IX). Thus, despite easier access to Cartagena and lower slave prices, owners did not purchase new slaves because they were readjusting the size of their cuadrillas in order to make their holdings once again profitable. The slaveholders were not aware of all the factors involved, but they were astute businessmen keenly aware of their profit and loss margin.

In determining the annual net profit of slave owners in the Chocó, and even more importantly their percentage of return on capital investment, the following factors were considered: first, the number of slaves owned and the total value of these slaves; second, the average cost of maintaining slaves in the Chocó; third, working capital, and the total value of all property, including slaves, land, equipment and furnishings; fourth, appropriate depreciation rates for slaves and other property; and fifth, the declared earnings. Once these factors are known, rates of profit can be computed by using the formula $Y=a−(b+c)x+z$ where Y is the rate of profit, a the declared earnings, b the depreciation, c the total cost of maintaining the cuadrilla, x the total value of slaves, and z other property and circulation capital. Simply stated, the rate of profit equals the net income divided by the total capital investment.

Unless the exact number of slaves owned by an individual was known, no attempt was made to determine the rate of profitability. With the number of slaves known, then the value of these slaves was calculated. Although many bills of sale (often involving manumission) are readily available, overall evaluations of entire cuadrillas usually only occurred following an owner’s death (for inheritance purposes), or if an individual’s property was impounded by the Crown (generally because of allegations of contraband activity against the owner). Slave prices in Table III, therefore, were used in calculations for the formula and they reflect the average values of all male and female slaves regardless of age or condition. Average values were higher at the beginning of the eighteenth century because high bullion production created an immediate demand for slaves. This demand was not easily fulfilled, due to importation restrictions concerning available routes into the Chocó. As the century progressed cuadrillas became more balanced, included children and older slaves, and the average value of all slaves declined.

Slave owners purchased their labor force or inherited it from deceased relatives. Once slaves had been procured, in order to receive maximum profits—or perhaps any benefit from their holdings—slave owners had to skillfully administer their mines and cuadrillas. Careless treatment, inattention, or brutality meant that slaves would become ill, weak, dissatisfied, or die. Any of these things limited production and, thus, profits. Hence, food, clothing, shelter, and medicine had to be provided, and these constituted a major expense. Some masters carefully supplied all the necessary food for their slaves, while others permitted their blacks more free time to scrounge for their own sustenance. Those owners who offered rations either grew their own food or purchased it from corregidores (who had charge of the Indians) or free blacks. Buying food was expensive because sellers charged what the market would bear, and transportation costs on food stuffs from outside the Chocó were extremely high. Most masters tried to produce most of their own provisions.

The documentation on expenses to maintain slave gangs is often incomplete and, therefore, difficult to evaluate; but some records do exist pertaining to the costs of maintaining a cuadrilla. In 1739 a slave owner, Pedro de Mosquera, calculated an expenditure of $45 a year for rations per prime slave¹⁷—a sum equal to 360 reales, or slightly under one real a day. Mosquera’s estimate is abnormally high and was the highest I discovered. Several years later, in 1747, the ex-lieutenant governor of Quibdó, José Pastrana, claimed it cost approximately 260 reales ($32.4) a year to maintain a working slave.¹⁸ This figure is substantiated by the expenses for a cuadrilla numbering 48 slaves owned by Luis de Acuña y Berrios. Provisions for Acuña’s slave gang included corn, platanos (plantains), sugar, salt, and meat. It cost $7,877.4 to feed the cuadrilla from 1721-1725. Thus, the yearly expense per slave for alimentation averaged $32.6 or 262 reales a year.¹⁹

The examination of other specific holdings shows that even Pastrana’s estimates and Acuña’s expenses ranged on the high side of the norm. Acuña purchased most of his rations, and other mineowners who provided the bulk of their own provisions cut costs considerably. Francisco de Rivas and Juan de Bonilla y Delgado, for example, spent $14,060 (112,480 reales) from 1765-1768 to sustain a cuadrilla of 200 blacks,²⁰ or an average of 187 reales a year ($23.4). Another large slaveholder, Salvador Gómez de la Asprilla y Novoa had virtually the same half-real daily expense average ($22.5) since he spent a total of $9,000 to maintain 400 slaves in 1757.²¹

The Rivas, Bonilla, and Gómez accounts included all costs for maintaining the cuadrillas (rations plus medicine, stipends for the clergy, tools, etc.). The actual cost of rations probably did not exceed $15 (120 reales) a year per slave. The minimum expenses for rations (the larger cuadrillas that provided much of their own food) would thus be $15 a year and the maximum (Mosqueras estimate) $45.

Mineowners naturally had many other expenditures. They paid stipends to the clergy for ministering to the slaves, bought tools and other equipment used in working the mine, provided medical care for the cuadrilla, and paid the expenses for local officials conducting inspections (visitas) of their mines. Disbursement for these items varied greatly, depending upon the size, condition, and age of the cuadrilla. The larger slave gangs that included children and older slaves cost more in stipends ($1 per slave each visit, one or two visits a year) and medical expenses but also made their own tools rather than purchase them. In most mines $5 to $13 a year sufficed to meet these expenses.²²

A large number of owners faced one other significant disbursement—commissions to managers. Administrators and overseers managed most of the larger mines in the Chocó. Administrators handled the distribution of slaves between mines and agricultural properties, and they had to be trustworthy since they manipulated accounts for the mines. Because of their positions of importance administrators reaped good incomes. Few, if any, worked on a salary basis. They received their food and lodging and a percentage of the mine’s yield, or a commission on the sums they spent to maintain the cuadrilla.

In many mines the positions of administrator and overseer were combined, but occasionally an owner paid commissions to both an overseer and an administrator. When the positions were combined, the individual holding the job was entitled to either 10 percent of the mine’s yield before the deduction of the quinto (crown tax on mining) or 10 percent of all expenditures for the cuadrilla. Regardless of how managers collected their commissions, however, it averaged from $3 to $9 per slave a year.²³ Generally speaking, the more a mine produced the greater the increment to the administrator. In the long run the interests of the manager and the owner coincided, as the income of both depended upon the continued productivity of the mine. In determining the owners’ total outlay for running a mine and cuadrilla in the Chocó, the estimates in Table IV are justifiable.

Although the range between minimum ($23) and maximum ($67) expenses is wide, the maximum occurred only in rare instances when the owner purchased at high prices all the food and equipment for the cuadrilla and mine. The records indicate that while the total cost of maintaining a large slave gang was high, they were more efficient in minimizing costs per slave, since they produced most of their own food, made their own tools, and sewed their own clothing. Since over 90 percent of the slaves in the Chocó belonged to owners of large cuadrillas (slave gangs numbering over 30),²⁴ it is reasonable to assume that the normal expenditure per slave in the Chocó was close to the minimum average of $23 a year.²⁵ The mean cost per slave in the Chocó (90 percent at $23 and 10 percent at $67) can be estimated at $27.4 per annum. As a safeguard against too low an estimate, this figure has been raised in my subsequent calculations to $30 per working slave per annum.

One final factor must be considered in determining total maintenance costs. Slaveholders listed slaves either as útil (working) or chusma (nonworking). Chusma slaves were those who were too old, too young, or too sick to labor in the mines or fields. They performed many useful tasks around the mines but received only half rations.²⁶ Thus chusma slaves cost less to provision. I have classified three-fifths of each cuadrilla as útil and two-fifths as chusma.²⁷ Each útil slave, therefore, cost an average of $30 a year to maintain, and each chusma slave, $20.

In order to derive the total value of the owner’s property, I have estimated assets other than slaves (tools, mines, agricultural lands, furnishings, etc.) and added this sum to the value of slaves owned. In a number of property inventories slaves constituted approximately 75 percent of the total property value.²⁸ In the larger holdings, however, they accounted for a significantly larger proportion. In 1768, in the case of one large cuadrilla, 212 slaves were worth $67,190, while total assets were appraised at only $78,980.²⁹ Land, tools, houses, and furnishings constituted only 15 percent of the total assets for this slaveholder. On the other hand, large mineowners needed more circulating capital. Hence, the 25 percent figure is a reasonable estimate for non-slave assets.

The Chocó owners did not compute depreciation, but consideration must be given to this factor in order to derive net profits or rates of profit. Tools, houses, and furnishings depreciated, but their total worth is not of great significance. Land is difficult to evaluate because most owners laid claim to large plots of ground and mines represented only a fraction of their holdings. The alluvial nature of the gold deposits dictated the use of placer mining techniques. Thus when owners exhausted the gold from one small plot of land they moved to another nearby section. The abandoned ground became worthless but did not affect the value of a large claim. What did become especially valuable was cleared agricultural land, and it usually increased in value with development. Abandoned agricultural land, however, quickly lost its value as it returned to tropical rain forest within a few months. In no instance where it was possible to trace holdings for several generations, was the land ever devaluated. Nonetheless, because owners had to replace buildings, and worn equipment, I have adopted a depreciation rate of 10 percent for land, equipment, and furnishings.

More importantly, depreciation of the owners’ greatest and most valuable asset—slaves—must be estimated. Unfortunately, the mortality rate of slaves cannot be determined—primarily because of the frequency of manumission—but there are many indications that blacks did not suffer a high rate of attrition and that at least by the late 1760s birth rates exceeded death rates. This was in part possible because the male-to-female ratio had become roughly equal.³⁰ There is every indication that the Chocó slaveholders preferred family units to single slaves,³¹ and that marriage, encouraged and sanctioned by the Roman Catholic Church, was common during the latter part of the colonial period. In 1782, almost one-third (32.05 percent) of the slaves in the Chocó were married (2273 out of 7088) and many of the nonmarried slaves were children in family situations.³² During the second half of the eighteenth century, about one-third of the slaves in the Chocó were under the age of 14.³³

The labor of prime slaves raised within the cuadrilla quickly paid off their master’s total investment, and by the age of 18 produced almost pure profit.³⁴ After the age of 35 slaves declined in value, but they remained productive long after that. Only the foolish or vindictive owner seriously abused his slaves, since continued service paid better returns in the long run. Mining involved some strenuous labor, but it was not terribly dangerous. Many hours were employed in the chore of panning the gravel product of the sluice washings (no shaft mines existed in the region). Older slaves became expert in this and other tasks and thus remained valuable.

Table V shows the average value of all slaves based on the observation of representative cuadrillas in 1768 and 1779 and provides a breakdown for 247 slaves by age and sex. It will be noted that while females generally were worth less than males at any given age, the total average values ($301) for 123 males and 124 females were identical. From these prices it can be seen that healthy slaves were considered a contribution to the cuadrilla until about the age of 70. The decrease in average value from age 30-34 ($488) to age 50-59 ($224) represents an annual devaluation of approximately 2 percent.

Obviously this does not constitute the total depreciation rate, because other slaves in the cuadrillas died, fled, or were granted freedom. Cimarrones (runaways) presented a continual problem, and virtually every slave inventory listed one or more slaves as having fled. However, except in 1728, there were no mass escapes, and most of the slaves who ran away in 1728 were quickly recaptured.³⁵ The most common means of “flight” from slavery involved self-purchase (coartación).³⁶ Owners, therefore, did lose slaves, but there is no indication that even 10 percent of a cuadrilla died before old age, fled, or was manumitted in any given year.³⁷ The depreciation rate for lost slaves (probably about 8 percent a year), plus the decrease in value of slaves past prime working age (2 percent) yields a total annual depreciation of 10 percent. This estimate has been adopted in order to calculate rates of profit.

Once costs and depreciation are calculated, the margin of profit received by slaveholders, will depend on the return from their holdings. Unfortunately, the rich volume of data utilized by Fogel and Engerman and other “cliometricians” in the United States cannot be duplicated for the Chocó. Most of the account books and ledgers pertaining to cuadrillas and mines in the region have disappeared. Fortunately, enough documents are extant concerning individual cuadrillas to permit conclusions during specific years. The eleven case studies, which are reported in Table VI, were selected for these reasons: first, they spanned almost the entire period of Spanish occupation in the Chocó; second, records pertaining to these chance samples were more complete than others; and third, certain special factors made these illustrations of particular interest. Ten of the eleven representative mines showed a net profit, and the range in rates of profit varied from −5.71 percent to 49.2 percent. All of the calculations in the formula $Y=a−(b+c)x+z$ are figured on a yearly basis.

The high profits received by Francisco Arboleda Salazar were typical of the returns recorded by those early miners who ventured into the Chocó. The slaves Arboleda brought with him were all prime slaves, and thus the average value of his cuadrilla was figured from Table II ($525) rather than Table III. His maintenance costs were also higher than normal since all 18 of his slaves were útil.³⁸ The high rate of profit Arboleda experienced (49.2 percent) doubtless justified the risks and hardships involved in establishing a slave gang in the Chocó and encouraged other miners to enter the region.

The mine owned by Luis de Acuña y Berrios, 30 years later, showed a net profit of only $395 a year. Although Acuña’s holdings had an accretion of funds, since prime slaves cost $520 in the early 1720s and his rate of profit was only 1.51 percent, his overall success is very unlikely. Acuña was in fact jailed for debt, and the many financial obligations he incurred initiated a law suit against his assets that continued for several years.³⁹

Partnerships seem to have been common in the Chocó. However, the company formed by Pedro de Mosquera and Miguel Moreno was neither lasting nor endearing. Personal letters included with papers related to the company show that both men were wealthy and influential. Mosquera resided in Popayán and was a descendant of some of the first miners to enter the Chocó. Moreno, who resided in the city of Mariquita, had business interests throughout western New Granada and owned several other slave gangs in the Chocó. Both partners shared equally in expenses and profits, but late in 1740 Moreno concluded that Mosquera (who was in charge of the venture) had cheated him. Mosquera denied the accusations, but Moreno argued that Mosquera deducted unreasonably high maintenance costs for the slaves in his charge from the gross product of the mine ($67 a year per prime slave). The partnership was dissolved, despite the fact that the company’s holdings had returned a reasonable rate of profit (10.22 percent).⁴⁰

Data concerning the cuadrilla owned by Francisco Maturana presented an example of the high earnings possible in the first half of the eighteenth century. Maturana’s slave gang worked a very rich section (playa) and mined over 150 pounds of gold (worth $30,000) in less than a year.⁴¹ That fortunate owner, like Arboleda before him, could have paid for his prime slaves in less than two years time, and the amount produced per slave ($300 a year) is well above average. Maturana’s rate of profit (42.69 percent) was the second highest recorded.

Doña María Clemencia de Caicedo’s mine gave a more reliable overall view because the information covered five years, came from an established mine, and did not rely on a lucky discovery. The mine had only 14 washings (cortes) during the five-year span, and profits were sent directly to the owner in Santa Fé de Bogotá.⁴² Doña María Clemencia’s rate of profit (14.11 percent) is probably typical of the established mines in the middle of the eighteenth century.

Economic information concerning the cuadrilla and mines owned by Manuel Gómez de la Asprilla y Novoa is unfortunately sketchy despite the fact that the Gómez family owned several of the largest slave gangs in the Chocó.⁴³ In 1757 the administrator of the mine, Pedro Salviejo (son-in-law of Manuel’s brother Salvador) requested payment of his salary and out-of-pocket costs for maintaining the cuadrilla belonging to Manuel (he also administered his father-in-law’s slave gang). He claimed that the total washings of the mine amounted to $16,000 during the past year while expenses were $3,500.⁴⁴ Significantly, the stated expenses are very close to the estimate derived by the calculations for maintenance costs previously described ($3,440). Because of the large capital investment, depreciation costs were high, but the rate of profit was still 9.03 percent.

The cuadrilla owned by Agustín Perea y Salinas returned a much higher profit per slave for its owner. Perea’s slaves produced a significant gain ($200 per slave, children included, $333 per prime slave), but they may have done even better. A short and obviously incomplete record book for quintos paid in Nóvita was used to derive the $7,000 sum, and only one entry was given under Perea’s name.⁴⁵ Even with the suspicion that Perea may well have gleaned more from his mine in 1766, he clearly had a sound investment.

In 1789 Manuel Gómez became entangled in a lawsuit over the sale and ownership of several slaves. During the course of the litigation he mentioned that rentals (jornales) and washings from his property at Yalí (above Nóvita) had yielded a net profit (lucro) of over $80,000 during the past 25 years.⁴⁶ This is only the profit he declared in a lawsuit against his interests. It is reasonable to assume that after a quarter of a century he had been able to deduct all pertinent costs and that the $80,000 are indications of pure profit. Some years were doubtless more lucrative than others, but for the 25-year period the Yalí mine and cuadrilla averaged a yearly profit of $3,200. However, because of the size of his slave gang, the average rate of profit on the capital invested was only 6.4 percent. The earnings declared by Gómez may well be viewed with some suspicion. The fact that he remained in the Chocó and reinvested earnings means that profits probably exceeded those he declared.

The mine owned by Doña María Gertrudis Gonzáles de Trespalacios is significant because it demonstrates the importance of depreciation in determining rates of profit. The mine yielded a negative rate of profit (-5.71 percent) but gross income ($1,324) exceeded yearly maintenance costs ($830). For several years following her husband’s death in 1779 Doña María received money from her administrator. She apparently did not suspect that her mine was in growing financial difficulties. In 1790, her mine became a declared failure.⁴⁷

A lawsuit ensued and Governor Manuel Junguito Baquerizo intervened, stating that the mine had been poorly supervised and administered during the decade since 1779. Most of the slaves in the cuadrilla, Governor Junguito recounted, were too old, too young, or too sick to be of any help. In addition, many slaves of prime working age had purchased freedom, and the remaining útil slaves did not produce enough to support the cuadrilla. Debts accumulated rapidly, and creditors wanted the governor to liquidate the mine’s assets. Doña María, however, remembering what were termed “high profits of the past” did not wish to sell. Governor Junguito could not legally force the sale since no debts were owed to the Crown. For the benefit of all concerned, the governor assigned the lieutenant governor of Quibdó to personally supervise the mine.⁴⁸ The decision was correct, for a decade later the mine was once again producing profits.⁴⁹

The final two models are similar in that they demonstrate a good rate of profit for the owners. In both of these cases the number of working slaves and children was specifically given: Palacios and Quintana owned 19 esclavos útiles; María de la Cruz Lemus had only 12. Not surprisingly, the formers’ total production was higher by $1,140.⁵⁰

Since the value of slaves had recently dropped, the high return experienced by Palacios and Quintana and María de la Cruz was necessary to sustain the loss in capital investment resultant from the recent devaluation of slaves. It is significant that during the last decade of the colonial period manumission through self-purchase accelerated, and most of those who were able to purchase freedom were working slaves (male and female) in their thirties. Importantly, even during the 1790s, slave owners still collected $500 from those working slaves who bought their freedom, even though prime slaves sold on the open market for only $300.⁵¹ Many owners recouped capital investment by permitting a higher degree of self-purchase, while at the same time making their mining operations smaller and more efficient.

As the eleven samples demonstrate, there was a considerable range in the sums accumulated by mineowners in the Chocó. Those with the most slaves normally made the most money but not necessarily the highest rate of profit. Depreciation was a more important factor with the larger cuadrillas; food supply was also a greater problem; more prime slaves had to be kept in agricultural ventures; and despite lower costs per slave, earnings were generally lower. Ten of the eleven slave owners portrayed gained income after expenditures and depreciation were deducted from their earnings, and nine of the eleven slave owners doubtless succeeded with their ventures.

The rates of profit derived from mining ventures in the Chocó would be especially revealing when compared to other investment possibilities. Unfortunately no study yet exists alluding to the rate of return on investment for colonial New Granada. Frank Safford meticulously compiled rates of profit for the years 1831-1865 and estimated the profitability of various careers in Central Colombia during that time. Safford stated that investors in land on the Sabana of Bogotá (a secure investment) could expect a return of about 5 percent.⁵² However, merchants importing products from Europe could expect a return of 16 to 50 percent, although there were higher risks involved.⁵³ These latter figures are compatible with most of the interest rates earned in the Chocó.

Several comparative possibilities for the eighteenth century do exist. Interest rates for borrowing money during the colonial period (occasionally from the Crown, more normally from religious orders) ranged from 3 to 5 percent.⁵⁴ Slave owners in the Chocó who borrowed money (often from businessmen in the Cauca Valley) paid 5 percent a year.⁵⁵ In Mexico at the end of the eighteenth century the more cautious businessmen avoided direct mining investments, preferring to loan money at 5 percent interest to non-mining ventures.⁵⁶ D. A. Brading disclosed that several merchants in Mexico made profits ranging from 3.2 to 9.2 percent in the middle of the eighteenth century,⁵⁷ and haciendas returned between 3.5 and 7 percent rates of profit.⁵⁸

It is presently impossible to determine if commercial and agricultural profits in New Granada were similar to those in Mexico, but, since individuals were willing to loan money to granadeno miners at 5 percent (and doubtless believed their investments secure), it is unlikely that continued returns on the various other secure investments ranged much higher. Therefore, a profitable return on capital invested in the Chocó would have to be at least 5 percent, and in view of the work and risks involved in establishing and maintaining a cuadrilla should probably be 7 to 10 percent. Nine of the eleven cases previously presented showed returns on investment greater than 5 percent, and seven of the eleven models had rates of profit in excess of 10 percent. These latter interest rates are even higher than those compiled by Fogel and Engerman for North American slavery. For most owners slavery and mining in the Chocó was indeed a profitable investment.

All of these investment rates represent probable minimum profits, as none of them account for the region’s acknowledged and heavy contraband trade in gold dust. Although no one has placed a monetary value on the total amount of gold surreptitiously sent out of the Chocó during the colonial period, royal orders (cédulas) and letters from governors, viceroys, and other officials stressed the huge volume of gold dust illegally exported.⁵⁹ One individual, Francisco Silvestre, a former governor of the Province of Antioquia and secretary of the Viceroyalty of New Granada, did estimate in 1789 that more half of the gold mined in the Chocó was fraudulently transported from the region.⁶⁰

Silvestre’s estimate is helpful in determining the total amount of bullion produced, when added to the amount of gold legally declared as mined in the Chocó. After 1721 all miners and merchants in the region were required to send their gold dust to either Quibdó or Nóvita for the deduction of the quinto.⁶¹ Thus, quinto records can be used to calculate the total bullion presented to the lieutenant governors in Quibdó and Nóvita for the deduction of crown taxes. The quinto did not remain constant throughout the eighteenth century, as the Crown reduced this tax in 1777 from 6 to 3 percent. Hence, the subsequent drop in the quinto collected (Table VII) did not signify a decline in total bullion produced.

A tabulation of quinto records between the years 1724 and 1803 shows that the yearly average of gold known to have been mined in the Chocó amounted to $320,435. Table VII clearly indicates that declared production was higher during the first half of the eighteenth century. While it is possible that contraband trade was not as well established in the first half of the eighteenth century (there are many indications to the contrary), it is more likely that the easily accessible and richer gold deposits were more commonly exploited during this period.⁶² It is reasonable to conclude that the 80-year average of $320,435 is a reliable yearly average for the amount of gold legally declared during the entire period from 1680-1810. The total declared amount mined during this period would thus be $41,656,550. Obviously this is not the total value of gold extracted from the Chocó mines since quinto records did not include gold smuggled from the region.

Acceptance of Silvestre’s estimation on smuggled gold yields a sum of $83,313,100 for gold mined in the Chocó during the period of Spanish domination. Perhaps Silvestre exaggerated, but even assuming that only one-third of the gold mined in the Chocó ended up as contraband, the amount illegally exported would be almost $21,000,000. Although the figures in Table VIII for the total value of gold mined in the Chocó (including contraband) can only be approximations, they gain added credibility from the data presented by Vicente Restrepo in his excellent nineteenth-century study of mining in Colombia. Restrepo reported that $77,200,000 worth of gold was mined in the Chocó during the colonial period⁶³—an evaluation that falls between this investigator’s two calculations which include contraband (i.e., between $62,484,825 and $83,313,100).

While estimates including the fraudulent extraction of bullion could easily be employed in the eleven case studies, it is of greater significance to consider the aspect of illicit commerce in relation to total production for the entire Chocó. Quinto records have already been utilized to derive total declared production (Table VII), and census reports for 1724, 1759, 1778, 1782, and 1804 (Table I) enumerate the number of slaves for specific years. This information, added to total capital, depreciation, and maintenance costs (deduced as in Table VI), permits use of the formula $Y=a−(b+c)x+z$ to compute rates of profit for the entire Chocó (Table IX).

In order to evaluate the effect of contraband trade, each of the selected years is divided into three categories: first, the rate of profit at the amount of bullion legally declared; next, the rate of profit if one-third of the gold produced was illegally exported; and finally, the rate of profit if one-half the bullion produced was illegally exported. The difference between these rates of profit is revealing. If the Chocó miners were not involved in contraband, then as a group they lost money in 1759, 1778, and 1782. There is a negative rate of profit of -1.25 in 1759, -4.32 in 1778, and -6.03 in 1782. Under the second category, the rate of profit is positive for three of the four years after 1759, but competitive to low interest rates of the time only in 1759 and 1804. In fact, in 1782, it might have been wiser to invest elsewhere even under the last set of calculations, since an investment in the Chocó yielded only 5.16 percent.

Under the last case, mining was a profitable venture producing the following positive rates of profit: 34.32 percent in 1724; 12.69 percent in 1759; 7.96 percent in 1778; 5.16 percent in 1782; and 18.87 percent in 1804. This must have been close to the real situation. Except in 1724, the alternatives, while possible, are unrealistic, for they propose that slavery was an unsound investment yielding either a loss or a marginal return. Since owners continued their investments in the Chocó for almost a century it is extremely unlikely that the rates of profit presented in the first two cases were the norm. Hence, the contention that one-half the gold mined in the Chocó was illegally exported is sustained by the computation of rates of profit.

The interest rates compiled in Table IX also help explain the decline in the number of slaves (and perhaps prices as well) in the Chocó after 1788. Slave prices and population figures show that the period of greatest mining extension in the Chocó was from about 1725-1785. During the first half of the century mineowners exploited rich deposits, made good profits, but had fewer slaves. High profits encouraged the owners to reinvest heavily, and the number of slaves in the Chocó almost doubled in the brief 13-year span from 1759-1782. But the owners had overextended themselves, and by the 1780s they increasingly found their holdings less profitable.

By 1782 the region was oversupplied with slaves, return on investment declined rapidly, and the fevered activity of the previous decades abated. Once rates of profit declined so did enthusiasm. Owners pleaded for help and the Crown responded by reopening the Atrato River to maritime commerce and providing bozales for sale at reasonable prices. Owners helped themselves by cutting back on the number of slaves they owned (and thus maintenance costs), and they exploited only richer ground with a smaller number of slaves. Owners who permitted or encouraged manumission through selfpurchase decreased the size of their cuadrillas and, at the same time, retained much of their original capital investment. Maintenance, food supply, and administration became easier and less expensive, and as the cuadrillas became smaller rates of profit and total proceeds once again increased.

Slavery in the Chocó, therefore, had certain economic limits. The optimum profitable number of slaves that could be engaged in the Chocó mining ventures under the systems of labor and food supply employed was less than 5,000. Owners slowly came to realize this, and from 1782-1804 the number of slaves working in the mines declined by more than 2,000. Significantly, gold production increased toward the end of the eighteenth century, even though the number of slaves declined. It might well be argued that slavery in the Chocó did temporarily, become cumbersome and inefficient. Rut slavery was in no danger of self-destruction. Precious metals remained available, and the slaveholders simply readjusted the size of their cuadrillas until they once again experienced a good return on investment. The profitability of slavery clearly played an important role in the Colombian Chocó.

Author notes