There has been relatively little historical study devoted to the diplomatic interrelationships among the various Latin American nations. Instead, most North American historians, with the notable exception of Robert Burr, have confined themselves to tracing points of contact and/or conflict between single Latin American states and either the United States or some major European power.1 The utilization of such an oblique approach tends to sustain the belief that the Latin American nations, both singly and collectively, have accepted a passive, or, at best, a secondary role in their relationships with the Great Powers and that the Latin American states have not adopted any significant hemispheric policy of their own. The area within Latin America where such a view would seem especially applicable is Central America, where, during the first third of the twentieth century, a group of small and impotent states was forced to live with intermittent military, and continual economic and political, pressures from the United States. Yet, although North American influence and interference in Central American affairs cannot be denied, it is both unfair and unrealistic to assume that such intervention precluded the development of any independent Central American initiatives or responses to isthmian internal and international problems. Indeed, Costa Rica’s experience with the United States and the other Central American nations in the 1920s and 1930s suggests the evolution of a distinctly Costa Rican isthmian policy that was remarkably innovative and independent. This is not to deny the obvious fact of North American hegemony but rather to note that within the parameters of that international reality, Costa Rica had some important degree of leeway and took advantage of it to benefit specifically Costa Rican interests. In the determination of those interests and the choice of consequent foreign policies, internal political considerations were often important factors that are too often ignored by historians. An analysis of Costa Rica’s specific role in the formulation, implementation, and later abandonment of an isthmian recognition policy reveals the extent of independence in that nation’s policy and the factors that Costa Rican policy-makers took into account in formulating it. Such a case study demonstrates the need for a similar focus in the study of the foreign policies of other Latin American countries.

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Costa Rica’s isthmian policy was characterized by a marked reluctance to become involved in the affairs of the other Central American nations. Inspired by a genuine isolationist impulse, as well as by an understandable tendency to let such other more interested and powerful hemispheric neighbors as the United States and Mexico take the lead in the resolution of Central American problems, Costa Rican policymakers generally attempted to adhere to a program of strict nonintervention in Central American matters.2 Costa Rica, however, was naturally unable and sometimes unwilling to disengage herself completely from isthmian affairs during this period.

One development that occasioned such a departure from isolationism was the 1917 bloodless coup d’etat, which saw the Costa Rican government headed by President Alfredo González Flores overthrown by Minister of War Federico Tinoco. Both the overthrown ex-President González and Julio Acosta, leader of the anti-Tinoco émigré forces and subsequently president (1920-1924) of Costa Rica, came to believe that this aberration in the nation’s otherwise placid democratic existence required alterations in national policies and, specifically, that new and better international machinery should be developed to deal with usurpations of legal authority. Tinoco’s affront to Costa Rica’s democratic tradition prompted Acosta, once president, to seek the prevention of any further Costa Rican and, if possible, Central American deviations from the democratic norm of peaceful presidential succession.

The 1922-1923 Washington Conference, where the Central American Republics met at the invitation of the United States to deal with outstanding isthmian international problems, provided the Costa Rican executive with the appropriate international forum. Accordingly, Acosta gave explicit instructions to the Costa Rican delegation at the conference to elaborate and improve upon existing isthmian recognition policy.3 As originally formulated by isthmian diplomats in 1907, Central American recognition policy proscribed the recognition of any isthmian government that came to power as a result of a coup d’etat or revolution. Recognition would be withheld until such time as the de facto government legitimized itself by allowing “freely elected representatives of the people” to reestablish constitutional rule.4 Although the United States and the other Central American nations represented at the 1922-1923 Washington Conference seemed satisfied with the 1907 policy, Costa Rica was not.5 The Costa Rican delegation, headed by ex-President González, pressed for and secured a more precise delimitation of the criteria required for the recognition of a Central American state.6 Article II of the resultant 1923 General Treaty of Peace and Amity forbade recognition of any “constitutionally reorganized” de facto isthmian government if

any of the persons elected as President, Vice-President or Chief of State Designate should fall under any of the following heads:

  1. If he should be the leader or one of the leaders of a coup d’etat or revolution, or through blood relationship or marriage, be an ascendant or descendant or brother of such leader or leaders.

  2. If he should have been a Secretary of State or should have held some high military command during the accomplishment of the coup d’etat, the revolution, or while the election was being carried on, or if he should have held this office or command within the six months preceding the coup d’etat, revolution, or the election.

Furthermore, in no case shall recognition be accorded to a government which arises from election to power of a citizen expressly and unquestionably disqualified by the Constitution of his country as eligible to election as President, Vice-President or Chief of State Designate.7

It was President Acosta’s hope that the introduction of more stringent recognition provisions into the 1923 treaty structure would “guarantee the rights of legitimate governments” on the isthmus.8 Thus, far from being a North American diktat, the new recognition doctrine represented a genuinely independent and completely understandable Costa Rican diplomatic initiative.

Fearing that his political opponents would make a partisan issue out of the treaties, President Acosta was reluctant to submit the pacts to the Costa Rican Congress during the remainder of his term.9 Accordingly, it was Ricardo Jiménez, his successor in the Costa Rican presidency (1924-1928 and 1932-1936), who assumed responsibility for the subsequent ratification, interpretation, and implementation of the Acosta-inspired recognition policy. What President Acosta did not realize at the time, however, and what Jiménez eventually learned through first-hand experience, was that the recognition provisions of the 1923 treaties could turn out to be a two-edged sword. Indeed, the general legacy of the Tinoco coup d’etat would provide major difficulties for President Jiménez in his efforts to make the new recognition policy consonant with Costa Rican domestic and international realities.

According to most observers, the major casualty of Federico Tinoco’s coup was the Costa Rican tradition of constitutional government and not the deposed executive. Coming into the presidency in 1914 as a compromise candidate with no significant political following, González had had to labor under the additional handicap of attempting to guide Costa Rica through the difficult years of World War I. With the war disrupting Costa Rica’s traditional coffee-based trade relationship with Europe, President González, in an effort to stave off financial disaster, introduced both property and progressive income taxes. Up to this time the Costa Rican government’s income had been derived primarily from the taxes levied on imports and secondarily from other indirect taxes. Whereas the old tax system had fallen with particular force on the poorer classes, the new tax structures were specifically designed to extract desperately needed national income from the hitherto untapped wealthier elements in Costa Rica. The president’s standing among members of the Costa Rican elite, already diminished as a result of his radical tax programs, received an additional blow in the wake of his veto of the Pinto-Greulich contract, an oil concession granted to a North American company. The Costa Rican Congress, with only a handful of dissenting votes, approved the contract over the president’s veto, thus widening the already extensive gap between the executive and legislative branches of government. González managed to isolate himself even further because many people believed that he intended to utilize his executive powers to secure for himself yet another term in office; thus, when Tinoco moved against the government, there were few Costa Ricans of any importance who had any real cause for regret. Although the Tinoco regime would eventually degenerate into an irresponsible and repressive dictatorship, it initially received widespread and even enthusiastic support in Costa Rica.10

Tinoco’s strength, however, began to erode when it became evident that international economic conditions, and not just the personality and programs of President González, were the primary factors in the national financial crisis. Tinoco’s efforts to resolve the nation’s difficulties were further hampered by President Woodrow Wilson’s adamant refusal to grant the regime diplomatic recognition. Without such recognition the Tinoco government was effectively cut off from North American sources of financial support. Tinoco therefore turned to the printing presses in an effort to achieve national solvency, a policy that led to severe inflation and to even greater financial chaos for Costa Rica.11 Tinoco’s position became even more vulnerable as the result of the unfavorable publicity generated by the brutal elimination of a small group of revolutionaries who dared to resist Tinoco by force of arms. This repression, coupled with the widely circulated allegations that North American oil and fruit companies had sponsored the Tinoco coup, added to the dictator’s discomfiture and helped to provide an appropriate climate for his eventual fall in August of 1919.12

The overthrow of Tinoco, however, did not resolve the basic problems facing the nation; indeed, undercurrents that developed during the Tinoco years continued to exercise a divisive influence in both the internal and external affairs of Costa Rica. Most Costa Ricans who at one time or another had supported the Tinoco government welcomed the policies of national reconciliation that characterized subsequent administrations. There remained, however, a small and influential group of unreconstructed Tinoquistas that maintained an almost automatic opposition to programs initiated by the new national leaders. The memories of Woodrow Wilson’s rebuff of Tinoco remained bitter ones for them, and they welcomed the opportunity to frustrate cooperation between the United States and Costa Rica. Furthermore, Costa Ricans in general, albeit after the fact, resented the intrusion of North American economic influence in their nation’s internal affairs, as represented by the alleged activities of the oil and fruit companies in the overthrow of González. Another aspect of the Tinoco experience that bothered Costa Ricans of all political persuasions was President Wilsons three-month delay in subsequently recognizing the Acosta administration.13 These factors, taken in conjunction with what many Costa Ricans perceived as their nation’s precarious position between North American protectorates in Nicaragua and Panama, tended to produce, if not a blatant wave of anti-Americanism, at least a general feeling of apprehension insofar as North American isthmian policy was concerned. Thus throughout the 1920s and early 1930s Costa Rican policy-makers had to be especially circumspect regarding the elaboration of any domestic or international policies that could be construed as favoring North American interests in Central America.

Given the fact that Costa Rican politics were essentially personalistic and that Ricardo Jiménez was the most controversial polemicist and politician in early twentieth-century Costa Rican experience, it is not surprising that the president encountered a considerable degree of opposition on purely personal grounds when he chose to champion and then implement Julio Acosta’s recognition policy. President Jiménez, however, would experience further complications with the Tinoquistas because he was one of the few Costa Ricans of stature who had not supported Tinoco. Most important, however, in explaining his difficulties, was the fact that the recognition policy that he supported was also the recognition policy that the United States now openly advocated as a solution to the perennial problem of isthmian political instability.14 That Costa Rica had earlier encouraged the adoption of this stringent policy was ignored by those who preferred to emphasize what they considered to be simply a renewal of North American interference in Central American affairs.

Recognition crises in Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador provided President Jiménez with the opportunity to implement the new recognition policy. Indeed, he served as president through most of the lifespan of the 1923 treaties. The 1924 Honduran crisis, the 1925-1926 Nicaraguan recognition dilemma, and the Salvadorean affair of the early 1930s all fell within his 1924-1928 and 1932-1936 administrations. The executive’s varying responses to these separate crises would reveal his changing attitude regarding the controversial doctrine.

The first test of the new recognition policy came in Honduras where, during the early part of 1924, an electoral stalemate degenerated into violent revolutionary strife. As Honduras appeared to be drifting ever deeper into anarchy the other Central American nations, acting in conjunction with the United States, tendered their good offices to the contending Honduran factions. At the subsequent Amapala Conference, representatives of the rival Honduran forces, the other Central American governments, and the United States managed to agree upon the establishment of a provisional government charged with the responsibility of restoring peace and constitutional order in Honduras. In an effort to prevent the outbreak of any further isthmian revolutionary activity, the Central American representatives at the Amapala Conference, at the suggestion of the American delegate Sumner Welles, agreed to recommend that those nations that had not yet ratified the Washington treaties should take the necessary steps to place the agreements before their respective legislatures.15

The Honduran provisional government managed to survive the difficult days of the post-revolutionary period and made significant progress toward fulfilling its transitional role by setting December of 1924 as the time for new presidential elections. A cloud was cast over the seemingly successful resolution of the Honduran crisis, however, when the leading presidential candidate turned out to be General Tiburcio Carías Andino, a major figure in the recent revolutionary strife. According to the United States government the Carias candidacy constituted a potential violation of the recognition provisions of the Washington treaties.16 Although the United States had indicated that it would use the recognition provisions of the 1923 treaties as a guide for its recognition of governments in Central America, the treaties themselves would not become officially binding on any of the isthmian nations until at least three of the signatory states had formally concluded the process of ratification. If a third nation, therefore, were to join Guatemala and Nicaragua in ratifying the pacts, these agreements would then have the force of international law for the ratifying nations and could be used with greater effect in the Honduran crisis.

Up to this point Ricardo Jiménez had not appeared particularly interested in ratifying the treaties, for the president, like his predecessor Julio Acosta, had to contend with a badly divided Congress.17 These events in Honduras, however, served to influence Jiménez more and more in favor of ratification. Indeed, while various North and Central American diplomats continued to ponder the implications of the Carías candidacy, President Jiménez made an unexpected move that aided substantially in the eventual resolution of the Honduran crisis. In a conversation with the American minister, Roy T. Davis, Jiménez explained that Costa Rica had traditionally remained aloof in its relations with Central America, not only because of a hesitancy to intervene in the internal affairs of the other isthmian states but also because of a desire to prevent the other Central American governments from interfering in any way with the internal affairs of Costa Rica. This attitude, however, was now about to change, for Jiménez indicated that recent North American efforts to bring peace to Honduras had created a favorable impression in Costa Rica, and he now felt that the time had come for Costa Rica to set aside her traditional policy and cooperate with the United States and the other Central American countries in a friendly effort to establish peace in Honduras.18 The president’s decision to become actively involved in the resolution of the Honduran problem became readily apparent during the fall session of the Costa Rican Congress when Jiménez without reservations enthusiastically endorsed the Washington treaties and used his considerable personal influence and prestige to secure their ratification in November of 1924. The executive’s achievement was all the more impressive, given the well-organized opposition to the treaties. Opposition leaders included Alejandro Alvarado Quirós and Ricardo Fernández Guardia—two individuals who had unsuccessfully sought North American recognition for the Tinoco regime in 1917. According to Minister Davis this group was interested in both embarrassing the Jiménez administration and opposing the United States. Davis went on to report that most of the individuals who were against the treaties had been active supporters of the Tinoco government and still harbored resentment against the United States for refusing to recognize Tinoco.19

Now that a majority of the Central American states had ratified the Washington agreements, the United States government moved rapidly to counter what it considered to be the revolution-tainted candidacy of General Carías. In a December 6, 1924, message, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes instructed the American chargé in Tegucigalpa to inform the Honduran provisional government that the United States would not be able to recognize any government in Honduras headed by someone barred by the provisions of Article II of the General Treaty of Peace and Amity. Hughes repeated this information to the other American legations in Central America and requested that the American ministers sound out the various executives as to whether or not they would be willing to join the United States in an effort to persuade the leaders of the Nationalist party (General Carías’s political vehicle) to reconsider their position. The Secretary of State hoped that this persuasion would be facilitated by the simultaneous action of the American and Central American diplomatic representatives in Tegucigalpa.20

In a subsequent interview with the American chargé, President Jiménez agreed that the time had indeed come for joint action in Honduras and he indicated that the Costa Rican chargé in Honduras would be instructed to act in conjunction with the American diplomatic representative. Jiménez expressed the belief that because Costa Rica was now bound by the Washington treaties there was simply no other alternative than to enforce the terms of these treaties in Honduras. If such action were not taken, Jiménez stated that the treaties would immediately become “dead letters.”21

In the case of Honduras, at least, the Washington treaties proved to be anything but “dead letters.” Carias bowed to the growing international pressure and withdrew his candidacy. Upon hearing of the Honduran leader’s decision, Ricardo Jiménez expressed pleasure that the successful resolution of the Honduran problem would serve as both a “vindication of the Central American treaties and as a means of constituting a government in Honduras which could be recognized by all.”22 Such a government came into power in February of 1925 headed by Dr. Miguel Paz Baraona, the holder of impeccable non-revolutionary credentials. Accordingly the Baraona government received recognition from the United States and the other isthmian nations, and the Honduran recognition crisis came to an end. Insofar as Ricardo Jiménez was concerned, however, the successful application of the 1923 recognition policy in Honduras provided only ephemeral satisfaction. New and infinitely more complex recognition problems were soon to surface in Nicaragua, problems that would force Jiménez to reconsider the wisdom of his break with Costa Rica’s traditional isthmian isolationist position.

The 1925-1926 Nicaraguan recognition crisis began when Emiliano Chamorro refused to accept defeat in the 1924 presidential elections. Chamorro, the leader of one faction of the Nicaraguan Conservative party, was encouraged to seize power when the weak coalition government, headed by Carlos Solórzano, a Conservative, and Juan Bautista Sacasa, a Liberal, was made even more vulnerable by the withdrawal of the United States Marine legation guard in August of 1925.23 Moving quickly to fill the resultant power vacuum, Chamorro and his supporters launched a coup d’etat on October 25, 1925. The Conservative leader quickly consolidated all effective military and political power in his own hands; reduced President Solórzano to mere figurehead status; and forced Vice-President Sacasa to flee the country. Using Sacasa’s enforced absence as a pretext, Chamorro’s subservient Congress, purged after the coup of any Liberal taint, stripped Sacasa of his position and formally banished him from Nicaragua. Chamorro then pressured puppet President Solórzano to resign, and the de facto ruler of Nicaragua formally assumed power on January 16, 1926. In an effort to consolidate his position on the international level, Chamorro immediately presented the other Central American governments and the United States with formal requests for recognition.24 Such recognition, however, was not forthcoming because the isthmian nations and the United States indicated that the terms of the 1923 Washington treaties made it impossible for them to grant it.25

Plagued by a continued inability to gain international acceptance, as well as by increased Liberal revolutionary activity, Emiliano Chamorro finally resigned his position as president on October 31, 1926. After considerable behind-the-scenes maneuvering on the part of Lawrence Dennis, the American chargé d’affaires, the Nicaraguan Congress, on November 11, 1926, elected Adolfo Díaz, a Conservative party leader and longtime friend of North American interests, to serve as president for the remainder of Carlos Solórzano’s unexpired term.26 Now that Adolfo Díaz represented the best hope of the United States for the establishment of Nicaraguan peace and stability, the Department of State moved rapidly to secure the normalization of Nicaragua’s relations with the other Central American states. Consequently, the American envoys in Central America received instructions to urge the various isthmian governments to join the United States in recognizing the new Nicaraguan government.27 Although the other Central American states soon tendered the desired recognition, Costa Rica did not.

President Jiménez, in addition to having some doubts regarding the legitimacy of the Diaz government, was also seriously concerned over the possibility that the opposition in the Costa Rican Congress would make the passage of domestic legislation, such as the pending contract with the Central Union Trust Company of New York, contingent on the attitude he adopted relative to the recognition of Díaz. Led by the former Tinoquista Alejandro Alvarado, the president’s congressional opposition had long maintained that he was subservient to the United States. Accordingly, Jiménez was reluctant to take any immediate action that would be interpreted as blindly following the lead of the Department of State and that would thus jeopardize the passage of his administration’s domestic program.28 The Secretary of State, while claiming to understand the president’s problems with the Congress, nonetheless expressed surprise at the Costa Rican leader’s delay in recognizing Díaz and ordered the American minister in San José to approach the Costa Rican president again in an effort to convince him of the “expediency of cooperating with the other Central American governments and the United States” in tendering this recognition.29 Minister Davis spent the next several weeks in a sustained effort to convince Jiménez that the American position regarding the legitimacy of the Díaz government was correct, but in the final analysis no amount of diplomatic cajolery, entreaty, or pressure was sufficient to make Jiménez change his mind.30

President Jiménez was sustained in his decision to withhold recognition from Díaz by opinions expressed both at home and abroad. In San José, El Diario de Costa Rica mounted an editorial campaign highly critical of the recent events in Nicaragua. The newspaper described the Díaz government as simply a “continuation” of the Chamorro regime, thus giving support to the widespread belief that Adolfo Díaz had played a significant, albeit covert, role in Emiliano Chamorro’s original coup d’etat. Accordingly, the editors insisted that the terms of the 1923 treaties made it impossible to extend the Díaz government recognition. The newspaper cast further doubt on the legitimacy of the Díaz administration by calling attention to the validity of Juan Sacasa’s legal claim to the Nicaraguan presidency. While condemning the United States for recognizing Díaz, the editors warmly praised the Costa Rican government for upholding the “letter and spirit” of the Washington treaties and claimed that “the press and the public” supported the president’s decision.31 From Washington, Costa Rican Minister Rafael Oreamuno advised President Jiménez to defer recognition of the Díaz government until after peace and order had been established in Nicaragua. Although the Costa Rican diplomat questioned the legitimacy of the Díaz administration and firmly believed that the United States had erred in granting Díaz immediate recognition, he felt that Costa Rica would have to recognize Díaz eventually. By waiting until peace came to Nicaragua, Oreamuno believed that the Costa Rican government would be able to recognize Díaz without seeming to follow the lead of the United States and at the same time would be able to devote more study to the entire problem of granting recognition.32

Unfortunately, the prospects for the establishment of peace and order in Nicaragua appeared remote, for early in December 1926 Juan Sacasa landed on the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua and directly challenged Díaz by establishing a rival Liberal government at Puerto Cabezas. Encouraged by the immediate recognition of his government by Mexico, Sacasa cabled the Costa Rican government seeking recognition, thus giving the Costa Rican authorities the option of recognizing either a Liberal or Conservative government in Nicaragua.33 President Jiménez, much to the surprise and exasperation of many interested parties, refused to recognize either of the two rival governments.

In a statement appearing in the Costa Rican press on December 14, 1926, Jiménez presented his government’s official position regarding the Nicaraguan recognition crisis. The executive lamented the fact that he was unable to recognize either government, but he insisted that this was his only possible position as “no government fulfilled the two conditions necessary for recognition: the effective control of the political situation . . . and conformity with the dispositions of the Washington treaties relative to the recognition of a government following a revolution or a coup d’etat.” While these conditions persisted, Jiménez declared that his administration would maintain the strictest neutrality in the Nicaraguan civil war. The president concluded his argument by saying As we see and appreciate the situation, the government in Managua lacks the proper title, and the government in Puerto Cabezas lacks the necessary possession of territory, and while title and territory are not combined we shall have to maintain an expectant attitude . . .,”34

Regardless of whether he was motivated by considerations of broad national interest, narrow political advantage, or a combination of both, President Jiménez appeared to have carried off a major coup in Costa Rican domestic and international policy. The refusal to recognize Díaz seems to have satisfied the congressional opposition, which had assumed Jiménez would follow the lead of the United States, for within days after the president’s policy declaration the Congress passed the administration’s loan contract with the Central Union Trust Company.35 The Costa Rican supporters of the Nicaraguan Liberal movement were undoubtedly relieved that Jiménez had denied recognition to Díaz, for the opinion of the Costa Rican government was highly regarded in Central America, and such recognition would have seriously damaged the Liberal cause. As far as the Costa Rican nonrecognition of Sacasa was concerned, the Nicaraguan Liberals and their Costa Rican sympathizers were probably not at all surprised, for Jiménez had made repeated statements indicating that although Sacasa appeared to be the legitimate ruler of Nicaragua, the Costa Rican government would only recognize a Liberal government that had established de facto control over a considerable portion of Nicaragua. Convinced that time, justice, and Mexico were on their side, the Liberals were willing to wait until military success made the implicit promise of Costa Rican recognition a reality.

Costa Rican public opinion also seems to have been united in support of the administration’s Nicaraguan policy. In its December 14, 1926, edition, La Tribuna indicated that “we are in agreement with the president’s policy, . . . it reveals that the president reflects the feeling of the people.” In a December 17 editorial, El Diario de Costa Rica commented that “this time, as on very few occasions, there has been no voice raised against the governmental resolution. . . .” Foreign Minister Juan Rafael Arguello de Vars, in a message to Rafael Oreamuno in Washington, also commented on the extremely favorable reception that the presidential declaration enjoyed in Costa Rica.36

The substantial degree of local support that President Jiménez received as a result of his Nicaraguan policy was in sharp contrast to the cool response his decision elicited among American diplomatic officials. Such local support, however, served to buttress the executive in his subsequent dialogue with the United States government. The State Department had already expressed its surprise over the Costa Rican failure to recognize the Díaz government in November, and the Jiménez announcement of December 14 simply served to compound the consternation of Washington over what it considered to be a breach of faith on the part of the Costa Rican government. As soon as Minister Davis heard of the president’s decision regarding Nicaragua, he obtained an interview and expressed his surprise over the adoption of such a “contrary policy.” Despite repeated representations, however, the envoy was unable to convince Jiménez to change his position. The reports that Davis subsequently sent back to Washington reflected the minister’s bewilderment, frustration, and bitterness regarding a situation that had gone far beyond the desires of American policy in Central America. Davis consistently used such words as “bad faith,” “selfishness,” and “unreasonable” to describe the action and attitude of the Costa Rican president while he emphasized the “fairness” and “justice” of the departmental option that Jiménez chose to ignore.37

The Department of State reacted to the Costa Rican stand on Nicaragua by instructing Minister Davis to ascertain the grounds on which Jiménez based his assertion regarding the Managua government’s ‘lack of title.”38 In response to the subsequent inquiry, Jiménez prepared a lengthy memorandum in which he explained his stand. The president indicated that each of the signatories of the Washington treaties had the right to determine the constitutionality of the action taken by the Nicaraguan Congress in first unseating Vice-President Sacasa and then electing Díaz president. According to Jiménez, Sacasa had been forced to leave Nicaragua and had subsequently been deprived of his position by unconstitutional means. The executive reasoned that if Sacasa had been unjustly removed from office by the Nicaraguan Congress, then the action taken by the Congress in the subsequent election of Díaz was also unconstitutional. Jiménez suggested that several possible alternatives existed by which the Nicaraguan controversy could be settled: the installation of Sacasa as president; the resignation of Sacasa, and his replacement by a successor elected under the terms of the Nicaraguan Constitution; the calling of a Constituent Assembly; the calling of general presidential elections; and, if none of these solutions worked, the signatories of the Washington treaties could denounce the pacts and formulate a Nicaraguan recognition policy on an individual basis that was in accordance with international law.39 Ricardo Jiménez enjoyed a widespread reputation in Latin America as a highly competent international lawyer; thus, when neither Davis nor the Department of State chose to respond to the legal points raised in the memorandum, Jiménez must have felt that his legal position had been effectively sustained.

Although North American Marines soon imposed a troubled peace in Nicaragua, Costa Rica’s Nicaraguan policy remained constant. As long as Adolfo Díaz held power, Costa Rica steadfastly refused to extend recognition to his government. It was not until January of 1929, when a new Nicaraguan administration took office, that Costa Rica was finally able to tender recognition to a Nicaraguan government that fulfilled the Jiménez criteria of combining “title and territory.” Clearly, Costa Rica’s Nicaraguan policy was an independent one and cannot be understood without reference to domestic politics.

Even though, as a result of this Nicaraguan experience, Ricardo Jiménez must have begun to recognize the complications inherent in Costa Rica’s recognition policy, it was not until the early 1930s that developments in El Salvador provided the occasion for the Costa Rican executive’s ultimate solution to the controversial recognition doctrine: the denunciation of the Washington treaties.

On December 2, 1931, Salvadorean military leaders, dissatisfied with the leadership of President Arturo Araujo, staged a coup and forced the executive into exile. As a result of this revolt, Vice-President Maximiliano Hernández Martínez assumed power, formed a new government, and immediately sought recognition from the United States and the other Central American governments.40 The United States government responded by indicating that American policy relative to recognition would be guided by the requirements set forth in the 1923 pacts. This information was passed along to the Central American nations by the American diplomatic representatives in those countries.41 The Department of State, however, made no immediate decision regarding the Salvadorean situation, and it was not until December 20 that Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, after receiving reports on the revolutionary movement, concluded that Martínez had indeed been involved in the coup d’etat. The United States, therefore, informed Salvadorean authorities that American recognition would not be granted. The American chargé in San José was instructed to tell the Costa Rican government of the American decision, in the hope that Costa Rica would follow the same policy.42 This is precisely what happened, for on December 23 President Cleto González Víquez, after holding a special meeting of his cabinet to discuss the Salvadorean affair, made the decision not to recognize the Martínez government.43 In making the public statement of this policy, González declared that his government had decided to “limit itself to the text of the Washington treaties.”44 There was no other public explanation or elaboration of Costa Rica’s Salvadorean policy.

Behind this terse public statement, however, there lay important political considerations. On the one hand, it was a poorly kept secret in San José that the presidential ambitions of Manuel Castro Quesada, while likely to be frustrated by Ricardo Jiménez if elections were held as scheduled in February of 1932, might find fulfillment as the result of a coup d’etat. Costa Rican officials reasoned that if the revolutionary activities of Martínez in El Salvador were rewarded with official recognition, then Castro might be encouraged to follow the same route to power in Costa Rica.45 On the other hand, President González was anxious to avoid the appearance of blindly following the dictates of North American policy and had been reluctant to make a public avowal of Costa Rican adherence to the Washington pacts until other Central American governments had made a similar commitment.46 When, on December 22, 1931, the Guatemalan and Honduran governments made public their decision to stand by the provisions of the Washington treaties with regard to the recognition of the Martínez government, the Costa Rican authorities felt free to act and quickly followed suit.47

Unlike the situation in the case of Nicaragua in 1926, the government’s determination not to recognize Martínez did not enjoy widespread acceptance in Costa Rica. In a lengthy newspaper interview, Alejandro Alvarado, the old Tinoquista, questioned the wisdom of the nations Salvadorean policy. Alvarado maintained that because the United States was not officially part of the Central American treaty structure, the American government was not justified in using the pacts as a basis for its Salvadorean recognition policy. Although Alvarado did not deny the United States the right of granting or withholding recognition, he insisted that this right should not be based on the Washington treaties. According to Alvarado, rather than adhere strictly to the treaties, the United States had always acted in Central America in line with its own special interests and in accord with the particular policy of each succeeding administration. He also indicated that El Salvador appeared to be at peace; if the nonrecognition policy were continued, the prospects for “discord and difficulties” for El Salvador would be increased. If this occurred, then the United States would be presented with precisely the opposite effects supposedly provided for by a strict interpretation of the Washington agreements. Alvarado felt that the treaties had operated to negate Costa Rica’s traditional policy of nonintervention in isthmian affairs. He therefore urged the government to recover its freedom of action and recognize Martínez.48

Given his previous negative experience with the United States and isthmian recognition policy during the Tinoco years, Alvarado’s stand probably could have been expected. The same could not be said, however, for the position assumed by former President Julio Acosta regarding the Salvadorean recognition dilemma. Acosta felt that the United States had exercised an unwarranted degree of influence in Central America through a capricious interpretation of the Washington pacts, and he now criticized the agreements that he himself had once acclaimed “because they subject us to the desires of Washington . . . without taking us into consideration.” Acosta wanted Costa Rica to continue maintaining close and cordial relations with the United States; however, he felt that such a relationship was impossible if the North American government continued to utilize the Washington treaties in such a manner as to deny the freedom of action and independence of the Central American nations. Acosta therefore suggested that the best possible path for Costa Rica to consider would be to denounce the treaties.49 Thus, the man who had personally initiated the new isthmian recognition policy a decade later became one of the first Costa Ricans to call openly for its abandonment.

While various Costa Rican leaders debated the wisdom of the government’s Salvadorean policy in the national press, events in El Salvador precipitated a reversal of roles in Costa Rica’s attitudes regarding the Martínez administration. In late January 1932, the Martínez government suffered a severe internal crisis when a revolt, allegedly inspired and led by Communists, came very close to plunging the nation into complete anarchy. The government, however, eventually crushed the insurrection by dealing unmercifully with its partisans. El Diario de Costa Rica, the newspaper that had favored the cause of Martínez, dropped its pro-Salvadorean stand and severely criticized Martínez’s brutal suppression of the revolution.50 According to the editors, Costa Rican public sentiment, which had earlier openly supported the recognition of Martínez, had now undergone a “violent change.” Voices that were once enthusiastically raised in favor of Martínez, they said, were now either silent or were openly raised against the Salvadorean government.51

While events in El Salvador undoubtedly caused a negative reaction among some elements of Costa Rican society, the Costa Rican government, on the other hand, was favorably impressed by the Martínez government’s liquidation of the revolutionary movement. On February 1, 1932, Foreign Minister Leonidas Pacheco asked the new American minister, Charles C. Eberhardt, to sound out his government regarding the possibility of holding an immediate Central American conference in Guatemala City for the purpose of “discussing ways and means of curbing Communist activities in Central America and helping El Salvador fight against this common enemy.” Pacheco also indicated that one of the hoped-for results of the conference would be the recognition of the Martínez government.52 The Department of State’s response to this feeler was immediate and negative. As far as El Salvador’s internal difficulties were concerned, Washington was convinced that the de facto authorities had the situation “well under control.” Regarding Pacheco’s interest in recognizing Martínez, the United States government indicated that it could not understand how Costa Rica could entertain such a position, given that nation’s obligations under the 1923 Washington treaties. According to the American point of view, recognition of the Salvadorean government by Costa Rica or any other isthmian nation could only be effected through a complete repudiation of existing treaty obligations.63 This negative American reaction discouraged any further initiatives on the part of the González administration regarding the recognition of Martínez.

With the inauguration three months later of a new administration in Costa Rica under Ricardo Jiménez, agents of the Martínez regime began to make overtures to the new government regarding the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations.54 El Salvador’s cause apparently received a sympathetic hearing in San José, for on May 11, 1932, Foreign Minister Pacheco, acting on instructions from President Jiménez, called at the American legation and asked the American minister to find out what the attitude of the United States would be if Costa Rica were to recognize Martínez. According to Pacheco, President Jiménez considered such recognition desirable “for reasons of sentiment peculiar to Central America and on account of the activity of Martínez in arresting Red expansion in Central America.”55 Eberhardt was subsequently instructed by Washington to inform the Costa Rican government that it would be “a pity for any of the Central American republics to repudiate the policy of the treaties simply for reasons of momentary expediency.” The American minister was also expected to tell the Costa Rican authorities that Martínez had indicated that he would remain in power only until June and that he was staying in office only that long to complete the stabilization of the country and to assure that there would be no further danger of a renewed outbreak of Communist insurgency.56 Again, negative reaction on the part of the United States discouraged the Costa Rican government from taking any immediate action regarding the recognition of El Salvador.

President Martínez, however, did not appear too eager to follow the path of voluntary retirement, for on June 8, 1932, he issued a manifesto in which he indicated that, because of the popular support enjoyed by his administration in El Salvador and because of his repeated and unsuccessful attempts to obtain recognition, he intended to disregard the provisions of the 1923 treaties and remain in office.57 Since there was no noticeable reaction in Costa Rica to the Martínez announcement, it seemed that the Salvadorean recognition controversy was no longer a critical national issue. Such was not to be the case, however, for within several months the Salvadorean question took Costa Rica deeply and not too reluctantly into the mainstream of isthmian international politics.

In early November 1932, during a special session of the Costa Rican Congress, Deputy Otilio Ulate attempted to secure support for a motion calling upon the president to denounce the Washington treaties. Ricardo Jiménez reacted quickly to this incipient congressional movement, and in a November 9, 1932, newspaper interview revealed that he had been considering this same step for some time and would denounce the treaties before the end of the year. Jiménez praised the United States for its “noble” and “disinterested” moral support of the 1923 pacts, but at the same time he pointed out that differences in the interpretation of the agreements on the part of both the United States and the Central American governments had led to such embarrassing international situations as the 1925-1926 Nicaraguan recognition crisis and the current Salvadorean dilemma. Accordingly, the Costa Rican executive called for a return on the part of the Central American nations to a policy of complete freedom insofar as recognition policy was concerned. Jiménez then indicated that these unofficial remarks would serve as the preliminary notice of his government’s formal intent to denounce the Washington treaties.58

In several subsequent interviews, the president consistently maintained that the only motivation for the impending denunciation of the 1923 pacts was dissatisfaction with Article II of the General Treaty of Peace and Amity, an article that constituted a threat to Central America because it involved “a kind of intervention in the internal politics of each nation.” Otherwise, as far as Jiménez was concerned, the treaties were perfectly acceptable.59 In response to questions regarding his earlier strong support of the treaties during the 1924 ratification process, Jimenez pointed out that at the time he believed that the recognition stipulations of the pacts would have little bearing on Costa Rica. He explained that when he approved the treaties, he had not anticipated that Costa Rica would ever suffer the evils of violent revolution so commonly associated with the other isthmian nations; thus, the possibility that the nonrecognition clause would ever be applied to Costa Rica had appeared quite remote. Jiménez now admitted, however, that he had overlooked the possibility that Costa Rica might be forced to intervene in the internal affairs of the other Central American nations through a strict adherence to the recognition provisions of the treaties. Such intervention, according to the president, violated the traditional Costa Rican policy of nonintervention; thus, the denunciation of the pacts would allow Costa Rica to return to her former pattern of international conduct.60

While the reasons that Jiménez publicly outlined for the impending denunciation of the treaties were certainly valid, there were also other factors involved in the formulation of his isthmian policy. The executive’s desire to recognize and thus strengthen the Martínez government had as one corollary the continued containment by Martínez of any further Salvadorean radical threats to isthmian peace and stability. The dangers of isthmian radicalism had been brought home to the Costa Rican government not only by the Communist revolt in El Salvador but also by the recent establishment in Costa Rica of a Communist party.61 Another goal of the president’s policy was the coalescence in Costa Rica of a broad wave of bipartisan support for the administration. By openly advocating the Salvadorean cause in the face of North American opposition, Ricardo Jiménez was able to enhance his own position, for in polls taken by the major San José dailies the overwhelming majority of public and private figures expressed complete solidarity with the president’s stand. Among those who enthusiastically backed the president were Alejandro Alvarado and Ricardo Fernández Guardia, thus marking one of the rare occasions that the leaders of the Tinoquista clique publicly sided with Ricardo Jiménez on a matter of major national policy.62 Buoyed by this uncharacteristic display of bipartisanship, Jiménez officially denounced the Washington treaties on December 23, 1932, and served public notice that as of January 1, 1934, the agreements would no longer be binding on Costa Rica.63 Several days later, on December 27, 1932, the Salvadorean government followed Costa Rica’s lead and also denounced the treaties.64

On January 1, 1934, when the Washington pacts ceased to have any further validity for Costa Rica, the Costa Rican government recognized El Salvador.65 President Jiménez described the recognition decision as a logical consequence of his administration’s policy over the past several years. The executive indicated that his government had made repeated efforts to persuade the other Central American nations to consider the revision of the 1923 agreements and the recognition of El Salvador; however, in December of 1932, when it had become obvious that it would be impossible to effect such a policy, the only alternative left to Costa Rica was the denunciation of the treaties.66 Although the Costa Rican government had been unsuccessful in its previous efforts to persuade the other isthmian states to consider the revision of the Washington treaties and the recognition of Martínez, Costa Rica’s renewal of relations with El Salvador appeared to provide a more favorable atmosphere for the realization of these goals. Taken by itself, however, Costa Rica’s action was not enough to bring about such change. A stronger influence was needed to achieve this, and, as had been the case so often in the past, the United States appeared willing to intervene in isthmian affairs.

Based originally upon a suggestion made by the American minister in Guatemala, a proposal for the resolution of the Salvadorean recognition dilemma was developed through various channels at the Department of State and then was sent up to Secretary of State Cordell Hull and President Franklin D. Roosevelt for final approval.67 According to the interpretation developed in Washington, the governments of Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua regarded the 1923 treaties as still being in force among themselves but not in force regarding their relationships with Costa Rica and El Salvador. Given this state of affairs, these three countries could now legally recognize El Salvador and then call a Central American conference to consider revision of the 1923 treaties. The Department of State would submit this proposal to President Juan Sacasa of Nicaragua, and if the idea were acceptable, Sacasa could then make the appropriate overtures on his own initiative to the governments of Guatemala and Honduras. The general consensus was that the United States should stay “strictly behind the scenes” in any subsequent Central American international developments. The advantages that might accrue to the United States, if the plan were carried to its conclusion, would be the possibility of North American recognition of El Salvador and the “amendment of the 1923 treaties in the manner as experience has shown to be desirable to those Central American governments as wish their continuance.”68 Thus the United States hoped to resolve the difficult Martínez recognition problem, while at the same time providing the Central American states with an opportunity to determine their own international destiny without any undue North American influence or pressure.

Once approval for the State Department’s proposal had been secured, the American minister in Managua presented the plan to President Sacasa, who in turn agreed to initiate the movement for the recognition of Martínez and the subsequent Central American conference. Both Guatemala and Honduras proved amenable to the Nicaraguan initiative while El Salvadorean authorities confidentially indicated that they were also willing to have a new isthmian conference.69 The Costa Rican government’s attitude was also positive, for United States Minister Leo B. Sack reported that both President Jiménez and Foreign Minister Leonidas Pacheco had promised the “fullest Costa Rican cooperation” in such an isthmian diplomatic venture.70 Accordingly, on January 25, 1934, when Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua recognized El Salvador, these same three governments also indicated that they would invite Costa Rica and El Salvador to attend a Central American conference that would consider the revision of the 1923 Washington treaties.71 On January 26, 1934, the United States recognized the Martínez government.72

The recognition of El Salvador by the other Central American nations and the United States was very well received in Costa Rica. President Jiménez told Minister Sack that this action was a “vindication of Costa Rican policy.”73 In an editorial entitled “The Good Neighbor Policy,” La Tribuna warmly praised the United States for the policy of nonintervention expressed so well in theory at Montevideo and now put into such beneficent practice in Central America.74 Led by such prominent individuals as former President Cleto González Víquez and the Tinoquista Alejandro Alvarado, many Costa Ricans publicly expressed their approval of the recognition of El Salvador and the anticipated isthmian conference. In short, the prevailing sentiment in Costa Rica was definitely in agreement with tire denouement of that country’s Central American policy.

Insofar as Costa Rica was concerned, the subsequent 1934 Central American Conference, held in Guatemala City, was somewhat of an anticlimax. The nation’s basic grievance with the 1923 structure had been the recognition provisions of Article II of the General Treaty of Peace and Amity; thus, the Costa Rican position at the conference was to oppose any measures that could possibly infringe upon the nation’s freedom of action regarding relationships with the other Central American states. When the Guatemalan delegation proposed the adoption of an isthmian recognition policy strikingly similar to the 1923 doctrine, the Costa Rican representatives understandably led the fight against the Guatemalan initiative. Because unanimity was required for the passage of any proposal at the conference, Costa Rica was assured that her national interests would be protected.75

Thus after ten years, Costa Rica, the nation that had originally authored the 1923 recognition policy, came full circle and led the movement for the abandonment of that very same policy. Inspired by the negative effects of the Tinoco experience, Julio Acosta was undoubtedly sincere in his original efforts to promote isthmian peace and democratic progress. Ricardo Jiménez, however, had been eventually forced to admit that strict adherence to the recognition provisions of the Washington treaties did not necessarily guarantee these laudable ideals. Although the successful settlement of the 1924 Honduran crisis provided what appeared to be an auspicious beginning for the new recognition policy, subsequent experience in Nicaragua demonstrated that, at least from a Costa Rican perspective, such a policy was difficult to sustain. When Maximiliano Hernández Martínez proved that he could maintain himself in power, in spite of the sanction of nonrecognition, while at the same time helping to make Central America less vulnerable to the threat of “Red” expansion, Ricardo Jiménez came to the conclusion that the 1923 recognition policy had outlived its usefulness. Taking added strength from a rare display of national consensus, President Jiménez lost little time in striking the treaties down, thus demonstrating that, insofar as isthmian recognition policy was concerned, the shade of Federico Tinoco had indeed been finally laid to rest.

In retrospect, the key decisions made by Costa Rican leaders—from Julio Acosta’s introduction of the new isthmian recognition policy at the Washingtan Conference to Ricardo Jiménez’s ultimate rejection of this policy in the early 1930s—were remarkably consistent. These decisions appear to have been based on eminently Costa Rican perceptions, interpretations, and analyses of isthmian realities-in short, a weighing of the Central American scene on Costa Rican terms. Such termsdemanded congruence between Costa Rican domestic and foreign policies; thus, internal political considerations were extremely important to Costa Rican leaders in making policy decisions on the international level. Although the Costa Ricans were interested in knowing the North American viewpoint regarding the recognition of Central American governments, and sometimes acted in concert with the United States, in the final analysis, they acted, not out of fear of the United States but as Costa Ricans committed to protecting what they considered to be their national interests. It is refreshing to discover that at least on some occasions North American policy was not necessarily fiat on the isthmus.

1

Robert N. Burr, “The Balance of Power in Nineteenth-Century South America: An Exploratory Essay,” HAHR, 35: 1 (Feb. 1955). 37-60; and Burr, By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830-1905 (Berkeley, Calif., 1965).

2

For an understanding of the geographic, ethnic, cultural, and political factors that all combined to accentuate Costa Rica’s tradition of isolationism, see John and Mavis Biesanz, Costa Rican Life (New York, 1944); Abelardo Bonilla, “El Costarricense y su actitud política,” Revista de la Universidad de Costa Rica, 10, (Nov. 1954), 33-50; Juan Bosch. Apuntes para una interpretación de la historia costarricense (San José, 1963); James L. Busey, “The Presidents of Costa Rica,” The Americas 18: 1 (July 1961), 55-70; Mario Sancho, Costa Rica, Suiza Centroamericana (San José, 1935).

3

Julio Acosta to Rafael Oreamuno, San José, Dec. 19, 1922. Private Archive of the Revollo Acosta family (San José, Costa Rica).

4

For the text of the recognition articles of both the 1907 and 1923 Central American treaties, see “The Conference on Central American Affairs,” International Conciliation, No. 189 (Aug. 1923), 638-639. For an account of the origins of the 1907 recognition policy, see Charles L. Stansifer, “Application of the Tobar Doctrine to Central America,” The Americas, 23: 3 (Jan. 1967), 251-255.

5

In a memorandum directed to Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, Latin American Division Chief Francis White presented a prospective agenda for the upcoming conference. The provisions for the nonrecognition of revolutionary governments outlined in this memorandum were identical to the terms of the 1907 recognition clause. See Memorandum from Francis White to Charles Evans Hughes, Washington, Oct. 14, 1922. United States State Department Papers, National Archives (Washington), Record Group 59, Decimal File Number 813.00 Washington/8a (hereafter State Department papers will be cited by decimal file number only).

6

Alfredo González to Julio Acosta, Washington, Feb. 7, 1923, Private Archive of the Revollo Acosta family.

7

International Conciliation, 638-639.

8

Acosta to Oreamuno, San José, Dec. 19, 1922, Private Archive of the Revollo Acosta family.

9

For an elaboration of Acosta’s position, see Clarence B. Hewes to Hughes, San José, May 3, 1923, 813.00 Washington/265, and Roy T. Davis to Hughes, San José, Aug. 29, 1923, 813.00 Washington/290.

10

The above material represents a synthesis of points discussed in Rodrigo Facio, Estudio sobre economía costarricense (San José, 1972), pp. 71-83; Tomás Soley Güell, Historia monetaria de Costa Rica (San José, 1926), pp. 137-144; Eugenio Rodríguez Vega, Los días de don Ricardo Jiménez (San José, 1971), pp. 71-91; Mariana Volio, Jorge Volio y el partido reformista (San José, 1972), pp. 53-60.

11

Soley Güell, Historia monetaria, pp. 144-156.

12

The Costa Rican case against the North American companies can be reviewed in Alfredo González Flores, Manifesto a mis compatriotas (San José, 1919), p. 8, and Jacinto López, La caída del gobierno constitucional en Costa Rica (New York, 1919), pp. 19-36. Lincoln G. Valentine presents the oil company’s rebuttal in Which? The Case of Costa Rica (Washington, 1919), while a modern scholarly interpretation can be found in Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921 (Princeton, 1964), pp. 428-433.

13

Although elected by an overwhelmingly popular mandate in December of 1919 and inaugurated as president in May of 1920, Julio Acosta did not receive official recognition from the United States until August 3, 1920. The reasons for this belated diplomatic recognition are still not clear. President Wilson’s illness is the most widely accepted explanation, but this excuse does not hold up when one considers the fact that Wilson recognized a Guatemalan government of questionable legality in June of 1920. For further treatment of this question, see Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy, pp. 442-445 and Theodore P. Wright, American Support of Free Elections Abroad (Washington, 1964), pp. 100-101.

14

Although not a party to the 1923 General Treaty of Peace and Amity, the United States government decided to adopt the recognition policy contained in Article II as its guide for the recognition of isthmian governments. In accordance with this decision, Secretary of State Hughes instructed American diplomatic personnel in Central America to give the “widest publicity” to the United States position regarding the recognition of Central American governments. For this official policy statement, see Hughes to the Central American missions, Washington, June 30, 1923, 815.00/2609.

15

Summer Welles to Hughes, Amapala, Honduras, May 3, 1924, 815.00/3151.

16

Hughes to the Central American mission, Washington, July 8, 1924, 815.00/3205a.

17

Davis to Hughes, San José, June 20, 1924, 813.00 Washington/302.

18

Davis to Hughes, San José, August 29, 1924, 815.00/3342. Costa Rican participation at the Amapala Conference was strictly limited to the role of a friendly mediator; thus, the Jiménez statement and, more importantly, the executive’s subsequent actions, did, indeed, constitute a definite break with Costa Rica’s previous isthmian policy.

19

Davis to Hughes, San José, September 4, 1924, 813.00 Washington/313.

20

Hughes to the Central American missions, Washington, December 9, 1924, 815.00/3477. Not all departmental officials were in agreement regarding the efficacy of the new isthmian recognition policy. Dana G. Munro indicated that he had serious misgivings regarding the situation in Honduras and the use of nonrecognition as a threat. Although conceding that there were no other apparent alternatives at the present time, Munro speculated on the possibility of taking up with the Central American governments the question of a possible modification of Article II of the General Treaty of Peace and Amity “with the idea of making its provisions less stringent and all inclusive.” Munro’s suggestion, however, was not acted upon, thus setting the stage for future recognition controversies involving the United States and the Central American Republics. For Munro’s comments, see Dana G. Munro to Francis White, Washington, December 5, 1924, 815.00/3477.

21

Harold M. Deane to Hughes, San José, Dec. 10, 1924, 815.00/3484

22

Deane to Hughes, San José, Dec. 11, 1924, 815.00/3504.

23

William Kamman, A Search for Stability: United States Diplomacy toward Nicaragua, 1923-1933 (Notre Dame, Ind., 1968), pp. 32-36.

24

Daniel Gutiérrez Navas to Juan Rafael Arguello de Vars, Managua, Jan. 16, 1926, Archivo Nacional de Costa Rica (San José), Sección Histórica, Cajas Diplomáticas (hereafter cited as ANCR).

25

Arguello de Vars to Miguel Cárdenas, San José, Jan. 18, 1926, ANCR; Frank B. Kellogg to Charles C. Eberhardt, Washington, Jan. 22, 1926, 817.00/3416.

26

Although the eighteen members of Congress who had been purged by Chamorro were recalled, only nine of their seats were filled when the hastily convened legislature met to elect a new president. Of the fifty-three congressmen present, forty-four voted for Díaz. For further information on the controversy surrounding the composition of the Nicaraguan Congress and the North American role in the election of Adolfo Díaz, see Oreamuno to Arguello de Vars, Washington, November 16 and 19, 1926, ANCR; Isaac Joslin Cox, Nicaragua and the United States, 1909-1927 (Boston, 1927), pp. 781-782; Harold Norman Denny, Dollars for Bullets: The Story of American Rule in Nicaragua (New York, 1929), pp. 233-236; Kamman, A Search for Stability, pp. 66-68.

27

Kellogg to Davis, Washington, Nov. 12, 1926, 817.00/4044.

28

Davis to Kellogg, San José, Nov. 14, 1926, 817.00/4062.

29

Kellogg to Davis, Washington, Nov. 16, 1926, 817.00/4062.

30

Davis to Kellogg, San José, Nov. 17, 1926, 817.00/4080; Davis to Kellogg, San José, Nov. 19, 1926, 817.00/4145; Davis to Kellogg, San José, Nov. 27, 1926, 817.00/4124; Davis to Kellogg, San José, Dec. 2, 1926, 817.00/4238; Kellogg to Davis, Washington, Nov. 24, 1926, 817.00/4093.

31

El Diario de Costa Rica, Nov. 18 and Nov. 24, 1926.

32

Oreamuno to Ricardo Jiménez, Washington, Nov. 26, 1926, ANCR.

33

Arguello de Vars to Oreamuno, San José, Dec. 7, 1926, ANCR.

34

El Diario de Costa Rica, Dec. 14, 1926.

35

Davis to Kellogg, San Jose, Dec. 23, 1926, 818.51/321. Minister Davis, in commenting on the passage of the loan proposal, indicated that “the attitude of President Jiménez in the Nicaraguan controversy apparently strengthened his position before the opponents of the loan. . . .”

36

Arguello de Vars to Oreamuno, San José, Dec. 17, 1926, ANCR.

37

Davis to Kellogg, San José, Dec. 15, 1926, 817.00/4320; Davis to Kellogg, San José, Dec. 24, 1926, 817.00/4346.

38

Kellogg to Davis, Washington, Dec. 16, 1926, 817.00/4247.

39

Davis to Kellogg, San José, Dec. 18, 1926, 817.00/4331.

40

Arturo R. Ávila to Leonidas Pacheco, San Salvador, Dec. 5, 1931, ANCR.

41

Henry L. Stimson to Lawrence Higgins, Washington, Dec. 4, 1931, 816.01/3a.

42

Stimson to McCeney Werlich, Washington, Dec. 20, 1931, 816.01/273.

43

Werlich to Stimson, San José, Dec. 24, 1931, 816.01/36.

44

La Tribuna, Dec. 24, 1931.

45

Werlich to Stimson, San José, Dec. 24, 1931, 816.01/42.

46

Pacheco to Fernando Iglesias, San José, Dec. 17, 1931, ANCR; La Tribuna, Dec. 24, 1931.

47

El Diario de Costa Rica, Dec. 22, 1931; La Tribuna, Dec. 24, 1931.

48

El Diario de Costa Rica, Dec. 31, 1931.

49

El Diario de Costa Rica, Jan. 14, 1932.

50

Even conservative estimates suggest that several thousand persons perished during the revolt. For more information, see the 1932 Salvadorean file in the Costa Rican National Archives, the Costa Rican press for January and February of 1932, and Thomas P. Anderson, Matanza: El Salvador’s Communist Revolt of 1932 (Lincoln, Neb., 1971).

51

El Diario de Costa Rica, Mar. 12, 1932.

52

Eberhardt to Stimson, San José, Feb. 1, 1932, 816.01/67.

53

Stimson to Eberhardt, Washington, Feb. 2, 1932, 816.01/67.

54

La Tribuna, May 26, 1932.

55

Eberhardt to Stimson, San José, May 11, 1932, 816.01/175.

56

William R. Castle to Eberhardt, Washington, May 13, 1932, 816.01/175.

57

El Diario de Costa Rica, June 10, 1932.

58

La Tribuna, Nov. 9, 1932.

59

La Tribuna, Nov. 30, 1932.

60

La Tribuna, Dec. 11, 1932.

61

On the foundation and early years of the Costa Rica Communist Party, see Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America (New Brunswick, 1957), pp. 384-385 and John P. Bell, Crisis in Costa Rica: The 1948 Revolution (Austin, Tex., 1971). pp. 11-14.

62

La Tribuna, Nov. 10 and Nov. 11, 1932.

63

Pacheco to Alfredo Skinner Klée, San José, Dec. 23, 1932, ANCR.

64

Miguel Ángel Araujo to Pacheco, San Salvador, Dec. 27, 1932, ANCR.

65

Pacheco to Antonio Álvarez Vidaurre, San José, Jan. 1, 1934, ANCR.

66

El Diario de Costa Rica, Jan. 11, 1934.

67

Matthew Hanna to Edwin C. Wilson, Guatemala City, Oct. 9, 1933, 816.01/334½; Memo by Willard L. Beaulac, Washington, Dec. 27, 1933, 816.01/348; Memo by Edwin C. White, Washington, Dec. 27, 1933, 816.01/382; William Phillips to Cordell Hull, Washington, Jan. 3, 1934, 816.01/348; Sumner Welles to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Washington, Jan. 8, 1934, 816.01/348.

68

Phillips to Hull, Washington, Jan. 3, 1934, 816.01/344a.

69

Phillips to Arthur B. Lane, Washington, Jan. 9, 1934, 816.01/349; Edward P. Lawton to Phillips, Guatemala City, Jan. 15, 1934, 816.01/360.

70

Leo B. Sack to Phillips, San José, Jan. 16, 1934, 816.01/363.

71

Araujo to Pacheco, San Salvador, Jan. 25, 1934, ANCR.

72

Hull to William McCafferty, Washington, Jan. 26, 1934, 816.01/412.

73

Sack to Hull, San José, Jan. 26, 1934, 816.01/410.

74

La Tribuna, Jan. 27, 1934.

75

Guatemala, Ministerio de Rclaciones Exteriores, Memoria de los labores del ejecutivo en el ramo de relaciones exteriores durante el año de 2934 (Guatemala City, 1936), pp. 365-374.

Author notes

*

The author is Assistant Professor in the Department of History at the State University College, Geneseo, New York.