Jorge Amado once wrote that the greatest problem of the Old Republic (1889-1930) was to decide whether Brazil should spell its name with a “z” or an “s.” As one of the most complex and least understood periods, the Old Republic remains something of an enigma. Silva attempts to define the Old Republic in terms of crises and political instability, which eventually paved the way for the coming of Getúlio Vargas.
The book, first written in 1960 but published in 1972, is divided into three parts: a long, detailed chronology from 1870 to 1922; ten chapters or sections, covering from the advent of the republic to the eve of the presidency of Artur Bernardes in 1922; and a collection of documents and excerpts from various sources. Instead of a narrative approach, Silva mixes his comments with a series of long quotes from books and documents, allowing the historical personalities and events to speak for themselves. This anthological quality of the book has its obvious strengths. Keeping his comments to a minimum, Silva does not burden the reader with repetitive facts, but at the same time this approach weakens his claim that the book is a synthesis. The physican-turned-historian provides an interesting character analysis of the first two army presidents; the last chapter on the regional politics of Pernambuco is solidly based on private archives, and his analysis is sound. However, the remainder of the book reveals nothing new.
While the book is written well (it includes a fine collection of political cartoons and portraits of the major personalities), it lacks fresh insights and interpretations. The author dwells on the theme that the Old Republic was born prematurely. The title of the book is meant to convey precisely this theme. The logical consequences of “implanting a premature system” was the breeding of a series of crises beginning with Deodoro da Fonseca and continuing throughout the next forty-one years. To support this hypothesis, the author infers that each presidency suffered from one or more crises, military or political. Thus within five years, three presidents were plagued by a naval revolt, the Federalista War in south Brazil, the War of Canudos in Bahia and congressional enemies; and Hermes da Fonseca and Epitácio Pessoa had their shares of army-led interventions in state politics, with or without presidential approval.
The point on the relationship between politico-military crises and instability is well made. About half of the book is devoted to the first five years of the republic. But Silva pays little attention to the presidency of Manuel Ferraz de Campos Sales (ten pages) and hardly any attention to the presidency of the period of World War I (one paragraph). No military revolts took place during these presidencies, but does this mean that no important changes occurred under these two presidencies? Many changes such as regionalization of party system and import-substituting industrialization cause an equality vexatious kind of political instability of the Old Republic, and they could, as easily as the military revolts, be worked into the hypothesis of Silva. But the anthological approach of the book obviously prevents him from so doing, since no good secondary, historical works exist on these periods from which Silva can extensively quote.
These shortcomings, however, are minor, considering that Silva does make a contribution by providing the reader with further clues as to where the keys to the enigma of the Old Republic might be found. This book is a welcome addition to the growing body of literature on the Old Republic.
