These volumes fall into line with Father Suárez’ revisionism as applied to the reign of Ferdinand VII. According to Suárez the conventional picture, derived from liberal historians, makes Luis López Ballesteros, as Minister of Finance 1823-32, stand out as a moderate against a background of black reaction. Suárez, in his introductory volume, emphasizes what he considers the ‘moderate’ elements in Ferdinand’s ministries (i.e., elements committed against both extreme liberals and extreme royalists). Ballesteros, therefore, appears less of an exceptional figure. The four volumes of documents collect the Memorials of Ballesteros, other ministers, and reports of government committees.
Ballesteros inherited the ‘chaos’ left by the liberal revolution. The liberals had attempted a thoroughgoing financial reform aimed to alleviate traditional reliance on a miscellaneous bundle of indirect taxes. The 1823 Restoration rejected these reforms on the grounds that new taxes were hard to collect and that it was therefore prudent to return to the old, well-tried (but, as it proved, inexpandable) sources of income.
The second legacy of the Revolution was the problem of the Cortes loans, raised 1820-23 on the Paris and London markets. Ferdinand refused to recognize these loans. The holders of liberal bonds were a well-organized pressure group against any further foreign loan to absolutist Spain; in 1830 Lafitte, the banker, went as far as to book all stage coaches to Bayonne in order that liberal exiles might get quickly to the frontier to topple Ferdinand VII and thus improve the chances of repayment of the 1820-23 loans.
Finally we get glimpses in the documents (e.g. II, 193; IV, 28, 290) of the losses occasioned by the ‘rebellions of America’. The loss in trade (70%) reflected in declining revenues between 1792 and 1827 has been usefully set out by Josep Fontana Lazaro in Moneda y Créditó (no. 115, December 1970, pp. 3-25).
Clearly the ‘enlightened’ civil servants would have liked to press for some deal with the liberal bond holders and some step to heal the breach with America. Both were impossible within the framework of absolutism (cf. the Memorial of Alcudia, V, 343-409). Ballesteros was therefore reduced to attempts to raise loans on bad terms, administrative reforms and the tidying up of particular abuses. He achieved little and resigned in despair at his inability to produce a balanced budget.
The editing is unsatisfactory. Apart from what many historians would consider an over-contentious introduction, the editor displays little understanding of the highly technical questions involved. The documents are left to speak for themselves, and what they say is often obscure.
