Slowly but surely the official documents of the major countries are being researched and the results incorporated into studies such as the one under review. Professor Berta Ulloa has utilized a previously untapped source of important documents, the papers from the Spanish Embassy in Mexico City. Perhaps even more important, she has given us the first in depth look at the material from the Archivo de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores de México for the period in question. She has, of course, also used the various collections of private papers and government documents in the United States. While the German documents and the publications based upon them by Friedrich Katz are missing, she has employed several studies which utilized the British Foreign Office papers. Thus, Professor Ulloa has provided a four-dimensional look at U.S.-Mexican relations: Mexican, United States, Spanish, and British.

In spite of its announced scope, the focus of events in this book is primarily from the Decena Trágica of February, 1913, through the Veracruz landing and the ABC arbitration fiasco of April-June 1914. Few books dealing with Woodrow Wilson and Mexico have managed to remain completely objective. As might be imagined, Professor Ulloa’s account is decidedly pro-Mexican, but it is not a polemic. Most of the major facts will be familiar to those who have been at all interested in this period of the Mexican Revolution; however, some of her conclusions may be new. For example, Professor Ulloa presents John Lind as having had a far greater influence upon President Wilson’s decision to invade Mexico than others have assigned to him. Did Lind’s counsel really influence Wilson? A second interesting interpretation regards the Tampico incident. Did the U.S. precipitate it in order to provide the excuse needed to intervene in Mexico? Obviously, not all will agree with her conclusions, but this study is a refreshingly new look at an old and oft told story.

Other aspects of the book warrant mention. A number of documents—some old some new—are quoted throughout the text. In addition, twenty documents are included in the appendix. Some of these materials from the Mexican Foreign Relations archives will be new to most readers. Documentation is substantial. There are eighty-eight pages of footnotes, many of which are explanatory.

Professor Ulloa was selective regarding the episodes which she decided to cover in detail. Events in northern Mexico, the Tampico incident, and the ABC mediation efforts are given proportionately the most consideration. Zapata and southern Mexico are virtually ignored. More information on certain persons and their part in the events which impinged significantly on U.S.—Mexican relations, e.g., the British Minister F. W. Stronge, Lord Cowdray, Admiral Cradock, etc., would have given the study better balance. There were a few minor slips. Badger was only a rear admiral at Veracruz in 1914, not a vice admiral. Also, there is an obvious mixup on footnotes at the conclusion of Chapter VIII. But these mistakes detract little from the overall quality of the study. This is an excellent addition to the literature on the field.