In many ways this is a book that challenges a reviewer who is acquainted with the Bolivian scene. The author has had some experience in Bolivia, the work is based on adequate sources and Malloy shows great enthusiasms for his topic. Apparently he did not start out with a fixed set of theories and conclusions, yet he did avoid sources that failed to fit into his developing pattern. Of American authors he relies heavily on Klein, extensively on Olen Leonard and Robert Alexander, but less on Patch, Heath, Zondag, Goodrich, and ignores others such as Wilkie, etc. He has used a few rather new Ph.D. dissertations and has reproduced the program from a rare pamphlet of RADEPA, the Fascist secret military cell which helped to bring Gualberto Villarroel to power. In sum, the footnotes show a most spotty use of sources. The lack of a bibliography (probably due to the publisher’s insistence) is most deplorable. It does have a good glossary.
The book has an introduction entitled “A Frame of Analysis,” followed by three parts: a quick survey up to the end of the Chaco War; from 1936 until the 1952-MNR revolution; and the period of the MNR until the fall of Paz Estenssoro in 1964. Then there is a well presented chapter called “conclusions.”
Malloy writes that the framework he proposes “rejects any deterministic cause-and-effect analysis . . .. There is no necessary outcome to a revolutionary situation . . .. A revolutionary situation is defined by its qualities, not its outcome.” In the last sentence of his conclusions he writes that “the Bolivian case appears to demonstrate . . . that the prospects of completing a development orientated revolution in countries below a certain level of development [compared to Cuba and Mexico as discussed] are, at best, extremely difficult.” Yet in the last paragraph of his framework Malloy writes “Bolivia provides an important example of a recent attempt to wrench a society out of extreme backwardness and propel it into modernity by means of violent revolution. Yet, this important process, for some inexplicable reason, has been largely ignored by American political analysts.” This reviewer does not agree with this statement. A study of American aid such as done admirably by Wilkie in his The Bolivian Revolution and U. S. Aid Since 1952 refutes Malloy’s remark. This is an example of the controversial nature of the Malloy book, in which interesting, often thoughtful, often contradictory and sometimes hasty analyses, theories and conclusions are in abundance.
The work is not really a historical study and although Malloy is described as a political scientist it is far more than a political study. The vocabulary has much modem jargon and, as in progressive education or modem sociology, obvious matters are detailed in long sentences with this new language. For example, one of the more modest sentences (p. 329) reads, “The Bolivian case indicates that the society in a transition-immobilization bind is less vulnerable to class-based counter-movements, especially those formed around lower classes, than the formation of cross-sectoral alliances.” The next two large sentences contain even more linguistic exercises. Malloy’s sharp inquiry does not have a lucid presentation.
While a few references are made to the Cuban and Mexican Revolutions, the author should have put the Bolivian “uncompleted” Revolution more explicitly into a comparative frame of reference with Cuba, Mexico and maybe the uncompleted Revolution of Guatemala. And with the rise of new revolutionary regimes such as those in Chile, in Peru (where for example the military government is imposing a tough agrarian reform) and other countries (Panama, Venezuela, Guyana), this comparative direction would have given Malloy a more convincing case for his study and added to his intellectual discussion.
And also, with a new military government now in power in Bolivia the book—as is usually the case with studies of recent Bolivia —is already somewhat out of date and its title, “The Uncompleted Revolution” in jeopardy. We still need a strictly historical study of the MNR and the neo-MNR period that came to an end in 1970. Malloy has given us a subjective and argumentative interpretation. The fact that I was tempted to write a review article instead of a book review must prove that he has accomplished his intended task. The book to my mind is superb in parts, weak in many instances and quite naive at other times. There is too much analysis for the simple sake of analysis.
