G. A. Mellander’s monograph deals primarily with United States diplomacy and involvement in Panamanian politics from just prior to November 1903 to 1908, and is directed towards the specialist. Lawrence Ealy’s book, which treats United States politics surrounding the Panama Canal, from before the Mexican War until the 1970s, is geared to the general reader.

In exploring the origins of Panamanian independence, Dr. Mellander neatly untangles the mess presented by copious, and often contradictory, secondary sources and constructs a lucid picture of what happened on the Isthmus. His lively narrative contains illuminating anecdotes and analyses, revealing insights into the personalities and times about which he writes. In treating the post-independence era, he weaves new sources into a judicious and well-documented account. For example, in addition to the usual characterizing of Philippe Bunau-Varilla as rapacious, Mellander credits him with the mobilization of decisive support for a successful national revolution. Also, he demonstrates conclusively that Panamanian Conservatives, rather than United States Minister William Buchanan, were chiefly responsible for article 136 of the 1904 constitution, which granted the United States the right of intervention in Panama. He then shows that the rival Liberals, in order to aid their own cause, also requested United States intervention in elections. The emergence of United States paternalism is traced to endeavors to influence elections of men committed to ensure the rapid and peaceful completion of the Canal. The detailed descriptions of early Panamanian elections do not specify the degree to which popular participation was effective. However, by indirection, the author imparts the feeling that political power was under oligarchical control.

Dr. Ealy, author also of The Republic of Panama in World Affairs 1903-1950 approaches his subject chronologically to 1914, and topically thereafter. His depictions of Yanqui politics are based largely on published sources. His work illustrates that United States policy towards Panama has been neither calculated nor consistent. The author confines himself to mild condemnation of those obstructionists in the United States who are satisfied with the status quo in the Canal and Canal Zone. Typical is Congressman Daniel J. Flood who was proclaimed “Public Enemy Number One” by Panama’s National Assembly, and whose views on Yanqui occupation of the Canal and environs lie somewhere between those of the American Legion and the John Birch Society. Ealy touches upon numerous problems existing in United States—Panamanian relations, including those pertaining to construction of a new sea-level waterway, potential new canal sites, the use of nuclear devices in excavation, international controls, existing differences over the regulation and improvement of the present Canal and Canal Zone, ideological conflicts on the Isthmus, and Panamanian nationalism. In so doing, he overemphasizes the defensive importance of the Canal in the missile age. Moreover, in the reviewer’s opinion, his suggestion that Washington might seek a canal route outside of Panama would invite a plethora of problems. To seek accords with another country would not circumvent the diplomatic impasses between the United States and Panama, and would compound difficulties by raising, with another nation, many of the issues already resolved with Panama.

Ealy’s expertise is most evident in his chapter “The Yanqui Legal System in the Canal Zone,” in which he explains how Anglo-American Law has been superimposed on Latin American and Roman traditions. The author castigates Washington for not consulting Panama specialists, and for seeking information from advisors known to be predisposed to traditional policies. In bringing his account up to date, he criticizes the Nixon administration for recognizing the regime of General Omar Torrijos. However, it may be too soon to judge Panama’s new military nationalists, who conceive of themselves as “popular” revolutionaries. Then again, perhaps the Nixon government should be faulted for recognizing the Torrijos regime for the wrong reasons. In his conclusion Dr. Ealy cautiously makes no predictions beyond the fact that the prospects for progress in United States-Panamanian relations are not good, primarily because of partisan politics in both nations.

These books illustrate that “Yanqui Politics and the Isthmian Canal” have continuously meant “The United States in Panamanian Politics.” But it must be remembered that Panama has often placed the United States in the untenable position of being urged to intervene and then condemned for doing so. Unfortunately, the United States has been used by the Panamanian oligarchy as both a wedge to retain power and as a scapegoat for its abuses.