As a detailed account of the Cuban communist movement in the pre-Castro era, this rather lengthy book is of some value to the historian, if used with care. The product of collaboration between two individuals linked to the Batista regime (under which García Montes served as Prime Minister), its avowed purpose is to show “how propaganda, which rules and dominates the modern world, can deceive an entire nation and morally destroy a Government.” Professing “absolute impartiality” they seek to portray the communist movement and the rise of Castro in the context of the “moral degeneration” of the Cuban nation. They fall less short of their goal in dealing with the pre-1952 period than when they attempt to treat events with which they were too personally involved during the final Batista government.
The authors dispose of the early manifestations of organized communism within the first hundred pages before devoting well over twice the space to the 1930-1944 period and proportionally equal treatment to the 1945-1952 interregnum between Batista’s term as elected president and his subsequent coup. The greatest relative detail is saved for the years 1952 through 1958 (when the volume ends). Theirs is essentially a book for specialists, since the reader without a background on Cuban affairs is poorly equipped to cope with the authors’ use of quotations tom out of context.
The generational difference between the orthodox communists and Castro’s 26th of July Movement can be inferred from the fact that almost all the 1959 leadership of the PSP were active at the cadre level or already rising in the party hierarchy by the early 1930s. The roles of such figures as Blas Roca, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, Aníbal Escalante, and the shadowy Fabio Grobart can be traced through the course of events (although the lack of an index reduces the work’s usefulness in this respect). One interesting feature is the analysis of changes made by Blas Roca between the 1943 and 1962 editions of his party history on such topics as the United States role in Cuba’s independence or the cooperation during World War II (pp. 307-310 and 319-323). The narrative underscores the communists’ collaboration with Batista from 1938 through 1944, their effort to renew this alliance after his 1952 seizure of power, and their failure to seek an accommodation with Castro until after the dictator embarked upon a more rigorous repression of the PSP in late 1957.
The authors are least convincing when they seek to demonstrate that Castro’s famous “History Will Absolve Me” speech borrowed heavily from Blas Roca’s writings (pp. 457 ff.) or that the relative economic growth of the Batista years led to material well-being for the masses, rather than just increased prosperity for the upper and middle classes with some benefits to urban skilled labor (pp. 496 ff.). Similarly, this reader remains unconvinced that the guerrilla movement was on the verge of being crushed in 1958 until Raúl Castro, by kidnapping U.S. citizens, maneuvered the Eisenhower administration into curbing Batista’s offensive. As elsewhere in this book, polemics again tend to prevail over canons of historical judgment.
