Julio A. Roca (1843-1914) was a dominant political and military figure at a crucial time in the history of the Argentine Republic. As conqueror of the “desert” (1879-1880), cabinet minister (1878-1880 and 1890-1891), president of the republic (1880-1886 and 1898-1904), maker of presidents and governors, and representative of the “liberal oligarchy,” he directly and indirectly helped give direction to the economic, political, and social transformation of Argentina that began in the 1880s. Despite his obvious importance, Roca has received until now little attention from Argentine historians. A notable exception is José Arce, whose outstanding political biography of Roca, published in 1960, remains the best introduction to a soldier whose motto was Paz y Administración. Two obvious reasons for the dearth of studies on Roca are the inaccessibility of private archives, and the present emphasis on broad economic, political, and social issues. In the eulogistic monograph reviewed here, Aurora Mónica Sánchez shows that the patient scholar can use available documents to great advantage.
Sánchez is primarily concerned with the military and political education of Roca before 1880, and through him, with the contributions of an embryonic and patriotic national army to the “formation of a powerful Nation.” That Roca should have chosen a military career seems only natural. Many of his paternal and maternal relatives had distinguished military records. His father, a professional soldier, had served with San Martín, and had participated in the wars with Brazil and Rolivia. Actually, both father and son were in the same army after 1858, and sometimes in the same unit. They fought for the Confederation at Cepeda and Pavón. As staff officers—a relative was chief of staff—, they accompanied General Wenceslao Paunero on his expedition to establish liberal governments in the interior provinces. In the ensuing campaign against Angel V. Peñaloza, and later against José Felipe Saá, Roca acquired experience in fighting the montonera. From 1864 onwards, he held important assignments on the frontier. Wherever he went, he dedicated himself to improving the training, discipline, morale, and living conditions of the troops, and the care and maintenance of their horses and equipment.
The political apprenticeship of Roca, Sánchez informs us, began when he accompanied Paunero’s chief of staff, Dr. Marcos Paz, on a political-military mission to Catamarca. The lessons his uncle taught him were reinforced in 1867 as he watched his future compadre, Colonel José M. Arredondo, try to persuade La Rioja to support Sarmiento’s bid for the presidency. As president, Sarmiento continued Mitre’s practice of using army officers on political missions needing military support, for his own party was weak, and the “Army then was the only national institution that could protect and enforce federal power.” One officer he heavily relied upon was Roca, who boasted “ ‘I know how to make revolutions in these places without taking part in them.’ ” That this trust was not misplaced was proven when Roca defeated his compadre Arredondo, now Sarmiento’s enemy, at Santa Rosa in 1874. In this campaign Roca also demonstrated his tactical ability, his knowledge of psychological warfare techniques, and his willingness to employ the railroad and telegraph in his operations.
Santa Rosa, Sánchez believes, was the first step on the road to the presidency; the “conquest of the desert” was the other. In 1878 President Arredondo, a fellow tucumano, made Roca his Minister of War and the Navy, partly because he had shown no political ambitions or attachment to any party. Roca was expected to keep the army neutral in the approaching presidential elections. Roca now was able to obtain government authorization to carry out a proposal made in 1872, that is, to take the offensive against the Indians, and in accordance with the law of 1867, to move the frontier boundary to the Río Negro. The success of his desert campaign was made possible by his own ability as an organizer, and by excellent army topographical studies of the area.
Sánchez properly stresses, this reviewer is convinced, the role of the army in forging the Argentine Republic. However, although Roca could say at the conclusion of the desert campaign that “ ‘We are preparing the cradle of a gigantic Nation,’ ” it is doubtful that the men in the armed forces shared his vision and enthusiasm. Aside from this question, Sánchez has presented us with valuable insights into the early fife of the man who was to start Argentina on the way to becoming a modern state.