If Lorenzo Meyer’s history was designed for the specialist, his straightforward narrative and analysis are comprehensible to all. He emphasizes the diplomatic rather than the economic issues of the petroleum controversy in ten chronological chapters, and draws parallels between the development of Mexico’s oil industry and her Revolution.
This work was thoroughly researched in archives in both Mexico and the United States. It is definitive in that it documents many previously accepted but uncorroborated ideas. Unfortunately, the writer was denied access to State Department files for 1934-1942 and thus relied heavily upon the “Josephus Daniels Papers” and Foreign Relations for this vital period. The reviewer has seen the diplomatic correspondence for the omitted era, and the author should have been afforded equal privileges in the furtherance of scholarship and good neighborliness. The State Department files reveal such facts as the Mexicans’ refusal to submit the 1938 expropriation matter to arbitration, because they deemed the United States untrustworthy, remembering that it had reneged on the arbitral award of 1911 in the Chamizal case.
Meyer’s perceptive commentary on Mexican power politics presents new insights into the petroleum lobbies in Mexico City and Washington. With unbiased empathy he shows the validity of Mexico’s complaints about foreigners’ deriving an overabundance of profit from a nonrenewable natural resource. He understands United States history and never abuses his license to criticize.
The diplomatic interplay evolving from Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution is detailed and particularly illuminates the policies of the Carranza administration. The oil conflict is stressed as a major test of the Good Neighbor Policy, and as the last grave confrontation between the United States and Mexico brought about by the 1917 program of the Mexican Revolution. Ambassador Daniels, who advocated protecting the oil interests, is depicted as having underestimated Cárdenas, while Secretary of State Cordell Hull wisely adhered to the policy of nonintervention. Meyer contends that Cárdenas was justified in terminating the policy of colonialism inherited from the Díaz epoch, and that he placed Mexico in control of her own destiny. He concedes that the petroleum takeover risked economic disaster, although it proved beneficial psychologically. Nationalization is explained as part of Mexico’s maturation, started by the Mexican Revolution and accelerated by World War II, which eventually led to improved relations with the United States.
The book is printed beautifully on fine paper, but the binding deteriorates rapidly. An English version would be useful, preferably with the addition of bibliography and index. Research libraries, Mexicanists, and inter-American relations experts will want to add this volume to their collections.
