The purpose of Arnold Payne’s monograph is “to analyze the significance of the coup d’état which deposed the government of President Manuel Prado on July 18, 1962.” In order to achieve this purpose, Payne makes a distinction between the “typical” and the “significant” coup d’état. The “typical” coup d’état, according to him, has “little import for the political system beyond the immediate transfer of power from one regime to another,” while the “significant” coup d’état inaugurates “a new period of political development, which . . . [is] distinguished from the preceding era by the following innovations: 1) the adoption of a new position by the leaders of the armed forces regarding their guardianship function; 2) the assumption of executive power by a new political elite; 3) a realignment of the country’s political power contenders; and 4) a new role (or lack of one) for political parties.” Utilizing this distinction, Payne argues that Peru has experienced three “significant” coups d’état in its history. These “watersheds in Peruvian history,” as Payne terms them, occurred in 1895, 1914, and 1962. Thus Payne’s analysis serves to remind us that all Latin American (or at least all Peruvian) coups d’état do not always spring from similar motives and do not, therefore, always have similar results.
Nevertheless, Payne’s case for the significance of the Peruvian coup d’état of 1962 lacks development. He does not offer enough evidence to demonstrate that the 1962 Peruvian coup truly inaugurated “a new period of political development.” He does adequately demonstrate that the 1962 Peruvian coup entailed “the assumption of executive power by a new political elite,” but he does not adequately demonstrate that it entailed the remaining “innovations.” In my opinion, it is possible that the remaining “innovations” did not obtain in Peru in 1962. For example, if the first “innovation” characterized the coup of 1962, why was Belaúnde overthrown in 1968? It might be that “the leaders of the armed forces” changed their attitudes “regarding their guardianship function” between 1962 and 1968; but if this occurred, it means that a “significant” coup might not remain significant, and, therefore, would not actually herald “a new period of political development.” This same type of comment, I think, might be made of the remaining “innovations.”
On the whole, however, Payne’s monograph serves the important function of providing basic information on the 1962 Peruvian coup d’état. This alone makes it valuable.
