In tracing “the history of the development of Brazilian nationalism” (p. 8), E. Bradford Burns provides a readable text followed by a useful ten-page bibliographical essay. The text covers three periods: “colonial nativism, nineteenth-century defensive nationalism, and twentieth-century offensive nationalism” (p. 8).
The birth and development of a devotion to Brazil is told with enlightening contemporary quotations and references to appropriate events that help explain why Brazil “did not fragment after independence” (p. 28). The manner in which this independence was achieved, Burns points out, meant that “for some time Brazilian nationalism failed to focus sharply” (p. 31). It was helped along by unfavorable reactions to words and deeds of foreigners. The Portuguese, British, and Spanish Americans were the chief culprits in those days.
For a while after the establishment of the republic, nationalism was promoted principally by intellectuals. A number of these, Burns shows, “became deeply involved in politics in the . . . 1920’s and 1930’s” (p. 67). Much that they called for in their writings, such as the suppression of regionalism, was achieved by Getúlio Vargas in the 1930s and early 1940s, when he governed unrestrained by political democracy. It was then that “the state replaced the intellectual as the primary guardian and promoter of nationalism” (p. 85) and that the shift occurred from cultural and political nationalism to economic nationalism.
The nationalists, with whom Burns is sympathetic, attained their high point during “the dynamic Kubitschek-Quadros-Goulart era” (p. 90) of 1956-1964. Burns finds nationalism in these years characterized by 1) a political leftist leadership, 2) increased criticism of foreign economic domination, 3) strong attacks against the United States, and 4) great attention to economic development. Francisco San Tiago Dantas, presenting himself as a nationalist and leftist in 1962, correlated nationalism with “the exclusive consideration of the interests of Brazil” (p. 109). Like a number of the quoted statements about the laudable aims of nationalists, his is less useful than Burns’ characterization. When, as Finance Minister in 1963, San Tiago Dantas sought to further what he felt were Brazil’s interests, he fell from power, labeled “antireformist” by the more advanced nationalists. Would-be leaders, who regarded leftism and nationalism as politically useful, condemned the International Monetary Fund’s anti-inflationary preachings, denounced the Alliance for Progress, called for the “expropriation or nationalization of foreign-owned property,” (p. 106), and praised the Cuban way.
The painful steps taken by the post-Goulart military regime to curb most of the rampant inflation inherited from the nationalists were, of course, unpopular. They gave unhappy “outs” like Henrique Lott and Doutel de Andrade a great opportunity to issue statements criticizing the new regime. Burns is inclined to agree with such statements, for he considers the military government anti-nationalistic and feels that its economic policy has reflected its “lack of genuine concern for the well-being of the populace” (p. 132). “Events,” he says, “seem to indicate that the military sought power both for its own sake and also to prevent change” (p. 132).
Burns implies that reforms advocated by those nationalists who lost influence in April 1964 would better have enabled Brazil to “provide a more decent life for all” (p. 133) than the steps which the Humberto Castelo Branco government decided to take. Some readers may find it difficult to form their own conclusions about these important issues without the help of analyses more profound than a survey such as this book can provide. But in any event all must agree that Burns has acquainted the reader with the “long history” of the “nationalist spirit in Brazil” (p. 5). This spirit, as he informs us in some of his passages, is not always linked to logic.
