This work consists of a series of essays that trace various trends in Cuban history, mostly since 1898, as an explanation of the Castro revolution. It is beautifully written, thoughtful, and sound, but the entire lack of documentation cannot be justified for a book that so largely depends on quotations or paraphrasings of other writers. In the introductory chapter Ruiz presents a fine summary of the Cuban paradox. He stresses the comparatively advanced state of Cuba and not its misery as the setting for revolution. According to him, Castro was probably not a Communist prior to his attainment of power, but, determined to break away from American domination, he turned to the Soviet Union despite the initial friendliness of Washington. Ruiz holds that Cuban society was fluid and immature, given to self-pity. Because only the Communists had a useful organization as well as a program embodying previous frustrations, he feels that Castro made a deliberate choice.
In sketching the roots of Cuban nationalism, Ruiz sets forth the Cuban version of history. According to this, the United States wrenched victory away from the rebels of 1898 and imposed a tutelage that gave Cuba an inferiority complex and distorted her economy. A provocative chapter on José Martí shows how the earlier hero established a mold for Castro’s 26th of July movement. Machado and Batista receive fair consideration. The refusal of the United States to recognize Ramón Grau San Martín in 1933 seems fateful to the author, for the revolution was blunted, and Cuba’s dependence on the Americans became intensified. The pattern was not to be broken despite many social welfare measures and the constitution of 1940. Hence Cuba’s uneven prosperity mainly benefited upper income groups tied to the United States, while the formless middle sectors strove for luxuries like those which the rich enjoyed. Meanwhile rural unemployment grew, organized labor became corrupted, and intellectuals were bitter and alienated. Socialism, long a factor in Cuban history, became more attractive, and the Communists developed a good organization, sometimes with Batista’s aid.
Ruiz ably describes the middle groups, who did not really constitute a class. The Church was very weak, and the army did not play the familiar Latin American role. The blacks he depicts as more depressed than most writers have regarded them. Strident nationalism, uniting with old revolutionary traditions and exploiting accumulated frustrations, took a militant form without any important resistance. Institutions were weak and unstable; corruption saturated all aspects of life; and political leaders had no moral authority. Thus the politically gifted Castro was able to topple the regime and give the island an altogether new orientation.
Useful as this book is, the absence of documentation cannot be excused. At times Ruiz asserts too confidently what popular opinion was. He tends to favor the Cuban interpretation of events over the American, and he does not realize that foreign ownership of the Cuban sugar industry declined sharply long before Castro came to power. Nor does Ruiz show much compassion for the very large number of Cubans killed, mistreated, or exiled by the present regime. His statement that massive economic development and the expansion of the middle sectors failed to deter the revolution should unsettle policymakers. The small community of Cuban experts will discover little that is original or new, but others should find this work a splendid introduction to a complex subject. Of course, neither this book nor any other can truly explain to general satisfaction why the Castro revolution happened.
