Edwin Lieuwen’s latest work represents another important contribution to our understanding of the role of the military in Latin American politics. This thin volume describes how the military leaders of the Mexican Revolution seized power during the 1910-1914 period, how they exercised that power during the following two decades, and how this power was taken from them during the Cárdenas administration. In a brief epilogue, the author notes the continuing decline of political influence of the Mexican military since the 1940 elections.
Considering the many events and personalities that filled the Mexican public scene during the troubled years from 1910 to 1940, the author has undertaken a most difficult task. Although important documents in the files of the Secretaría de Gobernación and the Secretaria de Defensa are still unavailable to scholars, Lieuwen has consulted a variety of printed documents, books, newspapers, and periodicals. Also, he has drawn heavily on unpublished reports by U.S. consular and diplomatic personnel; and he has obtained valuable information from research in the Obregón and Calles presidential papers located in the Archivo General de la Nación in Mexico City. Although inconveniently located at the end of the book, a total of 454 notes provide the reader with detailed references to the source materials used. Three appendices, a bibliography, a glossary of Spanish terms, and an 8-page index further add to the usefulness of this book. Also to be noted is the fact that the attractiveness of the artistically printed volume is enhanced through use of numerous illustrations, including selections from La Revolución Mexicana vista por José Guadalupe Posada.
Unfortunately, the work suffers from minor defects which more careful editing could have corrected: the subheading Amaro Recognizes the Army should be Amaro Reorganizes the Army (p. vi); the first name of Rudolfo Herrero (p. 54) and Rudolfo Calles (p. 115) is Rodolfo; Luis I. Rodríguez, not Ruiz Rodríguez (p. 135), was President of the PRM; and Padilla’s first name is Ezequiel, not Ezekiel. Also, in his youth Cárdenas was employed in a print shop rather than a paint shop (p. 113). Further, reference is made to General José Refugio (p. 24), omitting his surname, Velasco. Finally, it is inaccurate to state that “Carranza was shot in his sleep by General Rudolfo Herrero” (p. 54). No doubt the Mexican president was killed by bullets fired by Herrero’s men, but there is no evidence that Herrero fired the fatal shots.
Despite these flaws, Lieuwen’s Mexican Militarism is a valuable addition to the growing bibliography of English language books on the Mexican Revolution. It belongs on all modern Mexican political history reading lists, along with the well-known works by Cline, Cumberland, Ross, Quirk, Dulles, and Wilkie.
