The Intendant System and the Cabildos of Peru, 1784-1810

Bourbon administrative reform in Spain and in her Empire sought to centralize and improve the structure of government, to create more efficient economic and financial machinery, and in general to restore integrity and respect for law at all levels of administration. In the Empire the viceroyalty of Peru presented perhaps the most obvious need for reform, as its standards of administration had notoriously declined. Overhauling the administrative structure of the viceroyalty began in 1776 with the appointment of a visitor-general, José Antonio de Areche. Areche achieved little, partly because of his own ineptitude, but largely because of opposition from conservative forces within the viceroyalty. The outbreak of the Túpac Amaru rebellion in 1780 brought his constructive work to an end and emphasized his failure to improve administration in the provinces.¹ But the visita was energetically revived by Jorge Escobedo, and it reached its peak in 1784 with the establishment of a new system of administration, in which seven intendants replaced the corregidores.² It was hoped that the new administrators, with carefully defined powers and duties, would succeed in reviving the decadent viceroyalty.

Before the introduction of the intendant system the cabildos of Peru shared the inertia of other administrative bodies and corporations in the viceroyalty. The conditions of municipal life and government were at least as bad as those which prevailed in the newly formed viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata.³ After the golden age of municipal activity in the sixteenth century, local government lost its enterprise, imagination, and vitality, as the Crown tightened its control and extended the practice of selling offices.⁴ During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the decline showed itself in less frequent cabildo meetings, reluctance to purchase municipal office, peculation and maladministration of the inadequate municipal funds, absence of municipal building and expansion, and inability to deal decisively with urgent matters of public administration.⁵

The number of regidores permitted for each cabildo varied according to the status of the settlement. In a ciudad such as Lima the maximum was twelve.⁶ These posts were normally filled by creoles; indeed, the cabildos were the only important organizations capable of representing exclusively creole interests. There was no prohibition against peninsulares holding cabildo office, but the Crown recognized the need to emphasize creole involvement. In 1781 the Council of the Indies confirmed the viceroy’s decision to accept the lower of two bids for the office of alcalde provincial in the town of Cañete. The higher bid came from a man born in Spain, but his offer was rejected on the grounds that he was socially inferior to his rival, the Conde de Monteblaneo, descendant of a distinguished family of conquistadores.⁷

In such a case personal rivalry might increase the sums which applicants were prepared to pay, but generally enthusiasm to obtain municipal office was rare. The reason was not the poverty of the Peruvians. It was simply that, by the second half of the eighteenth century, royal officials exercised such close control over cabildo activities that the cabildos no longer possessed their earlier freedom of action. The prospect of office had lost its attractions.

Outside Lima the cabildos were dominated by the corregidores (who presided over their meetings) or occasionally by the ecclesiastical authorities, while in the capital the cabildo, more decayed, was firmly under the control of the viceroy.⁸ A special commissioner appointed by Areche in 1781 to reform municipal finances paid particular attention to the elections of alcaldes and other officials in Lima for the following year. He concluded that the process of election was a sham, since the cabildo merely confirmed decisions previously taken by the viceroy.⁹ The process preserved the pretense of free choice, but the clerk of the cabildo called it “a mere ceremony.” The names of those to be elected were public knowledge several days before January 1, the traditional date of the formal elections, when the capitulars assembled to confirm, by acclamation, the viceroy’s choices.¹⁰

The significance of this viceregal interference went beyond the fact that the cabildo was denied the right to choose its officers freely. As a consequence, the body became a skeleton, stripped of its luster and splendor and unable to fill its vacancies, since citizens were not prepared to pay for membership in a corporation which was publicly known to be dominated by the viceroy. Even those who held titles as regidores were reluctant to attend the regular cabildo meetings throughout the year, and in 1782 the viceroy was forced to request that temporary regidores be appointed to insure that the work of the corporation would continue.¹¹ Regular members were threatened with fines unless their attendance improved.¹²

The establishment of the intendant system did not bring increased interference in cabildo elections. On the contrary it led to determined efforts on behalf of Escobedo to insure that the cabildos, in particular that of Lima, should regain a freedom of choice which had been denied to them for many years.¹³ Each intendant received the power to confirm the election of alcaldes ordinarios and to preside over meetings of the cabildo of his provincial capital. This grant, however, involved merely a transfer of powers previously enjoyed by the viceroy and the corregidor respectively.¹⁴ In any ease, this authority was partly restored to the viceroy in 1787 when Article Eight of the Ordinance of Intendants was repealed. Thereafter, the viceroys or presidents of the audiencias in major cities held the power to confirm elections.¹⁵ In towns more than fifteen leagues distant from the seat of the viceroy or an audiencia, the intendants retained the right of confirmation, but were warned of the necessity to report promptly to the viceroy. In 1783, while preparing for the new system of administration, Escobedo feared that removing the heavy hands of the corregidores in the provinces might complicate the control of intrigue and faction appearing in some cabildos.¹⁶ Moreover, he was apprehensive lest the cabildo of Lima should use the actual ceremony of installing the intendants for an ostentatious demonstration of its privileges, as the cabildo of Buenos Aires had done.¹⁷

Anxious to avoid friction over points of protocol, Escobedo saw the establishment of the intendancies as an opportunity to revitalize municipal life and government, and he was determined that this important aim should not be frustrated by petty disputes. Thus for the benefit of both cabildos and intendants he issued an instruction regulating their joint ceremonies and providing a code of behavior.¹⁸ This emphasized the obligation of regidores and intendants to be regular and punctual in their attendance at meetings. To safeguard the authority of the intendants cabildos were forbidden to make secret representations to other tribunals or superiors, unless they had good grounds for complaint.

One of the main tasks which Escobedo faced as intendant of Lima was to revive the cabildo over which he presided. In April 1784, before formally assuming the presidency, he began this process of reform by removing from office the regidor, Antonio Álvarez de Ron, on the grounds that he was notorious for his corruption and intrigues and that he had led the cabildo in opposing Areche’s attempts to reform the administration of the propios.¹⁹ The next step was to fill the vacancies among the regidores, since by July 1784 the cabildo had no more than three.²⁰ It was clear that the cabildo could not fulfil its functions without members, but citizens had been unwilling to purchase the posts. The solution proposed by Escobedo and eagerly accepted by Viceroy Croix was that ten distinguished citizens of Lima should be persuaded to accept the posts, without charge and for life.²¹ Those selected, all members of the capital’s creole aristocracy, took office on the very day that Escobedo was officially received by the cabildo. In 1785 the Crown formally confirmed their appointment for life.²² Escobedo’s insistence that such a step would make the office of regidor more attractive and insure profitable sales of vacancies was fully borne out in subsequent years. In fact the cabildo complained in 1797 that frequent attempts to purchase varas or to revive old titles, together with the viceroy’s carelessness in dealing with such attempts, had raised cabildo membership to twenty regidores, eight above the official maximum.²³

The deficiencies of the Lima cabildo in 1784 mirrored those of other cabildos in the viceroyalty. Most of the new intendants found it necessary to bring them up to strength before they could use them as instruments for improving municipal affairs and public administration. The new intendant of Tarma, Juan María de Gálvez, found his capital without a cabildo.²⁴ He immediately appointed regidores and arranged for the election of alcaldes and the provision of municipal funds. The new cabildo met twice a week and according to the intendant made speedy progress in the cleaning of the streets, the regulation of food supplies, and the general organization of town life.

The provincial visita by Intendant Gálvez revealed much about the needs and conditions of municipal life outside of his capital. In the city of León de Huánuco the few regidores undertook little work, and the sala of the cabildo was opened only once a year, for the election of an alcalde ordinario.²⁵ The streets were dirty, the roads ill kept, and no attempt was made to undertake public works. Some of the lands intended to provide city funds had been usurped, others were let at very low rents, and the remainder unworked. The first step which Galvez took to remedy this state of affairs was to encourage the citizens to fill the cabildo vacancies and to restore the practice of twice-weekly meetings. He overhauled municipal finances, appointed a commissioner to administer the propios, and was able to increase their annual yield at once from 300 to 600 pesos. By 1793 they were producing 719 pesos.²⁶ Before Gálvez moved on he provided a public fountain and a tree-lined public walk in the city center.

In Huarás, capital of the partido of Huaylas, Gálvez founded a cabildo with two alcaldes and four regidores.²⁷ He formed another in the town of Atún Jauja, capital of the partido of Jauja, hoping to use the corporation as an agent to encourage the inhabitants to exploit the area’s rich mineral resources.²⁸ In each case steps were taken to insure a regular supply of municipal funds. In Jauja, for example, the cabildo was to let out the management of bullfights to a contractor. Partly aided by public contributions, the new cabildo cooperated with the intendant in his desire to improve public administration. One of its first steps was to arrange for the construction of an aqueduct to insure an adequate water supply. To illustrate his conclusion that he had succeeded in stimulating the people of Jauja to an interest in public affairs, Gálvez reported that the saleable office of alguacil mayor, previously unwanted because of the corregidor’s tight control, was now sought after by applicants eager to participate in useful work. He added that all the streets were regularly cleaned and some paved, and that a number of houses had been repaired and whitewashed.

Clearly an improvement in municipal administration depended in part upon the provision of adequate municipal funds. Throughout the viceroyalty the arrival of the intendants was followed by the inspection and reform of the propios and arbitrios. Sometimes the process began before their arrival. In Trujillo, for example, Escobedo increased the income from the arbitrios of mojonazgo and sisa, charged on aguardiente and wine, by transferring their collection from a private contractor to the exchequer officials.²⁹ The contractor had paid the cabildo 1,000 pesos annually; but under the new system the yield in the first five months, July to November 1783, was 1,175 pesos 3 reales. The cabildo, at first resentful of interference, thanked Escobedo for the benefits of the reform at the beginning of 1784.³⁰ As visitor-general, Escobedo was authorized to regulate the propios and arbitrios of the whole vieeroyalty, but he resolved to leave the control of affairs outside the province of Lima to the individual intendants, acting under the supervision of the junta superior. In this manner he hoped to avoid confusion and clashes of jurisdiction.³¹

The Ordinance of Intendants contained precise instructions on the procedure for establishing the machinery of control over municipal revenue and over the communal funds of the Indian villages.³² Having obtained information from the cabildos on the collection and expenditure of municipal funds, the intendants were to issue provisional reglamentos for their future administration; these were to be submitted for approval to the junta superior in Lima. In each city and town funds were to be controlled by a junta municipal composed of the senior alcalde ordinario, two regidores, and the procurador general, the latter without a vote. It was made clear that the cabildo as a body must not interfere with the work of the junta.³³ Each junta, acting under the supervision of the intendant, was to elect a majordomo, who would be responsible for the security of the existing funds and would prepare the annual accounts for the contaduría general in Lima. Further articles described the procedure for the transfer of surplus funds to the provincial treasuries and for the accounting, to be carried out by exchequer officials.³⁴ The heavy burden of work on the treasury officials in Lima province convinced Escobedo that here these functions should be performed by the contador general de propios.³⁵

In 1782 Areche had vainly attempted to investigate and reform the administration of municipal finances in Lima. He had failed largely because the cabildo proved reluctant to cooperate with the visitor’s special commissioner.³⁶ In 1784, however, Escobedo found that the cabildo was anxious to help secure the good administration of the propios.³⁷ This new attitude reflected the general enthusiasm resulting from the appointment of new regidores. A report provided by the cabildo, based on statistics for 1783, showed that the annual yield from propios and arbitrios in Lima was 36,379 pesos, while fixed costs, such as salaries, interest on debts, and costs of fiestas, amounted to 20,591 pesos, leaving only 15,786 for extraordinary expenses and public works.³⁸ A reglamento issued by Escobedo in February 1785, initiated the program of reform by reducing fixed costs to 17,387 pesos.³⁹

Some intendants found it difficult to obtain the detailed financial information essential for the preparation of the reglamentos.⁴⁰ The contador general de propios cited this reason for delay when, in 1787, he provided the general statement of municipal finances for the viceroyalty demanded by article 47 of the Ordinance of Intendants.⁴¹ The statement showed that in the principal towns and cities of Peru the income from propios and arbitrios was 54,491 pesos. After initial regulation by the intendants, fixed expenditure amounted to 31,266 pesos, leaving only 23,326 pesos for public works and administration. It was clear that throughout the viceroyalty there was an urgent need to increase the yield of the propios and to find new arbitrios. Some places had virtually no funds for public works. In Huancavelica, for example, the annual income of 1,199 pesos 6½ reales was barely adequate to pay the salaries of municipal employees. In Arequipa 5,107 pesos 4½ reales were necessary for fixed expenses, leaving a balance of only 535 pesos for public works. This sum was completely inadequate to meet the expenses caused by the earthquake of May 1784, which destroyed many public buildings.⁴² One method used by Intendant Antonio Álvarez y Jiménez to increase income was to raise the tax on maize used for making chicha from a half real to one real on each fanega.

In Lima Escobedo was anxious to find a new source of income to pay for public administration without arousing public discontent. He solved the problem by collecting an arbitrio known as bodegaje from shipowners who carried Chilean grain to Callao.⁴³ It was estimated that at the rate of one real per fanega this would bring in over 28,000 pesos a year, to be devoted to the expenses of cleaning and lighting the streets of Lima. In practice, as a result of complaints from the shipowners, the tax was transferred from them to the merchants who carried the grain from Callao to Lima.⁴⁴ Since these latter had been making an excessive profit previously, they were ordered to pay at a rate of one real per fanega, but forbidden to increase the prices charged to the bakers of the capital. Despite initial difficulties in enforcing payment, bodegaje was quickly established as a reliable source of income with an average yield of about 25,000 pesos.⁴⁵

As intendant of Lima Escobedo was responsible for regulating the municipal funds of Ica. Since they totaled only 284 pesos, it was considered essential to find new arbitrios.⁴⁶ Observing that the partido produced 20,000 arrobas of chilli each year, the cabildo suggested that a tax of 1½ or 2 reales should be added to the price of 14 reales per arroba. Escobedo and the junta superior accepted the idea, but limited the tax to one real. They also partly offset the gain with their decision that as the subdelegate of Ica lacked office accommodation and received only a small income, the rent of his house, 200 pesos a year, should be paid from the income of the propios. The cabildo was quite agreeable to this detail, but a cédula of 1788 ordered that the subdelegate should meet his own domestic expenses.⁴⁷

Another way to improve the financial condition of the municipalities was to eradicate waste, particularly in ceremonial functions, which often took precedence over administrative activity. This was particularly true in Lima, where the cabildo commonly made a great outlay to receive new viceroys. Despite a rebuke from the Crown for spending 30,000 pesos on the reception of Jáuregui, the cabildo used 46,119 pesos for the ceremonies connected with the coming of Croix in April 1784.⁴⁸ On the viceroy’s arrival at Callao, all the public dignitaries of the capital visited him at the cabildo's expense. Further costly items included the adornment of the viceregal palace, a public reception in Lima, and a bullfight in the viceroy’s honor. Not only did these ceremonies use up financial reserves, but considerable sums had to be borrowed at interest, and it was clear to Escobedo that money could not be wasted in this way if public administration were to be improved. The cabildo hesitated to accept reform, because some of its members used such occasions to make profits, while others were always anxious to impress a new viceroy. With cooperation from Croix, who shared his desire for a more productive use of resources, however, Escobedo prepared a new ceremonial which ordered that the costs of future receptions should not exceed 12,000 pesos.⁴⁹ Although the cabildo frequently sought permission to exceed this sum, the most expensive reception in subsequent years, that of Avilés in 1801, cost only 15,000 pesos.⁵⁰

According to the pattern which emerges in Lima and other cities the establishment of the intendancies was marked by attempts to revive the cabildos and to improve municipal finances, with the aim of making money and energies available for the improvement of public administration. An exception to this general pattern was the case of Cuzco, where the first intendant, Benito de la Mata Linares, was too suspicious of creole plots against the Crown to stimulate the only corporation in the city which was composed largely of creoles. In 1785, for example, he advised removing from office the regidor Buenaventura Guebara, whom he claimed to be part of a closely interwoven net of conspirators.⁵¹ Moreover, there is evidence that the Cuzco cabildo’s initiative in matters of public administration was stifled by the creation in 1787 of the audiencia, which dealt with a variety of matters ranging from public order to street cleaning.⁵²

Elsewhere the arrival of the intendants was marked by a genuine revival of municipal activity. In 1785 the cabildo of Trujillo expressed its gratitude for the moderation and good management which its intendant, Fernando Saavedra, had shown in public administration.⁵³ The cabildo of Huancavelica testified in 1788 to the great improvement of the town under the first intendant, Fernando Márquez de la Plata.⁵⁴ When he arrived the town had been dirty, with an inadequate water supply and poor roads, but Márquez soon arranged for the repair of an old fountain, the construction of a new one, and the improvement of roads and drainage. In cooperation with the cabildo he built a new bridge to facilitate the supply of food. The cabildo emphasized the intendant’s honesty and his “temperate behavior towards the citizens.”

Similar reports came from Arequipa, where in 1787 and 1788 the cabildo reported favorably upon the improvement in public administration brought about by the intendant Álvarez.⁵⁵ It was particularly impressed with his work to increase the yield of the propios, to provide schools, to rebuild the prison, hospital, and bridges, and generally to repair the ravages of the earthquake of 1784. Beneath the surface, however, relations between Álvarez and some of the regidores were less harmonious. In 1790 the intendant reported protests to the viceroy from three regidores that since municipal officials such as the schoolteacher, the surgeon, and the assessor of the cabildo received their salaries out of the propios, they should be appointed by the cabildo rather than by the intendant.⁵⁶ The latter official derived his power of appointment from the reglamento of propios and arbitrios, which he had drawn up in 1787, and which the cabildo had then approved.⁵⁷ The intendant pointed out that in exercizing this authority he was in no way usurping rights previously enjoyed by the cabildo since he himself had created most of the posts. The complaint made against the intendant’s authority does not constitute a representation from the cabildo, since it was made by only three regidores. Indeed the incident demonstrates, not the usurpation of cabildo rights, but the improvement of municipal affairs by the intendant, which in turn led members of the cabildo to seek a greater responsibility for the management of their own affairs.

Escobedo hoped that an improvement in conditions at Lima would follow the revitalization of the cabildo and the overhaul of municipal finances. Throughout 1784 and 1785 orders and regulations were issued to deal with public administration, especially with the cleaning and lighting of the streets, regulation of food supplies and prices, control of guilds, and the restoration of the city walls.⁵⁸ Yet in December 1785 Escobedo complained strongly to the cabildo that little real progress had been made in the previous eighteen months.⁵⁹ He recalled that in August 1784 the cabildo had been allowed to control the cleaning of the streets, dirty and insanitary largely because of the many open drains and sewers. As a result of his pressure, in December 1784 the cabildo divided the city into four cuadras, each supervised by a regidor, and four months later each cuadra was subdivided into ten barrios, each administered by an alcalde de barrio.

Escobedo was optimistic about the likely results of this scheme, especially after the decision to finance the work with bodegaje. But the alcaldes made little progress, largely because they had no effective means of imposing their authority on the citizens. In June 1785 Escobedo complained that the cabildo lacked interest in the enforcement of its decisions, and he also expressed concern at the failure of some regidores to attend meetings.⁶⁰ In December he again pointed out that although the cabildo was prepared to discuss ideas and approve plans, the public administration of the city was in a deplorable state, because the regidores had little interest in achieving positive results.

In its reply the cabildo acknowledged the superintendent’s good intentions, but suggested that his impression of progress made was too pessimistic.⁶¹ Although the alcaldes de barrio had been unable to enforce their decisions, the provision of cheap foodstuffs had improved. The failure of regidores to appear at meetings was due sometimes to illness and sometimes to business outside the city, but the cabildo assured Escobedo that enough always attended to deal with necessary business. Despite these assurances, it appears that Escobedo had underestimated the task of stimulating the cabildo to take an active part in the improvement of Lima. The creole elite always assumed posts of honor and privileges more readily than responsibilities.

Escobedo persevered, however, and made considerable progress. After receiving royal approval for the establishment of the alcaldes de barrio, Escobedo drew up a new reglamento for the policing of Lima, which reinforced the alcaldes with constables paid from the profits of the public lottery. In a radical attempt to provide central direction, he appointed one of the most distinguished alcaldes de barrio, José María de Egaña, to a new post of teniente de policía, with the honors of regidor and a salary of 3,000 pesos.⁶² Apparently the innovations succeeded, for by April 1787 the streets were free of refuse, and considerable progress had been made with paving and lighting.⁶³

Escobedo’s relationship with the cabildo in 1787 was mixed. There are signs that it resented the improved efficiency and centralization of authority brought about by the creation of the tenencia de policía. Moreover, the prestige-conscious regidores objected strongly to having Escobedo’s legal adviser, Manuel del Valle, preside over their meetings in his absence.⁶⁴ For his part Escobedo saw himself as the protector of the cabildo’s freedom to elect its alcaldes ordinarios without interference, although he failed to prevent the viceroy from regaining the right to confirm the elections.⁶⁵ He argued that the four alcaldes elected since the establishment of the intendant system were the first in memory to have received their posts by free vote of the regidores, rather than by pressure or bribery.

Evidence from the minute-books of the Lima cabildo bears out this claim; moreover it is clear that even after the confirming power had been restored to the viceroy in 1787, the cabildo continued to elect freely. The records show that between 1787 and 1810 the alcaldes were selected by secret vote on 19 occasions, while in only five years were they appointed by acclamation.⁶⁶ On twelve occasions voting was unanimous; on the other twelve a split in voting was recorded. At first sight unanimity and acclamation might suggest the possibility of outside pressure.

The cabildo made such vehement protests on the two occasions when the viceroy did try to interfere with its electoral freedom, however, that it was clearly accustomed after 1784 to elect its alcaldes and other officials without viceregal interference. In 1805, when the viceroy ordered that the procurador general should be reelected, the cabildo resisted and persuaded the viceroy not to dictate elections.⁶⁷ At the end of 1809, having elected its alcaldes for the coming year, the cabildo was surprised to learn that Abascal had allowed those chosen to persuade him that they were too busy to serve and had ordered fresh elections.⁶⁸ After considerable discussion the regidores accepted the decision, rather than reveal to the public any disagreement with the viceroy. But to uphold “the privileges and rights of the cabildo,” they insisted on sending “a respectful but firm representation.” In this they informed the viceroy that his right to confirm elections was only a formality and that under no circumstances could he revoke the cabildo’s decision or resist its wishes.⁶⁹ In reply the viceroy promised that in the future he would not allow those elected to renounce their posts without first consulting the cabildo.

One of the many complaints which Croix made against the intendant system in 1789 was that the new administrators oppressed the cabildos and ignored their decisions and rights, with the result that the citizens of the viceroyalty refused to take an active interest in public affairs.⁷⁰ The available evidence contradicts this assertion. Before 1784 the cabildos had been inactive and lethargic with little real independence, but they cooperated in the reform and revitalization which followed the arrival of the intendants. Municipal life was far healthier in 1789 than it had been five years earlier. When the cabildos eventually complained about the authority of the intendants, they were responding not to oppression, but to their own increased awareness of the scope and possibilities of local government instilled by the intendants. When cabildos came to demand “the restoration of rights” what they were really seeking was control over what the intendants had created.

This point is illustrated by the attitude of the Lima cabildo toward the tenencia de policía. In the view of Viceroy Croix the cabildo welcomed the practical benefits of the new office, but would have been happier if it had been granted the power to appoint the teniente, perhaps by rotating its choice among the regidores.⁷¹ Apparently the cabildo came to resent the increasing authority and efficiency of the teniente, for it made a number of complaints to the viceroy about his encroachment upon its privileges.⁷² These complaints ceased only when the tenencia was abolished in 1802 and its valuable source of income, bodegaje, transferred to the cabildo’s direct control.⁷³

A similar sensitivity may be found in the attitude of the Lima cabildo toward other local offices. In 1791 it sent to its representative in Madrid a demand for the restoration of its traditional right annually to reelect or dismiss municipal employees such as the assessor, the steward, the archivist, and the porters.⁷⁴ Escobedo had made the posts permanent, but the cabildo now sought a declaration that it could freely appoint and remove the officials. The Council of the Indies rejected the application.⁷⁵

After the first few years of the intendancy in Peru the evidence points to a continuing cooperation between cabildos and intendants, paralleled by a growing desire for more freedom from centralized control, especially in the application of municipal funds. In 1793, for example, the cabildo of Arequipa, supported by the intendant, protested about a cédula of 1789, which ordered that in the intendant’s absence from his capital command should devolve upon the senior military officer.⁷⁶ The protest bore fruit, for the Council of the Indies decided that the officer’s authority should be limited to military affairs, while matters political and financial would be controlled by the teniente asesor, with the aid of the alcaldes.⁷⁷

In 1795, after ten years of distinguished service in Arequipa, Intendant Álvarez was informed of the decision to relieve him.⁷⁸ On receipt of the news the cabildo eulogized him, bemoaning the loss of its “declared protector” who had always treated it well.⁷⁹ But it soon recovered from its grief and tried to exploit the situation to claim the privileges which some of its members had sought in 1790.

Most important of these privileges was the right freely to appoint to the posts of asesor de juzgados, schoolteacher, Latin master, and surgeon,⁸⁰ which Álvarez had reserved to himself in his reglamento de propios and arbitrios. The cabildo pointed out that it had not challenged such an arrangement because of Álvarez’s outstanding personal qualities. However, to avoid disputes with the new intendant, who would doubtless wish to continue the same policy, it wanted the “restoration” of the right freely to elect to all posts. Since public employees were paid from the income of the propios, “which is the patrimony of the people,” these employees should be satisfactory to the people and to the cabildos which represented them. The cabildo argued further that the existing system offered too much chance for securing employment by “illicit means.” Also, those appointed ignored the authority of the cabildo and became partisans of the intendant, to whom they owed their appointment. The cabildo concluded with the assertion that the right to appoint to municipal posts was an integral part of “the economic jurisdiction” which it enjoyed. Although it had temporarily renounced this in favor of Álvarez it now wished to have it restored.

The political ideas presented by the cabildo are most important. It sought to justify its claim to control appointments on the grounds that since the people paid taxes they should control their expenditure—an attitude which might have far-reaching consequences. It is clear that the cabildo, stimulated by the efficiency and improvement which Álvarez had brought about in municipal affairs, was seeking powers which it had previously not exercised.

In other areas of provincial affairs the cabildos also played a leading part. During 1784 the cabildo of Trujillo, trying to arrest the economic decline of the province, had sought a ban on the import of Brazilian sugar into the Spanish Empire and requested that measures be taken to arrange for an adequate supply of slaves.⁸¹ In 1796 the government granted its request that the ports of Huanchaco and Pascamayo be opened to trade.⁸² The other cabildos of the province paid particular attention to the conduct of the subdelegates. For example, in 1797 the cabildo of Piura complained that the subdelegate of the partido was making the Indians buy licenses for the production of aguardiente. In 1805 the subdelegate of Chachapoyas was dismissed following the receipt of complaints against him from the cabildo, including charges of embezzling royal revenues and oppressing the Indians.⁸³

Meanwhile, it had become clear that the cabildo of Lima in particular not only sought more control of affairs within the city, but regarded itself as the mouthpiece for creole grievances throughout the viceroyalty. In January 1793 the cabildo sent José Baquíjano y Carrillo to Madrid as its deputy-general and instructed him to seek increased rights for the cabildo and better creole representation in the consulado of Lima. Baquíjano was also to insist that at least one-third of the oidores in the Peruvian audiencias should be creoles, and that there should be no bar against a creole’s serving as oidor in the country of his birth.⁸⁴

In Madrid Baquíjano and his successor, Tadeo Bravo de Rivero, pressed hard for increases in the cabildo’s privileges.⁸⁵ Finally, in 1802, the cabildo of Lima was granted the same “style, honors, and distinctions” as the cabildo of Mexico enjoyed.⁸⁶ Some of the privileges concerned nothing more than protocol, such as the right of regidores to cover their seats with velvet during public ceremonies or to be addressed as “Excellency.” Much more important, the Spanish government abolished the contaduría general de propios, established by Escobedo, and restored to the cabildo full responsibility for the collecting, accounting, and spending of the propios and arbitrios. The tenencia de policía was also to be abolished, its employees dismissed, and its functions and income were to be taken over by the cabildo. These decisions swept away two of the most important municipal reforms associated with the creation of the intendant system and brought large sums of money under the direct control of the cabildo. In 1802 the propios were worth 36,827 pesos, while bodegaje and sisa (a tax on the sale of cattle), which had provided funds for the tenencia, were worth 32,529 pesos in addition.⁸⁷

It is not difficult to find the reason for the decision to grant the cabildo’s requests. The royal decree of May 23, 1802, which preceded the formal cédula stated that the cabildo could use its funds as it thought fit and freely make donations to the Crown through its representative in Madrid.⁸⁸ Eleven days earlier the Madrid representative of the Philippine Company had informed the Minister of Grace and Justice that it had completed arrangements to make available the sum of 100,000 pesos fuertes (132,812 pesos) which the cabildo of Lima wished to donate to the Crown. The cabildo lacked only permission to spend the revenue of the propios and arbitrios as it wished and to borrow money, using them as security, on an occasion “like the present, when it wishes to make a similar demonstration of its loyalty.” The decree of May 23 granted these powers, and on May 28 the Treasurer of the Philippine Company paid 100,000 pesos fuertes into the Madrid treasury.⁸⁹ As soon as the cabildo received confirmation of these actions, it took steps to raise a loan of 150,000 pesos with which to pay its debt to the Company and meet the expenses of its own representative.⁹⁰ Clearly the whole affair was a straightforward financial arrangement whereby the cabildo paid a handsome sum to the impoverished Crown in return for substantially increased control over municipal affairs.

The formula worked again in 1805, following the conditional offer of another large donation to the Crown.⁹¹ On this occasion the cabildo received full jurisdiction over places of entertainment and guilds, previously exercised by the audiencia, and its two assessors were granted the honors of oidores. The Crown also plugged a loophole in the cabildo’s control of municipal finances with the decision that a number of religious organizations should lose their traditional rights to receive fixed annual payments from the income of sisa.⁹² Profuse thanks were again offered to the deputy in Madrid. When the cabildo learned that the total bill for the privileges amounted to 149,122 pesos, rather than the 85,000 offered, two regidores voted not to pay it, but the majority decided to borrow another 150,000 pesos at 6 percent interest.⁹³ When in 1808 the cabildo learned that Bravo had offered the Crown a further 25,000 pesos, this time without authorization, it ordered him to refrain from further expenditure on its behalf, since its funds were virtually exhausted.⁹⁴

The aspirations of other cabildos were less ambitious than those of the corporation at Lima, but on a smaller scale they too sought greater freedom in the management of their affairs. In 1804 the cabildo of Arequipa praised the generosity of the intendant Salamanca, who had arranged for the establishment of a new hospital, as well as a new public fountain and cemetery,⁹⁵ but there are hints that all was not well in Arequipa. In 1806, when the representative of the cabildo appealed for permission for the regidores to wear rich uniforms, he argued that the office of regidor must be made more attractive, since only five of the twelve places were filled. He added vaguely that a further way to improve the situation would be for the Crown to insure that the privileges and rights granted to the cabildo were protected.⁹⁶ This was an indirect complaint against the authority of the intendant, and it is clear that throughout the viceroyalty a considerable amount of ill-will existed beneath the apparent admiration of the cabildos for the intendants. Although their assumption was historically inaccurate, many cabildos believed that rights and privileges had been taken from them in 1784. In short, the intendants were easily identifiable scapegoats for any grievances. As long as the absolutist structure of Spanish administration remained intact, the intendants were free from serious pressure, but when cracks appeared, the cabildos began to press their claims.

During the spring and summer of 1808-1809 news arrived in Peru of bewildering events in Spain—the fall of Godoy, the abdications of Charles IV and Ferdinand VII, and the national uprising against the French.⁹⁷ The Peruvians reacted with loyalty. In Arequipa, for example, the news that Ferdinand VII had abdicated and that a Central Junta had convened provoked fervent protests from the cabildo,⁹⁸ which declared that all considered themselves to be true Spaniards, ready to sacrifice their lives and estates in defense of sovereign and nation. Seven months later the six regidores who had signed this declaration with the intendant appealed for the latter’s dismissal. They maintained that for fourteen years they had suffered in silence while Salamanca had eaten away their rights and “turned the city into the black palace of despotism.”⁹⁹ Afraid to protest earlier, in the belief that Salamanca was a favorite of Godoy, they had finally been forced to act through fear of a public rising against the intendant and even against the cabildo for its failure to protect the citizens. The peninsular authorities took these complaints at their face value, replacing Salamanca with a native of Arequipa.¹⁰⁰

Even such a highly experienced intendant as Demetrio O’Higgins in Huamanga was almost dismissed during the period of administrative confusion which followed the abdication of Ferdinand VII. In March 1809 three regidores of the Huamanga cabildo complained that O’Higgins was denying it any initiative in matters of public administration, and that he had accused the regidores of sedition merely for insisting on their right to take independent action in providing relief after a landslide.¹⁰¹ They claimed too that O ’Higgins had stolen public funds and that he should never have been made intendant, since at the time of his appointment his uncle, the Marqués de Osorno, was viceroy of Peru. On receiving these complaints, the Council of the Indies recommended that O’Higgins be removed from office.¹⁰² The decision was reversed only when the Minister of Finance pointed out to the council that no previous complaints had been made against O’Higgins, and that, in fact, he had been praised for carefully enforcing the Ordinance of Intendants.¹⁰³

The liberals who came to the fore in Spain after the abdication of Ferdinand VII were anxious to eradicate maladministration in America. Their zeal for reform led them to accept somewhat uncritically the complaints of the cabildos, which were eager to exploit Spanish administrative confusion to increase their own strength. Not only in Arequipa and Huamanga but in other towns and cities cabildo intransigence was making itself felt after 1808. In Ica, for example, the alcaldes ordinarios openly defied the authority of the subdelegate during 1810, refusing to accept his nominee to exercise authority in his absence and insisting that administration must be controlled by the cabildo.¹⁰⁴

In Tarma, where no cabildo had existed before 1786, a complex struggle for authority developed. At the end of 1808, the intendant, Ramón de Urrutia y las Casas, heard rumors that two men whom he regarded as unfitted for municipal office were likely to be elected alcaldes for the coming year. Convoking a special meeting of the cabildo, he ordered that the two should be excluded from the list of candidates and defended his action as a logical extension of the duty conferred by article eight of the Ordinance to confirm elections.¹⁰⁵ After initial protests the cabildo agreed to proceed with elections on the appointed day, excluding the barred individuals. As the alcalde de primer voto for 1808 explained, however, it did so only to avoid being arrested by the intendant.¹⁰⁶ Strongly worded protests were sent to the viceroy, accusing Urrutia of “despotism” and “dictatorship.”¹⁰⁷ Despite the intendant’s insistence that in present circumstances it was essential for the viceroy to support him, Abascal proceeded to censure him for abusing his authority and ordered him to avoid similar excesses in the future.¹⁰⁸

The election of alcaldes for 1810 took place without the previous intervention of the intendant. Urrutia declared the election null and void, however, since a faction in the cabildo had insured victory for their candidates by moving up the date of the election without informing some regidores and thus depriving them of their votes.¹⁰⁹ Those elected in this fashion were Manuel de la Secada, one of those barred by Urrutia a year earlier, and Antonio Barrena, who was reported to be under the influence of the second man barred by the intendant, Alonso Caviedes. On this occasion Abascal fully supported the intendant’s action, in view of widespread complaints from Tarma about unrest caused by the election and by the misrule of the two alcaldes.¹¹⁰ He ordered that the two be deposed and replaced by the two senior regidores until new elections could be held at the beginning of 1811. The matter did not end there, however, since a group of cabildo members, led by the senior regidor, who was the uncle of Secada, decided to ignore the viceroy’s order, on the technical argument that since the alcaldes had appealed to the audiencia, no further action should be taken until the result of the appeal was known. This dangerous attempt “to obstruct the authority of the Superior Government” forced Abascal to take “the steps necessary to enforce the respect and obedience on which the security of the State depends.”¹¹¹ Unfortunately the available documentation does not specify what these measures were, but they seem to have been effective, at least for the time being. Abascal declared that the elections for 1811 took place peacefully. Tarma appears to have been peaceful in 1811, but perhaps this owes much to the fact that a new intendant assumed authority in June of that year.¹¹²

In some parts of the viceroyalty the cabildos remained docile through 1808.¹¹³ But the following year even the most peaceful were stirred into activity by the decision of the Central Junta that they should assist in the election of a deputy to be sent to Spain.¹¹⁴ Each cabildo was to elect three men, one of whom, chosen by lot, would have his name sent to the viceroy. From the list of names for the viceroyalty, the viceroy was to select three, and the final choice would again be determined by lot. By October 1809 this process was complete, and José de Silva y Olave, the rector of San Marcos, had been chosen as Peru’s deputy to the Central Junta. The cabildo of Lima proceeded to supply him with a set of instructions.¹¹⁵ An examination of these is essential to any understanding of the Peruvians’ attitudes toward Spanish authority on the eve of revolution.

The cabildo began by praising the decision to summon deputies as a recognition that the Spanish possessions were not colonies, but an integral part of the monarchy. Though Silva was instructed to maintain the rights and privileges of the cabildo, following this reference to self-interest attention was turned to “the general interest of the kingdom and of the capital.” The instructions which followed give an excellent picture of Peruvian grievances and show that the cabildo of Lima regarded itself as responsible for the interests of the whole viceroyalty. It disapproved of the intendant system, arguing that the intendants were too powerful and that the subdelegates had governed badly. It was maintained that the new system of government had been of no benefit to Peru and that the intendants had oppressed the cabildos. The deputy was to seek the restoration of a purified administration by corregidores and of the repartimiento system, which, it was argued, had been abolished without consideration for the interests of those who had supplied goods to the corregidores. The instructions also attacked many other financial and economic measures introduced as part of the intendant system.

The cabildo demanded an end to all monopolies, since the existing system led to high prices for commodities such as quicksilver, tobacco, playing cards, bitumen, sulphur, and powder. It bitterly attacked the monopoly of stamped paper as a burden on the litigant and declared that the collection of the alcabala in the provincial aduanas was evidence of a heartless desire to increase the revenue of the exchequer at the cost of the “oppression, anger, and tears” of the Peruvians. Appealing in general for freer trade, it specifically attacked a new tax recently imposed on grain imported from Chile.

A large part of the instructions was devoted to the demand that Americans should he given at least a half share in the government of America. In this, declared the cabildo, they were only requesting what was theirs by right. It went further to complain that a creole seeking office was obliged either to travel to Spain or to act through a representative in Madrid, both procedures being cumbersome and expensive. The laws passed to insure equality of opportunity for creoles and Spaniards were ignored, and the few Peruvians who had succeeded in obtaining high office had been forced to serve in other parts of the Empire. The general consequence of this situation was that the vast majority of Peruvians, despite their fitness for office, were limited to being only “farmers, clerics, or lawyers.”

The attitude of the Lima cabildo to Spanish administration in Peru is clear. It was highly critical and looked for changes. The wealthy class which it represented would have been satisfied with a greater degree of self-government, a prospect which seemed possible during the liberal ascendancy in the peninsula between 1811 and 1814.¹¹⁶ The interior provinces of the viceroyalty had less respect for traditional authority and were more susceptible to propaganda from Buenos Aires. The cabildo of Cuzco was closely involved in the revolutionary activity which came to a head in the city in 1814, and which rapidly spread over half the viceroyalty.¹¹⁷ The Lima liberals, however, remained aloof. By the time the actions of the restored Ferdinand destroyed their hopes of reform, they had missed their opportunity to overthrow Spanish authority and were incapable of organizing successful resistance to the powerful military forces built up by Abascal. Nevertheless, once it became clear that the demands made by the cabildo of Lima in 1809 could not be met within the framework of Spanish authority, logic inevitably pointed the way to independence.

In the years after 1808 the cabildos of Peru played a prominent part, being incomparably stronger and more self confident than they had been before 1784. The idea that the intendants oppressed them is a myth. The intendants reformed municipal finances and enlisted the support of new or revived cabildos for their programs of municipal improvement, stimulating bodies which had formerly been decadent and completely under the control of the civil and ecclesiastical authorities. An unforeseen result of this encouragement to municipal activity was that the cabildos soon sought to increase their powers, particularly over expenditure of municipal funds and appointment to municipal office. Moreover, as the structure of Spanish authority weakened, the cabildos, led by the intendants to seek wider powers and responsibilities, turned their attention from municipal and provincial affairs to national interests.

Author notes