This book is in the new tradition of reform-mongering which blurs the boundaries between positive and normative social science. Like other recent works of this genre, it heavily emphasizes the Marxian themes of contradiction and social necessity, as well as many untested or untestable propositions and sweeping pronouncements. Nevertheless, the book is interesting and contains new materials and interpretations which could be of considerable merit.
To Jaguaribe, Brazil is caught in a predicament not unlike that faced by almost all transitional societies. Traditional political models do not suffice to insure both development and national autonomy. National capitalism, a partially suitable model in the past, cannot resolve certain fundamental contradictions which in Brazil and elsewhere have become insurmountable obstacles to development and national viability. Examples of these are an increasingly heterogeneous society as industrialization proceeds, insufficient consciousness of its class interests by the national bourgeoisie, and external interference by the United States. The state-capitalist model would be inadequate also because the managerial and technical sectors of the middle class have not aspired to power and could not, therefore, seize revolutionary control of the state against a coalition of the landowners and the bourgeoisie. A more compatible model would be a form of national laborism which would: 1) reinforce the role of the state as the principal agent of socioeconomic development; 2) require drastic intervention in the rural agricultural world, oriented toward liquidating semifeudalism in it; and 3) bring about a rapprochement between the interests of the national bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This last could be done by raising the technological level and the scale of industrial production, thereby increasing the number of jobs, wages, and consumer capacity while also raising productivity. According to Jaguaribe, this course would require a substantial expansion of the state’s investment capacity, national autonomy, and a higher rate of growth. Moreover, it would require that the state be responsible for economic infrastructure and the large intermediate industries, leaving to the private sector the processing industries. Finally, a clear division would have to be made between sectors requiring domestic capital and those financed from abroad. In the latter case there should be a definite ceiling on foreign ownership and control.
A last alternative, and according to Jaguaribe the model now being applied, is that of colonial fascism. Here the social order is preserved “at the expense of the national structure and the maintenance of national individuality” (p. 181). This model also requires substantial reinforcement of the state, but for the purpose of preserving stability through coercion. It also requires close political and economic integration of the country into the Atlantic community. Such integration would consolidate complementary resources or industries on the basis of international specialization. It would also make the best use of foreign factors and help to compensate for the internal lack of dynamism caused by the preservation of the status quo. In addition, colonial fascism requires the reestablishment of the free-market mechanism under supervision of the state, insuring to the private sector the full control and management of the economy. This solution is seen to be doomed in the long run by its irremediable internal contradictions, viz., its overconcentration of income and power and the fallacious notion that interests between developed and less developed economies are necessarily complementary.
Jaguaribe concludes that the military regimes cannot continue to follow this model. The most likely outcome is one in which the military must restore power to the political parties as opposed to changing the tenor of the military regime. Without saying so, he apparently believes that it will eventually follow the nationalist labor model outlined above, but only after many twists and turns.
Jaguaribe’s description of the Brazilian problem is largely valid. However, his models by no means do justice to the complexity of that reality. Being overdrawn and oversimplified, these models largely ignore adjustments which have taken place in response to development obstacles. While some form of the national labor model is one future possibility, numerous other mixed outcomes are more likely. He has based his prescriptions and predictions on the fallacy of compatibility, the inability of political regimes to make adjustments, and the blindness of the industrial bourgeoisie to its class interests. However, these assumptions are still untested. Though Jaguaribe may be right, he must produce hard evidence, rather than unsupported generalizations, if he wishes to be convincing.