In a well-documented presentation based almost entirely on primary sources, Machado details the crises caused by fiebre aftosa (foot-and-mouth disease) in Mexico between 1946 and 1954. For the sake of amicable relations with Brazil the United States and Mexico violated a treaty and permitted Brazilian bulls, the probable disease carriers, to enter Mexico. The area of infection was widespread, and millions of Mexican cattle, hogs, sheep, and goats were affected by the malady. Mexico’s economy was jeopardized as the nation was deprived of food and clothing, and unemployment rose. Even la fiesta brava was threatened.
The author depicts the difficulties which the Mexicans encountered with regard to vaccinating and slaughtering livestock, bureaucratic disputes, and political corruption. A joint United States-Mexican Commission handled many problems adroitly, but Yankeephobia increased, and some Mexicans alleged that the United States was plotting to destroy their economy. These suspicions proved wrong, for the border became a symbol of cooperation, and both sides worked assiduously to prevent the spread of aftosa. Despite considerable cost to both governments the epidemic yielded positive results in Mexico. Diseased oxen were replaced by mules or machinery; inferior cattle were eliminated and breeds improved; new roads were built to reach formerly inaccessible areas of infection; and modern technology was introduced.
Although Guatemala charged that greater efforts were being made in the north to protect United States interests, increased contacts between Mexicans and Americans led to mutual understanding and improved relations. Machado contends that “a policy of enlightened self-interest in the eradication of FMD in the hemisphere may well prove a vital step in the overall improvement of hemispheric relations” (p. 82). Unfortunately, in this ease it is impossible to disassociate humanitarian objectives from self-interest. Although the author places the importance of the aftosa crisis to Mexican-United States relations in proper perspective, he overstates its potential from the standpoint of hemispheric relations.
Aside from the improper placement of footnote number eight on page fifteen, the work is error free, but it would have benefited from more thorough editing and stylistic revisions. In conclusion, one wonders what additional international ramifications of the aftosa crisis will be revealed when the Mexican and United States diplomatic archives for the years 1946-1954 are available for scrutiny by historians.