Although competition for the honor is feeble, this volume is the most readable account in print concerning the operations of the Organization of American States. The author categorizes in a manner that separates the legalisms from the practice, the trivia from the significant, and the rhetoric from the policy. If the book had no other virtue, it would still be a relief to read an account of the OAS which did not mention the 1826 Panama Congress or the 1889 Washington Conference.
Slater’s focus is on the interaction between United States foreign policy and the OAS, and he shows only negligible concern with the pre-World War II development of the inter-American system. Basically his approach is that of a “traditional” political scientist. He is sensitive to domestic political considerations in the United States that have helped to shape the Department of State’s policies toward hemispheric relations. The sources used include the minutes of OAS meetings, newspaper accounts, and interviews with Department of State and OAS officials. As a scholarly history the book will not stand examination. But as a perceptive analysis of the problems confronting hemispheric cooperation it is well worth reading, for Slater includes enough tidbits of information and novel interpretations to keep a reader already familiar with the subject from becoming bored.
The major portion of the book is devoted to two lucid chapters on “The OAS as an Antidictatorial Alliance” and two chapters on “The OAS as an Anti-Communist Alliance.” Among his many interesting conclusions is the claim that the United States has not dominated the organization. In fact, Slater argues that the OAS needed autonomy in order to help legitimize and evoke widespread consent for United States operations in Latin America. This led the United States to place restrictions on the employment of its economic and military power in hemispheric relations. He points to the fact that some of the most consistent opponents of recent U.S. anti-Communist policies have received significant economic assistance. In this regard he mentions Frondizi (a good case) and Goulart (a much more questionable example).
The book also effectively sets forth the problems of trying to bring democracy to the hemisphere via open or covert intervention. Slater feels that the case for prodemocratic intervention rests on its moral validity, rather than on its usefulness as an antidote to Communism. The ease for an activist OAS-United States policy for the promotion of democracy in Latin America, he concludes, “must therefore ultimately rest on the conviction that although it may or may not prove to be good for the United States, it will almost surely he good for the long-repressed peoples of Latin America.” Although the sentiment is admirable, the experiences thus far with intervention to help establish democracy are, by Slater’s own account, not very impressive in their results. Certainly what is good for Latin America is not necessarily good for the United States, but it is also true that an interventionist policy at this time may be detrimental to the long-range interests of both Latin America and the United States.
