The American Withdrawal from Haiti, 1929-1934

For over sixty years the protectorate policy in the Caribbean which the United States undertook during the generation after the Spanish American War has been under heavy fire from critics both at home and abroad. While historians have studied the rise of this policy in some detail, many details of its decline and abandonment are still only lightly sketched. Since so much of the controversy about Caribbean policy has centered on questions of motive, the attitudes and opinions of participants have a valid claim to attention. This essay will describe the last years of the American protectorate over Haiti, as seen from the vantage point of the United States legation in Port au Prince.¹

After 1920 the United States tried to reduce its interference in the internal affairs of the Caribbean republics. The officers who dealt with Latin American matters at Washington still hoped for the development of stable republican institutions in the Caribbean, but they realized that the effort to impose peace and progress by force had been unprofitable. At best the interventions in Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic had only partly achieved their objectives, and they had aroused hostile criticism which was politically embarrassing at home and harmful to our relations with the other American republics. Just before the end of the Wilson administration the State Department began to consider how the marines might be withdrawn.

It is more difficult to terminate an intervention than to start one. The American government was reluctant to remove its forces without achieving at least some of the purposes for which it had intervened and particularly without leaving in power an administration which had some hope of maintaining order. In the Dominican Republic and Haiti, and to a lesser degree in Nicaragua, loans had been contracted, and investors had bought bonds on the assurance that American officials would continue to collect the customs until the bonds were repaid. Inevitably the occupation authorities had made other commitments which could not be ignored. American representatives had to carry on long and difficult negotiations with the local leaders in Santo Domingo before turning over the government to an elected president and congress in 1924. The following year, when the United States withdrew its marines from Nicaragua, a civil war broke out and led to a second intervention which caused the American government more embarrassment than any of the earlier ones. Similar problems presented themselves several years later, when the United States decided to withdraw from Haiti.

The occupation of Haiti was somewhat different from that of the other two republics in that it rested on a formal treaty. The American intervention began in July 1915, when the local government collapsed and American marines were landed at Port au Prince to protect foreign lives and property. The country had been in turmoil for nearly two years, while President Wilson and his advisers pressed the Haitians to accept some form of American help. The occupation of 1915 enabled the Wilson administration to insist on an even more ambitious program of assistance than the president had earlier contemplated. By the treaty of September 16, 1915, the United States undertook to help Haiti in maintaining domestic peace and developing the country’s resources and assumed partial control of many vital governmental functions. The president of the United States was to nominate a general receiver of customs, a financial adviser, an engineer or engineers to direct sanitation and public works, and American officers to train and command a constabulary as the sole military force. The treaty was to be in effect for ten years from the date of ratification. In 1917 another agreement between the two governments extended it for a further ten years, or until May 1936.

The first years of the intervention were disappointing. A peasant rebellion in the regions which had customarily furnished soldiers for revolutionary armies was put down by the new constabulary and the American marines, but only after many months of guerrilla warfare. The Haitian government welcomed the help of the United States in suppressing the uprising, but a succession of conflicts broke out between Haitian and American officials over other matters.

According to the Americans’ interpretation of the treaty their appointees were virtually independent of the Haitian authorities in the conduct of their work and the training and organization of their staffs. Since the treaty services consumed most of the government’s income, the president of Haiti had relatively few jobs to distribute— an unpleasant predicament in a country where most of the upper class expected support from the national treasury. The Haitian government could not appropriate or disburse money without the approval of the financial adviser, and in 1918 it was compelled to agree that it would consult the American legation before promulgating any law which might affect the purposes of the treaty. President Dartiguenave’s resentment at these restrictions on his freedom of action made it difficult for the two governments to cooperate in any constructive program.

Furthermore, the foreign loan, which was relied on to provide funds for a constructive program, did not materialize, first because of World War I and after 1919 because of the Haitian government’s hostility to the financial adviser. In 1919, however, the two governments signed a protocol which authorized a loan and provided that the revenues pledged for its service would continue to be collected and allocated by American officials after 1936 throughout the life of the bonds.

During these years the American treaty services had little helpful guidance from Washington, where responsibility for Haitian affairs was divided between the State and Navy Departments. The State Department considered that it had jurisdiction over the financial adviser and the receiver general of customs, who were civilians. The Public Works Service was staffed by civil engineer officers from the Navy, and the Public Health Service by Navy doctors. Their directors reported to the Navy Department, like the marines who officered the constabulary. The American minister might have coordinated the work of the services, but he was ineffective and had in practice less authority and influence than the commander of the marine brigade. The American officials often quarrelled or worked at cross purposes with one another.

This situation improved after Brigadier General John H. Russell of the Marine Corps was appointed high commissioner in Haiti in 1922. General Russell received his instructions from the State Department, which assumed full responsibility for American policy in Haiti and authorized him to direct and coordinate the work of all the treaty services. He also established a good working relationship with Louis Borno, who became president of Haiti in 1922 and was reelected in 1926.

Under Russell and Borno much was accomplished. A series of bond issues refunded the country’s debts, the most important being a $16,000,000 loan floated by the National City Bank of New York. Combining the offices of financial adviser and general receiver of customs in one person made the financial administration more efficient. The Garde, as the constabulary was called, became a good police force, and for several years the marine brigade, reduced to about seven hundred men, took no part in maintaining order. For the first time since independence most of the principal towns were connected by roads passable for wheeled vehicles. Life became more pleasant and safer in the towns, and the Public Health Service made progress in controlling the endemic diseases which afflicted the country people. The Service Technique de l’Agriculture et de l’Enseignement Professionnel, a new treaty service set up in 1924, undertook a program of agricultural development and began to build up an ambitious system of farm schools for peasant children and vocational and professional schools in the cities.

When President Hoover took office in March 1929, few of the officers dealing with Haitian affairs in the State Department would have thought that a radical change of policy in Haiti was imminent or necessary. The treaty services had only just begun to attack Haiti’s appalling problems of poverty and ignorance and disease, but they seemed to be making progress, and their continuance seemed to offer the best hope for the country’s future. The peasants, who made up the great mass of the population, apparently appreciated what was being done for them. Encouraged by nearly ten years of peace, many farmers were moving back into fertile areas which had been almost abandoned before 1915 because they were so often in the path of revolutionary armies. The peasant market women made good use of the new roads and trails, and the country people flocked to the travelling clinics of the health service.

Very recently, however, a few clouds had appeared on the horizon. New alcohol and tobacco taxes, imposed at the suggestion of the financial adviser, aroused some discontent, and there was also opposition to the coffee standardization law, intended to make more profitable the exportation of the peasants’ chief money crop. These measures played into the hands of upper-class radical nationalist agitators, who were trying to get peasant support in their campaign against the American intervention. There was much hostility to the American regime among the elite, the mulatto aristocracy which included most of the few literate or articulate Haitians. Naturally the presence of foreign troops and the power exercised by foreign officials were especially offensive to this group. The occupation had brought real hardship to many of the upper class, because the use of government funds for public works and agricultural development had greatly reduced the amount of money available for political jobs and other favors. Furthermore, the occupation’s efforts to improve the situation of the peasants and to build up a middle class through technical and vocational education threatened the traditional social and economic ascendency of the élite.² Neither the American officials in Haiti nor the Latin American Division in the State Department paid enough attention to this growing discontent.

President Hoover, however, felt that American policies in Haiti should at least he reconsidered. There had been much criticism of intervention in anti-imperialist circles and in Congress, and the Sandino affair in Nicaragua had shown how unpleasantly action in one Latin American country could affect our relations with the others. The president himself, as he told Congress, did not like to be represented abroad by military forces.³ He was also influenced by attacks on General Russell and some of the treaty officials, inspired by American businessmen in Haiti who resented efforts to curtail privileges which they claimed under concessions granted before the American intervention. In September 1929 the president wrote Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson that he was contemplating the appointment of a commission to consider what course American policy in Haiti should take.

The president took no further action before the meeting of Congress in December. In the meantime, an ugly situation was developing in Haiti. The Haitian constitution of 1918 provided in a “transitory” article that an appointed Council of State should exercise the powers of Congress until the president permitted a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies to be elected by popular vote. Acting under this provision, the Council of State had elected Borno President in 1922 and had reelected him in 1926. Borno’s opponents were determined that his successor should not be chosen in the same way, and in 1929 they were exasperated when he again refused to hold a popular election. Early in December, during a student strike at the Service Technique’s central agricultural school, popular demonstrations against Borno and against the American occupation became so violent that for the first time in several years the American marines had to intervene to restore order. On December 7 President Hoover asked Congress for authority to send a commission to look into the situation.

Congress acted slowly, and the commission did not reach Haiti until February 28, 1930. Its members represented both political parties and several different points of view. W. Cameron Forbes, the chairman, had been governor general of the Philippines, and Henry Fletcher, a career diplomat, had been Undersecretary of State. Elie Vezina was a prominent Catholic layman. The other two members, James Kerney and William Allen White, were newspaper editors. In Hoover’s words, the commission’s task was to consider “when and how we are to withdraw from Haiti” and “what we shall do in the meantime.” The president did not contemplate an immediate withdrawal, because, as he said, “every group in Haiti considers that such action would result in disaster to the Haitian people.” But he pointed out that the treaty of 1915 would expire in 1936 and that it was necessary to “build up a certainty of stable and efficient government” after the United States withdrew. Hoover praised General Russell for what had already been accomplished.⁴

When the commission began to hold hearings at Port au Prince, nearly all of the witnesses were presented by a committee representing the various anti-Borno groups. Their denunciations of Borno and the occupation, and the publicity which their sometimes exaggerated charges received in the American press, aroused much public excitement. Both General Russell and the commission soon realized that there might be bloodshed if the demand for a popular election were not met. Russell consequently worked out a compromise plan with Borno, and the commission persuaded the opposition leaders to accept it. Eugene Roy, a business man who had not been active in politics, would be elected by the Council of State to succeed Borno, with the understanding that he would resign after a Congress had been chosen by popular vote. The Congress would then name a new president. Roy was elected in April, but only after the American government had made clear that it would install him in the presidency itself if the Council of State rejected him.

After staying only twelve days in Haiti, the Forbes Commission submitted its report on March 26. It praised the “fine record of accomplishment” under the leadership of President Borno and General Russell, but it criticized Russell and the treaty officials for not making a greater effort to train Haitians for the responsibilities which they would have to assume after the treaty expired. The commission recommended that at the end of the high commissioner’s tour of duty he be replaced by a civilian minister who should nationalize the treaty services and negotiate agreements providing for less interference in Haiti’s domestic affairs. The commission did not suggest the abrogation of the treaty or the immediate withdrawal of the marines, for it was “under no delusions” as to what might happen after the marines left, and it recognized the possibility that the Haitian government might need and request American help after 1936.⁵ President Hoover told the State Department that he would accept the report as the basis of his administration’s policy in Haiti.⁶

Despite continuing anti-American agitation President Roy worked fairly well with General Russell and the treaty officials while he prepared for the election of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. The American government left the matter entirely in his hands and instructed all American officials to do nothing that might influence the outcome. The voting, on October 14, 1930, resulted in a victory for the radical nationalist groups over the more conservative candidates supported by the leaders of the Port au Prince elite. When the Congress met in November it elected Stenio Vincent president of the Republic.

Just before the Congress met, General Russell resigned, and I went to Haiti as American minister, to take over the direction of the treaty services and to carry out the Forbes Commission’s recommendations. My instructions were to make every effort to create a situation in which the United States could withdraw as much as possible from participation in Haiti’s internal affairs. The American government was prepared to give up a part of its authority before the treaty terminated in 1936, if the Haitian government wished it to do so, and if the purposes for which the authority had been granted seemed to be fulfilled.

So long as the treaty was in effect, however, the United States would insist on the full recognition of its rights and authority, because it could not otherwise discharge its responsibilities imposed by the treaty. The United States would consequently expect the president of Haiti to appoint promptly any persons nominated as treaty officials and to continue submitting to the American legation for prior approval any legislation bearing on the objects of the treaty. Unless absolutely necessary, the legation was not to interfere with legislation, government contracts, or the execution of decisions by the Haitian courts. The underlying assumption was that the treaty of 1915 had “placed the United States in a relation to Haiti of the very highest fiduciary character,” so that “in the unfortunate contingency that interests of citizens of the United States should conflict with the true interests of Haiti and her people, the interests of the former must yield to those of the latter.”

These instructions contemplated a gradual relaxation of American control rather than early and complete withdrawal. Neither Haiti nor the United States, in fact, was free to terminate American supervision of Haiti’s finances, even after the treaty expired, because the protocol of 1919 provided that an official nominated by the president of the United States should control the collection and allocation of the Republic’s revenues during the life of the loan which the protocol authorized. Haiti had been able to obtain the loan of 1922 on favorable terms because of this provision and because Secretary Hughes had told the bankers and the purchasers of the bonds that the United States intended to exercise the authority which the protocol conferred. Bonds amounting to $16,541,000 in the three series issued under the protocol were still outstanding on September 30, 1930, and it seemed unlikely that these could all be retired before 1942, even with the most rapid amortization.

Hughes had also assured the bankers that the United States intended to continue exercising the authority conferred on it by the Treaty of 1915. The State Department consequently felt that it was not free to make any important change in the financial administration before 1936 nor to abandon the Garde before its training had been completed. It did feel, however, that the United States had an obligation to train Haitians for higher positions in the treaty services and to give them increasing authority and responsibility, so that the services could be turned over as efficient working organizations when the treaty expired.

General Russell and the treaty officials had already done more along this line than the Forbes Commission realized. In 1928 he instructed the officials to make a special effort to step up the training and promotion of their Haitian assistants.⁷ By December 1930 six of the eight district offices in the public works service were under the direction of Haitian engineers, and Haitians were being trained for the principal administrative positions at Port au Prince. Haitian doctors played an equally important role in the health service. There had been less progress in the Service Technique, which was newer and had been forced to start from scratch in developing agricultural experts and teachers for its vocational schools. In the Garde efforts to develop officer material had begun in the first years of the occupation, but progress was slow because few members of the literate upper class were interested in a career in the police. At the time of the Forbes Commission’s visit, only 35 to 40 percent of the officers were Haitians, and none of these had reached a rank higher than captain. The commission, however, approved a plan presented by the American officers which provided that all of them should be replaced by Haitians not later than 1936.

After the inauguration of the new government at Port au Prince, its first task was to negotiate an agreement for the Haitianization of the treaty services. The Vincent administration felt that it had a mandate to insist on the earliest possible restoration of Haiti’s independence, though both the new president and his Foreign Minister, M. H. Pauleeus Sannon, asserted that they wanted to assure the adequate training of the Haitians who were to take over administrative responsibility in the treaty services. Since this was what the United States also wanted, the prospect for an agreement seemed good. If the Haitians proposed a more rapid transfer of authority than the Americans thought practicable, they seemed willing to discuss the matter in a friendly spirit. They were pleased when the actual progress of Haitianization in the Garde was demonstrated early in December 1930, by the placing of one of the five military departments under the command of Major Demosthenes Calixte, who had enlisted as a private in 1915.

The Haitianization negotiations, however, were soon interrupted by a series of controversies about the current operations of the treaty services. Under Borno the treaty officials had worked fairly harmoniously with the ministries to which they were attached. Both the president and the high commissioner had determined policy and settled disagreements in a spirit of give and take. Frequently Borno’s views prevailed, for he was by no means a puppet,⁸ but he usually respected the treaty officials’ control over their personnel and their day-to-day work.

Unfortunately, it was inevitable that there should be more friction with an administration which felt that it must repudiate Borno’s policies and make a show of resisting American interference. Some of the extreme nationalists in the new cabinet, in fact, did what they could to create friction, usually by demanding that the treaty services do things which their directors and the legation considered improper. American officials had to insist on the integrity of the services so long as officials nominated by the president of the United States were responsible for their work. The American government could not allow the Garde to be used for improper purposes or the public works service to build roads which would benefit only a few politicians. It had to insist on the treaty officials’ right to select and remove their Haitian employees, because political appointments and promotions would destroy the morale and efficiency of the services.

Though President Vincent and Sannon repeatedly used their influence to patch up quarrels between their colleagues and the treaty officials, both were under increasing pressure to provoke a showdown over the question of American control. Much of this came from the newspapers, which were enjoying and often abusing a new freedom, because neither the president nor the legation wished to use the press law under which Borno had frequently jailed unfriendly editors. The nationalist press directed its attacks particularly at Commander Duncan, the engineer in chief, whose public works service of course especially interested politicians, because its payroll was large and the location of its roads and irrigation works was important to local landowners.

The showdown came in a characteristically Haitian way. Early in January 1931 the Minister of Public works sent Commander Duncan commissions signed by the president for delivery to three Haitians who were already working in the service on appointment by the engineer in chief. Inquiry about this unexplained and totally unnecessary move revealed that it was not so innocuous as it seemed, for Sannon angrily denied that there had been a mistake and asserted the government’s right to make appointments in all of the treaty services. The legation consequently instructed Duncan to return the commissions with a courteous note and at the same time sent a formal communication to the foreign office explaining the American government’s position about appointments in the treaty services.

At once the press urged tumultuous public demonstrations against what it represented as an affront to the president. Under nationalist pressure most Haitian employees of the Public Works Service went on strike. Though Vincent assured me that he did not feel affronted, it was dear that some of his associates were inciting the press, presumably in the hope that reports of disturbances would compel the United States government to change its policy further. The State Department, however, hardly knew about the crisis before it was over. When excited crowds began to gather in the streets, the president became alarmed and sent Sannon to ask that the legation help the government to extricate itself from the situation which it had created. Sannon warned that there might be serious disturbances, and that the administration might fall if the president were forced to withdraw the three commissions. He eagerly accepted an offer to permit the delivery of the commissions, in return for a written promise that the Vincent administration would make no further attempt to change the status of employees in the treaty services pending their Haitianization.⁹

Since this promise was kept secret, the government was able to claim a diplomatic victory which strengthened Vincent’s rather shaky political position. This result pleased the legation, although some treaty officials were unhappy about what they regarded as a blow to American prestige. The agreement was occasionally violated, but it discouraged any further serious effort to impose political appointments on the treaty services so long as they were under American control. It also averted a very real danger of disorders which would have been embarrassing to the American government.

The episode nevertheless helped to convince the American officials in Haiti that there was little hope for a Haitianization agreement under which the treaty services would continue to operate effectively while they trained a staff competent to take over in 1936. The promises to the bondholders would prevent any surrender of control over the financial services, or any abandonment of the Garde before its training had been completed, but there was little reason to keep American officials in the other services if the Haitian government’s attitude made it difficult for them to accomplish anything. The student strike in December and continuing nationalist attacks had already disrupted the work of the Service Technique, and a similar situation seemed to be developing in the Public Works Administration The health service had suffered less, but even its program had been curtailed because the drop in the price of coffee had cut government revenues sharply. The United States would have an interest in the sanitation of Port au Prince and Cap-Haïtien as long as American marines were stationed in those cities, but well-trained Haitian doctors were available to take over the remaining work of the service. Furthermore, both Commander Duncan and Dr. Stuart, the head of the health service, thought that their principal assistants were already reasonably competent and would profit little by further training under existing conditions.

The decision to accept a more rapid schedule for Haitianization made negotiation easier, and early in March 1931 the two governments were close to a tentative agreement covering all treaty services, but leaving for later consideration the question of financial control after 1936. The one important obstacle to an accord was the Haitian government’s reluctance to confirm the appointment of Dr. Carl Colvin, whom Hoover had nominated in June 1930 to be the new director of the Service Technique. Colvin had been assistant director of the service and was then acting director. He was a man of unquestioned ability and well liked by Haitians who knew him, but the nationalists opposed his selection simply out of hostility to the service. During Roy’s brief administration he had found various pretexts for postponing Colvin’s appointment, and the State Department’s acquiescence in this delay, of course, made it more difficult for Vincent to act.

The report of the Moton Commission further complicated the matter. When the Forbes Commission was appointed, some of the Republican leaders urged that a Negro be included in it, but the president decided instead to ask Dr. R. R. Moton of Tuskegee Institute to head a separate group which would study educational problems in Haiti. This group had arrived in Haiti in June 1930, and its members were naturally offended when the State Department thoughtlessly presented Colvin’s nomination as director of the educational work in the country without consulting them.¹⁰ Moton’s report, published in October 1930, approved the general program and the objectives of the Service Technique but criticized some aspects of its performance. It also deplored the fact that the service’s schools received much more financial support than the ill-equipped and inadequately staffed schools administered by the Haitian government.¹¹ These statements, made by persons whom the Haitians regarded as spokesmen for the American government, naturally intensified the opposition to Colvin’s appointment.

It was clear that Vincent could not make the appointment without arousing a political storm which might destroy such usefulness as the Service Technique still had. On the other hand, the Americans’ position in Haiti would be weakened if they failed to insist that the Haitian government accept treaty officials nominated by the United States. A surrender of principle on this point would endanger the execution of the obligations which would still rest on the American government after the Haitianization of the Service Technique. Under instructions from the State Department, the legation had repeatedly made it clear that the Colvin case must be settled before a Haitianization agreement would be signed. American officials had explored the possibility of a face-saving compromise with no success. They still felt that the matter could be settled with patience and persistence, but they warned the State Department that continued insistence might bring on another crisis in Haiti.

The department, which was already being criticized by anti-imperialists for the delay in concluding a Haitianization agreement, was alarmed at the thought of a breakdown in the negotiations at Port au Prince, and still more by the possibility of a noisy crisis in Haiti. On the other hand, it was unwilling to retreat in the Colvin case. In March 1931 it told the legation that it contemplated a new approach. It proposed to offer the early Haitianization of the other treaty services, but only on condition that the Haitian government accept a new treaty which would assure the continuance of American financial control and the continued efficiency of the Garde as long as the bonds were outstanding. The department thought that this procedure would make it unnecessary to insist on Colvin’s appointment and would eliminate controversies about the current operations of the treaty services.

This idea seemed more plausible in Washington than it did in Haiti. The new treaty which the department had drafted repeated word for word most articles in the hated treaty of 1915. Its proposal would have affronted Haitian patriotism, especially if put forward as a virtual ultimatum. The legation pointed this out and argued that the bondholders could be adequately protected after 1936 by arrangements less offensive to Haitian pride. For one thing, an executive agreement would be preferable to a treaty, which would require ratification by the Haitian congress. The legation also argued that it would serve the interest of both countries to turn over the treaty services as efficient working organizations, and that an agreement for this purpose was very near. American officials in Haiti still thought that the Colvin ease, which was the chief obstacle, could be settled with patience and good luck.

The State Department abandoned its proposal, but only after a long debate, first by cable and then at conferences in Washington. On April 22 Secretary Stimson authorized the resumption of negotiations for the early, orderly Haitianization of the public works, the health service, and the Service Technique. The United States would insist on Colvin’s appointment. The training and promotion of Haitian officers in the Garde would continue, with American officers in control until 1936. The State Department was disposed to permit the conclusion of an agreement about the other services before settling the problem of financial control after 1936, hut it declared that the new financial arrangement must be in the form of a treaty rather than an executive agreement. It accepted a plan drawn up by Sidney de la Rue, the financial adviser, as the basis for this arrangement.¹²

In the meantime the Haitian congress had met for its first regular session. The legation and the Vincent administration had looked forward to this event with some alarm, because it seemed certain that the nationalist majority would make trouble for both. When congress met, its members seemed too inexperienced and undisciplined to agree on any program, but in May they quarrelled with the administration over a question totally unconnected with Haitian-Ameriean relations, and the whole cabinet resigned. This was a misfortune, because Sannon had seemed pleased with the new American proposals and anxious to conclude an agreement based on them. It proved more difficult to deal with Abel Leger, the prominent lawyer and diplomatic historian who succeeded him.

Under the new Foreign Minister’s leadership, the Haitian government for the first time took a definite stand on Colvin’s appointment. According to Leger, the president and the cabinet had unanimously decided that the events of the past eighteen months made the appointment impossible. If Colvin resigned, however, the government would pay him the full salary which he would have received as director of the Service Technique for the time that he had served as acting director. The legation agreed to submit this proposal to the State Department for consideration.

This was a tactical error, for the suggestion that the United States might not be adamant about Colvin encouraged a more aggressive Haitian attitude in other matters. For some time there had been minor disputes over the Haitian government’s desire to promote Haitian Garde officers more rapidly than General Williams, the commander, thought advisable and over its efforts to make political appointments in the rural police force, which was not a part of the Garde, though under its jurisdiction. In an effort to force the promotion of Haitian officers, the government now refused to issue commissions to two American officers who had just been nominated. This was the most serious violation of the treaty that had yet occurred, and the State Department announced that it could not consider the proposed settlement of the Colvin case until the Haitian government gave specific assurances that it would respect the treaty provisions about the Garde. The Vincent administration refused to give these assurances, and the negotiations seemed to have reached a dead end.

The State Department decided that it would go ahead unilaterally with a Haitianization program if it had to, but shortly after the middle of June Leger made new proposals. First, he asked that public works, health, and the Service Technique be turned over to Haitian control on October 1, 1931, three months earlier than the United States had proposed. Also he repeated his suggested compromise in the Colvin case and added generous indemnities to Colvin and the other American experts in the Service Technique, many of whom, being teachers, would presumably be unable to find new positions for several months. In return the Haitian government would promise to respect the treaty provisions covering the Garde, and the president would sign commissions for American and Haitian officers already nominated or to be nominated in the future.

When he put forth the last proposal, Leger excepted one case in which the president felt that his own dignity and prestige were involved. This concerned a Haitian captain named Aarons, who was alleged to have made disrespectful remarks about the president when a local politician demanded the removal of a rural policeman whom Aarons had appointed. Though a board of Haitian officers which investigated this charge exonerated Aarons, the president refused to sign a commission awarding him the rank in which he was already serving on a probationary basis. The legation insisted that the commission be signed, realizing that American officers would have little control over the Garde if its members knew that their promotions might depend on the good will of local politicians. Promises of good conduct would mean little if one Haitian officer was sacrificed in what all his fellow officers were watching as a test case. Consequently the legation refused to make an exception as Leger proposed and recommended that the United States go ahead with its own program of Haitianization without further negotiations, if the matter were not settled.

At conferences in Washington during April, Secretary Stimson had said emphatically that the legation must retain full control of the Garde as long as the United States was responsible for it. When the State Department began to consider the possible consequences of unilateral action, however, it foresaw a situation in which American officers might have to work without Haitian commissions and the financial adviser might have to make payments to the treaty services without authorization from the Minister of Finance. This, it thought, would be a “military occupation.” The department felt that it could not justify breaking off the negotiations because one Haitian officer failed to receive a promotion.

At Port au Prince, American officials thought that the department’s fears were somewhat exaggerated. They were confident that they could handle the situation in a way that would cause the Haitian government to ask very soon for a resumption of the negotiations and that a firm stand in the Aarons case was the only way to avoid more serious trouble in the future. The legation argued the matter vigorously, but Undersecretary Castle cabled on July 3 that “we absolutely cannot get support in this country in this individual case.” He instructed the legation to acquiesce in the Haitian government’s views with respect to “Lieutenant” Aarons. Fortunately we had already learned indirectly that President Vincent was reconsidering his own position, and before we had to act on the department’s instruction, we received his assurance that he would sign Aarons’ commission when a Haitianization agreement was concluded. This opened the way for a resumption of the negotiations without further reference to the Aarons case.

In its instruction of July 3, and on previous occasions, the State Department criticized the legation for permitting the negotiations to be interrupted constantly by controversies about other matters. Francis White, the very able assistant secretary in charge of Latin American affairs, still advised telling the Haitian government what the United States was prepared to do and insisting on a reply. Attempts to pin the Haitian government down, however, were never very successful. Questions that arose from day to day in the treaty services had to be discussed, and most of them in fact were amicably settled by discussion. When there were real or factitious differences of opinion, however, it was difficult to discourage the Haitians from provoking controversies, because they knew from experience that they could often obtain concessions by doing so.

On July 17, for example, the Haitian government submitted to Congress, without the financial adviser’s approval, a budget which contained several objectionable features and authorized expenditures greater than the anticipated revenues. This violation of the treaty was especially serious, because the government’s revenues had fallen to a point where only the most careful financial management would enable it to meet essential expenses. The State Department at once instructed the legation to make a strong formal protest and to demand that the budget be withdrawn. Leger offered instead to obtain congressional authorization for any changes in the budget which might be required by the prospective Haitianization agreement, and explained that this would enable the government to adjust the budget in accord with the financial adviser. The legation reluctantly accepted this proposal in order to continue the almost completed negotiations.

The Haitianization agreement was signed on August 5, 1931. It provided that the Haitian government should take over the administration and control of the public works and health services and the Service Technique on October 1, but that an American scientific mission should have charge of sanitation and chlorination of water in Port au Prince and Cap-Haïtien as long as American troops were stationed in those cities. The 1918 agreement providing for the submission of legislation to the legation before enactment was abrogated, as was the requirement for the financial adviser’s visa on all orders of payment. The Haitian government specifically recognized its continuing obligation, however, to obtain the financial adviser’s approval for all expenditures and for measures affecting sources of revenue. The Haitian senators and deputies would receive representation allowances which they had voted themselves, hut which the financial adviser had not yet approved; and Americans who were leaving the treaty services would be given suitable indemnities. While awaiting a final settlement of the status of the Garde, the two governments agreed to maintain the status quo established by existing laws and agreements.¹³

During the negotiations the Haitian government advocated a “protocol of evacuation” and the abolition of martial law, which had been in effect since the first days of the intervention. The State Department was unwilling to set a date for the withdrawal of the marine brigade, because it intended to keep a force in Haiti as long as American officers were serving in the Garde. It did agree, however, that the brigade commander should issue a proclamation suspending martial law on the day when the Haitianization agreement was signed. Martial law had been little more than a technicality for some years, except for a brief period during the strike in December 1929, but it gave the American officials great potential authority and responsibility. Its abolition was a long step toward the restoration of Haiti’s independence.

The Haitianization agreement was not a treaty and required no further approval or ratification by either government. Leger got an enthusiastic ovation when he announced it to Congress, and the legation of Haiti in Washington was instructed to express the government’s “sincere joy” and to thank President Hoover. Captain Aarons received his commission a few days after the agreement was signed, and Colvin received a letter of appreciation from Vincent, as well as the balance of the salary which he would have had as director.

The Haitian congress adjourned on August 6. It had made less trouble than anyone expected, though it had passed resolutions declaring the treaty of 1915 invalid and calling on the executive to terminate the customs receivership and to curtail American financial control. In its last days it approved the budget for 1931-1932 with a provision authorizing the president to make any necessary changes. This seemed to open the way to settling the controversy which had been pushed aside in the last days of the Haitianization negotiations, especially as the Haitianization agreement specifically recognized the financial adviser’s authority over expenditures.

Unfortunately, the impression prevailed—with some foundation— that the Haitians had prevailed on the American government to relinquish much of its authority by tactics which made the exercise of its treaty rights troublesome and unprofitable. This encouraged a new effort to challenge the powers of the financial adviser. In flagrant violation of the agreement the government promulgated two of the budgetary laws with provisions to which the financial adviser had objected, and refused to submit proposals for detailed appropriations until a few days before the fiscal year ended on September 30. Leger evidently thought that the legation and the financial adviser would have to acquiesce in the government’s action because otherwise there would be no legal authorization to spend government funds or to pay salaries and indemnities to treaty officials who would leave Haiti after October 1.

Joseph McGurk, the chargé d’affaires, and Rex Pixley, the acting financial adviser, handled the situation with courage and tact. Leger was defiant and aggressive, but he changed his attitude when the State Department informed him that if necessary it would order the financial adviser to pay the expenses of the remaining treaty services and the essential expenses of other government departments. The Haitian government agreed to discuss the budget in the usual way with the financial adviser and to work under a reduced provisional monthly budget in the meantime. Nevertheless, a long and unpleasant controversy took place before a final agreement was reached. At one point the government tried to enlist anti-imperialist support in the United States by spreading a totally untrue story that the legation was threatening to cut off the salaries of all Haitian officials because it disapproved of some governmental appointments. Finally most of the questions involved were settled in principle by an exchange of notes, and on November 27 the financial adviser was able to approve the completed budget.

Both sides had made concessions. We had obtained Haitian recognition of the financial adviser’s authority to see that the budget was balanced and provision made for essential government services. On the other hand, the Haitianization of most of the treaty services removed the necessity of closely controlling the distribution of funds among the various government departments, and the new arrangement gave the Haitian government more freedom. Leger, however, wanted far more than this. In October he proposed that the office of the financial adviser-general receiver be replaced with a fiscal agent and two assistants who would have only vague powers over the collection of revenues and the debt service. This was of course unacceptable to the United States, and President Hoover remarked in his message to Congress on December 10 that American financial control in Haiti would have to continue as long as the bonds were outstanding. Leger angrily retorted in a formal note which for the first time officially questioned the continued validity of the treaty of 1915 and the protocol of 1919.¹⁴

Despite these controversies one could observe a remarkable change in the atmosphere at Port au Prince during the first months of 1932. Until then the president and his Ministers for Foreign Affairs had been courteous personally and the legation staff had been invited to official social functions, but there had been little informal contact. Pew Haitians, however friendly, dared to expose themselves to nationalist criticism by accepting an invitation from an American. Many seemed to expect that an antagonistic attitude, with a constant threat of strikes and disorders, would arouse anti-imperialist sentiment in the United States and help to speed American withdrawal. This obstructive policy had not been very effective, and anti-American feeling declined after the Haitianization agreement had shown that the United States really wanted to reduce its interference in Haiti’s internal affairs. After the settlement of the controversy over the budget, the leaders of the élite evidently decided to abandon the social boycott of the American official community.

In February, when the legation received intimations that the Haitians might respond in a friendly way if it took the initiative in seeking better relations, American officials arranged a large party on Washington’s birthday. This was a success, and from then on many Americans had pleasant social contacts even with some of the leaders who had been most hostile. One of those who did most to promote these contacts was Colonel Little, the brigade commander, whose horse races were enthusiastically attended by crowds of people of both nationalities. The changed atmosphere made the work of the remaining treaty officials much easier, though the Haitian government was as anxious as ever to free itself from foreign control.

President Vincent made no further serious effort to interfere with appointments in the Garde, where the process of Haitianization was still ahead of the Forbes Commission’s schedule. A second military department was placed under the command of a Haitian officer in January 1932. Two months later, however, Leger proposed a still faster schedule of Haitianization, which would ensure a complete turnover to Haitian officers by the end of 1934. He also asked that the United States promise to withdraw the marine brigade by the end of 1932 and the scientific mission by August 5, 1933, and added that the Haitian government would reserve the right to employ a military mission to complete the training and discipline of the Garde if this seemed necessary.

The American officials in Haiti thought that this proposal should be seriously considered, insofar as it related to the Garde, because a military mission with adequate authority would offer some hope for the maintenance of the Garde’s efficiency. Some members of the government and many other responsible Haitians were worried as were legation officials, about what would happen after the American officers left. The effort to keep the Garde free from political influence had encouraged a rather dangerous spirit of independence among the Haitian officers, and the recent seizure of power across the border by General Rafael Trujillo at the head of an American-trained military force had set them a bad example. Leger’s proposal seemed to be a serious effort to deal with this problem. The State Department was reluctant to make any further commitments about the Garde or the withdrawal of the marines until the question of financial control after 1936 was settled, but the legation urged that these matters be considered together, on the ground that no Haitian government was likely to consider the kind of control that we had to demand unless it could point to concessions obtained in return. If an agreement about the financial administration was delayed until the United States had no further concessions to make, the American government might eventually have to impose a solution by arbitrary action which would arouse criticism both at home and in Latin America.

The legation and the financial adviser had been working for some months on a new plan of financial control which we proposed to submit to the Haitian government. The problem was to give the bondholders the protection which both governments had promised them, and at the same time to make all practicable concessions to the Haitians’ desire for greater fiscal independence. After 1936, when nine or ten million dollars of the bonds would still be outstanding, the debt service would consume nearly one-fifth of the government’s normal revenue. It seemed essential to retain effective control over the collection of the customs, which were by far the largest source of revenue, and enough control over budget policies and expenditure to assure that funds would be available for the debt service after meeting indispensable government requirements. On the other hand it was not necessary to retain all the powers which the financial adviser exercised under the treaty of 1915. The principal change proposed was to relinquish control of the collection of the internal revenues. Like the customs receipts, these were pledged for the service of the bonds, but the refusal of the Haitian courts to support the collectors and the unpopularity of the alcohol and tobacco taxes made their collection troublesome. We thought that it would be wise to give up a responsibility that was certain to involve American officials in conflicts with native taxpayers.

The State Department was still inclined to insist on maintaining the financial control without essential change. After a full discussion at conferences in Washington, however, it authorized the legation to offer the new plan, with the stipulation that the proposed concessions should be made only if an accord were reached in the immediate future. Secretary Stimson also approved a draft agreement for completing the Haitianization of the Garde and establishing a military mission, to be signed with or after the financial agreement.

While these matters were being discussed in Washington, the Haitian congress was drafting a new constitution to replace that of 1918. The congressmen’s first thought was to increase their own powers at the expense of the executive and to extend their own terms. There was an acute political crisis when the president blocked these efforts by suspending the session, but after a few days a compromise allowed the session to be resumed. Contrary to expectations, the new constitution, adopted in July, contained no provisions which seriously affected American interests. To be sure, it asserted Haitian sovereignty over Navassa Island, which the United States claimed under the Guano Act and where we had a lighthouse. The American government avoided what would have been a futile argument, however, by making merely a formal reservation of its rights. The much criticised article permitting resident foreigners to own land in Haiti was retained in a slightly less liberal form, although the legation had made no effort to discourage its elimination. As a matter of fact, the hoped-for influx of foreign capital to develop Haiti’s agricultural resources had never materialized, and foreigners had acquired little land since 1918.

At least partly in an effort to improve relations with the congress, President Vincent accepted Leger’s resignation in July. Albert Blanchet, the new Foreign Minister, accepted the American plan as a basis for negotiations, and the two governments moved rapidly toward an agreement. The Haitians became more anxious to reach a settlement when they began to realize that Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1915, who had publicly boasted on one occasion of writing the 1918 constitution, would probably be the next president of the United States. Even the nationalists, who could not foresee the Good Neighbor Policy, began to urge the government to reach a settlement while Hoover was still in office.

Blanchet pointed out, however, that the Haitian congress would be unlikely to approve a treaty extending American financial control beyond 1936 without bringing any immediate benefit to Haiti. He asked that the new treaty abrogate some of the objectionable features of the treaty of 1915 and put into effect immediately the modified plan of financial control. The State Department reluctantly agreed, and the new treaty was signed at Port au Prince on September 3, 1932. It left in force several of the more general articles in the 1915 treaty, but required that those dealing with the Garde and the financial administration should be replaced on December 31, 1934 by two protocols. Protocol A provided that the Garde should be completely Haitianized by December 31, 1934, and that the United States should withdraw the marine brigade and the scientific mission at that time or earlier if practicable. To complete the training of the Garde, the president of the United States would designate a military mission, with powers to be defined in a separate agreement. The Haitian government promised to maintain strict discipline in the Garde under its existing regulations as long as any bonds issued under the protocol of 1919 were outstanding.

Protocol B designated a fiscal representative to collect the customs duties and to see to the debt service until the retirement of the bonds. This man would replace the financial adviser-general receiver on December 31, 1934. The internal revenue service would be completely Haitianized, and the fiscal representative would have only restricted authority to supervise its operations. He would also assist in preparing the budget, which the government promised to keep in balance. Except for the amounts required for the debt service and the expense of collecting the customs, all government funds would be deposited in the National Bank to the credit of the Haitian government, instead of remaining as hitherto in the custody of the financial adviser. All disbursements, however, would continue to be made by checks prepared by the service of payments in the fiscal representative’s office.¹⁵

The treaty of 1932 would have considerably reduced the control still exercised by the United States under the treaty of 1915. Under it the Garde was to be turned over to Haitian officers and the marine brigade and the scientific mission withdrawn at least sixteen months before the old treaty expired. It gave the Haitian government more freedom in deciding what taxes it would impose and where it would spend the funds remaining after the debt service had been met, as well as control over the politically important internal revenue service. The fiscal agent’s power to prevent illegal expenditures through the service of payments should have been less objectionable than the existing arrangement by which he passed on the expediency as well as the legality of each order of payment.

When I resigned as minister immediately after signing the treaty, it was generally expected that the Haitian congress would ratify it. The president had some enemies in the Senate, hut all of the deputies had been elected in January 1932 as supporters of the administration. Though they had quarrelled with the president about the new constitution, better relations had since been restored. There was little criticism when the terms of the treaty were made public. President Vincent, however, made no effort to line up support for it, and when it was submitted to the congress some of the leaders decided to humiliate him by opposing it with a show of patriotic indignation. No one dared to seem unpatriotic, and on September 15 the congress, sitting in joint session, rejected the treaty by a unanimous vote.

Consequently the treaty of 1915 remained in force. The State Department rejected the Haitian government’s proposal for a new agreement dealing only with the Garde and the withdrawal of the marines and insisted that it could make no further concessions with regard to the financial administration. It even intimated that the Haitianization of the Garde might be delayed, but soon realized that this was unwise. There was no immediate change in policy after the Roosevelt administration took office.¹⁶ The Haitian government for some time professed to hope that the treaty signed in September would eventually be ratified, but by June 1933 there was clearly little hope for congressional approval, so that the questions still pending would have to be dealt with in some other way.

Fortunately, relations between Haitians and Americans continued to improve. Norman Armour, the very able new American minister, soon won the Haitians’ confidence. Questions arising in the treaty services seemed to cause little friction, and even the question of the budget, which had made so much trouble in 1931, was settled amicably in the fall of 1932. When the State Department finally decided that the major problems still outstanding might be dealt with by an executive agreement—a procedure which it had refused to consider a year earlier—it was possible to negotiate a final settlement.

On August 7, 1933, Armour and Blanchet signed an executive agreement which provided for the termination of the American occupation. Progress achieved during the past eleven months made it possible to advance the date for the complete Haitianization of the Garde to October 1, 1934, and the marine brigade and the scientific mission were to be withdrawn within thirty days thereafter. A military mission would be established if the president of Haiti thought it desirable. The treaty of 1915 would remain in force until 1936, because it could not be abrogated by executive action, but the United States in effect agreed not to exercise all the powers which it had been claiming under the treaty. After January 1, 1934, and until the retirement of the bonds, a fiscal representative with not more than eighteen American assistants would carry on the services of the financial adviser-general receiver under conditions set forth in the new agreement. With a few verbal changes to make it more palatable in Haiti, the new agreement provided for the same financial control that the unratified treaty had contemplated.¹⁷

The Haitianization of the Garde was actually completed in August 1934, and the marines and the scientific, mission were withdrawn immediately afterward. At that time the Haitian government did not ask for a military mission. Sidney de la Rue, whom the Roosevelt administration had left in office at the request of the Haitian government,¹⁸ became fiscal representative. The Haitian political leaders and even the nationalist press greeted the agreement with approval.¹⁹

This attitude changed when anti-imperialist critics in the United States accused the Roosevelt administration of prolonging the occupation of Haiti in order to collect debts. Within a few months President Vincent was urging further changes in the system of financial control. The American government politely turned him down at that time. But a new agreement signed in 1941 abolished the office of fiscal representative and entrusted most of its functions to the National Bank of Haiti, which was reorganized with three American and three Haitian directors with an American as manager. Nearly $8,000,000 of the 1922 bonds were still outstanding because low coffee prices and later the war in Europe had caused the government to suspend all but token payments into the sinking fund after 1938. There were still $6,000,000 outstanding in 1947 when the Haitian government redeemed the bonds at par with the proceeds of an internal loan. At that point the United States ceased to have any responsibility for Haiti’s foreign debt.

The intervention in Haiti seemed for a time the most successful of the American efforts during the first decades of the century to impose political stability and promote economic and social progress in several of the Caribbean states. The United States exercised more effective control over a wider range of government activities for a longer period than in any of the other countries. The majority of the treaty officials in Haiti were competent and enthusiastic, and in most of the services they were able to build up efficient, well-trained native staffs. For some years, under President Vincent and his immediate successor, conditions in Haiti were very different from those before 1915. The health service seems to have deteriorated somewhat and the Service Technique very much more, but the Garde prevented any serious disorder and the public works service continued to function well. Unfortunately neither the American treaty organization nor the post-occupation governments did very much to ameliorate the dismal poverty and the almost universal illiteracy which were the chief obstacles to stable government and economic progress.

Author notes